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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI 
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in 
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON. 
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ, 
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, 
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and 
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities 
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Supreme Court Case No. 43922 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE SAMUEL A.HOAGLAND 
RICHARD EPPINK 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
CALLY YOUNGER 
DANIEL J. SKINNER 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date Code 
6/17/2015 NCOC 
COMP 
SMFI 
MOTN 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD. 
AFFD 
MOTN 
AFSM 
AFSM 
AFSM 
BREF 
6/19/2015 AFOS 
ACCP 
ACCP 
7/6/2015 MODQ 
7/8/2015 MOTD 
MEMO 
7/28/2015 ORDR 
CJWO 
NOTC 
ORDR 
CHJS 
DISF 
NOTR 
NOTS 
7/31/2015 NOHG 
HRSC 
8/3/2015 MODQ 
8/5/2015 ORDQ 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2015-10240 Current Judge: Samuel A. Hoagland 
Tracy Tucker, etal. vs. State Of Idaho, etal. 
User 
CCGRANTR New Case Filed - Other Claims 
CCGRANTR Complaint Filed 
CCGRANTR (9) Summons Filed 
CCGRANTR (5) Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Jeremy Payne 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Naomi Morley 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Jason Sharp 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Tracy Tucker 
CCGRANTR First Affidavit of Richard Eppink 
CCGRANTR Motion for Class Certification 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Jason D Williamson In Support Of 
Motion for Class Certification 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Judge 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Kathryn M Ali In Support Of Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Class Certification 
CCGRANTR Affidavit of Andrew C Lillie In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
for Class Certification 
CCGRANTR Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Richard D. Greenwood 
Certification 
CCBARRSA Affidavit Of Service (06/17/15) Richard D. Greenwood 
CCWRIGRM Acceptance Of Service (06/19/15) Richard D. Greenwood 
CCWRIGRM Acceptance Of Service (06/19/15) Richard D. Greenwood 
CCMYERHK Motion For Disqualification Of Judge Without Richard D. Greenwood 
Cause 
TCLAFFSD Motion To Dismiss Richard D. Greenwood 
TCLAFFSD Memorandum In Support of Motion To Dismiss Richard D. Greenwood 
TCPATAKA Order for Disqualification of Judge Without Cause Richard D. Greenwood 
TCPATAKA Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/0 Melissa Moody 
Cause 
TCPATAKA Notice of Reassignment Melissa Moody 
CCMEYEAR Recusal Under 40(d){4) Melissa Moody 
CCMEYEAR Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification Cheri C. Copsey 
CCMEYEAR Disqualification Of Judge - Self Cheri C. Copsey 
CCMEYEAR Notice Of Reassignment Cheri C. Copsey 
CCGARCOS Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests Cheri C. Copsey 
CCBOYIDR Notice Of Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
CCBOYIDR Hearing Scheduled {Motion to Dismiss Cheri C. Copsey 
08/20/2015 02:30 PM) 
CCGRANTR Motion For Disqualification of Judge Without Cheri C. Copsey 
Cause 
CCMURPST Order for Disqualification of Judge Without Cause Cheri C. Copsey 
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Date Code 
8/5/2015 CJWO 
NOTR 
8/17/2015 HRVC 
8/21/2015 MOTN 
MEMO 
8/24/2015 HRSC 
NOTC 
8/26/2015 DCHH 
HRSC 
HRSC 
MINE 
8/31/2015 ORDR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
9/3/2015 MOTN 
9/4/2015 STIP 
9/11/2015 MISC 
AFFD 
9/16/2015 ORDR 
9/18/2015 RPLY. 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2015-10240 Current Judge: Samuel A. Hoagland 
Tracy Tucker, etal. vs. State Of Idaho, etal. 
User 
CCMURPST Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/0 
Cause 
CCMURPST Notice Of Reassignment - Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCMASTLW Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled 
on 08/20/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
CCGRANTR Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery 
Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss 
CCGRANTR Memorandum in Support of Motion 
TCHARDSL Hearing Scheduled (Status/ADR 08/26/2015 
10:00 AM) 
CCGRANTR Notice of Status Conference 8.26.15 @ 1 O AM 
TCHARDSL Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled 
on 08/26/2015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
TCHARDSL Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Protective Order 
10/02/2015 10:00 AM) 
TCHARDSL Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
12/16/2015 03:00 PM) 
TCHARDSL Minute Entry and Scheduling Order 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission (Bret H. Ladine) 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission (Andrew C. Lillie) 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission (Jenny Q. Shen) 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission (Jason D. Willamson) 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission (Kathryn M. Ali) 
CCHOLDKJ Motion for Injunction and Motion to Amend Class 
Action 
CCGRANTR Stipulation and Motion to Amend Briefing 
Schedule 
CCGRANTR Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for 
Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending 
Decision on Motion to Dismiss 
CCGRANTR Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Judge 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
TCHARDSL Order Denying Motion for Injunction and Motion to Samuel A. Hoagland 
Amend Class Action 
CCVIDASL Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Samuel A. Hoagland 
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery 
Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss 
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9/21/2015 MOTN 
MOTN 
9/23/2015 CONT 
ORDR 
NOTC 
9/29/2015 ORDR 
ORDR 
10/8/2015 NOTC 
10/16/2015 DCHH 
10/20/2015 ORDR 
11/10/2015 NOTS 
11/12/2015 NOSV 
11/23/2015 RSPN 
AFFD 
AFFD 
11/24/2015 MISC 
RSPN 
12/4/2015 MEMO 
OBJT 
HRSC 
12/9/2015 RSPS 
12/11/2015 NOTC 
12/14/2015 REPL 
12/15/2015 NOTC 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2015-10240 Current Judge: Samuel A. Hoagland 
Tracy Tucker, etal. vs. State Of Idaho, etal. 
User 
CCMARTJD Motion to Appear by Telephone 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Judge 
Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCMYERHK (Unopposed) Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission Samuel A. Hoagland 
TCHARDSL Continued (Motion For Protective Order Samuel A. Hoagland 
10/16/2015 10:00 AM) 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Stipulation and Motion to Amend Samuel A. Hoagland 
Briefing Schedule 
TCHARDSL Notice of Hearing (10/16/2015@ 10 AM) Samuel A. Hoagland 
TCHARDSL Order Granting (Unopposed) Motion for Pro Hae Samuel A. Hoagland 
Vice Admission 
TCHARDSL Order Granting Motion to Appear by Telephone Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCGARCOS Notice of Substitution of Counsel (David W. Samuel A. Hoagland 
Cantril! for William H. Wellman and Sara B. 
Thomas) 
TCPATAKA Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order Samuel A. Hoagland 
scheduled on 10/16/2015 10:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 pages 
TCHARDSL Order Governing Discovery Samuel A. Hoagland 
TCLAFFSD Notice Of Service Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCBARRSA Notice Of Service Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCBOYIDR Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Samuel A. Hoagland 
Dismiss Filed July 8, 2015 
CCBOYIDR Affidavit of Ian Thomson Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCBOYIDR Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink Samuel A. Hoagland 
CCLOWEAD Errata (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion Samuel A. Hoagland 
to Dismiss) 
CCLOWEAD Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Samuel A. Hoagland 
Dismiss filed July 8, 2015 
CCTAYLSA Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Samuel A. Hoagland 
Motion to Dismiss 
CCTAYLSA Defendants Objection and Motion to Strike Notice Samuel A. Hoagland 
of Hearing (12/16/15@ 3pm) 
CCTAYLSA Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Samuel A. Hoagland 
12/16/2015 03:00 PM) 
TCLAFFSD Response To Defendants' Objection And Motion Samuel A. Hoagland 
To Strike Filed December 4, 2015 
CCMARTJD Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Skinner for Samuel A. Hoagland 
Cantrill) 
CCZUBEDK Reply In Support of Defendants Objection and Samuel A. Hoagland 
Motion to Strike 
CCLOWEAD Notice of Telephonic Appearance Samuel A. Hoagland 
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Date Code 
12/16/2015 DCHH 
1/20/2016 MEMO 
1/21/2016 JDMT 
CDIS 
STAT· 
1/25/2016 NOTA 
APSC 
3/22/2016 NOTC 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2015-10240 Current Judge: Samuel A Hoagland 
Tracy Tucker, etal. vs. State Of Idaho, etal. 
User 
DCELLISJ Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled 
on 12/16/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 200 pages 
TCHARDSL Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Motion to Dismiss 
DCABBOSM Judgment 
DCABBOSM Civil Disposition entered for: Bolz, Darrell G, 
Defendant; C L Butch Otter, Defendant; Huskey, 
Molly Hon, Defendant; Perry, Christy Rep, 
Defendant; Ricks, Kimber, Defendant; State Of 
Idaho, Defendant; Thomas, Sara B, Defendant; 
Wellman, William H, Defendant; Winder, Chuck 
Sen, Defendant; Morley, Naomi, Plaintiff; Payne, 
Jeremy, Plaintiff; Sharp, Jason, Plaintiff; Tucker, 
Tracy, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/21/2016 
DCABBOSM STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
CCBARRSA NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CCBARRSA Appealed To The Supreme Court 
TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. 
43922 
I 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Judge 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
Samuel A Hoagland 
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/ Jason D. Williamson Andrew C. Lillie CHRISTOPHE:R D. RICH, Clerk 
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
iwilliamson@aclu.org 
125 Broad Street 
New York, New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
·P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208) 344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP By TENILLE GRANT 
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com DEPUTY 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
303-899-7300 
303-899-7333 (fax) 
Kathryn M. Ali 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 
(202) 637-5910 (fax) 
Bret H. Ladine 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 374-2300 
(415) 374-2499 (fax) 
Jenny Q. Shen 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
ienny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
650-463-4199 (fax) 
Pro hac vice applications pending 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI 
MORLEY, and JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf 
of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, 
in his official ca acit as Governor of Idaho; 
CV oc 151024·0 
Case No. 
--------
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR 
INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY 
. ....... 
RELIEF 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 1 
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,: 
HON. MOLLY HUSKEY, in her official 
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public 
Defense Commission; DARRELL G. BOLZ, 
in his official capacity as a member of the 
Idaho State Public Defense Commission; 
SARA B. THOMAS, in her official capacity 
as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission; WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, in 
his official capacity as a member of the Idaho 
State Public Defense Commission; KIMBER 
RICKS, in his official capacity as a member of 
the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; 
SEN. CHUCK WINDER, in his official 
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public 
Defense Commission; and REP. CHRISTY 
PERRY, in her official capacity as a member 
of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission, 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. More than five years ago, the State ofldaho asked the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association ("NLADA") for a report on its public-defense system. That report found, 
unequivocally, that "none of the public defender systems in the sample counties are 
constitutionally adequate." Specifically, the report identified a number of specific areas of 
concern with respect to trial-level indigent-defense delivery in Idaho. These include the 
widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high attorney caseloads and workloads; 
lack of consistent, effective, and confidential communication with indigent clients; inadequate, 
and often nonexistent, investigation of cases; lack of structural safeguards to protect the 
independence of defenders; lack of adequate representation of children in juvenile and criminal 
court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack of performance-based standards; lack of ongoing 
training and professional development; and lack of any meaningful funding from the State. 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF -2 
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2. Five years later, the State has failed to fix this 'unconstitutional system. The Governor's 
Commission passed the buck by recommending that the Legislature create a special study 
committee. That legislative committee then passed the buck by establishing yet another 
commission to make recommendations to the legislature. In January 2015, the Governor 
acknowledged in his State of the State address that "the courts have made it clear that our current 
method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional 
muster." Astoup.dingly, the State failed yet again in the recently concluded 2015 legislative 
session to fund or improve its public-defense system. Because the executive and legislative 
branches refuse to take the necessary actions to fix Idaho's public-defense system, it falls on this 
Court to ensure that "[c]onstitutional rights, as well as this Court's duty to faithfully interpret our 
constitution and the federal constitution, do not wane before united efforts of the legislature and 
the governor."1 
3. Plaintiffs Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne bring this civil-
rights class-action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of themselves and all those 
similarly situated. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief for defendants haled before state 
courts throughout Idaho from the ongoing injuries and harm caused by the continuing failure of 
Defendants (the "State") to provide effective legal representation to indigent criminal defendants 
across the State ofldaho, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho statutes and 
regulations. 
4. Plaintiff Tracy Tucker was arrested in Bonner County on March 6, 2015, after being 
charged with attempted strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of a child. Although 
1 Miles;. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,640 (1989). 
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he was assigned a public defender, Mr. Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial 
appearance, during which the court set his bail at $40,000. Without the guiding hand of counsel 
at that initial proceeding, Mr. Tucker was unable to make any arguments to the court to justify a 
reduction in the bail amount. Since Mr. Tucker could not afford to post bail, he remained in the 
Bonner County Jail for the next three months. During his time in custody, Mr. Tucker met with 
his attorney just three times, for a total of approximately 20 minutes. Two of those "meetings" 
occurred in court, during Mr. Tucker's subsequent court appearances. In addition, during his 
three months in jail, Mr. Tucker attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach his attorney by phone more 
than 50 times. As of 10 days prior to Mr. Tucker's trial date, his attorney's demanding schedule 
had prevented him from conducting any meaningful investigation into Mr. Tucker's case, 
reviewing and explaining to Mr. Tucker the relevant discovery materials, or discussing trial 
strategy with Mr. Tucker. On June 2, 2015, Mr. Tucker pleaded guilty to attempted 
strangulation, at which time he was released from jail. Mr. Tucker is scheduled to be sentenced 
on August 3, 2015, and faces up to 15 years in prison. 
5. Plaintiff Jason Sharp was arrested in Shoshone County on May 16, 2014, pursuant to a 
warrant charging him with burglary and grand theft. Although ~e was assigned a public 
defender, Mr. Sharp was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance on May 20, 2014, 
during which the court set his bail at $50,000. Mr. Sharp was unable to make the necessary 
arguments to the court to justify a reduction in the bail amount at that initial proceeding. Since 
Mr. Sharp could not afford to post bail, he remained in the Shoshone County Jail for 
approximately two weeks. Without the help of his lawyer, Mr. Sharp was subsequently able to 
convince the court that his bail amount was inappropriate because it was based on the erroneous 
belief that he was on probation at the time of his arrest. The court eventually agreed and reduced 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF -4 
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his bond to $5,000. Unfortunately, Mr. Sharp was still unable to afford to pay his bail. Fearing 
that he would lose his job if he remained in jail, Mr. Sharp contacted his employer, who agreed 
to write a letter to the court vouching for Mr. Sharp and recommending his release. The court 
released Mr. Sharp from custody after receiving the letter of support from his employer. Over 
the course of the last year since his release, however, Mr. Sharp has been unable to communicate 
effectively with his attorney regarding the status of his case. For instance, despite repeated 
requests from Mr. Sharp, his attorney has not yet provided him with a copy of the discovery 
materials in his case, leaving Mr. Sharp unclear about what evidence the State does or does not 
have against him, and making it impossible for Mr. Sharp to participate meaningfully in the 
development of his defense. Moreover, aside from several motions to continue his jury trial, Mr. 
Sharp's ,attorney has not filed any substantive motions on his behalf. Even the court's decision 
to reduce Mr. Sharp's bond to $5,000, and ultimately to release him on his own recognizance, 
was the .result of Mr. Sharp's own advocacy in court and his employer's willingness to support 
him, rather than a response to any motion filed by his attorney. Mr. Sharp is scheduled to go to 
trial on July 14, 2015, and faces up to 30 years in prison if convicted on both counts. 
6. PlaintiffNaomi Morley was arrested in Ada County on March 14, 2014, following a 
serious single-car accident in which she was severely injured. Ms. Morley, who was 56 years 
old at the time of her arrest, was charged with driving under the influence and possession of a 
controlled substance after officers purportedly discovered prescription medication and drug 
paraphernalia. Although an Ada County public defender was present during Ms. Morley's initial 
appearance by video, Ms. Morley did not have an opportunity to speak with that lawyer and, 
ultimately, the Ada County Public Defender's office determined that it had a conflict of interest 
in representing Ms. Morley. The Court set Ms. Morley's bail at $15,000 at her initial 
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appearance. Since she could not afford bail, Ms. Morley remained in the Ada County Jail until 
her bail was reduced three weeks later, notwithstanding the recent serious injuries she had 
sustained. Since then, Ms. Morley's attorneys have been unable to provide her with adequate 
representation. For instance, Ms. Morley was told that if she wanted to retain an expert to 
challenge the State's contentions regarding the alleged presence of drugs in her system at the 
time of the accident, and/or to do any outside testing to challenge the prosecution's allegations, 
she would have to pay for such services herself. Also, despite informing her lawyer that another 
person would confess responsibility, it was only through Ms. Morley's own efforts that she 
recently obtained a sworn affidavit from the person acknowledging responsibility. On 
information and belief, Ms. Morley's lawyer's caseload has been so large, and his resources so 
few, that he has been unable to review Ms. Morley's extensive comments on the police reports in 
her case or to investigate the vehicle involved in the accident before the state scrapped it, 
destroying that evidence. Further, Ms. Morley has been unable to communicate effectively or 
consistently with her attorney, and is concerned that her attorney is pressuring her to plead guilty 
because he does not have the time or resources to prepare sufficiently for trial. Most recently, 
Ms. Morley turned down a plea offer that would have required her to spend 10 years in prison. 
She is scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015, and faces over 15 years in prison if convicted on 
all counts. 
7. Plaintiff Jeremy Payne was incarcerated at the Payette County Jail on January 25, 2015, 
after being arrested for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Although 
Mr. Payne was assigned a public defender, he was not represented by counsel at his initial 
appearance, during which the court set his bail at $30,000. Since he was not able to afford bail, 
Mr. Payne remained in jail pending resolution of his case. Mr. Payne was released from Payette 
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County Jail on June 9, 2015, after the State failed to take the case to trial in a timely fashion. 
Unfortunately, during the five months he was in custody, Mr. Payne was unable to communicate 
with his attorney on a consistent basis. In light of the many other felony cases assigned to his 
attorney, Mr. Payne only met with counsel twice at the County Jail, both for very short periods of 
time. Aside from those brief meetings, Mr. Payne has only met with his attorney in court-for 
even shorter periods oftime-just prior to his court appearances, and has been unable ·to contact 
his attorney by phone despite repeated attempts. Indeed, Mr. Payne has spent a total of 
approximately 30-45 minutes with his attorney since the inception of his case. Moreover, to 
date, Mr. Payne's attorney has been unable to conduct any meaningful investigation into his 
case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Payne his thoughts with 
regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Payne's preliminary hearing was waived and his 
trial has now been continued three times. Mr. Payne is now scheduled to go to trial on July 21, 
2015, ~nd faces up to seven years in prison if convicted. 
8. Sadly, the circumstances surrounding the named Plaintiffs' representations are not unique 
to them. Rather, they exemplify the experiences of thousands of indigent defendants across the 
State, who have been denied their right to effective counsel as a result of the State's failure to 
provide the necessary resources, robust oversight, and specialized training required to ensure that 
all public defenders can handle all of their cases effectively and in compliance with state and 
federal law. 
9. Despite amendments to Idaho's public-defender statutes that were passed in 2014 through 
a bill enacted as the "Idaho Public Defense Act," the current, patchwork public-defense 
arrangement in Idaho remains riddled with constitutional deficiencies and fails, at all stages of 
the prosecution and adjudication processes, to ensure adequate representation for indigent 
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defendants in both criminal and juvenile proceedings in Idaho. Although the State has been 
keenly aware of this failure to provide for the basic rights of indigent criminal defendants for 
years, without a guiding state-wide scheme, the majority of Idaho counties have failed to 
implement standards and requirements that satisfy either statutory or constitutional mandates. 
This has created a flawed system that forces many inexperienced and inadequately trained 
attorneys to juggle too many cases without enough resources. The result is constitutionally 
deficient representation of indigent defendants across the state. 
10. Certainly, if public-defense attorneys in Idaho had their way, they would be well 
equipped with the resources and training necessary to do their jobs effectively at all stages of the 
proceedings against their clients. But, due to the State's pervasive and persistent constitutional 
and statutory failures-including, but not limited to, the State's failure to provide adequate 
funding or relevant state-wide directives-public defenders are not able to provide the zealous 
representation constitutionally required of them in all of their cases. 
11. Indigent defendants in most Idaho counties, including the named Plaintiffs, are not 
represented by counsel at their initial appearances, during which a number of critical events often 
occur, including bail determinations, setting of pretrial release conditions, waivers of rights, 
entry of pleas, sentencing, and off-the-record discussions between the prosecutor and the 
defendant-and sometimes the presiding judge-regarding the defendant's case. 
12. Because public defenders in most instances do not have the staff or resources to be 
present at initial appearances, indigent defendants are most often left to fend for themselves 
during these critical proceedings, without the assistance of counsel. Counsel at this stage is 
especially important to, among other things, presenting reasoned legal arguments to reduce bail 
(including, but not limited to, arguments related to the strength of the State's case, as well as the 
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defendant's income, ability to pay, and ties to the community), advising their clients about how 
to plead, and negotiating with prosecutors regarding potential plea agreements and pretrial-
release terms. Further, the absence of counsel at initial appearances causes or contributes to the 
unnecessary detention of indigent defendants-sometimes for extended periods of time-who 
may otherwise have been released while they await resolution of their cases; limited ability of 
indigent defendants to interact with their lawyers, provide and review case materials, and assist 
in the evaluation of their cases and preparation of their defenses; significant impact to indigent 
defendants' work and family lives; insincere, uninformed, or uneducated pleas entered, partly or 
entirely, in order to obtain immediate release; and other adverse impacts, many times with 
lifelong consequences. 
13. Even after counsel has been appointed, indigent defendants in many counties, including 
defendants not in custody, lack sufficient access to the public defenders assigned to their cases. 
For example, defendants frequently do not have the opportunity to meet with their public 
defenders for purposes of receiving and reviewing the discovery materials related to their cases. 
Under such conditions, it is nearly impossible for defendants to assist in their own defenses or to 
understand and remain abreast of developments in their own cases . 
. 
14. Moreover, in many Idaho counties, there are disincentives for public defenders to engage 
experts ·or investigators because such costs may not be covered by public-defender contracts. 
Accordingly, public defenders routinely forgo the use of investigators and experts to carry out 
basic tasks, such as identifying and interviewing witnesses, and reviewing and analyzing 
evidence. In most instances, defense counsel must request additional resources from the court to 
hire an investigator or an expert, and, upon information and belief, such requests are rarely made, 
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in part because some public defenders believe that the available resources are so limited that the 
requests should be reserved only for extraordinary situations. 
15. These disincentives are caused, in large part, by the fixed-fee contract structure used in a 
number of Idaho counties, under which contracting attorneys are paid a flat fee in exchange for 
their representation of indigent defendants, irrespective of the number of clients the attorney may 
be assigned during the term of the contract, or the nature of those clients' criminal charges. A 
recent county-by-county survey revealed that at least 19 Idaho counties continue to use a fixed-
fee contract system to secure legal representation for indigent defendants, even though the Idaho 
Code expressly prohibits it. Such a system creates significant conflicts of interest by creating 
powerful incentives for the contracting attorney to spend as little time and money as possible on 
any given case-to the obvious detriment of indigent clients. 
16. In addition, public-defender caseloads in counties across the state are significantly higher 
than the national standards, making it difficult, if not impossible, for attorneys to provide their 
clients with the zealous representation to which they are entitled. According to a December 2014 
analysis conducted by Idaho's Legislative Services Office ("LSO"), in at least six Idaho 
counties, individual public defenders are responsible for handling more than twice the work that 
one attorney should ever take on. Individual public defenders in an additional 19 Idaho counties 
are responsible for handling the work of more than one attorney (but fewer than two).2 
17. On information and belief, the current caseloads carried by public defenders in most 
Idaho counties are only slightly better, if not worse, than those highlighted in the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association 2010 report ("NLADA Report") on Idaho's public-defense 
system. For instance, in Kootenai County, identified in the NLADA Report as one of the few 
2 Idaho Legislative Services Office - Report on 2013 Caseloads, available at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdefl 028 lso.pdf. 
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bright spots with respect to public-defense services in Idaho, public defenders continue to work 
under crushing caseloads. In 2014, four of the office's 15 attorneys handled well over 400 cases 
each, the bulk of which were felonies and misdemeanors. Another four defenders handled over 
300 cases in 2014, including a mixture of felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and other 
proceedings for which the Public Defender's Office is responsible. Such caseloads are well 
above national standards and impossible for one person to handle effectively. 
18. The issues associated with the overwhelming caseloads of Idaho public defenders are 
made worse by the fact that at least 26 Idaho counties permit contract public defenders to 
maintain a private practice, often without tracking the number of private cases being handled by 
the contracting attorney at any given time. Most of those counties (22 of them) also rely on 
fixed-fee contracts. This creates an even greater economic incentive for public defenders to 
deprioritize their indigent clients in favor of their paying clients. 
19. Further, many Idaho counties do not have the resources or expertise to provide the kind 
of specialized training or supervision to ensure that representation of indigent defendants is 
consistent with the State's constitutional mandates. According to a recent state-wide assessment 
by the Idaho State Public Defense Commission ("PDC"), "a significant number of indigent 
defense attorneys in the State are not receiving adequate training hours in areas directly relevant 
to the representation of their indigent clients."3 
20. These deficiencies are further exacerbated by the lack of true independence afforded to 
public defenders across the state. Under the current supervisory structure, public defenders 
report to their respective county commissioners, many of whom are not attorneys or are 
otherwise unqualified to oversee a legal practice-let alone one requiring specialized knowledge 
3 Idaho State Public Defense Commission, 2015 Report to the Legislature, 9. 
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of criminal law. For example, in Bonner County, the commissioners hold degrees in 
History/Business Systems Management, Aeronautics, and Education, respectively. None has any 
formal legal training or practice experience. The same is true in Bingham County, where it 
appears that only two of the three commissioners attended college, and none has a background in 
the law. Yet in some counties, commissioners have extensive authority related to criminal-law 
matters, including the authority to approve or reject requests for additional resources, and to 
terminate or choose not to renew the public defender's contract, leaving the defenders beholden 
to the often-uninformed whims of their supervisors. 
21. All of these deficiencies have combined to create a constitutional crisis with respect to 
indigent defense delivery in Idaho-a crisis that federal and state law require the State to address 
in a meaningful, expedient, and substantive way. 
BACKGROUND 
22. The State of Idaho has a long history of recognizing the right to counsel for those 
criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney. As early as 1864, Idaho law required 
that a defendant "be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being 
arraigned," and that he "be asked if he desires the aid of counsel."4 
23. In 1887, the Idaho legislature went a step further, passing a law requiring trial courts to 
advise defendants of the right to counsel during arraignments on criminal charges, and to appoint 
counsel if the defendant requested an attorney but was unable to afford one.5 
4 Cr. Prac. 1864 § 267. 
5 See R.S., R.C., & C.L. § 7721 (1887); LC.§ 19-1512 (1967). 
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24. Once the appointment was made, defense counsel were to "be paid out of the county 
treasury, upon order of the judge of the court, such sum as the court may deem reasonable for the 
services rendered."6 
25. Following achievement of statehood in 1890, Idaho lawmakers included the right to 
counsel in the state constitution. Specifically, Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution 
states that criminal defendants have a right to "appear and defend in person and with counsel." 
26. Since then, the Idaho judiciary has consistently interpreted this constitutional provision, 
as well as related statutes, as requiring the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at public 
expense.7 
27. By the time the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright8 in 1963, 
some 37 states-including Idaho-had already committed to providing counsel for indigent 
defendants, upon request, in all felony cases. Indeed, then-Idaho Attorney General Frank 
Benson was one of22 attorneys general to sign on to an amicus brief submitted to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in support of the plaintiffs claims in Gideon. 
28. After Gideon, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to expand the right to counsel in 
significant ways. The Court has extended the right to counsel to children in juvenile-
delinquency proceedings, see In re Gault;9 probationers in probation revocation proceedings, see 
Mempa v. Rhay; 10 and indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors, see Argersinger v. 
6 LC. § 19-1513 (Repealed). 
7 See State v. Montroy, 217 P. 611, 614 (1923) 
8 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
9 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
10 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
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Hamlin. 11 More recently, the Court found that the right to counsel attaches for all defendants at 
their initial appearances, see Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex.; 12 and that plea bargaining 
constitutes a "critical stage" of any criminal proceeding, thereby requiring the effective 
assistance of counsel in connection with plea negotiations, see Lafler v. Cooper 13 and Missouri 
v. Frye'. 14 
29. Idaho, on the other hand, has taken several steps backward in the half-century since 
Gideon. Rather than making good on its early efforts and serving as a model for other states to 
follow, the State of Idaho has failed to ensure-through lack of sufficient oversight, training, and 
funding-that people accused of crimes within its borders who are unable to afford an attorney 
are provided with constitutionally adequate legal assistance. As a result, Idaho has become the 
epitome of an indigent-defense system in crisis, notwithstanding the 2014 amendments to the 
public-defense statutes, which have done very little to address the underlying causes of the 
State's indigent-defense problem. 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association Analysis of Idaho's Indigent-Defense Services 
30. In its 2007 management audit ofldaho's State Appellate Public Defender, the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA") concluded that the caseload problems plaguing 
Idaho's appellate public defenders at that time could likely be addressed by improving trial-level 
' indigent defense services across the state. 
11 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
12 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
' 
13 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
14 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
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31. Following the release of the audit, the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission ("CJC")-
created by Executive Order in 2005-and composed primarily of various State officials involved 
in the criminal-justice system-authorized the NLADA to conduct a comprehensive study of the 
State's trial-level indigent-defense system. 
32. In January 2010, the NLADA released its evaluation of trial-level indigent-defense 
services in Idaho ("NLADA Report"). The Report included an assessment of services being 
provided to both adults and children in the criminal justice system, and focused specifically on 
seven counties. 15 
33. The NLADA's assessment was rooted in the American Bar Association's Ten Principles 
of a Public Defense Delivery System, promulgated in February 2002. According to the ABA, the 
Ten Principles are an interdependent set of standards that "constitute the fundamental criteria 
necessary to design a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free 
legal representation" to indigent defendants. 16 
34. The NLADA found that, for thousands of defendants across Idaho, the constitutional 
requirements of Gideon and its progeny have been left unfulfilled, and the standards set forth in 
the ABA' s Ten Principles have gone largely unmet. 17 
15 The counties highlighted in the NLADA Report are Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, Canyon, 
Kootenai, Nez Perce, and Power Counties. 
16 ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (Feb. 2002), at Introduction, 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ aid _indigent_ defendants/ls_ s 
claid _def_ tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf 
17 NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE GUARANTEE OF COUNSEL: 
ADVOCACY & DUE PROCESS IN IDAHO'S TRIAL COURTS: EVALUATION OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN IDAHO 2-3 (2010). 
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35. The NLADA Report further asserts that, in direct contravention of the Ten Principles, the 
State has failed to ensure adequate training and supervision for public defenders, making it 
nearly impossible to assess whether public defenders are meeting the standards established by 
Gideon and its progeny. 18 
36. The State has foisted this essential function on each of its 44 counties without providing 
any monetary or supervisory support to the counties for trial-level public defense, aside from the 
limited funds allocated by the Public Defense Commission in 2014 to create additional, non-
mandatory training opportunities for individual defenders who choose to take advantage of them. 
As the NLADA found, "[b ]y delegating to each county the responsibility to provide counsel at 
the trial level without any state funding or oversight, Idaho has sewn a patchwork quilt of 
underfunded, inconsistent systems that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and in 
the level of competency of the services rendered."19 The 2014 amendments to the public-defense 
statutes failed to remedy this deficiency. 
37. The NLADA identified a number of specific areas of concern with respect to trial-level 
indigent-defense services delivery in Idaho, many of which are still of concern today. These 
include the widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high attorney caseloads and 
workloads; inadequate, and often nonexistent, investigation of cases; lack of structural 
safeguards to protect the independence of defenders; lack of adequate representation of children 
in juvenile and criminal court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack of performance-based 
18 Id. at 67-73. 
19 Id. at 2. 
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standards; lack of ongoing training and professional development; and lack of any meaningful 
funding from the State.20 
Recent Amendments to Idaho's Public-Defense Statutes 
38. In March 2014, despite several years of research and study by the Idaho Criminal Justice 
Commission and a legislative study committee, and in recognition of the need for reform, Idaho 
enacted only meager amendments to its public-defense statutes, found mainly at sections 19-848 
through 19-866 of the Idaho Code. 
39. The 2014 amendments (1) establish a public-defense commission, along with its powers 
and duties;21 (2) clarify the duties of law-enforcement officers and/or the courts to notify 
criminal defendants of their right to counsel;22 (3) identify the various methods by which 
counties are permitted to provide indigent-defense services;23 and (4) encourage parity in 
compensation between public defenders and county prosecutors.24 
40. Under the amended statutes, counties may provide indigent-defense services by either (1) 
establishing and maintaining an office of public defender; (2) joining with the board of county 
commissioners of one or more counties within the same judicial district to establish and maintain 
a joint office of public defender; (3) contracting with an existing office of public defender; or (4) 
contracting with a defending attorney, provided that the terms of the contract do not include any 
20 Id. at iii-viii; 3-9. 
21 I.C. §§ 19-849 (2014) and 19-850 (2014). 
22 I.C. § 19-853 (2014). 
23 I.C. § 19-859 (2014). 
24 I.C. § 19-860 (2014). 
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pricing structures that charge or pay a single fixed fee for the services and expenses of the 
attorney.25 
41. Of Idaho's 44 counties, seven have established an office of public defender, 26 while just 
two have partnered to form a joint office of public defender.27 One county neither maintains a 
public-defender office nor a contract for the provision of indigent-defense services, choosing 
instead to have the court appoint attorneys on an ad hoc basis, even though the 2014 amendments 
eliminated such a system from the list of acceptable options.28 The remaining 34 counties 
provide indigent-defense services pursuant to a contractual agreement with a defending attorney 
or law firm, 19 of which operate under fixed-fee contracts.29 
42. Under the amended statutes, a county must "annually appropriate enough money to 
administer the program ofrepresentation that it has elected under section 19-859, Idaho Code[,]" 
but the State is still not required to contribute any funding toward the provision of trial-level 
indigent-defense services. 30 
43. The PDC, established in 2014, is responsible for promulgating rules related to training 
and data-reporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state.31 
25 See LC. § 19-859 (1}-(4). 
26 These are Ada, Bannock, Bonner, Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, and Twin Falls Counties. 
27 These are Minidoka and Cassia Counties. 
28 This is Washington County. 
29 See Idaho State Publi9 Defense Commission, 2015 Report to the Legislature, 5-7. 
30 LC.§ 19-862(1) (2014). 
31 LC.§ 19-850(1)(b). 
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44. The PDC is further responsible for making recommendations to the Idaho legislature, 
including an initial round ofrecommendations that was due by January 20, 2015, regarding a 
number of issues, including core requirements for indigent-defense contracts, qualifications and 
experience standards for defending attorneys, enforcement mechanisms, and funding. 32 Yet, as 
of the date of this Complaint, the PDC has failed to make any such recommendations. 
45. Despite the State's acknowledgement that significant reform is necessary in this arena-
by, among other things, the creation of various virtually powerless committees, including the 
establishment in 2010 of a public-defense subcommittee of the Criminal Justice Commission, the 
establishment in 2013 of a special committee of the legislature to recommend legislative reforms 
to the public-defense system, and the 2014 statutory amendments and formation of the PDC-the 
State has done little to meaningfully address the myriad problems plaguing Idaho's indigent-
defense system. 
46. Critically, the State still does not provide any funding or supervision to any of the 
counties with respect to the delivery of indigent-defense services at the trial level. 
47. Each county is still currently responsible for providing indigent-defense services to all 
criminal defendants within the county who are charged with misdemeanor or felony offenses and 
who are unable to afford an attorney. Yet, counties must do so without any meaningful funding, 
oversight, or training from the State. 
48. Despite the PDC's responsibility to promulgate rules related to training and data-
reporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state, no such rules have been 
promulgated to date. 
32 Id. 
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49. Despite the PDC's responsibility to make recommendations to the Idaho legislature 
regarding the core requirements for indigent-defense contracts, qualifications, and experience 
standards for defense attorneys, enforcement mechanisms, and funding, no such 
recommendations have been made to date. 
50. Moreover, even if the PDC had promulgated certain rules or made specific 
recommendations, it has no authority to reprimand or sanction counties or individuals that do not 
abide by such rules or recommendations. 
51. For instance, upon information and belief, at least 19 of the 34 Idaho counties that use a 
contract system currently operate under a fixed-fee pricing structure, despite express statutory 
prohibition against such contracts. 
Defendants' Ongoing Failure to Provide Indigent Defendants with Constitutionally Adequate 
Legal Representation 
52. In addition to the State's failure to meet the minimal requirements of the public-defense 
statutes, it has also failed to sufficiently address the many state and federal constitutional issues 
identified in the NLADA Report. 
53. According to a recent study conducted by the Pre-Trial Justice subcommittee of the 
Criminal Justice Commission, only five ofldaho's 44 counties provide counsel to indigent 
defendants at their initial appearance before a judicial officer, in violation of Idaho law. Only 
one of the named Plaintiffs had counsel present at her initial appearance-and that counsel 
ultimately had a conflict of interest preventing counsel from representing her. 
54. As a result of the State's failure to create and enforce a constitutionally consistent scheme 
that ensures representation for indigent defendants at initial appearances, many defendants, 
including the named Plaintiffs, are unable to effectively seek bond reduction or release from 
custody. As such, many defendants unnecessarily spend prolonged periods of time in pretrial 
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detentio.n or feel coerced to plead guilty to charges against which they have a valid and 
potentially effective defense, merely to get out of jail and avoid losing a job or meaningful 
contact with their children and families. 
55. Public-defender caseloads in counties across the state continue to exceed national 
standards, in some cases by more than double. 33 
56. As a result of their crushing caseloads and lack of support, Idaho public defenders do not 
have the time or resources to communicate with all of their clients consistently and effectively. 
57. The State's failure to commit sufficient resources to indigent defense has also made it 
impossible for public defenders to investigate and otherwise prepare all of their cases thoroughly 
and effectively. 
58. Moreover, the State does not provide public defenders with the specialized training and 
ongoing supervision necessary to ensure zealous and effective representation for indigent 
defendants. 
59. In failing to remedy these deficiencies, the State has caused harm to the Plaintiffs, and 
those similarly situated, by constructively denying them their 'Sixth Amendment right to 
competent counsel and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.34 
60. Pursuant to federal and state law, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of 
similarly situated individuals, seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants to 
33 Idaho Legislative Services Office - Report on 2013 Caseloads, available at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdefl 028 lso.pdf. 
34 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
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remedy the rampant denial of constitutional rights to which Idaho's indigent defendants are 
subjected on a daily basis.35 
JURISDICTION & VENUE 
61. This Court maintains original, subject-matter jurisdiction over this action under Section 
1-705 of the Idaho Code. 
62. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 5-402 of the Idaho Code because the 
State of Idaho is named as a defendant in this action, and Ada County encompasses the capital 
city of Boise. Additionally, the decisions that have caused the failures ofldaho's indigent-
defense system were made in Ada County. 
PARTIES 
A. Plaintiffs 
Tracy Tucker 
63. Plaintiff TRACY DON TUCKER is and at all times pertinent herein has been a resident 
of Sandpoint, Idaho. Mr. Tucker was taken into custody on March 6, 2015, after he was charged 
with attempted strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of a child, exposing him to 
over 15 years in prison. Mr. Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, 
during which the court set his bail at $40,000. Mr. Tucker could not afford to post bail, and as a 
result, he remained in Bonner County Jail until June 2, 2015. 
35 Through this Complaint, Plaintiffs do not, at this time, challenge the components ofldaho's 
indigent-defense system served by the State Appellate Public Defe~der (see Sections 19-867 
through 19-872 of the Idaho Code), which pertain primarily to felony criminal cases on appeal. 
Rather, this Complaint is focused on the State's failure to provide an adequate criminal-justice 
system for indigent defendants represented by overloaded and under-resourced defense attorneys 
at the trial level, and in misdemeanor and other appeals not handled by the State Appellate Public 
Defender. 
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64.1?onner County relies on contract attorneys, who are paid an annual fixed fee, to represent 
indigent criminal defendants being prosecuted within its jurisdiction. 
65. Although Mr. Tucker was assigned a public defender prior to his next court appearance, 
his attorney did not appear on his behalf at his arraignment on March 18, 2015. Instead, his 
public defender sent a substitute attorney who had no prior knowledge of Mr. Tucker's case or 
even of the charges that Mr. Tucker faced. On information and belief, the substitute attorney 
failed to seek a bond reduction or otherwise advocate on Mr. Tucker's behalf. 
66. Given the demands of his caseload, Mr. Tucker's attorney has met Mr. Tucker only on 
three occasions: once when his attorney came to Bonner County Jail and met with Mr. Tucker 
for approximately 10 minutes, and two additional times when he saw him in court. Mr. Tucker's 
attorney did not meet with him prior to either of those court proceedings-not even in the 
courtroom prior to the proceedings. Mr. Tucker has spoken with his public defender on the 
phone only on two occasions, both for approximately five minutes. Generally speaking, Mr. 
Tucker has also been unable to contact his attorney by phone. Between March 18, 2015, and 
June 1, 2015, Mr. Tucker attempted-unsuccessfully-to reach his attorney by phone on at least 
50 occasions. 
67. On information and belief, despite the fact that Mr. Tucker's trial was originally set for 
June 8, 2015, as often days prior to trial, his attorney had not had the chance to conduct any 
investigation into the case, contact or summon any witnesses, hire an investigator, review and 
explain the relevant discovery materials, or discuss trial strategy with Mr. Tucker. In total, on 
information and belief, Mr. Tucker has spent less than 20 minutes with his attorney throughout 
the course of his representation. Moreover, other than a bail reduction motion, Mr. Tucker's 
attorney never filed any motions on his behalf. 
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68. After remaining in jail for three months while unable to discuss a possible defense with 
his attorney, Mr. Tucker pleaded guilty to attempted strangulation on June 2, 2015. He is 
scheduled to be sentenced on August 3, 2015. 
Jason Sharp 
69. Plaintiff JASON MONROE SHARP is and at all times pertinent herein has been a 
resident of Kellogg, Idaho. Mr. Sharp was taken into custody on May 16, 2014, after he was 
charged with burglary and grand theft, exposing him to as much as 30 years in prison. Mr. Sharp 
was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance in court, during which his bail was set at 
$50,000. Mr. Sharp could not afford to post bail, and as a result, he remained in the Shoshone 
County Jail for approximately two weeks. 
70. On information and belief, Shoshone County relies on contract attorneys, who are paid an 
annual fixed fee, to represent indigent criminal defendants being prosecuted within its 
jurisdiction. 
71. On information and belief, attorney caseloads in Shoshone County vastly exceed national 
standards and are among the heaviest of any county in Idaho. 
72. Although Mr. Sharp was assigned a public defender at his initial appearance, he has had 
minimal contact with his attorney. Mr. Sharp had to advocate on his own behalf-without the 
assistance of his lawyer-in favor of a bond reduction. On information and belief, the court first 
agreed to reduce Mr. Sharp's bail to $5,000, after Mr. Sharp explained that he was not on 
probation at the time of his arrest, as the court had previously believed. Then, after receiving a 
letter of support from Mr. Sharp's employer vouching for him and recommending his release, the 
court released Mr. Sharp on his own recognizance. Neither the bail reduction, nor the court's 
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ultimate decision to release Mr. Sharp, were the result of any efforts undertaken by his public 
defender. 
73. Given the demands of his attorney's caseload, Mr. Sharp has only been able to meet with 
his attorney for approximately 90 minutes-total-throughout the 13 months during which his 
case has been pending. On information and belief, most of those meetings have occurred in or 
just outside the courtroom prior to a hearing. Mr. Sharp also has been unable to review the 
discovery in his case, despite repeated requests. 
74. Although Mr. Sharp is scheduled to go to trial on July 14, 2015, and faces up to 30 years 
in prison if convicted, on information and belief, his attorney has not had the chance to conduct 
any investigation into the case, contact or summon any witnesses, hire an investigator, review 
and explain the relevant discovery materials, or discuss trial strategy with Mr. Sharp. 
Naomi Morley 
75. Plaintiff NAOMI HELEN MORLEY is and at all times pertinent herein has been a 
resident of Garden Valley, Idaho. Ms. Morley was taken into custody in March 2014, following 
a serious single car accident on an Ada County roadway. 
76. Ada County relies on an institutional public-defender office to represent indigent criminal 
defendants being prosecuted within its jurisdiction. In the event that the public-defender office is 
unable to represent a defendant due to a conflict of interest, the County relies on conflict counsel 
to provide representation. 
77. Although Ms. Morley was assigned a public defender at her initial appearance before the 
court, she had no opportunity to actually confer with the public defender at that initial 
proceeding, during which her bail was set at $15,000. Ms. Morley could not afford to post bail, 
causing her to remain in jail for three weeks until her bail was reduced. It was later discovered 
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that the public defender's office could not represent Ms. Morley due to a conflict of interest. 
Conflict counsel was subsequently appointed. 
78. Ms. Morley's attorneys-both her public defender and her conflict attorney-have been 
unable to adequately investigate the charges against her. Her current attorney has encouraged 
her to accept a plea deal that Ms. Morley understands would require her to spend 10 years in 
prison, despite her claims of innocence. ~hen Ms. Morley inquired about the poss~bility of 
retaining an expert to dispute the findings of any blood sample analysis, she was told that, if she 
wanted to do so-or do any other outside testing to challenge the prosecution's allegations-she 
would have to pay for the testing herself. Given her indigent status, this is an expense that Ms. 
Morley cannot afford. 
79. Moreover, Ms. Morley has attempted to discuss the case with her attorney several times, 
but has been unable to do so in any meaningful way. Although Ms. Morley told her attorney 
about a witness who would testify that the controlled substances allegedly found were the 
witness's and not Ms. Morley's, it was only through her own efforts that Ms. Morley was able to 
obtain a signed affidavit from the witness, who acknowledged, under oath, that any controlled 
substances allegedly found belonged to the witness. Furthermore, when Ms. Morley tried to 
discuss certain discrepancies in the police report, her attorney was apparently so overloaded with 
cases that he did not have the time to engage with her, and her concerns went unheeded. On 
information and belief, had her attorney had a manageable caseload and thus the time to discuss 
the facts of her case, as well as her medical history, in greater detail, he would have recognized 
immediately that she had a valid defense that required thorough investigation. Ms. Morley is 
scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015. 
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Jeremy Payne 
80. Plaintiff JEREMY MICHAEL PAYNE is and at all times pertinent herein has been a 
resident of Payette, Idaho. Mr. Payne was taken into custody on January 25, 2015, after he was 
charged with driving without a license, as well as possession of a controlled substance and drug 
paraphernalia, exposing him to over seven years in prison. Mr. Payne was not represented at his 
initial appearance in court, during which his bail was set at $30,000. Mr. Payne could not afford 
to post bail, and as a result, he was remanded to the Payette County Jail, where he remained until 
being released on June 9, 2015, when the State postponed his trial date for the third time. 
81. Payette County relies on contract attorneys, who are paid an annual fixed fee, to represent 
indigent criminal defendants being prosecuted within its jurisdiction. 
82. Although Mr. Payne was assigned a public defender at his initial appearance, he did not 
have any contact with his attorney until the minutes leading up to his next court appearance on 
February 6, 2015. In the months that followed, Mr. Payne went before the court three more 
times and again met briefly with his attorney either in court just prior to the proceedings, or in 
jail the day before the court appearance. Given the demands of his caseload, Mr. Payne's 
attorney only met with him at the Payette County Jail on three occasions. Mr. Payne has also 
been unable to contact his attorney by phone. During the two-week period between May 12 and 
May 26, Mr. Payne left at least six phone messages for his attorney, none of which were 
returned. 
83. At Mr. Payne's pretrial hearing on April 17, 2015, his attorney informed him that in order 
to move forward with his jury trial in June 2015, he would have to waive his right to a speedy 
trial. However, his attorney failed to adequately explain the consequences of the waiver, and the 
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fact that Mr. Payne's refusal to waive his speedy trial right could result in his release from 
custody. 
84. On information and belief, despite that Mr. Payne's trial has now been rescheduled three 
times, Mr. Payne's attorney has not had the chance to conduct any investigation into the case, 
nor has the attorney reviewed and explained the relevant discovery materials or discussed trial 
strategy with Mr. Payne. In total, Mr. Payne has only spent approximately 30--45 minutes with 
his attorney throughout the course of his representation. 
B. Defendants 
85. Defendant STATE OF IDAHO has violated and continues to violate the Idaho and 
federal constitutions, which require it to ensure that adequate indigent-defense services are 
provided to Idaho's poorest citizens. The State Capital and center of State government is in Ada 
County. 
86. Defendant C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER is the Governor of the state ofldaho and is subject to 
this lawsuit in his official capacity as to all claims herein. As the chief executive of the state, 
Governor Otter bears ultimate responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated 
services to the people of Idaho. In 2005, the CJC was created by Executive Order and tasked 
with addressing "important criminal justice issues and challenges." Governor Otter maintains 
supervisory authority over the CJC. 
87. Defendants Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, 
Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy Perry are all of the members Idaho's Public 
Defense Commission. They are subject to this lawsuit in their official capacities as members of 
the Commission. The Commission is responsible for promulgating rules related to training and 
data-reporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state, and making recommendations 
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experience standards for defending attorneys, enforcement mechanisms, and funding. 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
88. Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on 
behalf of all indigent persons who are now or who will be under formal charge before a state 
court in Idaho of having committed any offense, the penalty for which includes the possibility of 
confinement, incarceration, imprisonment, or detention in a correction facility (regardless of 
whether actually imposed) and who are unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and 
all other necessary expenses of representation in defending against the charge. 
89. The Plaintiffs in this case represent a class (the "Class"), and this action should be 
certified as a class action under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 
90. Every day, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who are unable to afford an attorney 
and who depend on the State ofldaho to provide them with effective legal representation are 
criminally prosecuted in Idaho. 36 As such, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impractical. 
91. There are important questions oflaw and fact raised in this case that are common to the 
Class, including: 
a. Whether the State is required under the United States and Idaho Constitutions, 
and under Idaho law, to provide indigent defendants with effective legal 
representation, including at the time of initial appearance; 
b. Whether the State is currently providing constitutionally sufficient representation 
for indigent defendants in their respective jurisdictions; 
36 Idaho Legislative Services Office - CFY 2014 Budget & Policy Analysis, Figure 3.0, 
available at http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdefl 028 _ hoskins.pdf. 
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c. Whether the State has violated the United States and Idaho Constitutions by 
failing to implement, administer, and oversee adequate public-defense systems; 
d. Whether, by abdicating its responsibility to fund, supervise, and administer 
indigent defense services to the counties, the State has failed to ensure that 
indigent defendants are provided with effective legal representation, all in 
violation of the United States and Idaho Constitutions; 
e. Whether the State's failure to adequately fund and supervise the delivery of 
indigent-defense services impedes the provision of effective legal representation 
to indigent defendants; and 
f. Whether the State's failure to develop uniform workload and performance 
standards for public-defense attorneys in Idaho impedes the provision of effective 
legal representation to indigent defendants. 
92. The claims of the Class representatives are typical of the claims of the Class as a whole. 
Like all of the Class members, the Class representatives are being denied their right to counsel, 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13, of the 
Idaho Constitution, as a direct result of State's ongoing failure to adequately fund, supervise, and 
administer indigent-defense services in Idaho. 
93. The Class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 
The interests of the Class representatives are not in conflict with the interests of any other 
indigent defendant, and the Class representatives have every incentive to pursue this litigation 
vigorously on behalf of themselves and the Class as a whole. Moreover, the Class 
representatives are being represented by experienced, well-resourced counsel in this matter, 
including the American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, the national American Civil Liberties 
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Union's Criminal Law Reform Project, and the law firm of Hogan Lovells US LLP, whose 
attorneys possess substantial expertise in prosecuting class action lawsuits generally, and in 
indigent-defense reform litigation in particular. 
94. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a 
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, 
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct, exacerbating the differing and 
inadequate public-defender programs currently in place in various counties in the State. Such a 
risk is of particular concern in this case since the lack of uniform performance standards is 
central ~o the Plaintiffs' allegations. 
95. The common questions of law and fact articulated above predominate over any case-
specific questions that may arise out of any of the individual Class members' criminal cases. As 
such, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of this matter. 
96. Defendants have failed to adequately fund, supervise, and administer indigent- defense 
services in Idaho, thereby violating the rights of poor defendants across the state. As such, these 
Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, 
thereby making it appropriate for this Court to issue final injunctive and declaratory relief for all 
Class members. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
Overview of the Current State of Indigent-Defense in Idaho 
97. The State ofldaho leaves the responsibility for providing trial-level legal representation 
to indigent criminal defendants to each of its 44 counties. 
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98. Yet the State does not provide any funding, training, or supervision to support the 
delivery of indigent-defense services at the trial level. 
99. According to the NLADA Report, as well as the more recent county-by-county surveys 
conducted by the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission and the ACLU, respectively, no county in 
Idaho is currently providing indigent-defense services that meet state or federal legal standards. 
100. State officials themselves have recognized the current constitutional crisis 
regarding indigent defense services in Idaho. In August 2013, the Chief Justice of the Idaho 
Supreme Court noted that "our system for the defense of indigents, as required by Idaho's 
constitution and laws, is broken." And Governor Otter acknowledged in his 2015 State of the 
State address that, despite the 2014 amendments to Idaho's public defense statutes, "our current 
method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional 
muster." 
101. These constitutional and statutory deficiencies manifest themselves in myriad 
ways, including (1) failure to provide counsel to indigent defendants at their initial appearance; 
(2) extended and unnecessary pretrial detention; (3) excessive caseloads that far exceed national 
standards; ( 4) lack of sufficient investigation; (5) lack of sufficient expert analysis and 
testimony; (6) lack of consistent, effective, and confidential communication between indigent 
defendants and public defenders; (7) continued use of fixed-fee contracts for attorneys providing 
indigent-defense services; (8) lack of public-defender independence; (9) lack of sufficient 
training in the field of criminal defense; (10) lack of informed and consistent oversight of the 
provision of indigent-defense services throughout the State; and (11) lack of sufficient 
supervision and evaluation. 
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102. Each of these deficiencies is directly linked to the State's longstanding and on-
going failure to provide the funding, supervision, and training necessary to meet its legal 
obligations in the area of indigent defense. 
Lack of Representation at Initial Appearance 
103. Under Idaho law, "[e]very defendant, who according to law is entitled to 
appointed counsel, shall have counsel assigned to represent the defendant, from initial 
appearance before the magistrate or district court, unless the defendant waives such 
appointment."37 
104. Section 19-852 of the Idaho Code guarantees that an indigent person "under 
formal charge of having committed, or [] being detained under a conviction of a serious crime . 
is entitled to be represented by an attorney."38 
105. Section 19-851 ( d) defines "serious crime" as "any offense the penalty for which 
includes the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment or detention in a 
correctional facility, regardless of whether actually imposed."39 
106. An initial appearance is defined by Idaho Criminal Rule 5(a) as "the first 
appearance of the defendant before any magistrate," during which the judge or magistrate may, 
among other things, set bail and take a plea from the defendant.40 
37 LC.R. 44(a). 
38 LC. § 19-852. 
39 LC. § 19-85l(d). 
40 See LC.R. 5(a) 
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107. In 2014, the Pre-Trial Justice subcommittee of the CJC conducted a survey of all 
44 Idaho counties to determine, among other things, the number of counties that provide counsel 
for indigent defendants at their initial appearance before a judge or magistrate. 
108. According to the CJC survey, only five Idaho counties provide counsel for 
indigent defendants at their initial appearances, despite the critical nature of such proceedings. 
109. None of the named Plaintiffs was represented by counsel at his or her initial 
appearance. 
110. Plaintiff Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, even 
though he was charged with a serious felony and had his bail set at $40,000. Because he could 
not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue for a bond reduction on his 
behalf, Mr. Tucker remained in jail for three months before pleading guilty. 
111. Plaintiff Sharp was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, even 
though he was charged with two serious felonies and had his bail set at $50,000. Because he 
could not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue for a bond reduction on his 
behalf, Mr. Sharp remained in jail for two weeks until he was able to convince the court-
without the assistance of his attorney-to reduce his bond. 
112. An attorney from the Ada County Public Defender's office was present during 
Plaintiff Morley's initial appearance, but Ms. Morley did not have an opportunity to discuss her 
case with counsel at that time, and that office soon after determined that it had a conflict of 
interest and could not represent Ms. Morley. Ms. Morley's bail was set at $15,000 at her initial 
appearance. Because she could not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue 
for a bond reduction on her behalf, she remained in custody for three weeks until her bail was 
reduced. 
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113. Plaintiff Payne was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, even 
though the proceeding included the court's decision to set Mr. Payne's bail at $30,000. He could 
not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue for a bond reduction on his 
behalf. Mr. Payne remained in jail until June 9, 2015, when the state asked the court to postpone 
Mr. Payne's trial for a third time. 
114. On information and belief, criminal defendants in Bingham County routinely 
enter pleas at their initial appearances without having had the opportunity to consult with an 
attorney. Indeed, at initial appearances held on May 28, 2015, defendants were asked to enter a 
plea to the charges against them without counsel present and without having affirmatively 
waived their right to counsel or even having been informed by the judge of their right to counsel. 
More than half pleaded guilty and were sentenced without counsel present. 
Unnecessary and/or Extended Pre-Trial Detention 
115. Due in part to the lack of legal advocacy available to indigent defendants at their 
initial appearances, bail is often set at unnecessarily high amounts that low-income defendants 
cannot afford. For instance, Plaintiff Sharp's bail was originally set at $50,000, without any 
discussion between the court and Mr. Sharp regarding his ability to pay, employment status, or 
other relevant factors, including the fact that Mr. Sharp was not on probation when he was 
arrested, as the court originally believed. It was not until two weeks later that the court agreed to 
reduce Plaintiffs bond, after Mr. Sharp was able to explain to the court that he was not on 
probation at the time of his arrest and to have his employer write a letter to the court in support 
of his request for pretrial release. 
116. The attendant consequences for spending time in jail are severe. According to 
research studies conducted or cited by the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice 
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Assistance and the Arnold Foundation, among others, whether or not a criminal defendant is held 
in pretrial custody can have a tremendous impact on the outcome of the case. For instance, in its 
review of outcomes for more than 150,000 defendants in Kentucky during 2009-2010, the 
Arnold Foundation determined that "[w]hen other relevant statistical controls are considered, 
defendants detained until trial or case disposition are 4.44 times more likely to be sentenced to 
jail and 3.32 times more likely to be sentenced to prison than defendants who are released at 
some point pending trial."41 Similarly, in New York City, "the citywide conviction rate for cases 
with no pretrial release was 92%. By contrast, the conviction rate for cases in which the 
defendant was at liberty from arraignment to disposition was 50%."42 
117. Aside from the impact pre-trial detention can have on the defendant's criminal 
case, it can also significantly affect a defendant's employment or other obligations that he/she is 
unable to fulfill while in custody. For instance, prior to Plaintiff Tucker's arrest, he received a 
traffic ticket, which he intended to pay prior to the due date. Following his arrest, however, Mr. 
Tucker was unable to afford bail and remained in pretrial detention for over three months. 
Consequently, Mr. Tucker failed to resolve his traffic ticket on time and had his driver's license 
suspended while he was in custody. If it were not for his employer's uncommon willingness to 
write to the court on his behalf, Plaintiff Sharp likely would have remained in jail pending trial 
and lost his job as a result. And Plaintiff Morley remained in jail for two weeks prior to posting 
bond, despite suffering from severe injuries in connection with a serious car accident that 
occurred on the day of her arrest. 
41 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Investigating the Impact 
of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes 10 (Nov. 2013). 
42 Mary Phillips, N.Y.C. Crim. Just. Agency, Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes 32 (Nov. 
2007). "' 
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118. Pre-trial detention can also serve as an inappropriate incentive to obtain a guilty 
plea in exchange for release from jail. Such an incentive can and has been used even if a 
defendant has not yet spoken to a lawyer and notwithstanding the person's innocence or the 
availability of viable defenses to challenge the State's case. As noted above, Plaintiff Tucker, 
who spent three months in jail proclaiming his innocence and hoping-in vain-for a thorough 
investigation of his case, recently pleaded guilty after being told that he would be released from 
custody pending his sentencing. 
Excessive Caseloads and Workloads 
119. In 1973, under the direction of the U.S. Department of Justice, the National 
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals developed national caseload 
standards for the first time. According to NAC Standard 13.12: "The caseload of a public 
defender attorney should not exceed the following: felonies per attorney per year: not more than 
150; misdemeanors (excluding traffic) per attorney per year: not more than 400; juvenile court 
cases per attorney per year: not more than 200; Mental Health Act cases per attorney per year: 
not more than 200; and appeals per attorney per year: not more than 25."43 
43 It should be noted that, in recent years, experts in the field have suggested that the NAC 
standards are outdated and fail to account for the added complexities that have been infused into 
criminal defense practice over the last 40 years, including the introduction of sexually violent 
offender commitment proceedings, persistent offender or "three-strikes" statutes, significant 
collateral consequences resulting from convictions, and a growing recognition of the unique 
nature of juvenile defense. As such, commentators have argued that the NAC standards are 
themselves too high. See Norman Lefstein, Securing Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in 
Public Defense 43-48 (2011). 
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120. The NAC standards do not contemplate a mixed caseload. In other words, an 
attorney who handles felony cases should carry no more than 150 such cases during the course of 
a year, and nothing else.44 
121. In August 2009, the American Bar Association released its "Eight Guidelines of 
Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads" ("Guidelines") in an effort to set forth a 
"detailed action plan ... to which those providing public defense should adhere as they seek to 
comply with their professional responsibilities."45 Among other things, the Guidelines include 
assessment of "whether excessive workloads are preventing [public defenders] from fulfilling 
performance obligations"; supervision and monitoring of workloads; training with regard to an 
attorney's ethical duties in the face of excessive workloads; and the need for those managing the 
public defense system to determine whether excessive workloads exist.46 
122. Due in part to these excessive caseloads, and the resulting lack of time and 
resources available to public defenders, Plaintiffs were not represented at their initial 
appearances, were unable to communicate effectively with their attorneys on a consistent basis, 
and did not have their cases adequately investigated (if at all), or otherwise prepared in advance 
of trial. Moreover, as a result of their heavy caseloads, the public defenders representing 
Plaintiffs did not have the time or support necessary to file appropriate pretrial motions with the 
court. 
44 "The standards are disjunctive, so if a public defender is assigned cases from more than one 
category, the percentage of the maximum caseload in each should be assessed and the combined 
total should not exceed 100%." Justice Denied, Chapter 2, at 66 n. 102 (citing National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Courts 276 (1973)). 
45 ABA Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads, 1. 
46 Id. 
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123. Based on recent court observations, public defenders in Kootenai, Nez Perce, 
Payette, Bannock, and Bonneville counties, among others, have so many cases assigned to them 
that they are unable to even identify their clients until minutes before the defendants' court 
appearances. 
124. Moreover, excessive caseloads can negatively impact the relationships between 
attorneys and their clients. During court proceedings in Bonneville County on May 28, 2015, for 
instance, one defendant met with his lawyer in open court, just next to and within hearing 
distance of prosecutors, the judge, court personnel, other defendants, and members of the public 
attending court. On information and belief, after a heated exchange between the defendant and 
his attorney-which could be overheard throughout the courtroom-the public defender stated 
that she had "too many cases" and as a result, could not "deal with this right now." On 
information and belief, the defendant then indicated that he wished to "fire" his attorney and 
represent himself instead. As a result of trying to speak with his lawyer to understand his case, 
the defendant's own attorney then summoned the marshal to escort the defendant out of the 
courtroom. 
Lack of Effective or Consistent Attorney-Client Communication 
125. In many instances, indigent defendants in Idaho have insufficient access to their 
assigned public defenders and are unable to communicate with their attorneys for weeks or 
months at a time, due in large part to the extremely heavy caseloads public defenders are forced 
to handle, the lack of sufficient support staff to help attorneys manage their contacts and 
relationships with their clients, and the fixed-fee contracts used in many counties, which provide 
economic incentives to spend as little time as possible on any individual case. This lack of 
communication makes it virtually impossible for indigent defendants, including the named 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF -39 
000045
.. 
Plaintiffs, to understand developments in their case or to assist in their own defense in any 
meaningful way. 
126. Because of public defenders' heavy caseloads, lack of support, and contractual 
obligations, and the resulting lack of consistent communication between them and their clients, 
many indigent defendants, including those who are not in custody, are unable to access the 
discovery materials in their cases. Indeed, Plaintiffs Payne, Tucker, and Sharp all have been 
unable to access the discovery materials in their cases. 
127. Because Idaho's public defenders are overextended and lack sufficient resources, 
they often fail to receive or follow up on suggestions made by the defendant or the defendant's 
family with regard to possible witnesses, alibis, or other potentially exculpatory evidence. For 
instance, Plaintiff Morley urged her public defender to obtain a statement from a witness who 
could provide exculpatory testimony to prove Morley's innocence. No such statement was 
obtained by her attorney. As a result of Ms. Morley's own efforts, however, she recently 
received a signed affidavit from the witness, confessing responsibility for the alleged crimes and 
apologizing for the harin that she has caused Ms. Morley. 
128. As illustrated by the named Plaintiffs' experiences, when indigent defendants-
particularly those in custody-do get the opportunity to speak with their attorneys, the meetings 
are usually very short and often take place in open court or other areas of the courthouse that lack 
the privacy necessary for truly confidential and privileged discussions. This kind of interaction 
makes it difficult to establish a meaningful attorney-client relationship in which defendants can 
ask questions and gain a clear understanding of what is happening in their case and in which 
public defenders can answer their clients' questions thoroughly and gather all the information 
they need to advocate effectively. 
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129. Plaintiffs Payne and Tucker, both of whom spent substantial time in pretrial 
detention before being recently released, tried to contact their public defenders repeatedly while 
in custody but received no response. Each also alleges that he met with his attorney for a total of 
less than an hour since he was arrested. 
130. While they are not currently in custody, Plaintiffs Sharp and Morley allege that 
they are unable to communicate effectively with their attorneys. Specifically, both indicate that 
that their questions and suggestions go routinely unanswered by their attorneys; and that they are 
unclear about developments in their cases, or the implications of such develo.P,ments. 
Lack of Investigation and Expert Analysis and Testimony 
131. In counties across the state, having a publicly funded investigator or expert 
assigned to a case is a luxury that is most often reserved for indigent defendants charged with 
particularly serious felonies. 
132. Of the 34 counties that use a contract-defender model, the vast majority do not 
increase the amount of the contract to account for the cost of investigators and experts. Rather, 
contract attorneys must make special requests to the court or the local county's board of 
commissioners, on a case-by-case basis, to obtain the resources necessary to retain an 
investigator or expert. 
133. On information and belief, public defenders often choose not to make such 
requests at all, given the very limited funds available to meet them. Indeed, Plaintiff Morley has 
been told that if she wanted to have an expert analyze the drug evidence in her case and be 
prepared to testify at trial, she would have to pay for it herself. Ms. Morley is unable to pay for 
the expert on her own, and therefore could be prevented from having expert testimony to aid in 
her defense. 
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134. On information and belief, all of the Plaintiffs' appointed lawyers have been 
unable to investigate Plaintiffs' cases in any meaningful way, making it difficult to prepare 
defenses likely to succeed at trial-or in the context of plea negotiations, for that matter. 
Use of Fixed-Fee Contracts 
135. There are currently at least 19 Idaho counties utilizing a fixed-fee contract system, 
notwithstanding the fact that such contracts are prohibited by statute. 
136. For instance, in Payette County, the current public-defense contract provides that 
the County will pay the contracting attorney $560 for each "Public Day" that the attorney works. 
A Public Day is defined in the contract as "any day in which CONTRACTOR must appear in 
Court for a client he is appointed to under this Agreement, or any day in which CONTRACTOR 
works for 5 or more hours on clients he is appointed to under this Agreement." While the 
contract goes on to state that "[t]here is not a limit to the number of days that CONTRACTOR 
may use as Public Days in any given month," the fixed daily rate creates a disincentive to spend 
any extended amount of time in court, or to spend more than the minimum five hours working on 
indigent-defense cases. This is especially problematic given that the public defense contractors 
in ~ayette County are still permitted to maintain a separate private practice. Moreover, the 
contract states explicitly that it "does not include any costs of transcripts, or any expenses of 
trial, investigation or appeal for which the Court may approve expenditures." In order to access 
any additional funds, the contractor must first obtain "advance approval for such expenses from 
the district judge or magistrate having jurisdiction over the case." 
137. Upon information and belief, the 2010-2011 public-defense contract in Gem 
County, which is the most recent contract to be made publically available by the County, 
provides that the County "shall pay the sum of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars 
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($180,000) for Public Defense services" during the contract period, and that that sum is to be 
paid in twelve installments of $15,000 each. In the event that an indigent defendant in Gem 
County is charged with a "special-circumstance offense" (i.e. murder), the contracting attorney 
must negotiate with the County for certain "extraordinary expenses," such as "psychological 
evaluation and expert testimony, ballistics and forensic scientific testing and expert testimony, 
change of venue expenses, and conflict-of-interest attorneys." It appears that, for all other 
alleged crimes, such expenses would have to be taken out of the fixed $180,000 fee, along with 
all expenses associated with salaries, insurance, equipment, and office space. 
138. The fixed-fee contract system in Gem County may also explain a disturbing 
occurrence during court proceedings held on May 27, 2015, during which the public defender 
appeared to ignore a clear conflict of interest. The case in question involved co-defendants-one 
adult, one juvenile-charged with various drug crimes. While the two defendants were 
represented by different attorneys, upon information and belief, both lawyers work in the office 
of the contracting attorney. This was particularly noteworthy since one of the defendants had 
already pleaded guilty, while the other considered whether or not to do the same. Indeed, at 
various points during the proceeding, both defendants and both attorneys were present in the 
courtroom while their individual circumstances were discussed. Since the Gem County 
contract-like most other fixed-fee contracts in Idaho-requires the public defender to pay for 
conflict counsel out of the lump sum payment they receive from the county, there is a powerful 
disincentive to ignore or attempt to work around clear conflicts of interest. 
139. In Custer County, the current public-defender contract states that the contracting 
attorney shall receive an annual sum of $50,000 for services rendered, and an additional $65.00 
per hour for ariy time spent on indigent defense cases exceeding 50 hours in any given month. 
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However, upon information and belief, the current Custer County public defender is based in 
Blackfoot, Idaho, approximately two hours from the county seat in Challis. Nevertheless, the 
contract states that "the Attorney shall not charge Custer County for the travel expenses." 
140. Fixed-fee contracts create a serious conflict of interest for defending attorneys 
because they encourage the attorney to spend as little money and time as possible on each case in 
order to maximize the amount of money and time that can be used to cover other cases, and other 
expenses, including compensation for the contracting attorney and any staff to assist with 
representation. 
141. To make matters worse, upon information and belief, at least 26 of the 34 counties 
operating on a contract system permit public defenders to maintain a private legal practice. 
Indeed, the Franklin County public defense contract states explicitly that "[a]ttorneys providing 
services under this Agreement may undertake representation of person charged with a crime in 
this or any other jurisdiction for a fee." 
142. Plaintiff Payne was arrested and charged in Payette County and was assigned a 
public defender. Due, in part, to the fixed-fee contract in effect in Payette County, the 
contracting attorney who represented Plaintiff Payne had limited incentive to spend the money 
and time necessary to locate and interview witnesses, secure expert testimony, or otherwise 
explore ways of challenging the criminal charges at issue. Indeed, the defender had substantial 
incentive not to engage in any defense activity or strategy that is not absolutely required. 
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Lack of Independence 
143. The first of the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Ten Principles is to ensure 
that "the public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of defense 
counsel, is independent."47 
144. In many counties, the loc'al board of commissioners retains the authority to hire 
and fire the public defender at will, even though few, if any, of the commissioners has any 
experience working as attorneys, let alone supervising attorneys. 
145. The board of commissioners also typically controls the amount of funding that 
will be extended to the public defender, and in some cases, will make the final decision as to 
whether a request for an investigator or expert will be approved. 
146. Upon information and belief, at least 17 counties require public defenders to 
request additional resources from either the court or the county commissioners to pay for an 
investigator or an expert in a given case. 
147. Upon information and belief, at least 10 counties require public defenders to 
request additional resources from either the court or the county commissioners to pay for 
laboratory testing. 
148. Given the vast authority that boards of county commissioners maintain over 
public defenders and the day-to-day operations of the public-defender office, there is a real fear 
ofretribution among public defenders. On information and belief, public defenders working in 
institutional offices, as well as those working under contract, are concerned that they will lose 
their jobs or contracts, or be otherwise disciplined, if they run afoul of the commissioners' 
47 ABA Ten Principles of A Public Defense Delivery System no. 1, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ aid _indigent_ defendants/ls_ s 
claid _def_ tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam. pdf. 
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expectations. As a result, many of Idaho's public defenders are beholden to their commissioners 
and therefore lack the independence necessary to do their jobs effectively. 
149. Indeed, Defendant Otter recently approved, and the State of Idaho enacted, 
changes to Idaho's indigent-defense statutes that removed a two-year-minimum term 
requirement for public defenders in institutional offices. Removing the two-year-minimum term 
requirement severely undercuts any independence those public defenders might hope to have, as 
it leaves them vulnerable at any time to termination for no reason or for unjustified reasons. The 
removal of the minimum term requirement was done over the expressed objection of public 
defenders. 
150. The State's failure to set standards regarding the commissioners' ability to hire 
and fire public defenders without justification results in, among other things, less zealous 
advocacy on the part of the defending attorneys, including a reticence to seek supplemental 
funding for investigators, experts, or other necessary resources. 
Lack of Sufficient Supervision and Evaluation 
151. While independence is essential, the last of the ABA Ten Principles also requires 
that public defenders be "supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency 
according to nationally and locally adopted standards." ABA Ten Principles, no. 10. 
152. The State currently plays no role whatsoever-either by way of directly 
supervising or setting guiding principles regarding the same-in supervising or evaluating the 
work done by public-defense offices and contractors in the various counties. 
153. The limited supervision that does exist is often deficient since it is carried out by 
local county commissioners with little or no experience overseeing the work of an attorney. 
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154. Moreover, because the State has not established uniform performance standards, 
there is very little reliable data available for managers to evaluate the work of the attorneys they 
oversee, whether it be related to overall workloads, the extent and nature of client contact, 
motion practice, adequacy of investigation, or level of preparation for hearings and trials. 
Harm to Plaintiffs 
155. All of the above-mentioned issues have combined to cause tremendous harm to 
Plaintiffs and to the Class as a whole. 
Plaintiff Tracy Tucker 
156. Plaintiff Tracy Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, 
resulting in his inability to make any arguments as to the amount of his bail, which was 
ultimately set by the court at $40,000. Because he was not able to afford bail, Mr. Tucker 
remained in jail for three months pending the resolution of his case. Throughout the duration of 
his case, Mr. Tucker has been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with his public 
defender, making it virtually impossible for him to participate in the development of his defense. 
In addition, Mr. Tucker's attorney was unable to conduct any meaningful investigation into his 
case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Tucker his thoughts with 
regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Tucker ultimately pleaded guilty after spending 
three months in jail. He is scheduled for sentencing on August 3, 2015. 
Plaintiff Jason Sharp 
157. Plaintiff Jason Sharp was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, 
resulting in his inability to make any arguments as to the amount of his bail, which was 
originally set by the court at $50,000. Since Mr. Sharp could not afford to post bail, he remained 
in the Shoshone County Jail for approximately two weeks until, without the help of his lawyer, 
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Mr. Sharp was able to convince the court that his bail amount was inappropriate given the 
circumstances. of his case. He was subsequently released pending trial. Throughout the duration 
of his case, however, Mr. Sharp has been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with 
his public defender, making it virtually impossible for him to participate in the development of 
his defense. In addition, Mr. Sharp's attorney was unable to conduct any meaningful 
investigation into his case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Sharp 
his thoughts with regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Sharp is scheduled to go to trial 
on July 14, 2015~ and faces up to 30 years in prison if convicted on both counts. 
Plaintiff Naomi Morley 
158. Although counsel from the Ada County Public Defender's office was present with 
Plaintiff Naomi Morley at her initial appearance, Ms. Morley had no opportunity to consult with 
that lawyer at that time, resulting in her inability to make any arguments as to the amount of her 
bail, which was ultimately set by the court at $15,000. In any event, that office soon after 
determined it could not represent Ms. Morley due to a conflict of interest. Because she was not 
able to afford bail, Ms. Morley remained in jail for two weeks before having her bail reduced and 
posting bond-all while recovering from serious injuries sustained in a car accident on the day of 
her arrest. Throughout the duration of her case, Ms. Morley has been unable to communicate 
effectively or consistently with her public defender, making it virtually impossible for her to 
participate, in any meaningful way, in the development of her defense. In addition, Ms. 
Morley's attorney has been unable to conduct any meaningful investigation into her case, review 
the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Ms. Morley his thoughts with regard to trial 
strategy and related matters. Ms. Morley is scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015, and faces 
more than 15 years in prison if convicted. 
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Plaintiff Jeremy Payne 
159. Plaintiff Jeremy Payne was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, 
resulting in his inability to make any arguments as to the amount of his bail, which was 
ultimately set by the court at $30,000. Because he was not able to afford bail, Mr. Payne has 
remained in jail pending resolution of his case. Throughout the duration of his case, Mr. Payne 
has been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with his public defender, making it 
virtually impossible for him to participate, in any meaningful way, in the development of his 
defense. In addition, Mr. Payne's attorney has been unable to conduct any meaningful 
investigation into his case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Payne 
his thoughts with regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Payne is scheduled to go to 
trial on July 21, 2015, and faces up to seven years in prison if convicted. 
160. The State ofldaho has not provided Plaintiffs, or those similarly situated, with the 
representation to which they are constitutionally and otherwise legally entitled. They have not 
been provided with adequate representation at every critical stage; have not had sufficient 
opportunity to discuss their cases with their attorneys, to participate in building a defense against 
the charges they face, or to make informed decisions about the disposition of their cases. Upon 
information and belief, the State of Idaho will continue to fail to provide Plaintiffs with the 
representation to which they are entitled. 
161. The representation provided to Plaintiffs is illustrative of the patterns of 
representation provided to indigent defendants throughout the State of Idaho and results from the 
structural and systemic failings that were identified in the 2010 NLADA Report and subsequent 
studies carried out over the last five years. 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 49 
000055
~ I • 
\ I I • 
! ' 
State Liability 
162. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it is the states' constitutional duty to provide for the 
effective assistance of counsel for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney. 
163. The State ofldaho has failed to provide any significant funding to support the 
provision of indigent defense services across the state. 
164. The State ofldaho has failed to provide any supervision over the provision of 
indigent defense services across the state. 
165. The State ofldaho has failed to establish or adopt any consistent, statewide 
caseload standards for public defenders in the state. 
166. The State of Idaho has failed to establish or adopt any consistent, statewide 
performance standards for public defenders in this state. 
167. In light of the NLADA's 2010 report, the ongoing work of the CJC and other 
committees tasked with studying indigent defense issues in Idaho, and the amendments to the 
public defense statutes in 2014, the State ofldaho has been on notice for more than half a decade 
that its public-defender system is failing to provide constitutionally sufficient representation. 
168. Despite being on notice of the many failings of Idaho's indigent defense system, 
the State has failed to take sufficient action to remedy the deficiencies. 
169. The State's failure to take sufficient steps to remedy the deficiencies ofldaho's 
indigent defense system is the proximate cause of the harm suffered by indigent criminal 
defendants throughout ldaho--including the named Plaintiffs and the Class they represent. 
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
First Claim for Relief 
Violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants) 
170. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the 
allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 
171. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the State of 
Idaho to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal 
representation at all critical stages of their cases. 
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for suit against the government for constitutional 
violations. 
173. The State of Idaho has violated the Sixth Amendment because it has failed to 
ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal representation 
at all critical stages of their cases, including at initial appearances, resulting in the constructive 
denial of counsel. 
Second Claim for Relief 
Violation of Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution (Right to Counsel) 
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants) 
174. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the 
allegations of all preceding paragraphs. 
175. Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution requires the State ofldaho to 
ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal 
representation. 
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176. The State ofldaho has failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants 
receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical stages of the case, including at 
initial appearance, in violation of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution. 
, Third Claim for Relief 
Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants) 
177. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the 
allegations of all preceding paragraphs. 
178. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires the State of Idaho to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive 
meaningful and effective legal representation. 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for suit against the government for constitutional 
violations. 
180. The State of Idaho has failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants 
receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical stages of the case, including at 
initial appearances, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
Fourth Claim for Relief 
Violation of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution (Due Process) 
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants) 
181. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the 
allegations of all preceding paragraphs. 
182. Under Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, the State ofldaho is 
required to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal 
I 
representation at all critical stages of the case, including at initial appearances. 
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183. The State ofldaho has failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants 
receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical stages of the case, including at 
initial appearances, in violation of Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: 
A) Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure·48 
' ' 
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate 
representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial appearances; 
C) Declare that the constitutional rights ofldaho's indigent criminal defendants are being 
violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for the State to move 
this Court for approval of specific modifications to the structure and operation of the 
State's indigent-defense system; 
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants by providing 
constitutionally deficient representation; 
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval and 
monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense that is 
consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the State ofldaho; 
I 
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval and 
monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys 
representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in order to ensure 
accountability and to monitor 'effectiveness; 
G) Enter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of indigent-
defense services in the State of Idaho; 
H) Award Plaintiffs and the Class reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred during the 
course of this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, LC.§ 12-117, the Private Attorney 
~eneral doctrine and other applicable law; and 
I) Grant any other relief the Court deems necessary and proper to protect Plaintiffs and the 
Class from further harm. 
48 Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, along with their supporting brief, have been filed with 
this court in conjunction with this complaint. 
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ubmitted this 17th day of June, 2015. 
Jason D. Williamson 
ACLU Foundation 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Bret H. Ladine 
Jenny Q. Shen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMY PAYNE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Gem ) 
I, Jeremy Michael Payne, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. My name is Jeremy Michael Payne. I am an adult and I live in Emmett, Idaho, 
Gem County. 
2. I was arrested in Payette County on January 25, 2015, and charged with driving 
without a license and possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. 
3. I was not represented by counsel my initial appearance, at which time the court 
set my bail at $30,000. I could not afford that bail amount, and as a result, I remained in custody 
until June 9, 2015. 
4. I have only been able to meet with my attorney for a total of approximately 30-45 
minutes since my case started. Most of those meetings occurred in or just outside the courtroom 
just prior to my court appearances. 
5. I have repeatedly tried to reach my attorney by telephone, but have not been able 
to do so on any consistent basis. Between May 12 and May 26, 2015, I left at least six voice 
messages for my attorney, none of which were returned. 
6. My lawyer hasn't been able to review discovery materials in my case with me. 
7. Even though I am scheduled to go to trial on July 21, 2015, it is my understanding 
that my attorney has not had the chance to conduct any investigation into my case, contact or 
summon any witnesses, hire an investigator, review and explain the relevant discovery materials 
to me, or discuss any trial strategies with me. 
8. Everything I have stated in this affidavit is a fact I know personally. I will testify 
in person and under oath about these facts before this Court if I am called as a witness. 
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DATED this l Sctay of June, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
,, ,,, .......... ,,. 
,,,,,.. D A. Ep/l ~,,,,, 
~f.~ ......... ~ 
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DATED this~ day of June, 2015. 
Richard Eppink, ACLU of Idaho Foundation 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Jenny Shen 
Bret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLP 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
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AFFIDAVIT OF NAOMI MORLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Boise ) 
I, Naomi Morley, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. My name is Naomi Morley. I am an adult and I live in Garden Valley, Idaho, in Boise 
County. 
2. I was arrested in Ada County on March 14, 2014, following a serious single-car 
accident in which I was seriously injured. 
3. I have been charged in Ada County with driving under the influence and possession of 
controlled substances and paraphernalia. 
4. I was assigned a public defender, and I am currently represented by an appointed 
conflict attorney. 
5. Although I think there was a lawyer at my initial appearance on these charges, I do not 
remember having any opportunity to consult with that lawyer. The court set my bail at $15,000 
at that time. I could not afford that bail amount, and so I remained in the Ada County Jail until 
my bail was reduced three weeks later, even though I had been severely injured in the car 
accident. 
6. My appointed lawyers have been unable to provide me with adequate representation. 
If I want to retain an expert to challenge the State's contentions about the alleged presence of 
drugs in my system at the time of the accident, or any other outside testing, I have to pay for such 
services myself, I was previously informed. 
7. I also have had to track down my own witnesses. Despite informing my lawyer that 
another person would confess responsibility, it was only through my own efforts that I recently 
obtained a sworn affidavit from the person, acknowledging responsibility. 
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8. Also, after preparing an extensive analysis of discrepancies in the state's investigation, 
I gave it to my lawyer but was informed that he did not even look at it. And the vehicle involved 
in the crash was apparently scrapped by the state, and my lawyer did not inspect it before it was 
destroyed. 
9. I have also been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with my lawyer. I 
am worried that my lawyer is pressuring me to plead guilty because he does not have the time or 
resources to prepare sufficiently for trial. I have turned down a plea offer that would have 
required me to spend 10 years in prison. I am scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015. 
10. Everything I stated in this affidavit is a fact I know personally. I will testify in 
person and under oath about these facts before this Court if I am called as a witness. 
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DATED this -J3aay of June, 2015. 
~~ NaiMorley'S 
ot c e State of Idaho 
Residing at: Ot$e 
My commission expires: "t-( Z,.,'f, /zo'"Z-1 
.• 
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DATED this~ day of June, 2015. 
Richard Eppink, ACLU ofldaho Foundation 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Jenny Shen 
Bret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLP 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JASON SHARP 
STATEOFIDAlIO ) 
: ss. 
County of Shoshone ) 
I, Jason Momoe Sharp, having been duly gworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. My name is Jason Monroe Sharp. I am an adult and 1 live in Kellogg, Idaho, 
Shoshone County. 
Page: 11116 
2. I was arrested in Shoshone County on May 16, :2014, and chargEld with burglary 
and grand :theft. 
3. I was not represented by cotmSel my initial appearance on May 20, 2014, at which 
time the cowt set my bail at $50,000. l could not afford that bail. .amotmt, and as a result, .r 
remained in custody until May 29, 2014. 
4. After I e,gplained to the court, without the assistance of my lawyer, that I was not 
on probation at 1he time of my arrest, as the judge believed, the court reduced my bail to $5,000. 
I still was unable to afford to pay my bail, however, and remained in custody. 
5. Fea:ringthatI might lose my job ifl retnai.uedm.jail, I contacted my employer, 
without the assistance of my lawyer, and asked that he write a letter to the court supporting my 
employer, the comt released me fromjail on my own recognizance. 
6. I have only been able to meet with my attorney for a total of approximately one 
hour throughout the 13 months during wbich my case has been pendm.g. Most of the meetings l 
have had with my lawyer have occurred :in or just outside the courtroom prior to my coutt 
appearances. 
7. I have also has been unable to 1·eview the discovery in my case, despite repeated 
requests to do so. 
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8. Even though I am scheduled to go to trial on July 14, 2015, it is my understanding 
that my attorney has not had the chance to conduct any investigation into my case, cont.act 01· 
summon any witnesses, hl.1:e an investigator, review and explain the relevant discovery materials 
to :me, or discuss any trial st,rategies with me. 
9. Everything I have stated in this affidavit is a fact I know personally. I will testify 
in pe.rson and under oath about these facts before this Corut if I am called as a witness. 
DA'IED this 16 day of June, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this LL:t_ day of June, 2015, 
DATED this 16day of June, 2015. 
Notary blic fOl." ofidaho 
Residing ; Mu.U...t1..\ 
My commission expires: lD }:).sit '1 
U of Idaho Foundation 
Jason D. Williamson, ACLU Foundation 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Jenny Shen 
B:ret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLf' 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffi 
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Jason D. Williamson 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
jwilliamson@aclu.org 
125 Broad Street 
New York, New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208) 344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Andrew C. Lillie 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP Cl-lRISTOPHl:.R 0. RiCH, Ciork 
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com ByTENILLE GRANT 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 DEPUTY 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
303-899-7300 
303-899-7333 (fax) 
Kathryn M. Ali 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
katluyn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 
(202) 637-5910 (fax) 
Bret H. Ladine 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 374-2300 
(415) 374-2499 (fax) 
Jenny Q. Shen 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
650-463-4199 (fax) 
Pro hac vice applications pending 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., 
Defendants. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF TRACY TUCKER 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonner ) 
I, Tracy Don Tucker, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
#868 P.001/003 
1. , My name is T,racy Don Tucker. I am an adult and I live in Sandpoint, Idaho, 
Bonner County. 
2. I was arrested in Bonner County on March 6, 2015, and charged with attempted 
strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of a child. 
3, Although I was appointed a public defender at my initial appearance before the 
court on March 9, 2015, I was not represented by counsel at that appearance, at which time the 
court set my bail at $40,000. I could not afford that bail amount, and as a result, I remained in 
the Bonner County Jail until June 2, 2015. 
4. The attorney assigned to my case did not appear on my behalf at my arraignment 
on March 18, 2015. Instead, a substitute attorney with no prior knowledge of my case or even 
the charges against me. The substitute attorney failed to seek a bond reduction at my 
arraignment. 
5. My appointed lawyer has been unable to provide me with adequate representation. 
Between March 9 and June 1, 2015, I was only able to meet with my attorney on three occasions: 
once, when my attorney came to Bonner County Jail and met with me for approximately 10 
minutes, and two additional times when I saw my lawyer in court My attorney did not meet 
, . 
with me prior to either of those court proceedings-not even in the courtroom prior to the 
proceedings. 
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6. During the three months I was in custody, I spoke with my public defender on the 
phone only on two occasions, both for approximately five minutes. Between March 18, 2015 
and June 1, 2015, I attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach my attorney by phone at least 50 times. 
7. As of June 8, 2015, ten days prior to my original trial date, it is my understanding 
that my attorney had not conducted any investigation into my case, contacted or summoned any 
witnesses, or hired an investigator. My attorney also did not review or explain the discovery 
materials in my case, or discuss potential trial strategies with me. 
8. On June 2, 2015, l pleaded guilty to attempted stranguladon and was released 
from custody the same day. I am scheduled to be sentenced on August 3, 2015. 
9. Everything I have stated in this affidavit is a fa.ct I know personally. I will testify 
in person and under oath about these facts before this Court if I am called as a witness. 
DATED thish£' day of June, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this/u'day of June, 2015. 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing ~t: . 8~ ~~.. l-.D 
My comm1ss1on expires: 0 ¥ Oo/ ~~ / ? 
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DATEDthis~dayofJune,2015. ~ 
~ACLU of Idaho Foundati 
Jason D. Williamson, ACLU Foundation 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Jenny Shen 
Bret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLP 
AtlorneJ:~for the Plaintiffs 
: -~··. :•: 
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Jason D. Williamson 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
jwilliamson@aclu.org 
125 Broad Street 
New York, New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208)344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Andrew C. Lillie 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
an drew .lillie@hoganlovens.com 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
303-899-7300 
303-899-7333 (fax) 
Kathryn M. Ali 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 
(202) 637-5910 (fax) 
Bret H. Ladine 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 374-2300 
(415) 374-2499 (fax) 
Jenny Q. Shen 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
650-463-4199 (fax) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA_ 0. 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of C \/ 0 C 1 5 1 0 2 4 
themselves and all others similarly situated, Case No. _______ _ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
... 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., 
Defendants. 
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FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD EPPINK 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Richard Eppink, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in this case. 
2. Exhibit A to this affidavit is a true copy of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, 
2015 Report to the Legislature, obtained from Ian Thomson, Executive Director of the 
Public Defense Commission. 
3. Exhibit B to this affidavit is a true copy of the Payette County Public Defender Contract 
for 2014-2016, obtained through a Public Records Law request on about October 6, 2014. 
4. Exhibit C to this affidavit is a true copy of the Gem County Public Defender Contract 
for, obtained through a Public Records Law request on about October 2, 2014. 
5. Exhibit D to this affidavit is a true copy of the Custer County Public Defender Contract, 
obtained through a Public Records Law request on about October 22, 2014. 
6. Exhibit E to this affidavit is a true copy of the Franklin County Public Defender 
Contract, obtained through a Public Records Law request on October 21, 2014. 
7. Exhibit F to this affidavit is a true copy of a report I received from Justin Curtis, an 
attorney who I understand works in the office of the Idaho State Appellate Public 
Defender and is a member of a subcommittee of the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission 
that is investigating pre-trial justice in Idaho. I understand from Mr. Curtis that this list 
represents the results of a survey he conducted for the subcommittee about which Idaho 
counties provide counsel at the time of arraignment to defendants who cannot afford an 
attorney. I received this list by email from Mr. Curtis on April 21, 2015. 
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8. I have reviewed the current clients, former clients, and other matters I am handling and 
have handled in the past to determine whether I may have any professional conflict of 
interest or potential conflict of interest that might inhibit my ability to represent a class of 
all indigent defendants in Idaho. I have also considered the information that I am aware 
of, including confidential and privileged information, concerning the named plaintiffs and 
proposed class representatives of that class to determine whether there may be a conflict 
of interest or potential conflict of interest between class representatives or between any 
class representative and any absent class member. I have not identified any potential 
conflict of interest that I believe would prevent me from fairly and adequately 
representing the class or that would prevent the proposed class representatives from 
serving as class representatives for the absent class members. 
9. I am admitted to practice before Idaho state courts, the U.S. District Court for the 
District ofldaho, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I have served as 
lead counsel or the only handling attorney in major litigation in areas of significant public 
interest or developing law, in both state and federal court, including in class actions. I am 
currently the Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation 
and practice exclusively in the areas of constitutional and civil rights law and policy with 
major societal significance. 
DATED this 16th day of June, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME this 16th day of Ju e, 2015. 
1 
........... ·--~~-
INGRID ANDRULIS 
Notary Public · 
State o(ldabo .1 
. ' ···; ,' 
~j_ 
Nota . Public for Idaho 
Residing at: ~/5v 
My commission expires: /.j .. 22 ""2/)/t/ 
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I. SUMMARY 
The State Public Defense Commission (PDC) was recently established 1 as a 
means to improve the delivery of indigent legal defense services throughout Idaho. 
The mission of the Commission is to seek and preserve freedom for all by vigorously 
safeguarding Constitutional rights. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, "The price of 
freedom is eternal vigilance." In that effort, the Commission aims to: 
(A) serve as a clearing house of information for relevant stakeholdei·s; 
(B) maintain standards to ensure that defending attorneys have adequate 
training and resources to fulfill their Sixth Amendment obligations; 
(C)promulgate rules for public defender training and data collection 
regarding indigent defense services; 
(D)inform the legislature of any Sixth Amendment issues. 
In a very short period, the Commission has established an office, held regular 
meetings, begun to assess the collection of relevant data, and identified its 
immediate priorities for its first year of operation. Consequently, the members of 
the Commission are engaged in developing recommended model contract terms and 
constructing rules and 
regulations regarding 
public defender training 
and qualifications. 
I 
• GATHER INFORMATION 
• PROVIDE TRAINING 
• ISSUE RULES & STANDARDS 
• INFORM LEGISLATURE 
1 For a brief discussion of the relevant background leading to the creation of the State Public 
Defense Commission, see Supplemental Material at pp.13· 15, included at the end of this 
report. 
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II. APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS 
According to statute, all appointed members of the Commission are voluntary 
and serve part-time. The following Commissioners were appointed upon the 
creation of the Commission in July of 2014: 
Member Appointment Authority Term 
Sen. Chuck Winder President Pro Tempore of Elected Term 
Senate Senate :S 2 years 
Rep. Jason A. Monks Speaker of the Elected Term 
House of Representatives House of Representatives :S 2 years 
Hon. Molly Huskey, Chair* Chief Justice of 2 years District Court Judge, Third District Supreme Court 
Comm. Kimber Ricks Governor 3 years Idaho Association of Counties 
William H. Wellman, Esq. Governor 3 years Owyhee County Public Defender 
Sara B. Thomas, Esq. Governor 3 years State Appellate Public Defender 
Darrell G. Bolz, Vice-Chair* Governor 3 years Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission 
* Both the Chair and Vice·Chair serve terms of a single year. 
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III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COMMISSION 
The Commission met for the first time on August 27, 2014. Given the obvious 
challenges in creating a new agency and meeting its statutory obligations, the 
Commission has met a total of nine times in the intervening four and a half months. 
In that time the Commission has selected a chair and vice-chair for its first year of 
operation, drafted bylaws, and adopted a mission statement, vision statement and 
statement of values. 
In accordance with statute, the Commission 
hired a full-time Executive Director, Ian Thomson, 
to handle the day-to-day operations of the 
Commission. He began working for the 
Commission in October. Prior to joining the 
Public Defense Commission, Mr. Thomson worked 
in the Capital Litigation Unit at the Idaho State 
Appellate Public Defender. Previously he worked 
as a trial-level public defender for several years. 
The Commission also obtained office space and 
hired a part-time administrative assistant. In 
establishing a new state agency, the Commission 
has contracted with other state agencies and 
private contractors to provide necessary services 
and support for the creation and maintenance of 
the office. 
Hard at Work 
• Establishing a new state agency 
from the ground-up 
• Forming sub-committees 
-Model Contracts 
-Training & Qualifications 
• Assessing public defense services 
in each county 
• Assessing current public defender 
training and continuing legal 
education 
The Commission identified its statutory priorities and formed two primary 
subcommittees: one to explore model contract terms for use by the various counties, 
and the other to devise administrative rules regarding public defender training and 
qualifications. The entire membership of the Commission also agree4 to work on 
data reporting requirements throughout the first year. 
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Public Defense Delivery Assessment 
The Commission has made a complete assessment of the way in which each 
county in Idaho provides for indigent defense services. Accompanying that 
information, the Commission has generated a comprehensive public defender roster, 
consolidating contact information for every institutional public defender, contract 
defending attorney, and contracted conflict public defender across Idaho. 
By statute there are four 
approved means for providing Sixth 
Amendment counsel to those who 
qualify2: (1) a county can establish 
and maintain an institutional public 
defender office, (2) more than one 
county can jointly establish and 
operate an institutional public 
defender office, (3) a county can 
contract with the public defender 
Cassia County Courthouse 
office of another county for services, 
or (4) a county can choose to contract with private practitioners to act as the 
defending attorneys for those who qualify. 
The following is a brief synopsis of the methods of delivery being used in the 
various counties throughout Idaho. 
INSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES 
Seven (7) counties have now chosen to establish and maintain a public 
defender office. (Ada, Bannock, Bonner, BonnevilleB, Canyon4, Kootenai, and Twin 
Falls counties.) 
2 Idaho Code §19·859(1)·(4). 
a Bonneville County also created a separate Office of the Conflict Public Defender in 2014, 
which employs two full·time attorneys to handle cases conflicted out of the primary office. 
4 The Canyon County Public Defender was only established in 2014, and began operation on 
October 1st. 
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Those offices currently employ a combined total of 115 full-time attorneys to 
handle the majority of the indigent cases in their respective counties. Between those 
offices, the PDC has identified another forty-one (41) attorneys that are used to 
handle conflict cases. 
JOINTLY OPERATED PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES 
Only two (2) counties have opted to enter into a joint operating agreement, in 
order to pool resources together and establish an office of the public defender. 
(Cassia and Minidoka counties.) A joint management board, with members from 
each county, has been arranged to handle the finance and maintenance of the office. 
The Mini-Cassia Public Defender currently employs five (5) full-time public 
defenders and operates a small office in each respective county. 
COUNTIES CONTRACTING WITH OUTSIDE PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES 
No county in Idaho is currently contracting with an outside institutional 
public defender office to provide Sixth Amendment representation. 
COUNTIES WITH PRIVATE ATTORNEY CONTRACTS 
Thirty-four (34) counties are currently under contract with one or more 
attorneys in private practice to provide representation for those who qualify. 
(Adams, Bear Lake, Benewah, Bingham, Blaine, Boise, Boundary, Butte, Camas, 
Caribou, Clark, Clearwater, Custer, Elmore, Franklin, Fremont, Gem, Gooding, 
Idaho, Jefferson, Jerome, Latah, Lemhi, Lewis, Lincoln, Madison, Nez Perce, 
Oneida, Owyhee, Payette, Power, Shoshbne, Teton, and Valley ~aunties.) 
Between those thirty-four (34) coJnties, there are fifty·thlee (53) separate 
contracts involving sixty-seven (67) diffe~ent attorneys who are engaged in 
providing services. The Commission haJ also identified an additional six (6) 
attorneys that have conflict·specific conJacts in those counties,land another two (2) 
who frequently serve as a conflict attornly without the benefit of a contract. 
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There is one county (Washington) that has neither a public defender office 
nor an existing contract for the provi~ion of indigent defense services. The 
Commission has identified seven (7) attorneys who are most frequently appointed 
by the sitting judge to handle those cases on an ad hoc basis. 
Type of Service Number of Counties Number of Attorneys 
County Institutional Public 7 115 Defender Office 
Jointly Operated Public 2 5 Defender Office 
Contract Defending Attorney 34 67 
Contract Conflict Defending 10 47 Attorneys 
Felony and capital appeals in forty-three (43) counties are handled by the 
office of the State Appellate Public Defender.6 The State Appellate Public Defender 
currently employs a staff of sixteen (16) attorneys, and uses the services of three (3) 
private appellate lawyers to handle felony conflicts. According to the Commission's 
most recent assessment, there are 136 full-time attorneys employed at institutional 
public defender offices at the trial and appellate level in Idaho. Another sixty-seven 
(67) work under a contract with one or more counties, and another fifty-nine (59) 
serve as either contract conflict-defense attorneys or are frequently used as 
appointed attorneys to handle similar matters. 
The Commission has also discovered that half of Idaho's counties (twenty-
two) are being served by contract defending attorneys whose principal office is 
located outside of the county. (See figure below.) 
5 Six counties with institutional public defender offices, along with four contract counties, 
have entered into specific contracts for conflict services. 
s All counties, except for Jefferson County, have chosen to participate and contribute to the 
state funds which qualifies them for these services. 
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Legal Education and Training Assessment 
The Commission has undertaken a concerted effort to identify those 
attorneys who are in the greatest need of additional training, support, and 
resources. In anticipation of planning training programs for public defenders, the 
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Commission has completed an initial assessment of the amount and source of the 
mandatory continuing legal education (MCLE) credit hours obtained by each public 
defender in their current reporting period. That initial assessment confirms that a 
significant number of indigent defense attorneys in the State are not receiving 
adequate training hours in areas directly relevant to the representation of their 
indigent clients. 
The Commission has joined 186 attorneys serving as public defenders in 
Idaho to the National Association for Public Defense (NAPD), which provides 
attorneys with significant online resources. Particularly for attorneys who practice 
alone, or are located in more remote areas, online resources can provide a 
substantial and cost-effective method to provide guidance and support. 
IV. IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENSE REFORM INTERIM COMMITTEE 
During its first few months of operation, the Commission was tasked with 
certain clear priorities by the joint Public Defense Reform Interim Committee. 
Those objectives included the development of model contract terms to serve as 
guidelines to the counties with private contracts, and the provision of relevant 
training to public defenders in the current fiscal year. 
The Commission has adopted the priorities of the Interim Committee, and 
due to limited time and resources the State Public Defense Commission is not 
submitting any legislative recommendations for public defense reform at this time. 
The Commission feels strongly that signihcant reforms in the absehce of clear and 
reliable data and information would be a !disservice to all of those i~volved. The 
Commission will be looking toward the implementation of Odysse~ (the statewide 
court technology software) to provide betJer information on caseload and workload 
of those attorneys representing defendants at county expense. Tha} program 
represents a $21 million investment by tle State into improving effective case 
management throughout the criminal juJtice system. However, as ~dministrative 
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District Judge Richard Bevan recently reported to the House Judiciary, Rules & 
Administration Committee, the statewide implementation of Odyssey is not likely to 
be completed until 2017. 
Model Contract Terms and Public Defender Standards 
The Commission has undertaken a serious study of the nature and 
composition of contracts being used by counties throughout Idaho. They have begun 
their review of other model contracts, and are progressing quickly in identifying 
those terms that are necessary to ensure that counties can provide representation 
with financial or ethical conflicts, and still take into consideration the particular 
circumstances of the individual counties. At the same time these contract provisions 
should provide the attorney with adequate protections and financial compensation 
for the work being provided to their clients. 
The Commission expects to present recommended model contract terms in 
the upcoming year and to have those available to the counties by the time existing 
contracts expire in the fall of 2015. In addition, the Commission will be submitting 
proposed rules for adoption and approval regarding the qualifications of contracted 
public defenders and training requirements for those attorneys handling indigent 
appointments. 
Full Utilization of Trustee and Benefit Payments 
The Commission is fully aware th{t its trustee benefit patent allocation 
has been set-aside specifically for the training of indigent defense attorneys across 
the state. In addition to providing attorn!ys with online resom,s through the 
NAPD, the Commission is planning to h+t and sponsor three distinct training 
conferences before the end of the 2015 fiscal year, at little or no Jost to those who 
attend. A primary conference for trial- aJd appellate-level public defenders is 
scheduled for June 4-5 in Caldwell, whic! will accommodate up o 155 attorneys. An 
additional capital training will be held iJ Coeur d'Alene on June 12th for up to 
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twenty-five (25) attorneys. Furthermore, a specialized training for attorneys who 
handle juvenile and child-protection cases is planned in Boise on May 29th for 
another twenty (20) attorneys. Those trainings are expected to fully exhaust the 
money allocated for trustee benefit payments in the current year. 
Outreach and Education 
Finally, the Commission is engaged in important information gathering and 
public education with respect to the public defense function. In accordance with 
those aims, representatives of the Commission have already made considerable 
efforts to meet with chiefs of the institutional public defender offices across the 
state, several contract attorneys, county commissioners, and a limited number of 
prosecuting attorneys. The Commission will continue to strive to inform the 
relevant stakeholders about the Commission's role, the guidance it can provide to 
county commissions, and the support it can offer to defense attorneys representing 
Idaho's indigent population. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The State Public Defense Commission is determined and committed to 
improving the quality and effectiveness of indigent representation in every county 
of Idaho. The Commission also acknowledges that there is clear room for reform and 
improvement. Although an assessment has begun, given the diversity of the current 
public defense system and the diffuse nature of its administration, the challenges 
faced in collecting data from each county, and the difficulty in implementing model 
contract terms, a more robust analysis of each county's system will take a 
considerable amount of time. Consequently, the Commission believes that it will 
require additional time and study before making legislative recommendations 
involving substantive and systemic reform. 
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SUPPLEMENT AL 
MATERIALS 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE IDAHO STATE 
PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION 
In 2008 the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), along with the 
Juvenile Justice Commission, requested the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association (NLADA) conduct a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the 
provision of indigent defense across the state of Idaho at the trial-level. Over the 
course of a year, the NLADA sent evaluators to seven representative counties 
throughout the state, including Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, Nez 
Perce, and Power. 
The NLADA issued their final report in January 2010, entitled, The 
Gua1·antee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due P1·ocess in Idaho's T1'ial Cou1·t (Evaluation 
of Trial-Level Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho. The report concluded 
[T]he state of Idaho fails to provide the level of representation required 
by our Constitution for those who cannot afford counsel in its criminal 
and juvenile courts. By delegating to each county the responsibility to 
provide counsel at the trial level without any state funding or oversight, 
Idaho has sewn a patchwork quilt of underfunded, inconsistent systems 
that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and in the level 
of competency of the services rendered. While there are admirable 
qualities of some of the county indigent defense services, NLADA finds 
that none of the public defender systems in the sample counties are 
constitutionally adequate. 
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At the same time the NLADA was conducting their analysis of Idaho's 
system, the CJC created its own Subcommittee on Public Defense in December of 
2009. The CJC's subcommittee included representatives from the Idaho Association 
of Counties, the state court system, the Attorney General's office, county 
prosecutors, judges and magistrates, legislators, attorneys, public defenders, and 
the Department of Corrections. That group undertook its own study of the public 
defense system over the course of three and a half years. 
The CJC's subcommittee made several legislative recommendations, 
including (1) a revision of state statute addressing the definition of indigency, and 
clarifying when a person or child qualifies for legal representation at county 
expense, (2) a clarification of when a single attorney can serve as a guardian and 
attorney in the same matter, (3) the establishment of standards for juvenile 
representation, and (4) the creation of a legislative Interim Committee to explore 
public defense reform. Largely in response to those recommendations, the joint 
legislative Public Defense Reform Interim Committee was created in the 2013 
session and was extended through 2014. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION 
During the 2014 session the Legislature established the State Public Defense 
Commission, as a self-governing agency of the Executive branch. The Commission's 
charter is codified in Idaho Code § 19-848 through § 19-850. The <;:ommission was 
established on July 1st, 2014. r 1 
The statutory mandate and authori!y of the PDC was cleatly set forth in LC. 
§19·850(a) and (b). The PDC has been chal.ged with the followingi 
(1) Promulgate rules with regards to 
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a. Training and continuing legal education requirements (CLE) for 
indigent defense attorneys, including criminal, capital, post-conviction, 
juvenile, abuse and neglect, civil commitments, and civil contempt; 
b. Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports that 
indigent defense attorneys must submit to their county commissions 
and administrative judge, including caseload, workload and 
expenditures. 
(2) Make recommendations to the Idaho legislature regarding the public defense 
system (by January 20 of each year), including 
a. Core contract requirements for counties to use when engaging services 
of private attorneys (including model contracts); 
b. Qualifications and experience standards for indigent defense 
attorneys; 
c. Enforcement mechanisms; 
d. Funding issues, including for trainings, data collection and reporting, 
and handling conflict cases. 
The Legislature approved an initial annual budget of $300,000. Of that 
$119,900 was appropriated for personnel costs, $74,200 was dedicated to general 
operating expenses, and $105,900 was dedicated as trustee benefit payments for 
public defender training costs. 
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OFFICE OF 
Clerk of the District Court 
BETTY J. DRESSEN 
CLERK AND EX-OFFICIO 
AUDITOR AND RECORDER 
October 6, 2014 
FOR PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO 
American Civil Liberties Union 
Jason D Williamson 
125 Broad St., 18th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
Dear Mr. Williamson: 
1130 3RD AVENUE N,, ROOM 104 
PAYETTE, IDAHO 83661-2473 
In reply to your public records request dated September 26, 2014 we have 
enclosed the closed contracts and the new contracts for Public Defense. If 
you have any questions please contact my office at 208-642-6000. 
Sincerely, 
~;JJ~ 
Betty J. Dressen 
Payette County Clerk 
EXHIBIT B 
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.iQJ,P<EMENT BETWEEN PAYETTE COUNTY, ID~ PHILLIP B. HEE'\~ FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC D~FENDER 
t,. ~, 
The County of Payette, State ofldaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into 
agreements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Board of Collilty Com.missioners 
enters into the following agreement with Phillip B. Heersink, Attorney at Law of Fruitland, Idaho, for 
the purpose of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi-~al cases 
in Payette County, for the period of October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016. 
Hereinafter, Payette County will be referred to as the "COUNTY" and Phillip B. Heersink 
will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR11 • The parties agree as follows: 
1 This agreement shall be for all services and expenses of a public defender for Payette 
ColUlty for the calendar years stated above, excluding extraordinary expenses as may be determined 
by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary expenses shall be determined through negotiations 
between the parties and shall be authorized only upon written agreement of both parties or in 
accorda,nce with Paragraph 11. 
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTOR for the term above described, sums to 
be payable as follows: 
A. CONTRACTOR agrees to dedicate whatever days per month are necessary to provide 
the full services required hereunder to worldng on matters he is appointed to under this Agreement. 
The days that CONTRACTOR performs under this Agreement will be defined as ''Public Days." A 
Public Day is any day in which CONTRACTOR must appear in Cmut for a client he is appointed to 
under this Agreement, or any day in which CONTRACTOR works for 5 or more hours on clients he is 
appojnted to under this Agreement. There is not a limit.to the number of days that CONTRACTOR . 
m.ayuse as Publlc Days :in an.y givenmonth, due to the requirement of CONTRACTOR to providethe. 
legal services _agreed to herein. · 
B. ForeachPublicDaythatCONTRACTOR works, theCOUNTYwillpayhim$560.00. 
C. The CONTRACTOR shall provide an invoice on the first day after the 14th of each 
month that the Courts are open in the COUNTY ("Worldng Day"), and another on the first Worldng 
Day after the 281h of each month. That invoice will identify the Public Days worked in the period after 
the last invoice. 
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D. The COUNTY shall pay the amounts claimed in said invoice within seven (7) days of 
receipt of the :invoice. 
3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees that h~ shall practice law independently of any contractor 
under a separate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARAIB 
CONTRACTOR"), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The 
County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms of this 
contract. 
4. In exchange forthepaymentbythe COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available 
full time and provide the criminal and quasi-criminal defense services for those persons determined 
by the Court to be indigent in the following cases: 
A. All felony cases, including felony probation violations. This paragraph shall 
not include cases where the CONTRACTOR has a conflict due to a prior 
appointment under this contract or the previous agreement. 
B. All misdemeanor cases in which the SEPARATE CONTRACTOR has a 
conflict in representation, including p~obations violations. 
C. All juvenile charges in which the SEP ARAIB CONTRACTOR has a conflict 
in representation, including probation violations. 
D. Representation of at least one indigent parent, if necessary, or the Guardian ad 
Litem, in Child Protective Act, including those child protection cases currently 
assigned to CONTRACTOR. · 
E. All probation violations where, in the discretion of the 
Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represen~ the 
probationer rather than the attorney who represented the defendant 
in the prior criminal proceedings in which the probation was entered. 
F. In all ot;her cases in which the State of Idaho is a party, in which it is the 
determination of tµe trial court that it is appropriate that an attorney pe 
appointed to represent an indigent party. 
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G. Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court. 
H. Post Conviction cases as assigned by the Comi. 
I. All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to any 
previous agreements/ 
J. All services not herein listed but which are listed in specificati.on.s for bids 
which were- submitted to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her 
solicitation for such bids in 2008. 
5. CONTRACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be 
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necessary 
supplies; Workman's Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the like. CONTRACTOR 
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1 :00 
' p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mondaythm Thursday and Fridays from 9:00 am. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays 
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above 
referenced office dUl'itig regular business bouts except as the court calendar, vacation, illness, and 
other absences may preclude. 
6. All ptofessional legal personnel assisting the CONTRACTOR in performing under this 
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CbNTRACTOR They shall not be 
empioyees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly 
understood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract 
is that of independent contractor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor 
and as such has the sole employment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff 
serving him and performing the services under this contract 
3 
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7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur, : 
except to the extent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent 
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is 
appointed due to a confli~t that exists due to CON1RACTOR' S private practice, the expenses for 
such representation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are 
incurred. 
8. The CONTRACTOR shall provide to the COUNTY, in timely fashion, all reports required 
by the Idaho Code, and shall further file any other reports relating to the operation of his office 
reasonably requested by the County in its efforts to maintain an efficient criminal justice system. 
It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not 
include information which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons 
being represented by the CON1RACTOR. 
9. Should this contract not be renewed, all cases which have b~en assigned to the 
CONTRACTOR by the end of the Contract term, i.e., September 30, 2014, and which cannot be 
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled as a "Hold-Over" case by the 
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a "hold-over" upon 
completion of the contract the CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any 
case which is open at the end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of 
awaiting sentence or entry of fmal plea will not be included as a billable, "hold-over case" and 
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR. Provided, however, if the contract is 
not renewed but not assigned to another attorney, the contract shall automatically renew on a 
month. to month basis. 
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10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises 
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For 
these purposes a "special circumstance"' offense would be a homicide case wherein the state seeks the 
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to 
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessaiy. 
11. This contract does not include any costs of transcripts, or any expenses of trial, 
investigation or appeal for which the Court may approve expenditures It is understood by 
CONTRACTOR that there are limited funds placed in other budget line items that have been created 
by COUNTY which may be drawn upon by CONTRACTOR for such expenses, or other expenses 
related to the defense of indigent clients, such as investigators, expert witnesses, or necessary travel 
expenses. CONTRACTOR may draw on such funds by obtaining ad.vane approval for such expenses 
from the district judge or magistrate having jurisdiction over the case; provided, however, that in no 
event shall COUNTY be liable or responsible for any costs or expenses for any appeals for other 
proceedings that fall within the jurisdiction of the State Appellant Public Defender's office pursuant 
to Idaho Code 19,..867, et. Seq., and as amended. 
12. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereof by 
giving thirty (3 0) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. Provided, 
however, this agreement may be modified or cancelled should the state or federal legislatw:e or courts 
of proper Jqrisdiction requh'e a modification of Payette County's public defender services. Further, if 
it becomes clear to CONTRACTOR that these terms do not provide adequate resources for him to 
perform his full duties hereunder, he may seek to renegotiate the said terms with the COUNTY by 
scheduling a meeting with the Board of County Commissioners. 
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13. Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible 
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts, 
the COUNTY and the CON1RACTOR enter into the above agreement. 
Dated this J.5 ~ of August, 20 if 
AITEST: 
~ 
Payette ounty Commissioners 
Coun of Payette, State ofldaho 
,J,l .Q~'l..:.t ~ 
Dated tbis..2.:f'" day of August, 26-:t:3". 
PIIlLLIP B. HEERSINK, Attorney at Law 
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SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PAYETTE COUNTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT . 
lt shall be the duty of the Payette County Public Defender(s) to provide 
representation for the following matters: 
Other duties: 
1. All city and county misdemeanors 
2. All felonies 
3. Representation of the parent, or both parents if there is no conflict, and the 
child/guardian ad litem in child protection actions 
4. Persons held on mental holds 
5. Juveniles 
6. Post coflviction relief 
7. Conflicts for one (1) co-defendant in all misdemeanot and felony cases 
8. All appeals which originate in magistrate or district court, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the State Appellate Public Defender 
9. All. cases and matters pend:ihg with the current Payette Colll\ty Public 
Defender at the time the new contract period begins 
10. Second chair in any capital case (The second chair shall not be compensated 
any additional funds) 
Ceitain Administrative Duties: In order to provide the raw data for the statutorily 
required annual report, (pursuant to :Cdaho Code, Section 19-864) the contl'act 
holder must submit to the County and the Administrative District Jucige an 
~ocounting of its books i;m.d records appertaining to the public defendet1 s work on 
the last day of January for eacp. contract yeat and mote often if requested by the 
County and the Administrative District Judge. 
Qualifications: 
Any person submitting a proposal must be qualified and able to practice law :iµ the 
State ofidaho. Flui.her ail applicant must be qualified, or capable and willing to 
Public Defender Specifications 1 
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become qualified to sit second chair in a capital case by the time such 
qualifications ~ay become necessary. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 19-859, 19-860, 19-861 and any other 
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, those entities or individuals responding to 
this Request for Proposal must demonstrate their qualifications and compliance 
with these statutes. Any chosen contract public defender shall be subject to 
periodic reviews by the Administrative District Judge and the Board of County 
Commissioners to ensure that services are being provid~d as contracted for and 
that complaints as to the service provided are corrected in due course. 
Payette County will provide funds to compensate and sh?ll find ·additional counsel for the 
following matters: 
=i. Lead counsel in capital cases. 
2. Additional attomeys in matters involving three (3) or more co-defendants, 
when the co-defendants must be represented by separate counsel. 
3. The second parent appearing in a child protection case, when the 9ourt orders 
that each parent shall be represented by r:,eparate counsel, and one pareut is . 
already represented by the Payette County Public Defender or his/her 
designee. 
4. Additional expenses, such as DNA tests, or investigative services shall be paid 
by the County upon prior application and approval to the district judge and/or 
county commissioners for those defendants qualifying for the public defe:q_der. 
Your proposal should include the following: 
1. How you propose to manage the above requirements. 
2. The dolla.r amount of the service. Your final cost must include rental space, 
copy service, office supplies, secretarial service, additional employees and 
overhead costs. 
3. Any other information or proposed terms not specifically addressed may be 
submitted. 
I;>µe t9 the conflicts and the number. of defendants qualifying for the public defendey; it 
will be necessary for at least two (2) persons to contract .with the County to fulfill the above 
Public Defender Specifications 2 
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requirements or for the recipient of the contract to subcontract a portion of the con1J:act. The 
final decision as to whether the contract will be awarded to two (2) persons or will be 
mibcontracted by the party awarded the contract will be made by the Board of County 
Commissioners, upon recommendation from the District Judge. · 
It is NOT a requirement that the Payette County Public Defender be full-time, however, it 
is required that the contract recipient maintain an office located in Payette County which keeps 
regular business hours form at least 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 1 :00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday 
through Thursday and 9:00 am. to 12:00 p.m. on Fridays, and further that the contract recipient 
be generally available dUl'ing those office hours and devote sufficient time and resources to the 
position to fulfill all terms listed above. If a matter is cale11.dared for the Payette County Public 
Defender in the Payette County Court, that matter shall have priority above any matters arising 
· from the contract recipient's private caseload. IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF TIIB PAYETTE 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENQER TO PAY THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH APPOINTING 
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL WHEN HE/SHE HAS A CALENDARING OR ETHICAL 
CONFLICT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR ABOVE. 
'the Payette County Commissioners reserve the right to reje.ct any and all proposals. 
Upon award of the contract, the contract recipient(s) will have 30 days in which to negotiate any 
additional terms,and to endorse the contract. Additional contract tenns will be added. Previous 
contracts may be reviewed upon request. The contract will begin October 1, 2008 and expire 
September 30, 2010. However, in the event of emergency, the contract recipient must be 
prepared to asswne all responsibility upon award. 
All proposals are to be sealed and delivered to Betty Dressen by September 22, 2008 
at 5:00 p.Iil. The award will be made on or about September 25, 2008. 
Upon submission of my proposal, I agree to the above terms and conditions. 
Signature: ----~~---
Please print name: --------
Public Defender Specifications 3 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO AND KELLY 
WHITING FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The County of Payette, State ofldaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into 
agreements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Board of County Commissioners 
enters into the following agreement with KELLY WHITING, Attorney at Law of Fruitland, Idaho, for 
the purpose of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi-criminal cases 
in Payette County, for the period of October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016. 
Hereinafter, Payette County will be refe1Ted to as the "COUNTY" and KELLY WHITING 
will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR". The parties agree as follows: 
1 This agreement shall be for all services and expenses of a public defender for Payette 
County for the calendar years stated above, excluding extraordinary expenses as may be determined 
by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary expenses shall be dete1mined through negotiations 
between the parties and shall be authorized only upon written agreement of both parties or in 
accordance with Paragraph 11. 
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTORforthetermabove described, sums to 
be payable as follows: 
A. CONTRACTOR agrees to dedicate whatever days per month arenecessmyto provide 
the full services required hereunder·to working on matters he is appointed to under this Agreement. 
The days that CONTRACTOR performs under this Agreement will be defined as "Public Days/' A 
Public Day is any day in which CONTRACTOR must appear in Court for a client he is appointed to 
under this Agreement, or any day in which CONTRACTOR works for 5 or more hours on clients he is 
appointed to under this Agreement. There is not a limit to the number of days that CONTRACTOR 
may use as Public Days in any givenmoilth, due to the requfrement of CONTRACTOR to provide the 
legal services agreed to herein. 
B. For each Public Day that CONTRACTOR works, the COUNTY will pay him $560.00. 
C. The CONTRACTOR shall provide an invoice on the first day after the 141h of each 
month that the Courts are open in the COUNTY (''Working Day"), and another on the first Working 
Day after the 28th of each month. That invoice will identify the Public Days worked in the period after 
the last invoice. 
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D. The COUNTY shall pay the amounts claimed in said invoice within seven (7) days of 
receipt of the invoice . 
. 3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees th.at he shall practice law ind_ependently of any contractor 
under a separate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARATE 
CONTRACTOR''), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The 
County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms of this 
contract. 
4. In exchange for the payment by the COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available 
full time and provide the criminal and quasi-criminal defense services for those persons determined 
by the Court to be indigent in the following cas~s: 
· A. All tnisdemeanor charges, including criminal appeals to the district court and 
probation violations. This paragraph shall not include cases where the 
CONTRACTOR has a conflict due to a prior appointm.eni,underthis contract 
or the previous agreement. 
B. All felony cases in which the SEPARATE CONTRACTOR has a conflict in 
l'epresentation, including probations violations. 
C. All juvenile charges. 
D. Representation of at least one indigent parent, if necessary, or the Guardian ad 
Litem, in Child Protective Act, including those child protection cases currently 
assigned to CONTRACTOR. 
E. All probation violations where, in the discretion of the 
Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represent the 
probationer rather than the attorney who represented the defendant 
in the prior criminal proceedings in which the probation was entered. 
F. In all other cases ii;i which the State has an interest, in which it is the 
determination of the trial court that it is appropriate that an attorney be 
appointed to represent an indigent party. 
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G. Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court. . 
H. Post Conviction cases as assigned by the Court. 
I. All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to any 
previous agreements/ 
J. All services not herein listed but which are listed in specifications for bids 
which were submitted to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her 
solicitation for such bids in 2008. 
5. CONTRACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be 
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necess~ 
supplies; Workman's Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the like. CONTRACTOR 
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1 :00 
p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday thru Thursday and Fridays from 9:00 am. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays 
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above 
referenced office during regular business hours except as the court calendar, vacation, illness, and 
other absences may preclude. 
6. All professional legal personnel assisting the CON'DlA.CTOR in performing under this 
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CONTRACTOR. They shall not be 
employees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly 
tmderstood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract 
is that of independel).t contractor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor 
and as such has the sole employment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff 
serving him and performing the services under this contract. 
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7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur, 
except to the ~xtent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent 
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is 
appointed due to a conflict that exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice, the expenses for 
such representation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are 
incurred. 
8. The CONTRACTOR shall provide to the COUNTY, in timely fashion, all reports required 
by the Idaho Code, and shall further file any other reports relating to the operation of his office 
reasonably requested by the County in its efforts to maintain an efficient criminal justice system. 
It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not 
incl~de infonnation which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons 
being represented by the CONTRACTOR. 
9. Should this contract not be renewed, all cases which have been assigned to the 
CONTRACTOR by the end of the Contract term, i.e., September 30, 2014, and which cannot be 
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled as a ''Hold-Over" case by the 
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a 11hold-over 11 upon 
completion of the contract the CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any 
case which is open at ~e end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of 
awaiting sentence or entry of final plea will not be included as a billable, "hold-over case 11 and 
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR. Provided, however, if the contract is 
not renewed but not assigned to another attorney, the contract shall automatically renew on a 
month to month basis. 
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10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises 
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For 
these purposes a" special circumstance" offense would be a homicide case wherein the state s¢eks the 
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to 
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessaty. 
11. This contract does not include any costs of transcripts, or any expenses of trial, 
investigation or appeal for which the Court may approve expenditures It is understood by 
CO~CTOR that there are limited funds placed in o~er budget line items that have been created 
by COUNTY which may be drawn upon by CONTRACTOR for such expenses, or other expenses 
related to the defense of indigent clients, such as investigators, expe1t witnesses, or necessary travel 
expenses. CONTRACTOR may draw on such funds by obtaining advance approval for such 
expenses from the district judge or magistrate having jurisdiction ovetthe case; provided, however, 
that in no event shall COUNTY be liable or responsible for any costs or expenses for any appeals for 
other proceedings that fall within the jurisdiction of the State Appellant Public Defender's office 
pursuant to Idaho Code 19-867, et. Seq., and as amended. 
12. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereofby 
giving thirty (30) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. Provided, 
however, this agreement may be modified or cancelled should the state or federal legislature or courts 
of proper jurisdiction require a modification of Payette County's public defender services. Further, if 
it becomes clear to CONTRACTOR that these terms do not provide adequate resources for him to 
perform his full duties hereunder, he may seek to renegotiate the said terms with the COUNTY by 
scheduling a meeting with the Board of County Commissioners. 
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13. Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible 
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts, 
the COUNTY and 1he CONTRACTOR enter into the above agreement. 
Dated this~ day of Ji;!~ .µw 
~~ 
ATTEST: 
;;s ~n 
Payette County Commissioners 
County of Payette, State ofldaho 
. ..Ji.\ /HS)<!+; .,ef t.o )~ \~ 
Dated this UJ day of .R:tt'J', ~ 
KELLY WHITING, Attomey at Law 
. . .. 
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SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PAYETTE COUNTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT 
It shall be the duty of the Payette County Public Defender(s) to provide 
representation for the following matters: 
Other· duties: 
1. All city and county misdemeanors 
2. All felonies 
3. Representation of the parent, or both parents if there is no conflict; and the 
child/guardian ad litem in child protection actions 
4. Persons held on mental holds 
5. Juveniles 
6. Post conviction relief 
7. Conflicts for one (1) co-defendant in all misdemeanor and felony cases 
8. All appeals which originate in magistrate or district court, subject to the 
jurisdiction Qf the State Appellate Public Defender 
9. All cases and matters pend.ihg with the current Payette County Public 
Defender at the tlrr!.~ the new -contract period begins 
I 0. Second chair in any capital case (The second chair shall i:iot be compensated 
any additio:p.al funds) 
· Certain Administrative Duties: In order to provtde the raw data for the statutorily 
required aJJ11ual report, (pursuant to Id$o Cod~, Section 19-864) ilie contract 
4older must submit to the County and the Administrative District Judge a11 
accounting ofits books and records appertaining to the public defender; s work on 
the last day of January for each contract year and more often if requested by the 
County and the Administrative District Judge. 
Quaii:fications: 
Any persqn submitting a proposal must be qualified and able to pr~cp.ce law 4i the 
State ofldaho. Further an applicant must be qualified, or capable and willing to 
Public Defender Specifications 1 
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become qualified to sit second chair in a capital case by the time such 
qualifications may become necessary. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 19-859, 19-860, 19-861 and any other 
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, those entitle~ or individuals responding to 
this Request for Proposal must demonstrate their qualifications and compliance 
with these statutes. Any chosen contract public defender shall be subject to 
periodic reviews by the Administrativ.e District Judge and the.Board of County 
Commissioners to ensure that services are being prbvid¥d as contracted for and 
that complaints as to the service provided are corrected in due course. 
Payette County Will provide funds to compensate and shall find additional counsel for the 
following matters: 
1. Lead counsel in capital cases. 
2. Additional attorneys in matters involving three (3) or more co-defendants, 
when the co-defendants must be represented by separate col,lllSel. 
3. The second parent appearing in a child protection case, when th<;: co_urt otders 
that each parent shall be represented by ~eparate counsel, and one parent is 
already represented by the Payette County Public Defender or his/her 
designee. 
4. Additional expenses, such as DNA tests, or investigative services shall be paid 
by the County upon prior application and approval to the district judge and/or 
county commissioners for those defendants qualifying for the public defender. 
Your proposal should include the following: 
1. How you propose to manage the above requirements. 
2. The dollar amount of the service. Your final cost must include rental space, 
copy service, office supplies, secretarial service, additional employees and 
overhead costs. · 
3. Any other information or proposed terms not specifically addressed may be 
submitted. 
])µe to the conflicts and the n1:1mber of defendants qualifying for the public defender, it 
will be necessary for at least two (2) persons to contract with the County to fulfill the above 
Public Defender Specifications 2 
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requirements or for the recipient of the contract to subcontract a portion of the contract. The 
final decision as to whether the contract will be awar4ed to two (2) persons or will be 
subcontracted by the party awarded the contract will be made by the Board of County 
Commissioners, upon recommendation from the District Judge. · 
It is NOT a requirement that the Payette County Public Defender be full"time, however, it 
is required that the contract recipient mamtain an office located in Payette County which keeps 
regular business hours form at least 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday 
thr~mgh Thursday and 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Fridays, and further that the contract recipient 
be genel'ally available dUl'ing those office hours and devote sufficient time and l'esottrces to the 
position to fulfill all terms listed above. If a matter is calendared for the Payette County Public 
Defender in the Payette County Court, that matter shall have priority above any matters arising 
· from the contract recipient's private caseload. IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE PAYETTE 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER TO PAY THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH APPOINTING 
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL WHEN HE/SHE HAS A CALENDARING OR ETHICAL 
CONFLICT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR ABOVE. 
!he Payette County Commissioners reserve the right to reject any and ~1 proposals, 
Upon award of the contract, the contract recipie11t(s) will have 30 days in which to negotiate any 
additional tem1s and to endorse the contract. Additional cpntract terms will be added. Previous 
contracts may be reviewed upon request. The contract will begin October 1, 2008 and expire 
September 30, 2010. However, in the event of emergency, the contract recipient must be 
prepared to assume all responsibility upon award. 
All proposals are to be sealed and delivered to Betty Dressen by September 22, 2008 
at 5:00 p.m. The award will be made on or about September 25, 2008. 
Upon submission of my proposal, I agree to the above terms and conditions. 
Signature: -----~----
Please print name: --------
Public Defender Specifications 3 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO AND KELLY 
WIDTING FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The County of Payette, State ofidaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into 
agreements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Boal.'d of County Commissioners 
enters into the following agreement with KELLY WHITING, Attorney at Law of Payette, Idaho, for 
the purpose-of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi"criminal cases 
in Payette County, for the period of October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2014. 
Hereinafter, Payette County will be referred to as the 11COUNTY11 and KELLY WHITING 
will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR". The parties agree as follows: 
1. This agreement shall be one of two contractual provisions for all services and expenses of a 
public defender's office for Payette County for the calendar years stated above, excluding 
exll'aordinary expenses· as may be determined by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary 
expenses shall be determined through negotiations between the parties and shall be authorized only 
upon written agreement of both parties. 
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTOR for the term above described, said sum 
to be payable as follows: 
$10,000 to be paid on the Wednesday after the second Monday of each month during the 
term of this contract, commencing October 1, 2012. 
3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees that he shall practice law independently of any contractor 
llllder a sepal'ate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEP ARA TE 
CONTRACTOR"), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The 
County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms of this 
contract. 
1 
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4. In exchange for the payment by the COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available 
full time and provide the criminal and quasi-criminal defense services for those persons determined 
by the Court to be indigent in the following cases: 
A. All misdemeanor charges filed on or after October 1, 2012, including criminal 
appeals to the district court and probation violations. This paragraph shall not 
include cases where the CONTRACTOR has a conflict due 1:o a prior 
appointment under this contract or the previous agreement. 
B. All felony cases in which the SEP ARA TE CONTRACTOR has a conflict in 
representation, and which are arraigned in the District Court on or after 
October 1, 2012 including probations violations. 
C. All juvenile charges filed on or after October I, 2012. 
D. Representation of at least one indigent parent, if necessary, or the Guardian ad 
Litem, in Child Protective Act cases filed on or after October 1, 2012, 
including those child protection cases currently assigned to CONTRACTOR. 
E. All probation violations filed on or after October 1, 2012, where, in the 
discretion of the Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represent 
the probationer rather ~an the attorney who represented the defendant in the 
prior criminal proceedings in which the probation was entered. 
F. In all other cases in which the State has an interest, and which are filed on or 
after October 1, 2012, in which it is the determination of the trial court that it 
is appropriate that an attorney be appointed to represent an indigent party. 
G. Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court. 
H. All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to his 
previous subcontractor's agreement with Phillip B. Heersink. 
I. All services listed in speei:fications for bids which were submitted 
to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her solicitation for such bids in 
2008, and which is attached hereto. 
5. CON1RACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be 
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necessary 
2 
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supplies; Wol'kman' s Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the like. CONTRACTOR 
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1 :00 
p.m. to 5 :00 p.m. Monday thru Thursday and Frid8:ys from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays 
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above 
referenced office during regular business hours except as the court calendru.\ vacation, illness, and 
other absences may preclude. 
6. All professional legal personnel assisting the CONTRACTOR in performing under this 
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CONTRACTOR. They shall not be 
employees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly 
understood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract 
is that of independent confJ:actor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor 
and as such has the sole employment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff 
serving him and pe1forrning the services under this contract. 
7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur, 
except to the extent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent 
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is 
appointed due to a conflict that exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice, the expenses for 
such representation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are 
incurred. 
8. The CONTRACTOR shall provide to the COUNTY, in timely fashion, all reports required 
by the Idaho Code, and shall further file any other reports relating to the operation of his office 
reasonably requested by the County in its efforts to maintain an efficient criminal justice system. 
3 
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It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not 
include information which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons 
being represented by the CONTRACTOR. 
9. Should this contract not be renewed, all cases which have been assigned to the 
CONTRACTOR by the end of the Contract t~rm, i.e., September 30, 2014 and which cannot be 
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled as a "Hold-Over" case by the 
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a "hold-over" upon 
completion of the contract t~e CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any 
case which is open at the end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of 
. awaiting sentence or entry of final plea will not be included as a b~lable, "hold-over case" and 
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR. 
10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises 
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For 
these purposes a "special circumstance" offense would be a homicide case wherein the state seeks the 
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to 
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessary. Other special circumstance, but such 
are unpredictable and unable to be determined at this time. In the event that such special 
circumstance case occurs, the parties shall discuss whether a case qualifies as a special circumstance, 
~d shall discuss expenses for unknown projections of change of venue, psychological evaluations of 
defendants, living expenses fol' change of venue,. expenses for conflicts of interest attorneys necessary 
beyond all of the attorneys available either in the Contractor's office or in his conflicts of interest 
offices and other unforeseen expenses which cannot be considered by the contracting parties at this 
4 
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time. In the event the parties are unable to agree the extraordinary expenses shall be determined by a 
District Judge of the Thlrd Judicial District not currently assigned to Payette County. 
11. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereof by 
giving thirty (30) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. 
l'.?, Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible 
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts, 
the COUNTY and the CONTRACTOR enter into the above agreement. 
Dated'thls 2°d day of July, 2012. 
ATTEST: 
&te'fi~ Betty~'bressen, Clerk 
VJ J')j 
Dated this 2. day of~ 2012. 
Rudy Endrik , 
Payette County Inill1Ss10ners 
County of Payette, State of Idaho 
KELLY WHITING, Attorney at Law 
5 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYETI'E COUNTY, IDAHO AND PIDLLIP B. 
HEERSINK FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The County of Payette, State of Idaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into 
~ements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Board of County Commissioners 
enters into.the following agreement with PHILLIP B. HEERSINK, Attorney at Law of Payette, Idaho, 
for 
the purpose of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi-criminal cases 
in Payette County, for .the period of October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2014. 
Hereinafter, Payette C0tmtywill be referred to as the "COUNTY" andPIIlLLIP B. HEERSINK 
· will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR". The parties agree as follows: 
1. This agreement shall be one of two contractual provisions for all services and expenses of a 
public defender's office for Payette County for the calendar years stated above, excluding 
extraordinary expenses as may be determined by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary 
( 
expenses shall be deter.mined through negotiations between the parties and shall be authorized only 
upon written agreement of both parties. 
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTOR for the term above described, said sum 
to be payable as follows: 
$8,000 to be paid on the Wednesday after the second Monday of each month during the 
term of this contmct, commencing October 1, 2012. 
3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees that he shall practice law independently of any contractor 
under a separate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARATE 
CONTRACTOR"), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The 
1 
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County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms of thls 
contract 
4. In exchange for the payment by the COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available 
full time and provide 1he criminal and quasi ~criminal defense services for those persons determined 
by the Court to be indigent in the following cases: 
A. All felony charges filed on or after October 1, 2012, including probation 
violations. This paragraph shall not include cases where the CONTRACTOR 
has a conflict due to a prior appointment under this contract or the previous 
agreement entered into in 2012. 
B. All misdemeanor cases in which the SEP ARA TE CONTRACTOR has a 
conflict in representation, including criminal appeals to the district court and 
probation violations, and including probations violations. 
C. All mental commitment petitions/hearings filed on or after October 1, 2012. 
D. Representation of at least one indigent parent, if necessary, or the Guardian.ad 
Litem, in Child Protective Act cases filed on or after October 1, 2012,; 
including those child protection cases currently assigned to CONTRACTOR. 
E. All probation violations filed on or after October 1, 2012, where, in the 
discretion of the Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represent 
the probationer rather than the attorney who represented the defendant in the 
prior criminal proceedings in which the probation wa:s entel'ed. 
F. In all other cases in which the State has an interest, and which are filed on or 
after October 1, 2012, in which it is the determination of the trial court that it 
is appropriate that an attorney be appointed to represent an indigent party. 
G. Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court. 
H. All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to his 
previous public defender agreement with the County. 
I. All services listed in specifications for bids which were submitted 
to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her solicitation for such bids in 
2008, and which is attached hereto. 
2 
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5. CONTRACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be 
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necessary 
supplies; Workman's Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the.like. CONTRACTOR 
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 am. to noon and 1 :00 
p.m. to S :00 p.m. Monday thru Thursday and Fridays from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays 
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above 
referenced office during regular business hours except as the comt calendar, vacation, illness, and 
other absences may preclude. 
6. All professional leg~l personnel assisting the CONTRACTOR in performing under this 
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CONTRACTOR. They shall not be 
employees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly 
understood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract 
is that of independent contractor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor 
and as such has the sole ~mployment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff 
serving him and performing the services under this contract. 
7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur, 
except to the extent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent 
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is 
appointed due to a conflict that exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice, the expenses for 
such repl'esentation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are 
incurred. 
3 
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It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not 
include information which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons 
being represented by the CONTRACTOR. 
9. Should tbis contract not be renewed, all cases which have been assigned to the 
CON1RACTOR by the end of the Contract term, i.e., September 30, 2014 and which cannot be 
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled a~ a "Hold-Over" case by the 
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a "hold-over" upon 
completion of the contract the CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any 
case which is open at the end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of 
awaiting sentence or entry of final plea will not be included as a billable, "hold-over case" and 
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR. 
10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises 
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For 
these purposes a "special circumstance" offense would be a homicide case wherein the state seeks the 
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to 
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessary. Other special circumstance, but such 
are unpredictable and unable to be determined at this time. In the event that such special 
circumstance case occurs, the parties shall discuss whether a case qualifies as a special circumstance, 
and shall discuss expenses for unknown projections of change of venue, psychological evaluations of 
defendants, living expenses for change of venue, expenses for conflicts of interest attomeys necessary 
beyond all of the attomeys available either in the Contractor's office or in his conflicts of interest 
offices and other unforeseen expenses which cannot be considered by the contracting parties at this 
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and shall discuss expenses for tmknown projections of change of venue, psychological evaluations of 
defendants, living expenses for change of venue, expenses for conflicts of interest attorneys necessary 
beyond all of the attomeys available either in the Contractor's office or in his conflicts of interest 
offices and other unforeseen expenses which cannot be considered by the contracting parties at this 
time. In the event the parties are unable to agree the extraordinary expenses shall be determined by a 
District Judge of the Third Judicial District not currently assigned to Payette County. 
11. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereof by 
giving thirty (30) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. 
12. Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible 
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts, 
the COUNTY and the CONTRACTOR enter into the above agreement. 
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2012. 
ATTEST: 
~.Qc~ 
e'i.Ysen, Clerk 
i~ Dated this~ day of , 2012. 
R~ 
Payette County Commissioners 
County of Payette, State ofldaho 
PHILLIP B. HEERSINK, Attomey at Law 
5 
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CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
OF INDIGENTS 
THIS CONTRACT is made and entered into between the County of Gem, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, by and through its representative, the Board of County 
Commissioners, hereinafter called "County", and Mimura Law Offices, PLLC, hereinafter called 
"Public Defender." 
WHEREAS, the aforementioned County has the legal obligation to provide for legal 
representation of indigent persons within its boundaries, and 
WHEREAS, it is mutually agreed by the parties to this Contract for Legal 
Representation of fudigents that the term of this Contract shall be from October I, 2007, to 
September 30, 2008, subject to renewal, by written agreement, for an additional one-yeaiterm at an 
agreed upon amount to be determined no later than July 1st 2008; and 
WHEREAS, the continued contracting for public defender services is in the best 
interest of the County in promoting the efficient administration of justice, continuity for the indigent 
clientele needing legal services, and conforms to the highest standard of due process of law 
guaranteed by our State and Federal constitutions; and 
WHEREAS, the County Commissioners of the aforementioned County have 
mutually agreed to contract with Public Defender, to provide such representation in the County. 
NOW, WITNESSETH: 
The County has employed, and does hereby contract with Public Defender to 
hereafter, for the term of this contract, act as counsel to any needy or indigent person who has a 
legal right to court appointment of counsel to represent him or her and who shall come within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this County, as herein provided. Specifically included, but not limited 
to, any needy or indigent person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, or any person 
who is under formal charge of having committed or is being detained under a conviction of a 
serious crime as defined in Idaho Code Section 19-851; proposed patients in commitment 
proceedings, parents or children under the jurisdiction of the Child Protective Act, the Termination 
of Parent and Child Relationship Act or the Juvenile Corrections Act; and all other persons for 
whom the County has a legal obligation to provide legal representation, with the exception of any 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or any proceeding under the Post Conviction Relief Act. 
The Public Defender shall provide for such needy persons all legal services to which they are, or 
may become, entitled under the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the State ofldaho. 
It is understood that Gem County will participate in the Idaho Capital Crimes 
Defense Program and the State Public Defender Appellate Program. · 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 1 
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It i~ understood and agreed by the parties that the court concerned ,vith the foregoing 
matters shall detertnin~ whether. _a p~rson desirjng se~ces of the Public Defender is a "needy or 
indigent person" \Vlthin the meaning of the statute autliorizing the appointment. 
It is further understooa. 'and agreed that Public Defender sh.ail at all times during this 
agreement be, and remain, :a Professioµal Liprited :pa~ility G~mpany whose current managing 
members a,re licensed to practice law in this state, and that any attorney(s) providing services under 
this Contract will-be 9ompetent to counsel an1 represent~ indigent person in legal proceedings. 
, 
Gem County shall pay the sum of One Hundred, Eighty-One Thousand, Five 
Hundred dollars and no cents.($ 181,500.00) for Public Defender services from October 1, 2007, 
to September 30, 2008, to Pu,blic" Defe11der. This .amount shall be paid in twelve (12) equal 
monthly :mstallments of Fifteen Thousand,- ·one Hundred and Twenty-Five dollars and no cents 
($ 15,125.00) 'aue' and payable on e>r before the last bu~iness day of each month. . 
-
. , It is further understood that the Public Defender shall maintain a lawyer's 
professional li~bility insurance poµcy for' the~sel~e·s and their staff covering representation of 
clients assigned by the ·court for representation by the Office of the Public Defender. The Public 
Defender further agree_s to hold the County h~ess for any claims of malfeasance or misfeasance 
,brought against ilie Coimty by any person for whom representation is provided by the Public 
D~fender under direction of the court. 
' It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall submit a report to the 
Board of C<?tlllty Commissioners of the County on or about June 1, 2008, for informational 
purposes to plan for the following fiscal year's budget. , 
· It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall file an affidavit of 
attorneys fees, or orally advise the Court of any fees earned in appointed cases in which it provides 
legal services and will seek an order of reimbursement on behalf of the County where appropriate. 
In the event that an ethical conflict exists as a result of the Public Defender's 
representation of any client, the Public Defender shall notify the court, the court shall appoint 
alternate counsel. The Public Defender shall pay the first said alternate counsel compensation for 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by alternate counsel at the rate of $70.00 per hour as per 
Administrative Order; or the amount provided by any change in Administrative Order during the 
term(s) of this Agreerµent. The Public Defender shall also be responsible for payment of any 
additional conflict counsel appointed by the Court in any proceedings brought under the Child 
Protective Act. With that exception, the County shall be responsible for contracting with and 
paying any conflict counsel beyond the first conflict counsel appointed by the Court in any 
particular ,case -during the term of this contract. The Public Defender agrees that any conflict 
Public Defender shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and competent to defend and 
represent indigent persons in legal proceedings and will obtain from each so qualified conflict 
coun~el a written 8;greement to pold tb,e Coup.ty harmless from any claims of malfeasance or 
misfeasance brought against the County by any person for whom representation is provided by any 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS- Page 2 
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conflict Public Defender appointed by the Court. 
It is agreed that Public Defender will maintain an office and staff in Emmett, Idaho. 
The parties understand and agree that an actual business office shall be established and shall be 
open for business between the hours of approximately 9:00 am through 12:00 pm and 1 :00 pm 
through 4:00 pm Monday through Thursday, and shall be available by telephone between 
approximately 9:00 am through 5:00 pm on Fridays. The Public Defender may be closed for 
federally recognized and County holidays. 
It is further understood by the parties of this Contract that in the event a special-
circumstance offense arises, the two parties will negotiate to determine a supplemental agreement. 
For these purposes, a "special-circumstance" offense is where the offense of murder js charged, 
whether with one or with multiple defendants. Where a defendant is accused of murder, one or 
more attorneys may need to be involved and extraordinary expenses, which are unpredictable and 
cannot be determined at this time, may become necessary. These extraordinary expenses may 
include, but · are not limited to, attorney's fees, psychological evaluation and expert testimony, 
ballistics and forensic scientific testing and expert testimony, change of venue expenses, and 
conflict-of-interest attorneys. In the event the parties are unable to agree, the extraordinary 
expenses shall be determined by a committee consisting of the Chairman of the Board of Gem 
County Commissioners, the sitting lawyer-magistrate for Gem County, and a representative of the 
Gem County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Special-circumstance expenses shall be utilized only 
by the approval and order of the district court and these expenses shall be paid by the County. 
This agreement may be terminated by either party at any time during the term 
thereof by giving thirty (30) days' notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. 
This agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 
assigns of the parties hereto, but nothing herein shall be construed to permit a substitution of parties 
without consent of all parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands on the day and 
year set forth below. 
GEM_~ OF COMMISSIONERS 
lfnw /{- 7-JiOOJ 
Michele Sherrer, Chairman Date 
ATTEST: 
GEM COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 3 
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Mimura Law Offices, PLLC 
Susan Lynn Mimura, Chairman 
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CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
.. . . . · OF INDIGENTS 
,.,.1, 
. THIS CONTRACT i~ ~ade and entered into between th~ County· 9f Gem, a 
political subdivision of the State o{Idaho, by and through its representative, the Board of County 
Commissioners, hereinafter called ,iComity", and Mimura Law Offices, PLLC, hereinafter called 
"Public Defender." · · 
WHE~AS, the aforementioned County has the legal obligation to provide for legal 
representation of iniligent persons :vvithin its boundaries, and 
' . 
WHEREAS, it is mutually agreed by the parties to this Contract for Legal 
Representation of Jndigents that the term of this Contract shall be from October 1, 2010, to 
September 30, 2011, subject to renewal, by written agreement, for an additional one-year term at an 
.. ., .. . . . 
agreed upon ~ount to be determined no later than July 1, 2011; and 
• •T ,• - ~ • • 
WHEREAS,' contracting for public defender se~ices is in the best interest of the 
County in promoting the efficient administration of justice, and conforms to the highest standard of 
due process of law gu~anteeq. by our ~tate and F~deral constitutions; and 
· WHEREAS, the County Commissioners of the aforementioned County have 
mutually agreed to cong-act with Public Defender, to provide such representation in the County. 
NOW, WI1NESSETH: 
The County· has employed, and does hereby contract ·with Public Defender to 
hereafter, for -µie term of this contract, act as counsel to any needy or indigent person who has a 
legal right to court appointment of counsel to represent him or her and who shall come within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this County, as herein provided. Specifically included, but not limited 
to, any needy or indigent person who is being detained by a law e.nforcement officer, or any person 
who is under formal charge of having committed or is being detained under a conviction of a 
serious crime as defin~d. in Idaho Code Section 19-851; proposed patients in commitment 
proceedings, parents or children under the jurisdiction of the Child Protective Act, the Termination 
of Parent and Child Relationship Act or the Juvenile Corrections Act; and all other persons for 
whom the County has a legal obligation to provide legal representation, with the exception of any 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or any proceeding under the Post Conviction Relief Act. 
The Public Defender shall provide for such needy persons all legal services to which they are, or 
may become, entitled under the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the State ofldaho. 
It is w:iderstood. that Gem County will pru:ticipate . i~ .tJ:i~ Idaho Capital Crimes 
Defense Program and the State Public Defender Appellate Program. 
It is understood and agreed by the parties that the court concerned with the foregoing 
matters shall determine whether a person desiring services of the Public Defender is a "needy or 
indigent person" within the meaning of the statute authorizing the appointment. 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 1 
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~ · . . . It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall at all times during this 
; agreement 'be, ~d remafu., ···a .. P,rofessional. Limited Li~bility Company whose current managing 
~. •' members :ate licensed to practice law in, this state, and _that any attorney( s) provifug services UJ;J.der 
f: ·. - this Contfact will be competent to _counsel and represent an indigent person in legal pro~eedings . 
.-· ... 
t. . 
'-
•• 
~·s ~; 
Gem County shall pay the sum of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($180,000) for Public Defender services from October I, 2010, to September 30, 2011, to Public 
Defender:· This amollilt ·shall 1:fo paid in t~elve (12) equ~ monthly installments. of Fifteen 
Thousand Dollars ($15,000) due and payable on the last business day of each month .. 
. . -.-
... ~ 
, It is further understood that th_e Public Defender shall maintain a lawyer's 
professional liability insurance policy for themselves and their· staff covering representation of 
clients assigned by the court for representation by the Office of the Public Defender. The ·Public 
. Defender further agrees to hold the County. hannless for any claims or'malfeasance or misfe~ance 
· · brought ·against the ·county by ~y,person· for whom rypresentation. i.s provided by the P~blic 
. , Defender under dire9tion of the court. . 
; It is _further ~derstood · and ~greed that Public Defende~ shall submit a report to the 
Board. of Cqunty Commissioners of the County on or about June 1, 2011, for infonnational 
purpose's to plan. for the following :fispal year's budget. 
· It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall file an affidavit of 
attorneys fees earned in every case in which they provide legal services and seek an order of 
reimbursement on behalf of the County in each case. 
· In the event that an ethical conflict exists as a result of the Public Defender's 
representation of any client, the Public Defender· shall notify the court, the court shall appoint 
alternate counsel. The Public Defender shall pay the first said alternate counsel compensation for 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by alternate counsel at the rate of $75.00 per hour· as per 
administrative order. The Public Defender shall also be responsible for payment of any additional 
· conflict ·counsel appointed by the Court in any proceedings brought under the Child Protective 
Act. With that exception, the County shall be responsible for contracting with anp paying any 
conflict counsel beyond the first conflict counsel appointed oy the Court in any particular case 
during the term of this contract. The Public Defender agrees that any conflict Public Defender 
shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and competent to defend and represent 
indigent persons in legal proceedings and will obtain from each so qualified conflict counsel a 
written agreement to hold the County hannless from any claims of malfeasance or misfeasance 
brought against the County by any person for whom representation is provided by any conflict 
Public Defender appointed by the Court. 
It is agreed that Public Defender will maintain an office and staff in Emmett, Idaho. 
The parties understand and agree that an actual business office shall be established and shall be 
open for business between the hours of approximately 9:00 am through 12:00 pm and 1 :00 pm 
through 5:00 pm Monday through Thursday, and between approximately 9:00 am through 12:00 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 2 
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i '. · · ' . · · •. lt is further µnde:rstood by the parties of-this Contract ·that in the 'event a special~ 
fi· - _: circumstance offense arises,''the two parties vvill negotiate to determine a supplemental agreement. t/ _ For these purposes, a ''special-circumstance" ·offense is· where the offense of murder is charged, 
~ ·. · wheth~r with one or with multiple· defend?JltS. Where a defendant. is accused of murder, one or 
t . f more attorneys may need to be involved and extraordinary expenses, which are unpredicJable and 
,. . . cannQt be determined at this time, may become necessary. These _extraordinary expenses may 
i. . :1 in,clude," out' are !IOt limited to: attorney's fees; psychological -evaluation and 'e:xperf tesfun~ny, 
( · ballistics and forensic scientific testing and expert testimony, change of venue expenses, and 
~- ' conflict-of-interest attorneys. . In the event the parties are unable to agree, the extraordinary 
i ·. expenses shall be determined by a committee consisting of the Chairman of the Board of Gem 
~ County Commissioners, the sitting lawyer-magistrate for Gem County, and a representative of the 
~ Gem County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Special-circumstance expenses shall be utilized only 
· · by the approval and order of th~ district court and these expenses shall be paid by the County. L:>:. - ,. . 
This agreement may be terminated_ by either party at any time during the term 
• thereof by giving thirty (30) days' .notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. 
. . 
, This agreement is _binding on the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 
assigns· of the parties hereto, but nothing herein shall be construed to permit a substitution of parties 
without consent of ~I pm-ties her~to. 
IN 'WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands on the day and 
year set forth below. 
GEM COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
Lan Smith, Chairman Date 
ATTEST: 
Shelly Gannon, Gem County Clerk 
GEM COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 3 
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CUSTER COUNTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT 
'
~,t- - .... 
. Jv.!) I ,0\'1-
ThiS agreement is entered into this ~'day o~r, ~' by and between Custer 
County, State ofldaho, a political subdivision of the State ofidaho, hereinafter "COUNTY", and 
David Cannon, attorney at law, who is licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho, hereinafter 
"ATTORNEY". 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, the County_ of Custer, State ofldaho, desires to contract with the above 
attorney at law for legal services to be provided to Custer County and for the legal representation 
of indigent persons who are charged with criminal offenses and who are eligible for the services 
of a court appointed attorney, and for the legal services as set forth hereafter, and 
WHEREAS, the Attorney desires to accept the responsibilities and benefits described in 
this agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained 
in this document, the parties to this agreement hereby stipulate and contract as follows: 
1 
DUTIES 
The Attorney agrees to perform as a Public Defender and shall perform all the duties 
required by law of a Public Defender, as listed in Idaho Code § 19-852, including the following: 
--...... 
1. Representallindigent persons who are under formal charge, of having committed or 
being detained under a conviction <;>fa serious crime, when appointed by a court of law. 
2. Represent all indigent persons in Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code § 20-50 I et. 
seq.) proceedings and any other juvenile proceedings when appointed by a co~ of law. 
3. Represent all indigent persons sentenced from Custer County, when those persons file 
Uniform Post Conviction proceedings when appointed by a court of law. 
4. Represent all indigent persons who are involved in involuntary civil commitment 
proceedings, when appointed by a court of law. 
5. Represent all indigent persons who are involved in Appeals, at all levels, to higher 
courts, except the Idaho State Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court, and Federal Courts, 
when appointed by a court of law. 
6. Represent all indigent persons who are charged with probation violations, when 
EXHIBIT D 
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appointed by a court of law. 
7. Represent children, indigent parents, guardians, or others in Child Protection Act 
(Idaho Code§ 16-1602 et seq.) proceedings, when appointed by a court of law. 
8. The Attorney shall not be required to represent any persons who are involved in 
guardianship or conservatorship unless appointed by a court of law and unless said Attorney is 
provided additional compensation for the perfol'11)ance of those functions; said compensation 
shall be paid from the contingent District Court Fund provided this purpose and other purposes 
set forth in this document. 
9. The Attorney shall be paid extra compensation at the rate of$65.00 per hour and 
reasonable expenses for defenses of the following: · 
a) Capital Offenses; 
b) Potential Capital Offenses 
c) Attempted Capital Offenses 
II 
LIMITATIONS 
It is agreed the Attorney inay engage in the private criminal and civil practice of law as 
provided in the Canons of Ethics of the Idaho State Bar and the American Bar Association as 
long as said private practice does not violate said canons of ethics. 
III 
ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
.. The Attorney shall assume all of the responsibilities required of a Public Defender , when 
appointed by a Court, beginning July 1, 2012. It is specifically agreed t}?.at the Attorney shall 
assqme the responsibility to represent all indigent persons who are eligible for a court appointed 
attorney ori or subsequent to July 1, 2012, ,and he shall also be responsible for the representation 
of indigent persons who have cases pending and who have been represented by a court appointed 
attorney prior to July 1, 2012. A few select indigents who already have appointed counsel other 
than the Attorney and whose best interest would be served by the continuation of the present 
appointed counsel shall continue as such outside the terms of this agreement. 
IV 
TERM OF CONTRACT 
It is specifically agreed that the term of this contract and the agreements and provisions 
whi.ch are the subject to this contract, shall be in effect from July 1, 2012 through July 1, 2017. 
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V 
COMPENSATION 
It is specifically agreed that Custer County shall pay to the Attorney who has executed 
this agreement, during the term of this contract, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN DOLLARS ($4,167.00) per month, FIFTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($50,000) per year, with the first payment to be made on the last day of the month of 
July, 2012, and equal monthly installments to be made on the last day of each month thereafter. It 
being further understood that the contract will·be reviewed at regular intervals to determine the 
need for upward adjustment and contract·modification based on economic factors at the time . 
. However, under no circumstances will the County pay less than the amount setforth herein. The 
first review shall take place during the regular County Commissioners meeting in July, 20'13 and 
regular reviews to be held at one year intervals thereafter. It being understood by the parties 
hereto that if the Attorney shall exceed, fifty (50) hours per month, such additional time spent 
shall be compensated at the rate of SIXTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($65.00) per hour. It being further 
understood that the Attorney shall not charge Custer County for the trav~l expenses. H_owever, 
should the County be unable to increase the payment to compensate for said additional time 
being expended on behalf of this contract, the contract may be terminated by the parties hereto 
without further penalty or liability. At the time of termination, those cases which are currently 
being served by the Attorney to this agreement shall continue at the current Seventh District 
Court appointed attorney fee rate. Each installment payment shall be paid to the Attorney on or 
before the last day of each month, provided that the Attorney shall file with Custer County on a ·. 
monthly basis a claim form indicating the services provided pursuant to this contract. 
VI 
COMPENSATION INCLUSIONS 
The compensation provided for in the preceding paragraph is the total compensation 
which shall be paid to the Attorney and includes all compensation that may be paid to any 
assistant or other attorneys· who may be employed as independent contractors or otherwise by the 
attorney. The compensation is also the total compensation which shall be provided for clerks, 
stenographers, secretaries, paralegals and other persons that the Attorney may hire, and the 
compensation shall also include the total compensation for appropriate office facilities, furniture, 
equipment, books, postage, paper supplies, other facilities and supplies and travel expenses, 
which are required to perform the terms and provisions of this contract, except that it is 
specifically agreed that the total compensation listed in the preceding paragraphs with that title 
shall not include compensation which may be provided to the Attorney for extraordinary services 
which may be provided and which may be compensated from a contingent District Court fund 
specifically establjshed for the purpose of providing compensation to Public Defenders for 
extraordinary services that are provided to indigent persons pursuant to court appointment. 
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VII 
EXTRAORDINARY COMPENSATION 
It is specifically agreed that a District Court fund shall be established for the purpose of 
providing compensation to the Attorney for the performance of the extraordinary duties required 
of a Public Defender and when he is required to pursue any appeal to the District Court which 
requires the filing of necessary appeal pleadings, the preparation and printing and filing of an 
appeal brief or briefs. It is also agreed that additional compensation shall be provided when the 
Attorney appointed by the Court to represent indigent persons in guardianship, conservatorship 
and child protection proceedings. It is also specifically agreed that additional compensation shall 
be paid for actual out-of-pocket expenses, which are incurred by the Attorney, in handling the 
items set forth in this paragraph, said expenses shall include but not be limited to the following: 
1. Expenses for printing, binding and mailing of briefs. 
2. Investigations, experts and/or psychiatric and medical examinations. 
It is further agreed that the additional compensation provided for the performance of the 
extraordinary services set forth above shall be claimed and paid, based subject to a determination 
of reasonableness by the Custer County Commissioners. It is further agreed that the out-of-
pocket expenses which are incurred for the performance of extraordinary services as set forth 
above·, shall be claimed and paid when properly verified and considered reasonable by the Custer 
County Commissioners. 
VIII 
CONFLICTS 
It is specifically agreed that the Attorney is not required to employ other attorneys, who 
are competent and qualified to practice law within the State of Idaho, for the performance of the 
services required of a Public Defender when the party to this agreement has a conflict of interest 
and is unable to represent a particular indigent defendant. It is further agreed that in the event 
there is such a conflict which cannot be handled by the attorney, additional compensation shall be 
allowe~ to other attorneys who are required to be employed and appointed by the Court for the . 
representation of indigent persons. The compensation required for the payment of attorneys who 
handle these additional conflicts shall be paid from the contingent District Court fund. Any and 
all fees to be paid for compensation to attorneys who handle these co¢1icts will be set and paid 
by the Court. The parties to this agreement hereby authorize any District Court Judge or 
Presiding Magistrate of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho to approve the 
appointment of reasonable counsel in conflict situations that cannot be handled by the Attorney 
and the parties to this agreement further authorize the Custer County Commissioners to rule upon 
compensation paid to those attorneys who handle such additional conflicts. The parties to this 
agreement further agree that a motion for the appointment of legal counsel because of a conflict 
may be made by the Attorney at any time. It is further agreed that the motion must be granted, 
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prior to the incurring of any expenses by separate appointed counsel in all cases. 
IX 
RECORDS 
In addition to the requirements set forth in the Idaho Code and the terms and provisions 
of this contract, the Attorney agrees that he shall prepare and make available to the office of the 
County Commissioners of Custer County, on a periodic basis subject to a timely and reasonable 
request, a statement of all financial expenditures that have been made by the Attorney, certifying 
the dollar amounts spent during the previous record keeping period in fulfilling the terms of this 
contract. These records shall be available to the Custer County Commissioners, following a 
timely and reasonable request, for an inspection of said records. The Custer County 
Commissioners specifically agree that all records kept by the Attorney shall be kept confidential, 
for all purposes, except for calculations necessary for future Public Defender contracts . 
. X 
COOPERATION 
The Attorney agrees to cooperate with the Courts and with Custer County and Custer 
County agencies in the procuring of financial information from the indigent persons for whom 
the Attorney shall provide court appointed legal services. This cooperation is understood to mean 
that the Attorney may question and examine each indigent person whom he is appointed to 
represent for the purpose of obtaining financial information which shall disclose the assets and 
liabilities of the indigent client. It is specifically agreed that the Court system shall require at least 
one financial statement, under oath, for an indigent client, prior to the time the Court makes a 
determination that the indigent person is eligible for the services of Court appointed legal 
counsel, or within a short period of time following the appointment by the Court. The Attorney 
further agrees to supply to Custer County and Custer County Court system, upon reasonable 
request, an estimate of the time spent and the effort expended in the representation of any 
indigent client so that the Court may order the indigent to reimburse County for the expense of 
the Public Defender representation. 
XI 
NOTIFICATION 
The Attorney agrees that he will do everything within reason to notify the trial court and 
the Custer County Prosecuting Attorney at the Court Clerks of proposed changes in Court 
schedules or jury trial schedules or other Court appearances, as necessitated for any reason, at 
least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the scheduled trial or other Court appearance. 
000136
f I 
.. 
I • 
1 
XII 
This contract for the performance of the duties required of the Public Defender, and for 
the compensation and benefits that are agreed to in consideration of the performance of those 
duties, is entered into this~ day ofT.; ld ... , 2012, by the parties whose signatures appear 
below. 
J_~~Q 
David Cannon nty hainnan 
Board of County Commissioners 
~ {: 
. Clerkoi'tfu(court 
, I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
l 
l 
I 
I 
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CUSTER COUNTY CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT 
WHEREAS, Custer County is required by statute or court order to furnish legal representation to certain 
needy, indigent, minor, and incapacitated persons at county expense, 
WHEREAS, Custer County finds that from time to time the attorneys who are employed to provide such 
representation may have a conflict or may not have the qualifications to handle a crime which is a 
capital offense, 
WHEREAS, it behooves Custer County to contract with an attorney to handle such cases and to 
contract with said attorney for a certain prescribed hourly amount prior to representation, 
WHEREAS, Mr. Fred Snook is an experienced attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho 
and is competent to counsel, advise, and represent persons to whom other representation may not be 
available, 
THEREFORE, Custer County and Fred Snook, Esq. hereby agree to the following: 
1. Representation. Fred Snook agrees to represent the individuals, to the best of his ability, to 
whom Custer County owes a duty to provide legal representation and to whom Custer 
County is unable to provide services for under the current public defender contract. 
2. Term. The term of this agreement shall be from the 1st day of October, 2014 through the 
291h day of September, 2015. · · 
3. Compensation. Custer County agrees to pay Fred Snook at the hourly rate of $80 and 
mileage of .50¢ per mile to and from scheduled Court hearings. 
4. Additional Costs and Representation. The compensation set forth in Paragraph 3 does not 
include payment or reimbursement to Fred Snook for additional costs of expenses of 
transcripts, expert witness fees, investigator fees, fees for preparation of reports ad 
evaluations, or other costs and expenses incurred in investigation, preparation, trial, or 
appeal. If such additional expenses need to be incurred and Custer County is required by 
. statute to provide the items, then Fred Snook shall obtain advance approval for the 
expenditure by both the presiding judge and the Custer County Commissioners by making a 
. written Motion for advance approval of the expenses by the presiding judge and, to the 
extent required by law, shall give advance written notice of the hearing to the prosecuting 
· attorney and the Custer County Commissioners. 
5. Description of Services. Fred Snook shall use his best efforts to represent any person to 
whom the county is required by law or statute to provide legal representation, whom it is 
ordered to represent by the courts in Custer County, and whom may not be represented by 
current contract public defenders due to a conflict. Fred Snook. Fred Snook shall not 
charge the person whom he represents any fee in addition to the fees paid to Fred Snook by 
the county under this agreement. 
6 .. Performance of Contract. Fred Snook is solely responsible to ensure that the services 
which are the subject of this contract are performed in a professional, competent manner, 
consisted with the rules promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Bar 
Commission. Custer County may terminate this contract if Fred Snook establishes a pattern 
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of rendering ineffective assistance of counsel to needy persons under this contract or fails to 
abide by other rules of Professional Conduct. 
7. Substitution. Fred Snook shall not delegate his responsibilities under this contract o 
attorney other than those named in this contract. Nor shall he delegate his responsibilities 
under this contract to legal interns under Rule 221 of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules, 
without the prior written approval of the County Commissioner as adopted by resolution. 
8. Assignability. This contract is non-assignable, unless upon the prior written approval of the 
Count Commissioners as adopted by resolution. 
9. Private Practice. Nothing in this contract shall be construed to prohibit Fred Snook from 
practicing law privately in addition to rendering t~e services qa.lled for under this contract. 
may contract to provide similar serviced to ·other counties and individuals. 
1 O. Meeting with Clients. Fred Snook shall make reasonable efforts to meet (in person or 
by phone) each client in advance of the date and time· set for each hearing to discuss the 
details of the case and/or purpose of the hearing with the client. This requirement shall not 
apply when the defendant and the attorney have previously met and agreed up on a course 
of action to be taken and no additional information is available so that no purpose would be 
served meeting prior to the scheduled hearing. The primary purpose of this provision is to 
avoid delays in starting a court hearing, avoid anxiety in clients caused by not having any 
information about what is expected to occur at upcoming hearing, and to avoid the payment 
by the. county of unnecessary expense of witness travel when matters can be easily 
resolved but are not due to the lack of communication between lawyer and client. 
11. Evaluation. The county will conduct evaluations of Fred Snook to determine whether the 
provisions of this contract are being met. This may be in the form of written questionnaires 
or interviews to clients and other relevant persons. Lawyers shall be informed of the results 
of any evaluation and given notice and an opportunity to respond and/or rebut any 
· information obtained through he evaluation process. 
12. Termination of Contract. This contract may be terminated by the parties upon mutual 
agreement or by either party upon the material breach of the terms of the contract by the 
other party. The county or Fred Snook may cancel this contract a any time without 
cause upon ninety (90) calendar days written notice specifying the date of termination. The 
contract shall terminate on September 29, 2015. 
13. Employment Status. Fred Snook shall have and maintain the status of independent 
contractor. 
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CUSTER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS: 
Chairman Date 
Commissioner Date 
Commissioner Date 
This contract is scheduled for signature October 29, 2014. 
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October 22, 2014 
CUSTER COUNTY COMMIS~IONERS 
POBOX385 
CHALLIS, ID 83226 
(208) 879-2360 
(208) 879-5246 (fax) 
To Whom It May Concern: 
To follow is the report submitted by the contract public defender in July, 
2014. At that time he was informed that he needed to submit more 
information in the future as per Idaho Code 19-864(2). Our County Attorney 
will reiterate this instruction in correspondence to the public defender. 
~~;,'~ 
Custer County Commissioners 
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STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES 
JULY 1, 2013 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2014 
CUSTER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT 
INSURANCE 
LEGAL LIBRARY 
MAINTENANCE & REPAIRS 
COMPUTER REPAIRS 
OFFICE SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT 
PROFESSIONAL FEES 
RENT 
SECRETARY SALARY 
TELEPHONE 
UTILITIES 
GASOLINE 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT 
$435.00 
69.13 
70.50 
540.89 
235.15 
178.75 
10,500.00 
10,000.00 
794.89 
479.17 
1960.00 
$25,263.48 
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October 21, 2014 
Jason D Williamson 
FRANKLIN COUNTY 
Clerk of the District Court -Auditor -.Recorder 
American Civil Liberties Union 
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor 
New York, NY 100·04 
Mr Williamson, 
Enclosed is the information you requested. The contract with our Public Defender is 
attached. The contract is good through September, 2017. 
We do not have any drafts of contracts, position announcements or other requests 
seeking services for the provision of indigent defense services to criminal defendants 
entitled to representation at public expense. 
We do not have any reports at this time. 
If there fa anything else that you need, please feel free to contact me. 
~~~ 
Shauna T Geddes 
Franklin Co Clerk 
., 
.. 
·;, 
Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk, 39 West Oneida, Preston, Idaho 83263 
208-852-1090 (office)• 208-852-1094 (fox)• email: stgeddes@plmw.cmn EXHIBIT E 
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AGREEMENT FOR INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIS'IRICT OF IDAHO 
FRANKLIN COUNTY 
THIS AGREEMENT this agreement is made between Don Marler, Marler Law Office, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Office of the Public Defender": and Franklin County, hereinafter 
referred to as ''Franklin". 
IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Office.ofThePublic Defender. 
The Office of the Public Defender shall consist of such attorneys and employees of the 
Marler Law Office, as may be designated by the Public Defender. The Office Of The Public 
Defender shall be responsible to provide conflict counsel, except where the interest of a Franklin 
County Defendant is in conflict with another Franklin County Defendant. Conflict counsel shall be 
provided for by Franklin County, by way of separate contract of agreement. 
2. Services Covered. 
The Office Of The Public Defender shall provide legal services for indigent person in the 
following categories or cases: 
(a) Felony Cases. 
(b) Juvenile court pro.ceedings including:· 
( l) Proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act. 
(2) Proceedings under the Child Protective Act. 
(3) Involuntary termination proceedings wherein the State ofldaho or any agency 
of the State is a moving party. 
(c) Extrndition proceedings. 
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(d) All indigent defendants who have filed Post Conviction proceedings. 
( e) Appeals of all categories of cases listed above through the final appeal, through 
District Court. This shall not include appeals to the Supreme Court, or the Court of 
Appeals, as they are now handled by the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 
Boise, Idaho. 
(f) All indigent defendants charged with probation violations. 
(g) All criminal proceedings pursuant to Criminal Rule 35 and other related motions and 
proceedings including jury trials wherein the Public Defender is appointed to represent 
indigent defendants. 
(h) All misdemeanor proceedings in Franklin County. 
3. Services Excluded. 
The following services are excluded from the contract: 
(a) Civil Contempt Proceedings. 
(b) Adoption proceedings. 
(c) Involuntary tennination proceedings except as specified in paragraph 2(b)(3). 
(cl), Appeals to the United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals; and all 
Federal Court Proceedings. 
(e) Parole revocations procee~ings, and hearings or proceedings of any kind before the 
Idaho Commission of Pardons and Paroles. 
(f) Civil indigence claims. 
(g) Civil claims or defense of civil claims by or against clients of the Office Of The 
Public Defender, except as otherwise specifically provided in the Agreement. 
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·. • 
(h) Defense of any criminal charges against clients of the Office Of The Public Defender 
charged or arising outside Franklin County, except that the Office Of The Public 
Defender may cooperate and assist proper officials in other jurisdictions in resolving 
such criminal charges as part of a common agreement regarding joint disposition of 
such other charges and those matters in which the client is represented by the Office 
Of The Public Defender. 
(i) Conflict cases involving First Degree Murder, where the death penalty is sought (i.e., 
capital cases). 
(J) Cases involving First Degree Murder, non - de~th penalty cases or capital cases to be 
paid to the Public Defender by Franklin County as we see forth in Paragraph 9 herein. 
(k) Conflict cases as set forth herein above. 
4. Representation. 
Representation will be made at all stages of the proceedings until completed. The Office 
Of The Public Defender shall include necessary representations of such indigent person in matters 
of investigation, trial preparation, preparation and filing of motions, arguments of motions, and 
motions, briefing and argument on appeals and any re-trails following an appeal. This includes 
preparation of all briefs, documents, letters, research and any and all things regarded as necessary 
to adequately represent the indigent person. 
Representation will at all times comply with the standards mandated by the United States 
Constitution of the State ofldaho, the Jaws of the State ofldaho, and ethical standards of the 
America Bar Association and the Idaho State Bar, 
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5. Indigent Persons. 
An indigent person shall include any person determined by a judge within Franklin County 
to be entitled to legal representation at public expense, pursuant to the laws and the Constitution 
of the State ofldaho and United States Constitution. The County agrees to provide personnel and 
standards for the screening of persons requesting counsel, with recommendations to go to the 
judges of the Sixth District for final determination. 
6. Interview Schedule. 
For clients who are in custody, the Office Of The Public Defender shall attempt to 
provide initial contacts with clients personally, by telephone, or email within ninetyMsix (96) 
hours, or whenever possible within five (5) working days of notification of appointment. 
For clients who are not in custody, the Office Of The Public Defender shall attempt to 
make initial contact with clients within ten ( l 0) working days for the purpose of discussing the 
client's case, 
7. Conflict Oflntcrest. 
If at any time after an appointment has been made, the Office Of The Public Defender 
determines that be.cause of conflict of interest, assignment of qualified legal counsel outside the 
Office Of The Public Defender is necessary to provide adequate and competent representation in 
a particular matter or matters, the Public Defender may immediately notify the court making the 
assignment in which the matter is pending, the County Attorney, and the County Commissioners 
of Franklin County. If the court finds that such conflict requires appointment of counsel outside of 
the Office Of The Public Defender, these cases shall be referred to conflict counsel. The court shall 
appoint con'flict counsel to act in such matters, pursuant to Idaho Code § l 9M856 and § 19M 
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860 and other applicable laws on such terms and conditions as may be appointed by the court. 
8. Terms of this Mreement. 
The duration of this Agreement shall be from October 1, 2012, through September 
30, 2017. Further, the Office Of The Public Defender and Fl'anklin County shall be entitled to 
exercise and additional five yeru- option under the terms of the same Agreement for continuation 
of legal services through the year 2022, subject to renegotiation of the compensation for said 
contract. 
9. Payment For Services. 
The appropriation for the Office OfThe Public-Defender shall be a total sum of five 
thousand dollars and no cents ($5,970.25) per month, for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 
2012, through September 30, 2017. 
That in addition to the foregoing sums, the defense of any defendant charged with First 
Degree Murder shall be evaluated and negotiated on a case by case basis with regard to hourly 
rates, necessary resources, and a maximum amount per defendant. 
All payments shall be due on the last working day of each month, and shall be paid 
by the 1st day of each month, beginning with November 1, 2012,· for services provided for the 
proceeding month. 
Fmthermore, there shall be an automatic cost of living increase in the monthly amount 
of Three Percent (3%) for each year of the contract, commencing October 1, 2013, and each year 
therea"fter. 
10. Costs and Expenses. 
The Office Of The Public Defender shall pay for all costs, fees and expenses incurred in 
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providing services pursuant to this Agreement, except for the following, which shall be paid by 
Franklin County, unless otherwise ordered to be paid by the State, or County: 
(a) Witness fees and expenses, including expert witnesses. 
(b) Depositions. 
(c) Transcripts. 
(d) Service of Process fees. 
(e) Costs of medical and psychiatric evaluations when ordered or approved by the Court. 
(f) Costs of investigative services and for evaluations of evidence when ordered or 
approved by the court. 
11. Malpractice Insurance. 
The Office Of The Public Defender shall carry malpractice insurance, at its expense, 
during the entire the entire period of the Agreement, in the amount of at least Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars and no/100 ($500,000.00) for each attorney. 
12. Non-Privileged Information. 
All clients served by this Agreement shall be advis~d by the appointing judge that 
information regarding their financial circumstances which would be probative or determining 
indigence is not privileged information and will be disclosed to any judge, the prosecuting attorney 
of this District, or Office Of The Public Defender, upon appropriate request. The Office Of The 
Public Defender shall have no duty to investigate the financial circumstances of any client served 
by this Agreement, nor to disclose such information in the absence of a specific request by a judge 
or prosecuting attorney of this District. 
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13. Record Keeping and Reporting:. 
The Office Of The Public Defender shall maintain individual case records on each 
appointed client which shall be available for inspection by the Administrative Judge for the 
judicial district of the trial court administrator or the trial court administrator, upon request. 
14. Notice To The Office Of the Public Defender. 
All notices of appointment of clients for representation by the Office Of The Public 
Defender, shall be made by contact with the Marler Law Office, P.O. Box 6369, Pocatello, Idaho 
83205M6369. Notification of appointment to represent clients should be made by telephone to 
(208) 478M 7600, and/or fax to (208) 478M 7605. 
All subsequent notices should be provided directly to the attorney of record representing 
the particular client, or when no attorney appears of record, by notice to the Office Of The Public 
Defender at the above address. 
15. Authorization For Private Practice. 
Attorneys providing services under this Agreement may undertake representation of person 
charged with a crime in this or any other jurisdiction for a fee. Attorney's providing services 
under this Agreement who are independent ofMarler Law Office, may unde1take representation 
of persons charged with a crime for a fee, provided that such representation does not conflict 
with the representation of indigent clients. Private representation of clients for a fee shall not be 
accepted by an attorney providing services under this Agreement where any repres.entation is 
reasonably likely to lead to a conflict of interest with a matter arising under this Agreement which 
would require of counsel outside of the Office Of The Public Defender. 
Page 7 of9 
000150
,. 
16. Modification. 
Any modification of the Agreement shall be in writing and approved by all parties. There 
are no parole agreements accompanying this Agreement. 
17. Ai::reement Disputes. 
Any dispute relating to this Agreement shall be resolved through recourse first with 
the District Judges of the Sixth Judicial District, who shall act collectively as a body in any 
determination with regard to the dispute and second by appropriate legal remedies, if necessary. 
18. Termination of Agreement. 
Franklin may terminate this Agreement with the Office Of The Public Defender 
immediately fo~ good cause shown at any time. All cases assigned prior to termination for cause 
shall be completed pursuant to the Agreement unless representation is ass'ijmed by its successor 
attorney with approval of the appropriate court; provided that all services provided after the date of 
termination shall be compensated a~ a rate as may be agree upon, or in the event of no agreement 
then at the rate as established by prior agreement between the county and The Office Of The 
Public Defender, utilizing current counsel's current hourly rate as a basis for the rate. 
"Good Cause" required for immediate termination shall mean failure of the Office Of The 
Public Defender to comply with the terms of this Agreement to the extent that the delivery of 
services to clients is impaired or rendered impossible, or willful disregard by The Office Of The 
Public Defender oft!1e rights and best interest of the clients resulting in impairment of the rights 
and interests of the clients. Individual actions of the Office Of The Public Defender, or any one 
attorney taken in connection with one case alone, shall not necessary constitute • good cause11 for 
removal. 
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The Office Of The Public Defender may withdrawal from this Agreement at any time 
without penalty if for any reason the Office Of The Public Defender determines that it is unable 
to provide adequate and co~petent representation to the clients assigned under this Agreement, 
provided that the Office Of The Public Defender shall give at least one-hundred twenty (120) days 
written notice of its intent to withdraw and the reason therefore, and provide further that the Office 
Of The Public Defender will not be allowed to withdraw from any case assigned under the terms of 
this Agreement in which the rights of interests of clients would be impaired. Withdrawal shall be 
deemed a termination of this Agreement as of the effective date of the notice of withdrawal. 
. :/-
DATED this ~day of October, 2012. 
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Counties where defendants are represented at arraignment: 
Yes: 
No: 
1. Ada 
2. Bonner (usually) 
3. Camas (usually) 
4. Canyon 
5. Jerome (usually)· 
6. Twin Falls 
7. Adams 
8. Bannock 
9. Bear Lake 
10.Benewah 
11.Bingham 
12. Bonneville 
13. Boundary 
14.Butte 
15.Caribou 
16.Cassia 
17. Clark 
18. Clearwater 
19.Custer 
20.Elmore 
21. Idaho 
22.Fremont 
23. Franklin 
24.Gem 
25.Gooding 
26. Kootenai 
27. Latah 
28.Lemhi 
29.Lewis 
30.Madison 
31. Minidoka 
32. Nez Perce 
33.0neida 
34.0wyhee 
35.Payette 
36.Shoshone 
37.Teton 
38. Washington 
EXHIBIT F 
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No Information: 
39.Blaine 
40.Boise 
41 . Jefferson 
42.Lincoln 
43.Power 
44.Valley 
V 
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LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JUL O 8 2015 
CALLY YOUNGER, ISB #8987CH1'tlSlOPHER o. flllCH Cl k 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR By STACEY LAFFERTY' er 
P.O. Box 83720 · DEPUTY STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
MICHAELS. GILMORE, ISB #1625 
W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB #9361 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Boise, ID, 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208)-334-2100 
Cally. younger@gov .idaho. gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attornel General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2n Floor 
Attorney for Defendant C.L. "Butch" Otter 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-4130 
Fax: (208) 854-8073 
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov 
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendants State ofldaho, Hon. 
Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz, Sara B. 
Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber 
Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. 
Christy Perry 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves and ) 
all others similarly situated, ) 
Plaintiffs, ~ 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in his 
official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON. MOLLY 
HUSKEY, et al., in their official capacities as member 
of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______ D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_s. __________ ) 
Case No. CV OC 1510240 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants (1) the State of Idaho, (2) the Governor of Idaho, the Hon. C.L. "Butch" 
Otter, and (3) the seven members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission hereby move 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) to dismiss the Class Action Complaint for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. This Motion to Dismiss is supported by an accompanying 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
ORIGINAL 
000155
\ , 
.... 
' ' 
DATED this 8th ,day of July, 2015. 
MICHAEL . ILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants other than 
Governor Otter 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
By~ A . -~ 
{~R 
Attorney for Governor Otter 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Richard Eppink 
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation 
P.O. Box I 897 
Boise, ID 83701 
Jason D. Williamson 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
125 Broad St. 
New York, NY I 0004 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
555 Thirteenth St. NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
Bret H. Ladine 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
Jenny Q. Shen 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
4085 Campbell Ave., Ste. I 00 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
ffu.s.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 208-344-7201 ~ Email: reppink@acluidaho.org 
@'lJ.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
Q._,,Facsimile: 212-549-2654 
~ Email: jwilliamson@aclu.org 
@U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
0..,,Facsimile: 303-899-7333 
CJ Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com 
~.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 202-637-5600 Er' Email: Kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
izr-u.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 415-374-2499 ~ Email: bret.Iadine@hoganlovells.com 
@"u.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D acsimile: 
E ail: jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
\ 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
MICHAELS. GILMORE, ISB #1625 
W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB #9361 
Deputy Attorneys General 
CALLY YOUNGER, ISB #8987 JUL O 6 ?01~ 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERN~ISTOP 
P O B 83720 HERD. AICH, Clerf, 
. . ox By STACEY LAFFERTY 
Boise, ID, 83720-0010 DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208)-334-2100 
Cally. younger@gov .idaho .gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attornel, General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2° Floor 
Attorney for Defendant C.L. "Butch" Otter 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-4130 
Fax: (208) 854-8073 
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov 
mike. gilmore@ag. idaho. gov 
Attorneys for Defendants State of Idaho, Hon. 
Molly Huskey, Rep. Darrel G. Bolz, Sara 
B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber 
Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. 
Christy Perry 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in 
his official capacity as Governor of Idaho; HON. 
MOLLY HUSKEY, et al., in their official capaci-
ties as members of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission, 
") 
) Case No. CV OC 1510240 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
------------------
Defendants (1) the State of Idaho, (2) the Governor of Idaho, the Hon. C.L. "Butch" 
Otter, and (3) the seven members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission file this Memo-
randum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and 
Declaratory Relief. This Memorandum first reviews the Complaint, then explains why no relief 
can be granted against any of the named Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT 
The Complaint is brought for the purpose of vindicating rights to the effective assistance 
of counsel under the Federal and State Constitutions. Complaint,~~ 3, 25, 59, 92, 162, 171, 173, 
175, 178, 180, 182, 183. It names four Plaintiffs that it proposes as class representatives. All 
four named Plaintiffs appeared in court in response to a criminal complaint accusing the Plaintiff 
of a crime for which he or she could be imprisoned if convicted. Complaint, ~~ 4-7. Although 
each of the named Plaintiffs alleged that he or she could not afford bail, none of them alleged 
that he o~ she was indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel; one of them alleged indi-
gence in the context of not being able to afford an expert. Id., ~ 78. 1 
The first named Plaintiff is Tracy Tucker. The Complaint alleges: (1) Mr. Tucker was 
arrested in Bonner County, had bail set at $40,000 at an initial appearance in which he was not 
represented by counsel, could not afford to post bond, was held in jail awaiting trial, was repre-
sented at arraignment by a "substitute" attorney who was unfamiliar with his case and who did 
not advocate in his favor, was able to contact his public defender only three times for a total of 
20 minutes before a scheduled trial, eventually pleaded guilty rather than go to trial, and awaits 
sentencing; and (2) Bonner County pays its public defenders under a fixed fee annual contract. 
Complaint,~~ 4, 63-67, 110, 117, 118, 126, 129, 156. 
The second named Plaintiff is Jason Sharp. The Complaint alleges: (1) Mr. Sharp was 
arrested in Shoshone County, had bail set at $50,000 at an initial appearance in which he was not 
represented by counsel, could not afford to post bond, later had bail reduced to $5,000, again 
could not afford to post bond, was later released from jail while awaiting trial through the efforts 
of his employer and without the assistance of the public defender, has been unable to obtain 
discovery materials from his public defender, has not been able to persuade his public defender 
to file substantive motions in his behalf, has met with his public defender for only 90 minutes 
It would not be productive to dwell on the lack of allegations of indigence entitling Plaintiffs to the 
services of appointed counsel because it seems likely that this omission can be cured. If Plaintiffs file 
affidavits of indigence or an Amended Complaint alleging indigence before oral argument on the Motion 
to Dismiss, Defendants will not raise any procedural objections to treating the Complaint as though it had 
alleged that the named Plaintiffs were indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel. 
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over 13 months, and is scheduled to go to trial; and (2) Shoshone County pays its public defen-
ders under a fixed fee annual contract. Complaint,~~ 5, 68-74, 111, 115, 126, 130, 157. 
The third named Plaintiff is Naomi Morley. The Complaint alleges: Ms. Morley was ar-
rested in Ada County, had a public defender present at her initial video appearance when bail was 
set at $15,000 (but had not been able to speak with the public defender, who later determined that 
he had a conflict of interest and could not represent her), could not afford to post bond, remained 
in jail for three weeks until her bail was reduced, was told by her conflict counsel that she would 
have to pay for expert drug testing services herself, obtained on her own (and without the assist-
ance of conflict counsel) an affidavit from another person indicating that drugs found in Ms. 
Morley's car were not Ms. Morley's, has been unable to communicate with conflict counsel 
about her comments to the police investigation or about her scrapped car, and fears that conflict 
counsel will not be able to adequately prepare for trial because of his workload. Complaint,~~ 6, 
75-79, 112, 117, 127, 130, 133, 158. 
The fourth named Plaintiff is Jeremy Payne. The Complaint alleges: (1) Mr. Payne was 
jailed in Payette County, had bail set at $30,000 at an initial appearance in which he was not rep-
resented by counsel, could not afford to post bond, remained in jail for over four months until the 
State faqed to timely take his case to trial, met with his public defender outside of court only 
twice during that time, has not been able to discuss discovery or strategy with his public defend-
er, who in turn has not been able to meaningfully investigate his case, and is scheduled for trial 
after waiving his preliminary hearing; and (2) Payette County pays its public defenders under a 
fixed daily rate contract. Complaint,~~ 7, 80-84, 113, 126, 129, 136, 142, 159. 
The named Defendants are: (1) the State of Idaho, Complaint,~ 85; (2) Governor C.L. 
"Butch" Otter,~ 86; and (3) the seven members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission,~ 87. 
The Defendants are more fully described as follows: 
(1) The State of Idaho is a sovereign State. Idaho Admission Act, 26 Stat. L. 215, ch. 
656. Se.ction 1 of that Act "declared Idaho to be a State of the United States of America ... ad-
mitted into the Union on equal fo~ting with the original States" and "the constitution which the 
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people of Idaho have formed for themselves ... is hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed." 
Article XVIII of the Idaho Constitution that was accepted, ratified and confirmed by Congress 
was titled "County Organization"; § 5 of Article XVIII provided for the Legislature to establish a 
system of County government; § 11 provided that "County, township, and precinct officers shall 
perform such duties as shall be prescribed by law." Section 22 of the Idaho Admission Act pro-
vided that "All acts or parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act, whether passed by 
the legislature of said territory or by Congress, are hereby repealed." 
(2) The Governor, who is sued in his official capacity, holds a constitutional office in the 
' Executive Department of Idaho State Government. The supreme Executive Power is vested in 
the Governor. Idaho Constitution, Article IV,§§ 1 and 5. 
(3) The Idaho Public Defense Commission, whose seven members are sued in their offi-
cial capacities, is an agency of the Executive Department created by statute and located in the 
Department of Self-Governing Agencies.2 The Public Defense Commission has a duty to prom-
ulgate rules for criminal defense attorney training and data reporting and to make recommenda-
tions to the Legislature for legislation regarding public defender issues.3 
2 Idaho Code § 19-849( 1 ), a section of the Idaho Public Defense Act, creates the State Public De-
fense Commission and provides that it consists of the following members: 
§ 19-849. State public defense commission. -(1) There is hereby created in the de-
partment of self-governing agencies the state public defense coi:nmission. The commission 
shall consist of seven (7) members as follows: 
(a) Two (2) representatives from the state legislature that shall include one (1) mem-
ber from the senate and one (1) member from the house of representatives; 
(b) One ( 1) representative appointed by the chief justice of the Idaho supreme court; 
and 
(c) Four (4) representatives appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate as 
follows: 
(i) One ( 1) representative from the Idaho association of counties; 
(ii) One (1) representative who has experience as a defending attorney; 
(iii) One (1) representative from the office of the state appellate public defend-
er; and 
(iv) One (1) representative from the Idaho juvenile justice commission. 
3 Idaho Code§ 19-850(1), another section of the Idaho Public Defense Act, imposes the following 
duties on the Commission: 
§ 19-850. Powers and duties of the state public defense commission. - (1) The 
state public defense commission shall: 
(a) Promulgate rules in accordance with the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code, establishing the following: 
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Statute provides for the Boards of County Commissioners to provide for indigent cri-
minal defense.4 No statute gives the Governor or the Public Defense Commission supervisory 
authority over persons who provide indigent public defender services or the County officers who 
are required by statute to provide for such services. Perhaps that is why the Complaint does not 
seek injunctive relief against the Governor or members of the Public Defense Commission. 
Excluding the Complaint's requests for class certification, attorneys' fees and "any other" relief, 
the Complaint has the following Prayers for Relief against the State (or against no one in parti-
(i) Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending attor-
neys, which shall promote competency and consistency in case types including, 
but not limited to, criminal, juvenile, abuse and neglect, post-conviction, civil 
commitment, capital and civil contempt; and 
(ii) Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports submitted pur-
suant to section 19-864, Idaho Code. The data reported shall include caseload, 
workload and expenditures. 
(b) On or before January 20, 2015, and by January 20 of each year thereafter as 
deemed necessary by the commission, make recommendations to the Idaho legislature 
for legislation on public defense system issues including, but not limited to: 
(i) Core requirements for contracts between counties and private attorneys for 
the provision of indigent defense services and proposed model contracts for 
counties to use; 
(ii) Qualifications and experience standards for the public defender and 
defending attorneys; 
(iii) Enforcement mechanisms; and 
(iv) Funding issues including, but not limited to: 
1. Training and continuing legal education for defending attorneys; 
2. Data collection and reporting efforts; and 
3. Conflict cases. 
(c) Hold at least one (I) meeting in each calendar quarter. 
4 Idaho Code § 19-859, also a section of the Idaho Public Defense Act, imposes upon County Com-
missioners the obligation to provide for indigent criminal defense and prohibits "fixed-fee" contracts: 
§ 19-859. Public defender authorized - Joint county public defenders. - The 
board of county commissioners of each county shall provide for the representation of indi-
gent persons and other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an attorney at public 
expense. The board of county commissioners of each county shall provide this representa-
tion by one (I) of the following: 
(1) Establishing and maintaining an office of public defender; 
(2) Joining with the board of county commissioners of one (1) or more other counties 
within the same judicial district to establish and maintain a joint office of public defender 
pursuant to an agreement authorized under section 67-2328, Idaho Code; 
(3) Contracting with an existing office of public defender; or 
(4) Contracting with a defending attorney, provided that the terms of the contract shall 
not include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee for the services and 
expenses of the attorney. The contract provisions of this subsection shall apply to all con-
tracts entered into or renewed on or after the effective date of this act. 
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cular), not against the Governor or the members of the Public Defense Commission: 
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally ade-
quate representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial 
appearances; 
C) Declare that the constitutional rights of Idaho's indigent criminal defendants 
are being violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for 
the State to move this Court for approval of specific modifications to the 
structure and operation of the State's indigent-defense system; 
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants 
by providing constitutionally deficient representation; 
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval 
and monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public 
defense that is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and 
laws of the State of Idaho; 
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval 
and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for at-
torneys representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in or-
der to ensure accountability and to monitor effectiveness; 
G) Enter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of in-
digent defense services in the State ofldaho; 
Complaint, p. 53. 
For the reasons explained in the following Argument, none of these Prayers for Relief can 
be granted against any of the named Defendants, so the Complaint should be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against any of the named Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
First, Defendants acknowledge the seriousness of the issues that Plaintiffs describe in 
their Complaint. The rights of indigent criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel 
provided at public expense are recognized by case law under the State and Federal Constitutions 
and underlie the Idaho Public Defense Act. Those rights are judicially enforceable in individual 
criminar defendants' cases. The Complaint, however, proposes a judicially unmanageable and 
unenforceable solution to the problems that it identifies. That is why Defendants move to dis-
miss. This Argument first explains why the Federal claims against these Defendants should be 
dismissed, then why the State law claims against these Defendants should also be dismissed. 
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I. The Complaint Does Not State a Claim Upon Which Relief May 
Granted Under Federal Law 
The Sixth Amendment, which is part of the Bill of Rights, does not directly apply to the 
States. "[T]he Bill of Rights curtail[ s] only activities by the Federal Government, see Barron v. 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833), but the Fourteenth Amendment subjects 
state and local governments to the most important of those restrictions .... " Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 187, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1746 (1984). The Sixth Amendment, which provides 
indigents a right to effective assistance of counsel, applies to prosecutions in State courts through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.-,-, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012). 
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the vehicle through 
which the Sixth Amendment is _applied to the States: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the pri-
vileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the law. 
Section 1 does not itself create a right to sue to vindicate Federal rights; § 5 gives that 
power to Congress, which "shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted pursuant to Congress's 
power under§ 5. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28, 112 S.Ct. 358, 363 (1991). Section 1983 is the 
presumptive vehicle under which persons may sue to vindicate their Federal rights. City of 
Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119-120, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 1458 (2005). 
Indeed, Plaintiffs sued under§ 1983, Complaint~~ 3, 172, 179, which provides in relevant part: 
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... , subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person with-
in the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such offi-
cer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless 
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a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavail-
able .... 
(Emphasis added; provisions relating to the District of Columbia and the Territories omitted.) 
Section 1983 is a powerful vehicle for vindicating Federal rights, but its reach does· not go be-
yond what it authorizes. 
A. The State of Idaho Is Not a "Person" Subject to Suit Under§ 1983, So the Federal 
Claims Against the State Must Be Dismissed 
Section 1983 authorizes suits against a "person." A State is not a "person" and cannot be 
sued under § 1983: "We find nothing substantial in the legislative history that leads us to believe 
that Congress intended that _the word 'person' in § 1983 included the States of the Union." Will 
v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989). Thus, 
Will affirmed dismissal of a suit against an agency of the State of Michigan because a State is not 
a "person" who can be sued under§ 1983. Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312. See also Miller v. Idaho 
State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,862,252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2011) (same). 
Will and Miller were suits for damages, not for declaratory and injunctive relief. How-
ever, Wills reasoning that the State is not a "person" who can be sued under § 1983 did not de-
pend on whether the suit was in law or equity, and the same reasoning applies to suits for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief. "When a litigant seeks injunctive relief [ under § 1983] that involves a 
state agency's unlawful or unauthorized act, he must sue some individual in authority at that 
agei:icy, not the agency itself." Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex.App. 2008), 
citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10, 109 S.Ct. at 2312, n.10. "Plaintiff's prospective federal claims 
under § 1983 and § 1988 seek only declaratory relief and attorney fees. These claims must, 
however, be asserted only against 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983. The state itself is not 
such a person." Lucchese v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990), citing Will. Thus, the State 
of Idaho is not a person who can be sued under § 1983, and the Federal claims against it must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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B. The Governor and the Members of the Public Defense Commission Are Not Persons 
Against Whom the Requested Relief Under the Federal Claims Can Be Granted, So 
the Federal Claims Against Them Must Be Dismissed 
Wills seemingly harsh rule that the State is not a "person" who may be sued under§ 1983 
is ameliorated by its footnote 10, which stated: "Of course a state official in his or her official 
capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-ca-
pacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." Will, supra, 491 
U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312 (internal punctuation omitted), citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 
150. 167, n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, n.14, and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 
441, 453-454 (1908). However, the ability to sue some State or local state actors in their official 
capacities for injunctive relief under § 1983 does· not mean that this Complaint has sued the 
proper officials. As Leachman noted, a plaintiff "must sue some individual in authority in the 
agency," not merely any State officer. None of the Defendants sued here are an "individual in 
authority" for the task of providing public defender services for the indigent. 
To begin, the Complaint does not allege any acts or omissions in which the Governor was 
personally involved that resulted in a denial of effective assistance of counsel to any of the four 
named Plaintiffs. See Complaint, ,r 86, which contains only legal conclusions that the Governor 
"bears ultimate responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated services to the peo-
ple of Idaho" and has supervisory authority over the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission. As 
explained in the following pages, these legal conclusions are incorrect. 5 The same is true for the 
members of the Public Defense Commission - the Complaint has no allegations of fact that any 
one of them was personally responsible for acts or omissions that resulted in a denial of effective 
assistance of counsel to any of the four named Plaintiffs. See Complaint ,r 87 (summarizing the 
Commission's statutory duties under Idaho Code§ 19-850(1), supra, n.3). 
s On a motion to dismiss for failure state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Defendants ac-
cept the Complaint's allegations of fact, but are not bound by its conclusions of law. Owsley v. Idaho 
Industrial Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455,462 (2005) ("to survive a 12(b) motion to dismiss, 
it is not enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations ... the non-movant is entitled to have his 
factual assertions treated as true, ... this privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the non-
movant hopes the court to draw from those facts"). 
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Of course, the Governor and Commission members have political or governmental inter-
ests in improving Idaho's indigent defense system, but they have no legal authority to address 
the system as requested in the Complaint. The Complaint implicitly concedes this point because 
its Prayers for Relief do not ask for the Governor or Commission members to be enjoined at all. 
The Complaint was wise not to seek injunctive relief against the Governor or the Commission 
~members. That is because individual state officers sued for injunctive relief in their official 
capacities under § 1983 must have some connection with the enforcement of the laws at issue. 
Complaints under § 1983 frequently sue Governors for injunctive relief, and Governors 
are dismissed almost as frequently because they usually have no direct connection to enforce-
ment of the law in question. E.g., when the Governor of California was sued over a statute that 
made it illegal to sell foie gras produced by force feeding ducks, the Governor was dismissed as 
a defendant because he had no direct connection with enforcement of the law: 
Ex Parte Young ... allows citizens to sue state officers in their of-
ficial capacities for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief ... 
for their alleged violations of federal law. The state official must 
have some connection with the enforcement of the act. That con-
nection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state 
law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for 
enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to 
suit. Here, Governor Brown is entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity because his only connection to § 25982 is his general 
duty to enforce California law. 
Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied- U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 398 (2014) (internal punctuation and citations omitted; 
two paragraphs reformatted as one). 
Although Governor Brown's dismissal was based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit, not upon failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the result is the 
same: If the Governor had been involved in enforcing the law in question, there would have 
been no Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit in Federal Court, and the Court would have 
proceeded to the merits to address whether the Complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. But no relief was possible because the Governor did not enforce the law in question, 
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and an injunction against him would not have benefited the Plaintiffs. See also Ariz. Contractors 
Ass 'n v. Napolitano, 526 F.Supp.2d 968, 983 (D. Ariz. 2007) ("[t]he Act does not charge the 
Governor with any specific duty, and her general duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted is not sufficient to make her a party to this challenge"), aff'd on other grounds, 558 F.3d 
856 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, - U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011); Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 
986-987 (9th Cir. 1998) (members of judicial discipline commission could not be sued over 
Nevada Supreme Court rules prohibiting disclosure of facts in complaints against judicial offi-
cers and allowing Supreme Court to hold persons who disclose such facts in contempt because 
commission members had no power to change the rules and no contempt power). In the cases 
just cited there were no injuries in fact caused by or redressable by the defendants; these essential 
elements of standing were absent. In short, the defendants were legal strangers to the controver-
sies and .were named simply as placeholders for the State, a pleading devise that attempted to 
circumvent the principle that States are not persons under§ 1983. 
Like the Governors in Canards and Arizona Contractors and the judicial discipline com-
missioners in Snoeck, Governor Otter and members of the Public Defense Commission do not 
directly control, regulate, administer, or otherwise bear responsibility for provision of public de-
fender services, and they have no ability to provide the requested relief. They are legal strangers 
to the Federal claims. The Federal claims against them should be dismissed. 
II. The Complaint Does Not State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be 
Granted Under State Law 
There are Federal cases directly or very nearly on point because Federal case law has de-
veloped in thousands of published opinions under § 1983. In candor, the State law issues that the 
Complaint presents are open questions, and the parties will be arguing from cases that are less 
than perfect analogies. For that reason, this part of the argument will address policy as well as 
law in order to flesh out the bare constitutional text. 
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A. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court Does Not Have 
Authority to Enjoin the State 
Statute provides for Counties to administer indigent defense programs. See Idaho Code 
§ 19-859, n.4, supra. The Complaint's Prayers for Relief, however, see page 6, supra, ask the 
Court to entangle itself in the actions of another branch of government by enjoining, approving 
and monitoring policy changes that can only be achieved by legislation, namely, by the Court: 
• "provid[ing] a deadline for the State to move ... for approval of specific modifications to 
the structure and operation of the State's indigent-defense system," Prayer C; 
• enjoining the State "to propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, a plan to 
develop and implement a statewide system of public defense," Prayer E; and 
• enjoining the State "to propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, uniform work-
load, performance, and training standards for attorneys representing indigent criminal 
defendants," Prayer F. 
There are no statutes requiring what these Prayers request or tasking any officers to do what 
these Prayers request; the only way to achieve the requested relief is by new legislation. 
Thus, this case could present serious separation-of-powers issues concerning the District 
Court's authority to enjoin the "State," which would require the Court in effect to enjoin the 
Legislature to pass new statutes "for this Court's approval." Happily, the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure make it unnecessary to reach these separation-of-powers issues, and the Court need 
not address them. This is consistent with the principle of constitutional avoidance. "The general 
rule of constitutional avoidance encourages courts to interpret statutes so as to avoid unnecessary 
constitutional questions." Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 864, 252 P.3d 1274, 1282 
(2011 ). By analogy, the principle of constitutional avoidance should also apply to Court Rules. 
The Civil Rules in question are 3(b) and 65(d). They provide: 
Rule 3(b). Designation of party 
... Provided, all civil actions by or against a governmental 
unit or agency, ... shall designate such party in its governmental ... 
name only, and individuals constituting the governing boards of 
governmental units . . . shall not be designated as parties in any 
capacity unless the action is brought against them individually or 
for relief under Rules 65 or 74. 
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Rule 65(d). Form and scope of injunction or restraining orde.r 
Every order granting an injunction . . . shall be specific in 
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought 
to be restrained; and is binding only on the parties to the action, 
their officers, agents, servants, and attorneys, and upon those per-
sons in active concert or participation with them, who receive ac-
tual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Weyyakin Ranch Property Own_ers 'Association, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896 
P.2d 327 (1995), holds that the general rule that suit is brought against a government entity in the 
name of that governmental entity and not against its officers does not apply when the suit is for 
an injunction. To obtain an injunction, Rule 3(b) requires the Complaint to name specific offi-
cers to be enjoined; naming only the governmental entity violates the rule. 
This action for injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 ... sought 
to enjoin the "City of Ketchum" from taking any further action to 
complete the proposed annexation. Tlte designation of the "City 
of Ketchum," rather titan the elected officials individually, vio-
lates I.R.C.P. 3(b). Because the temporary restraining orders failed 
to name the elected officials individually, the trial court never ob-
tained jurisdiction over them, and therefore did not have the au-
thority to find them in contempt. 
127 Idaho at 2-3, 896 P.2d at 328-329 (emphasis added). 
It is obvious, despite the Complaint naming as Defendants the Governor and members of 
the Public Defense Commission, that neither the Governor nor the Commission have statutory or 
constitutional authority to tell the County officers who operate Idaho's indigent defense system 
how to operate the system. The only State entity that can change the system in the way requested 
by the Prayers for. Relief is the Idaho Legislature, which is not named as a Defendant and which 
under Rule 65(d) would not be bound by any injunction entered by the District Court.6 Pursuant 
6 It is almost certain that an injunction requiring the Legislature to pass legislation on a specific topic 
that would be subject to the District Court's approval and monitoring would violate separation of powers. 
Article II,§ 1, of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
§ 1. Departments of government. - The powers of the government of this state are 
divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person 
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
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to Rules 3(b) and 65 and Weyyakin all requests for injunctive relief against the State should be 
dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 3(b). 
B. The Court Does Not Have Authority to Issue a Declaratory Ruling Against the State 
Because There Is No Justiciable Controversy Between Plaintiffs and the State 
The Civil Rules' prohibition against issuing an injunction against the State leaves open 
the issue _of whether declaratory judgment can be entered against the State. The availability of 
declaratory judgment alone against the State is not explicitly addressed by the Rules or in the 
case law.· The Court may assume without deciding that there may be cases in which a District 
Court can enter declaratory judgment against the State and/or the Legislature, e.g., when the 
Constitution itself imposes an affirmative legislative duty upon the State. See Article IX, § 1 ("it 
shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and 
thorough system of public, free common schools"); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993) (Legislature among defendants sued 
for decla~atory and injunctive relief under Article IX, § 1 ). 
Plaintiffs' state law claims here are based upon Article I, § 13, which is constitutionally 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
The Legislative Power includes the power to decide what legislation will be considered or enacted. 
"§ 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exer-
cise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724 (1966). 
An injunction requiring enactment of specific legislation or legislation on a specific subject would 
violate separation of powers (assuming that the Constitution does not explicitly require legislation on that 
topic). "[T]he broader rule is that mandamus will not lie to compel the Legislature to enact any 
legislation. A separation of powers does allow for some incidental overlap of function. But a judicially 
compelled enactment of legislation is not an incidental overlap; it is the very exercise of legislative power 
itself." County of San Diego v. State, 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 594, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489, 501, review denied 
(2008) (decided under California's similar separation-of-powers article). Also Cedar County Committee 
v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 377, 380, 950 P.2d 446, 447 (1998) ("the creation of a new county is an exercise 
of legislative power ... ; the Legislature cannot be compelled to form a new county") (decided under 
Washington's similar separation-of-powers article). These cases are of academic interest, however, 
because the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow an injunction to be issued against the State, and 
these separation-of-powers issues need not be addressed. 
Further, naming the State as a defendant also has other serious separation-of-powers issues. "It is 
the general rule that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a· governmental unit can only be sued 
upon its consent," and that, "such consent is evidenced by the state constitution or a legislative mandate." 
Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239,244, 141 P.3d 1108, J 113 (2006). Rule 3(b) avoids 
the constitutional issue of whether. this Court can "waive" sovereign immunity. 
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unlike Article IX, § 1: The former puts no affirmative duties on the State or any State officer 
while the latter puts an affirmative duty on the Legislature. Article I, § 13, provides: 
§ 13. Guaranties in criminal actions and due process of 
law. - In all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall [1] 
have the right to a speedy and public trial; [2] to have the process 
of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, 
and [3] to appear and defend in person and with counsel. 
No person shall [4] be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense; nor [5] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself; nor [6] be deprived to life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. 
Section 13 creates at least six sets of constitutional rights for defendants in criminal cas-
es, as noted by the bracketing above. But § 13 does not place any duty on the "State." If§ 13 
impliedly imposes any duties upon the "State," all of the rights involved would be asserted in a 
criminal proceeding, and the only branch of State government present in all State criminal pro-
ceedings is the Judiciary, so presumably any duties created in one of the branches of State gov-
ernment would be duties for presiding judges, not for the Legislative or Executive Branches.7 
Be that as it may, the determination of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judg-
ment comes from the Declaratory Judgment Act itself and the cases decided under it, not from 
the preceding paragraph's and the footnote's speculations. The Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act 
provides that "Courts of record ... shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Idaho Code § 10-1201. However, 
declaratory judgments can only be issued in justiciable controversies: 
Idaho courts have the power to declare the rights, status and 
legal relations of persons .... LC.§ 10-1201 ... 
An important limitation upon this jurisdiction is that, "a de-
7 If the "State" has duties under a part of§ 13, then does it also have duties under all of§ 13? For 
example, should the "State" be responsible for monitoring all District Judges, Magistrates, Prosecuting 
Attorneys, and public defenders to assure that (1) all defendants have speedy and public trials, (2) all 
defendants have process to compel witnesses, (3) no defendant is subject to double jeopardy, and (4) no 
defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated? 
Many officers in addition to public defenders are implicated by § 13 's constitutional rights. There 
is no principled distinction under which monitoring public defenders can be separated from monitoring 
trial judges and prosecutors. What State officer can do that under our constitutional system? No one. 
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claratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an 
actual or justiciable controversy exists." This concept pre-
cludes courts from deciding cases which are purely hypo-
thetical or advisory. 
State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 597, 809 P.2d 455, 458 (1991) 
(internal citation omitted). · 
Wylie v. State, 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011 ). 
One aspect of justiciability is redressability. In re Jerome County Bd. of Com 'rs, 153 
Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012). Redressability is an essential element of justicia-
bility - without the possibility of judicial redress, a judgment or order is an advisory opinion. 
Therefore, courts will not rule on declaratory judgment actions 
which present questions that are moot or abstract. An action for 
declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted, 
would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based on the 
judgment and no other relief is sought in the action. 
Wylie, 151 Idaho at 31, 253 P.3d at 705 ( citations and quotation marks omitted). As Wylie further 
observed: "Turning to the question of justiciability, Wylie has been unable to articulate how a 
judgment declaring the Ordinance invalid would provide him any relief," so Wylie's request for 
declaratory judgment was not justiciable. 151 Idaho at 34, 253 PJd at 708. 
The situation here is similar. Rule 3(b) precludes injunctive relief against the State for 
Plaintiffs' benefit. A declaratory ruling against the State would therefore not provide judicial re-
lief for Plaintiffs. Accordingly, there is no justiciable controversy between Plaintiffs and the 
State, and Plaintiffs are simply asking the Court for an advisory opinion. In fact, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act has co·dified the principle that the Court need not issue an advisory opinion. 
§ 10-1206. When court may refuse judgment or decree. 
- The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment 
or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, 
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to 
the proceeding. 
If ever there were a situation calling for the application of§ 10-1206 and for the Court's 
refusal to enter declaratory judgment against the State, this is it. There is a statutory framework 
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in place by which public defender services are provided by the Counties. Plaintiffs' concerns are 
addressed by that statutory framework, which provides a robust right ofrepresentation: 
§ 19-852. Right to counsel of indigent person - Repre-
sentation at all stages of criminal and commitment proceedings 
- Payment. - (1) An indigent person who is being detained by a 
law enforcement officer, ... or who is under formal charge of hav-
ing committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious 
crime, is entitled: 
(a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a 
person having his own counsel is so entitled; and 
(b) To be provided with the necessary services and facilities 
of representation including investigation and other prepara-
tion. The attorney, services and facilities and the court 
costs shall be provided at public expense to the extent that 
the person is, at the time the court determines indigency 
pursuant to section 19-854, Idaho Code, unable to provide 
for their payment. 
(2) An indigent person who is entitled to be represented by 
an attorney under subsection (1) of this section is entitled: 
(a) To be counseled and defended at all stages of the matte.r 
beginning with the earliest time when a person providing 
his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an 
attorney and including revocation of probation; 
(b) To be represented in any appeal; 
(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction or post-
commitment proceeding that the attorney or the indigent 
person considers appropriate, unless the court in which the 
proceeding is brought determines that it is not a proceeding 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be 
willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivo-
lous proceeding. 
(3) An indigent person's right to a benefit under subsection 
(1) or (2) of this section is unaffected by his having provided a 
similar benefit at his own expense, or by his having waived it, at an 
earlier stage. 
Plaintiffs are not objecting to these State laws; they are objecting that the laws are not 
being followed. Rather than "slog" through the work of addressing individual problems in indi-
vidual Counties or groups of Counties, whose populations range from fewer than 1,000 residents 
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to greater than 400,000, and whose on-the-ground practical administrative solutions surely can-
not be applied Statewide, Plaintiffs want this Court to issue a "cookie cutter" declaration that the 
State must fix everything even though no "cookie cutter" response can do so. 
In essence, Plaintiffs want this Court to issue a declaration and injunction to the State that 
it must make Counties follow the law. There are two central problems with this. The first is 
obvious: The Counties are not parties to the lawsuit, and Plaintiffs are suing the State as a proxy 
for the Counties. If Plaintiffs have identified problems with the Counties' administration of the 
law, suing the State is not the solution. The second is that courts do not issue injunctions "to 
obey the law": "But the mere fact that a court has found that a defendant has committed an act in 
violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute and thus subject 
the defendant to contempt proceedings ifhe shall at any time in the future commit some new vio-
lation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was originally charged." N.L.R.B. v. Express 
Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-436, 61 S.Ct. 693, 699 (1941). Yet Prayers B through F are little 
more than requests to enjoin the State against ever allowing a violation of the law governing in-
digent defense. That should not be the basis for declaratory or injunctive relief. 
The State closes this part of its argument with some practical prudential and jurispruden-
tial con~iderations. For 125 years of Idaho statehood, Counties or other local units of govern-
ment have provided whatever indigent defenses were provided at the trial level. The Idaho 
Constitution, which Congress approved in the Idaho Admission Act, contemplated that Counties 
would provide many governmental services required by law. No decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States has ever held that the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
§ 1983 required a State to take on or to supervise provision of indigent defense services through-
out a State. No decision of the Idaho Supreme Court has ever required_ the State to take on or to 
supervise the provision of indigent defense services throughout the State under State law. 
Plaintiffs' requested relief would affect not only public defenders; it would affect how 
every District Judge and every Magistrate conduct criminal trials and hearings. In the abstract, 
one District Judge has the legal authority to issue judgments and orders that would affect how 
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every County, every other District Judge, and every Magistrate administer indigent defense, even 
if there are no controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States or of the Supreme 
Court of Idaho requiring the District Judge to do so. But that is not the best way to develop the 
law from a prudential or jurisprudential standpoint. A decision to restructure how every County 
and trial court provides indigent defense - if it were ever to be made - should not come 
without review of the Idaho Supreme Court (and perhaps the United States Supreme Court) 
because of its extraordinary implications for all of the Counties and trial courts in the State. That 
is yet another reason why the State law claims against the State should be dismissed. 
C. The Governor and the Members of the Public Defense Commission Are Not Persons 
Against Whom the Requested Relief Under the State Law Claims Can Be Granted, 
So the State Law Claims Against Them Should Be Dismissed 
This Memorandum explained why the Governor and Members of the Public Defense 
Commission could not be enjoined under Federal law at pp. 9-11, supra. The argument and 
cases were based upon the Federal law, but the same underlying reasoning also applies to the 
State law claims: Neither the Governor nor the Commission members can be enjoined to per-
form duties they do not have. The State law claims against them should also be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
All of Plaintiffs' Federal and State law claims should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted against these Defendants. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2015. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
B 
CHAEL S. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants other than 
Governor Otter 
\ 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
By~ 
Attorney for Governor Otter 
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One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
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~U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
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Defendants move this Court under Rule 26(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to 
issue a protective order staying discovery pending a decision on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
filed July 8, 2015. This motion is supported by an accompanying Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2015. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By w.VcoA~og~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants other than 
Governor Otter 
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Defendants file this Memorandum in Support of their motion for a protective order 
staying discovery pending the Court's decision on Defendants' motion to dismiss, which they 
filed July 8, 2015. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed this case on June 17, 2015, contending that the public defense systems in 
Idaho's counties fail to provide indigent criminal defendants with adequate representation, in 
violation of their federal and state constitutional rights. Although Idaho statutes require Idaho's 
counties to provide defense to indigent defendants, Plaintiffs did not sue the counties or their 
commissioners. Instead, they sued the State, the Governor, and the commissioners of the Public 
Defense Commission. 
Defendants responded to the complaint on July 8 by filing a Rule 12(b) motion to 
dismiss. The motion raises purely legal arguments primarily centered on justiciability. It 
contends that none of the defendants Plaintiffs chose to name are proper defendants. The motion 
is based on the following legal principles: 
• The State ofldaho is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus 
cannot be sued for violating Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights; 
• The other defendants - Governor Otter and the members of the Public Defense 
Commission - cannot be sued for the relief requested under section 1983, or for alleged 
violations of Plaintiffs' state constitutional rights, because they have no legal authority to 
make the sweeping changes to Idaho's public defense system Plaintiffs request; and 
• Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the 
State under state law, because the Court lacks authority to enjoin the State and there is no 
justiciable controversy between the State and Plaintiffs. 
All these matters raised in the motion are legal issues to be resolved by the briefing on the 
motion to dismiss. 
After Defendants moved to dismiss, Plaintiffs served discovery requests. Plaintiffs 
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served all Defendants with interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for documents. 
Plaintiffs also noted the depositions of two non-party witnesses. Copies of Plaintiffs' discovery 
requests are attached as appendices to this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has discretion to stay discovery pending the outcome of the motion to dismiss. 
Rule 26( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to make orders regarding 
the timing and sequence of discovery. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[ c ]ontrol 
of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court." Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 749 
.890 P.2d 331,335 (1995) (citing Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dept of Health 
& Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683 P.2d 404, 409 (1984)). In Service Employees, the Court 
upheld the trial court's decision to suspend discovery pending the outcome of a "motion to 
dismiss [that] raised purely legal issues." See 106 Idaho at 761, 683 P.2d at 409. If an entire 
case can be resolved by a dispositive motion pending before the court, it is particularly 
appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to stay discovery. See Taylor v. AJA Servs. 
Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 570-71, 261 P.3d 829, 847-48 (2011) (upholding district court's decision 
to stay discovery pending resolution of dispositive motion, "especially since th[ e] motion for 
summary judgment could have been dispositive of the entire case"). 
There are good reasons for the Court to stay discovery until it resolves Defendants' 
pending motion to dismiss. If the Court grants the motion, it will dispose of the entire case. No 
discovery is necessary to resolve the motion, because it raises purely legal issues. The Court 
should consider no evidence outside the pleadings in deciding the motion. '"The only facts 
which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are those 
appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court may properly judicially 
notice."' Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) (quoting Hellickson v. 
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Idaho App. 1990)). 
Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if discovery is stayed pending the outcome on the motion 
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to dismiss. If any of Plaintiffs' claims survive the motion, there will be plenty of time for 
Plaintiffs to conduct discovery before trial or summary judgment, neither of which has even been 
scheduled. 
In contrast, permitting discovery before the Court rules on the motion to dismiss would 
impose unnecessary and undue burdens on Defendants. The burden is unnecessary because 
Defendants' motion to dismiss should resolve the entire case on purely legal grounds. There is 
no need for depositions, document productions, and written discovery at this point. And the 
burden would be substantial. For example, Plaintiffs have requested information and documents 
dating back to 2010. See, e.g., Document Request No. 1 (requesting all documents relating to the 
provision of indigent defense services in Idaho since 2010). Other requests have no time limits. 
See, e.g., Document Request No. 12 (requesting all documents relating to the absence of counsel 
at indigent defendants' initial appearances in Idaho). At least one request applies to any State 
official. See Document Request No. 24 (requesting "all documents relating to any informal or 
formal complaints or other information provided or conveyed by state officials relating to 
Idaho's indigent defense system and funding for that system, since the passage of the Idaho 
Public Defense Act in 2014") (emphasis added). 
Moreover, discovery at this point would impose additional burdens on members of the 
Public Defense Commission, who also serve in other capacities. For example, both the Hon. 
Molly Huskey and Sara B. Thomas have served as the State Appellate Public Defender since 
2010. Plaintiffs' requests would encompass many privileged communications from the 
Defendants' public defense work. Their current counsel in this case from the Attorney General's 
office would be unable to assist them in document review and production, because the Attorney 
General serves as prosecutor in those appellate cases handled by the State Appellate Public 
Defender. Those Defendants would bear the entire burden of an enormous amount of document 
review that may be entirely unnecessary if the Court grants the motion to dismiss. All 
Defendants except William Wellman serve or have served in legislative, judicial, or other 
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governmental positions.1 They similarly would be required to scour all their records from these 
positions to comply with the demands of Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Moving full-speed ahead 
with discovery now would unreasonably burden Defendants, who maintain that Plaintiffs have 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no good reason to force Defendants to undertake the burdens of discovery while 
their motion to dismiss is pending. Defendants respectfully request that the Court exercise its 
discretion to enter a protective order staying all discovery until the Court resolves the pending 
motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2015. 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By 
W. SCOTT ZANZIG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants other than 
Governor Otter 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
By 
CALLY YOUNGER 
Attorney for Governor Otter 
1 During the relevant time period, Hon. Molly Huskey has served as a district judge. Sara Thomas has 
served on the Criminal Justice Commission. Rep. Darrel Bolz, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy 
Perry have served in the legislature. Kimber Ricks has served as a county commissioner. William 
Wellman has served as a defending attorney. 
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS 
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 3 3 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Tracy 
Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and 
through their undersigned attorneys, hereby request that Defendants, the State ofldaho, 
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and Idaho State Public Defense Commissioners Molly Huskey, 
Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Chuck Winder, and 
Christy Perry ("Defendants") answer, in writing, and under oath the following interrogatories 
and serve such answers upon counsel for Plaintiffs. 
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
In addition to the definitions and instructions set forth in Rules 26 and 33 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the following definitions and instructions apply to each of the 
discovery requests set forth herein and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests. 
Definitions 
1. The present tense includes the past and future tenses. 
2. The tenn "document," as used herein, means the original and all non-identical 
copies of any handwritten, printed, typed, recorded, or graphic or photographic material of any 
kind and nature, including all drafts thereof and all mechanical or electronic sound recordings or 
transcripts thereof, however produced or reproduced, and including, but not limited to, 
accounting materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment books, books of account, 
calendars, catalogs, checks, computer data, computer disks, computer generated or stored 
information, computer programming materials, contracts, correspondence, date books, diaries, 
diskettes, drawings, electronic-mail ("e-mail") messages, faxes, guidelines, instructions, inter-
2 
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office communications, invoices, ledgers, letters, licenses, logs, manuals, memoranda, metadata, 
microfilm, minutes, notes, opinions, payments, plans, receipts, records, regulations, reports, 
sound recordings, statements, studies, surveys, telegrams, telexes, timesheets, vouchers, word 
processing materials (however stored or maintained) and working papers, and all other means by 
which information is stored for retrieval in fixed form. 
3. The term "communication," as used herein, means and includes any transmission 
or exchange of information between two or more persons, whether orally or in writing, and 
including but not limited to any conversation or discussion by means of letter, note, 
memorandum, telephone, telegraph, telex, telecopier, fax transmission, cable, e-mail, or any 
other medium. 
4. The terms "relate to," "related to," "relating to," and "regarding," as used herein, 
mean mentioning, citing, quoting, involving, representing, constituting, discussing, reflecting, 
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, or in any 
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly. 
5. The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any natural person, corporation, 
and any other form of business entity, including, but not limited to, partnerships, joint ventures, 
and associations, and shall include directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents, 
attorneys, or anyone else acting on the person's behalf. 
6. The terms "and" and "or," as used herein, are to be construed conjunctively or 
disjunctively, as necessary, to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive. 
7. The terms "any" and "all," as used herein, shall mean "any and all," and shall be 
construed so as to bring within the scope of the request any information that otherwise might be 
construed to be outside its scope. 
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8. The term "describe," as used herein, means to state all facts of which you are 
aware concerning the subject, including, but not limited to, identifying any dates, any person 
involved in or with knowledge of the subject, and any places or locations relevant to the subject. 
9. The term "identify," as used herein, means: 
a. In connection with persons, to give, to the extent known, the person's full 
name, present or last known address, and, when referring to a natural person, 
the present or last known place of employment; 
b. In connection with a document, to give, to the extent known, the (i) type of 
document; (ii) general subject matter; (iii) date of the document; and 
(iv) author(s), addressee(s), and recipient(s); 
c. In connection with an oral statement or communication, to the extent known, 
to (i) state when and where it was made; (ii) identify each of the makers and 
recipients thereof, in addition to all others present; (iii) indicate the medium of 
communication; and (iv) state the substance of the statement or 
communication. 
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10. The terms "you," "your," and "Defendants," as used herein, shall mean the State 
ofldaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Commissioner Molly Huskey, Commissioner Darrell G. 
Bolz, Commissioner Sara B. Thomas, Commissioner William H. Wellman, Commissioner 
Kimber Ricks, Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner Christy Perry, and each and every 
former, present, and future commissioner and officer of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission. 
11. The terms "public defender" or "public defenders" shall mean any attorney or 
attorneys providing legal services to an "indigent person," as that term is defined at Idaho Code § 
19-851(4), who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a 
conviction of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§ 19-851(5), as well as any 
attorney or attorneys providing legal services to a 'juvenile," as that term is defined at Idaho 
Code § 20-502(11 ), who is under formal charge of having committed, or who has been 
adjudicated for commission of, an act, omission or status that brings her or him under the 
purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.). 
12. The terms "county commissioner" or "county commissioners" shall mean any 
member or members of a board of county commissioners as described in Idaho Code Ann. § 31-
701 - 3 l-718. 
Instructions 
1. These interrogatories are continuing in character so as to require you to 
supplement your answers and responses promptly if you obtain additional information. 
Supplemental answers and responses shall be served on Defendants within a reasonable time, as 
set forth in Rule 26( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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2. If you encounter or claim the existence of any ambiguities construing a definition, 
instruction, or interrogatory herein, set forth the matter deemed ambiguous and the construction 
used in responding. 
3. Unless otherwise indicated, no interrogatory herein limits the scope of any other 
interrogatory. 
4. All interrogatories (and any requests for the production of documents) are to be 
answered on the basis of your knowledge and belief, and/or the knowledge and belief of your 
agents and attorneys. 
5. If any information furnished in an answer is not within your personal knowledge, 
identify each person who has personal knowledge of the information furnished in such answer 
and each person who communicated to you any part of the information furnished. 
· 6. Where a claim of privilege is asserted in responding or objecting to_ an 
interrogatory, state the factual basis for the claim of privilege, including (1) the date of the 
subject document or communication; (2) the identity of the author, preparer, or the person 
responsible for the communication, including without limitation, the author's, preparer's, or 
responsible person's name, address, employment, and title; (3) the identities of each person who 
was sent or had access to or custody of the document or communication, together with an 
identification by employment of each such person; (4) the location of the document (if 
applicable); and (5) a summary of the document's or communication's subject matter in 
sufficient detail to enable an evaluation of the claim of privilege. 
7. All interrogatories must be answered in full and in writing. If any interrogatory 
cannot be answered fully after exercising reasonable diligence, please so state and answer each 
such interrogatory to the fullest extent you deem possible; specify the portion of each 
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interrogatory that you claim to be unable to answer fully and completely; state the facts upon 
which you rely to support your contention that you are unable to answer the interrogatory fully 
and completely; and state what knowledge, information, or belief you have concerning the 
unanswered portion of each such interrogatory. 
8. If any interrogatory is objected to with respect to only a part of the interrogatory, 
fully answer the remaining parts of the interrogatory to which you have not objected. 
INTERROGATORIES 
1. Identify the state official(s), other than the Governor and the Idaho Public 
Defense Commission, with the authority to ensure that indigent defendants are receiving 
representation that meets state and federal constitutional standards. 
2. Describe, in detail, any and all efforts undertaken by Defendants to address state 
oversight of public defense delivery in Idaho since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act 
in 2014. 
3. Describe, in detail, any recommendations proposed by the Idaho Public Defense 
Commission to the Idaho state legislature on the provision of indigent defense in Idaho 
including, but not limited to, funding and enforcement issues, since the passage of the Idaho 
Public Defense Act in 2014. 
4. Describe, in detail, any communications between the Idaho Public Defense 
Commission and individual county commissioners related to funding and/or staffing problems 
since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act in 2014. 
5. Describe, in detail, any proposals by the Governor's Office to contribute funding 
to the provision of trial-level indigent defense services prior to or since the passage of the Idaho 
Public Defense Act in 2014. 
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6. Describe, to the best of your knowledge, the method by which each ofldaho's 44 
counties funds its indigent defense system. 
· 7. Identify which entity or entities are charged with ensuring compliance with the 
requirement, pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-860(1), that "[s]o far as is possible, the 
compensation paid to [] public defender[ s] shall not be less than the compensation paid to the 
county prosecutor for that portion of his practice devoted to criminal law." 
8. Identify which entity or entities are charged with ensuring compliance with the 
requirement, pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-8629(1), that "[t]he board of county 
commissioners of each county shall annually appropriate enough money to administer the 
program of representation." 
9. Describe, in detail, any efforts undertaken by Defendants to bring public defender 
caseloads within Idaho into compliance with the national standards set by the National Legal Aid 
& Defender Association and/or American Bar Association. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1510240 
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF DOCUMENT REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS 
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Tracy 
Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and 
through their undersigned attorneys, hereby request that Defendants, the State of Idaho, 
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and Idaho State Public Defense Commissioners Molly Huskey, 
Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Chuck Winder, and 
Christy Perry ("Defendants") produce for inspection and copying the requested documents 
described below. 
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
In addition to the definitions and instructions set forth in Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the following definitions and instructions apply to each of the 
discovery requests set forth herein and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests. 
Definitions 
1. The present tense includes the past and future tenses. 
2. The term "document," as used herein, means the original and all non-identical 
copies of any handwritten, printed, typed, recorded, or graphic or photographic material of any 
kind and nature, including all drafts thereof and all mechanical or electronic sound recordings or 
transcripts thereof, however produced or reproduced, and including, but not limited to, 
accounting materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment books, books of account, 
calendars, catalogs, checks, computer data, computer disks, computer generated or stored 
information, computer programming materials, contracts, correspondence, date books, diaries, 
diskettes, drawings, electronic-mail ("e-mail") messages, faxes, guidelines, instructions, inter-
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office communications, invoices, ledgers, letters, licenses, logs, manuals, memoranda, metadata, 
microfilm, minutes, notes, opinions, payments, plans, receipts, records, regulations, reports, 
sound recordings, statements, studies, surveys, telegrams, telexes, timesheets, vouchers, word 
processing materials (however stored or maintained) and working papers, and all other means by 
which information is stored for retrieval in fixed form. 
3. The term "communication," as used herein, means and includes any transmission 
or exchange of information between two or n:iore persons, whether orally or in writing, and 
including but not limited to any conversation or discussion by means of letter, note, 
memorandum, telephone, telegraph, telex, telecopier, fax transmission, cable, e-mail, or any 
other medium. 
4. The terms "relate to," "related to," "relating to," and "regarding," as used herein, 
mean mentioning, citing, quoting, involving, representing, constituting, discussing, reflecting, 
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, or in any 
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly. 
5. The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any natural person, corporation, 
and any other form of business entity, including, but not limited to, partnerships, joint ventures, 
and associations, and shall include directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents, 
attorneys, or anyone else acting on the person's behalf. 
6. The terms "and" and "or," as used herein, are to be construed conjunctively or 
disjunctively, as necessary, to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive. 
7. The terms "any" and "all," as used herein, shall mean "any and all," and shall be 
construed so as to bring within the scope of the request any information that otherwise might be 
construed to be outside its scope. 
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8. The term "describe," as used herein, means to state all facts of which you are 
aware concerning the subject, including, but not limited to, identifying any dates, any person 
involved in or with knowledge of the subject, and any places or locations relevant to the subject. 
9. The term "identify," as used herein, means: 
a. In connection with persons, to give, to the extent known, the person's full 
name, present or last known address, and, when referring to a natural person, 
the present or last known place of employment; 
b. In connection with a document, to give, to the extent known, the (i) type of 
document; (ii) general subject matter; (iii) date of the document; and 
(iv) author(s), addressee(s), and recipient(s); 
c. In connection with an oral statement or communication, to the extent known, 
to (i) state when and where it was made; (ii) identify each of the makers and 
recipients thereof, in addition to all others present; (iii) indicate the medium of 
communication; and (iv) state the substance of the statement or 
communication. 
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10. The terms "you," "your," and "Defendants," as used herein, shall mean the State 
ofldaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Commissioner Molly Huskey, Commissioner Darrell G. 
Bolz, Commissioner Sara B. Thomas, Commissioner William H. Wellman, Commissioner 
Kimber Ricks, Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner Christy Perry, and each and every 
former, present, and future commissioner and officer of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission. 
11. The terms "public defender" or "public defenders" shall mean any attorney or 
attorneys providing legal services to an "indigent person," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§ 
19-851(4), who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a 
conviction of a "serious crime," as that tennis defined at Idaho Code§ 19-851(5), as well as any 
attorney or attorneys providing legal services to a ''juvenile," as that term is defined at Idaho 
Code§ 20-502(11), who is under formal charge of having committed, or who has been 
adjudicated for commission of, an act, omission or status that brings her or him under the 
purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.). 
12. The terms "County Commissioner" or "County Commissioners" shall mean any 
member or members of a Board of County Commissioners as described in Idaho Code Ann. § 
31-701-31-718. 
13. The term "initial appearance" shall mean the first time a person under formal 
charge of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code § 19-851 ( 5), or of an act, 
omission, or status that brings her or him under the purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act 
(Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.), appears before a judge regarding the charge. 
14. The term "state officials" shall mean any state or county official within the State 
ofldaho. 
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Instructions 
1. If any part of a document is responsive to any request, the whole document is to 
be produced . 
. 2. Any alteration of a responsive documen~, including any marginal notes, 
handwritten notes, underlining, date stamps, received stamps, endorsed or filed stamps, drafts, 
revisions, modifications, and other versions of a final document is a separate and distinct 
document, and it must be produced. 
3. If you file a timely objection to any portion of a request, definition, or instruction, 
provide a response to the remaining portion as well. 
4. The terms defined above, along with the individual requests for production and 
inspection, should be construed broadly, to the fullest extent of their meaning, in a good faith 
effort to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. These discovery requests are continuing and require supplemental responses as 
specified in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) if you (or any person acting on your behalf) 
obtain .additional information called for by the requests between the time of the original response 
and the time of trial. Each supplemental response must be served on Plaintiffs no later than 
thirty (30) days after the discovery of the further information, and in no event should any 
supplemental response be served later than the day before the first day of trial. 
6. The fact that a document is produced by another person or entity does not relieve 
you of the obligation to produce your copy of the same document, even if the two documents are 
identical in all respects. 
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7. In producing documents and other materials, you are requested to furnish all 
documents or things in your possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such 
documents or materials are possessed directly by you or your directors, officers, agents, 
employees, representatives, subsidiaries, managing agents, affiliates, investigators, or by your 
attorneys or their agents, employees, representatives, or investigators. 
8. Documents are to be produced in full. Redacted documents will not constitute 
compliance with any individual request. If any requested document or thing cannot be produced 
in full, produce it to the extent possible, indicating which document or portion of that document 
is being withheld and the reason that document is being withheld. 
9. In producing documents, you are requested to produce the original of each 
document requested, together with all non-identical copies and drafts of that document. If the 
original of any document cannot be located, a copy must be provided in lieu thereof, and must be 
legible and bound or stapled in the same manner as the original. 
10. Documents must be produced in the file folder, envelope, or other container in 
which the documents are kept or maintained by you. If, for any reason, the container cannot be 
produced, produce copies of all labels or other identifying marks. 
11. Documents must be produced in such fashion as to identify the department, 
branch, or office in whose possession it was located and, where applicable, the natural person in 
whose possession it was found and the business address of each document's custodian(s). 
12. Documents attached to each other should not be separated. 
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13. Documents not otherwise responsive to this discovery request must be produced if 
such documents mention, discuss, refer to, or explain the documents that are called for by this 
discovery request, or if such documents are attached to documents called for by this discovery 
request and constitute routing slips, transmittal memoranda, letters, comments, evaluations, or 
similar materials. 
14. If any documents requested herein have been lost, discarded, destroyed, or are 
otherwise no longer in your possession, custody, or control, or have been transferred voluntarily 
or involuntarily to another person or persons, or otherwise disposed of, they must be identified as 
completely as possible including, but not limited to, information necessary to identify the 
document and the following information: the date of disposal or transfer, the manner of disposal 
or transfer, the reason for disposal or transfer, the person authorizing the disposal or transfer, and 
the person disposing of or transferring the document. 
, 15. If you claim the attorney-client privilege or any other privilege or work product 
protection for any document, state the factual basis for the claim of privilege, including (1) the 
date of the subject document or communication; (2) the identity of the author or preparer, 
including without limitation, the author's or preparer's name, address, employment, and title; (3) 
the identities of each person who was sent or had access to or custody of the document, together 
with an identification by employment of each such person; ( 4) the location of the document (if 
applicable); and (5) a summary of the document's or communication's subject matter in 
sufficient detail to enable an evaluation of the claim of privilege. 
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16. Notwithstanding the assertion of any objection to production, any document as to 
which an objection is raised containing non-objectionable matter that is relevant and material to a 
request must be produced. However, that portion of the document for which the objection is 
asserted may be withheld or redacted, provided that the above-mentioned identification is 
furnished. 
17. If any responsive document is no longer in your possession, custody, or control, 
identify its current or last known custodian and describe, in full, the circumstances surrounding 
its disposition from your possession or control. Without limitation to the term "control," as used 
in this paragraph, a document must be deemed to be in your control if you have the right to 
secure the document or a copy thereof from another person or entity, public or private, having 
possession, custody, or control thereof. 
DOCUMENT REQUESTS 
1. All documents and/or studies conducted, drafted, received, and/or published by 
Defendants relating to the provision of indigent defense services in the State of Idaho since 2010. 
2. All documents and/or studies conducted, drafted, received, and/or published by 
Defendants relating to the length of pre-trial detention for defendants in the State of Idaho since 
2010. 
3. All documents and/or communications with representatives of the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association relating to the provision of indigent defense services in the State 
ofldaho since 2010. 
4. All documents and/or communications with representatives of the Sixth 
Amendment Center relating to the provision of indigent defense services in the State of Idaho 
since 2010. 
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5. All documents and/or communications regarding any alternate legislation or 
reforms considered by the State ofldaho relating to the provision of indigent defense services 
since 2010, apart from or in addition to the Idaho Public Defense of Act of 2014. 
6. All documents and/or communications relating to any informal or formal 
complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to the funding of 
indigent defense services and the resources allotted to public defenders in the State ofldaho, 
including but not limited to, funds to pay investigators or experts. 
7. All documents and/or communications relating to any informal or formal 
complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to public defender 
caseloads in the State ofldaho. 
8. All documents and/or communications relating to any formal or informal 
complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to attempts by 
prosecutors in the State ofldaho to communicate with indigent defendants regarding their 
pending criminal case without appointed public defense counsel present. 
9. All documents and/or communications relating to any formal or informal 
complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to the role of county 
commissioners in the provision of indigent defense services in the State ofldaho. 
10. All documents and/or communications relating to any formal or informal 
complaints or other information received by Defendants from indigent criminal defendants in 
Idaho since 2010 relating to the representation provided to them by a public defender. 
11. All documents and/or communications received by Defendants since 2010 
relating to Idaho indigent defendants' access to and ability to contact or communicate 
consistently with their assigned counsel, including but not limited to, informal or formal 
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complaints or other information related to indigent defendants' inability to review discovery or 
other case-specific materials with their public defender. 
12. All documents and/or communications relating to the absence of counsel at 
indigent defendants' initial appearances in the State ofldaho. 
13. All documents and/or communications relating to any informal or formal 
complaints or other information received by Defendants from indigent defendants in Idaho since 
2010 alleging that defendants were forced to pay for the costs of their representation, including, 
but not limited to, paying for mandated pre-trial drug testing and the costs of expert witnesses. 
14. All documents and communications relating to any actual or proposed funding of 
indigent defense services by the State of Idaho since 2010, including all documents and 
communications relating to how indigent defense services are funded by each of the 44 counties 
within the State ofldaho since 2010. 
15. All documents relating to the annual funding each county within Idaho has 
devoted to the provision of indigent defense services for each year since 2010, reported 
separately for each county. 
16. All documents submitted by any county to the central registry and reporting portal 
established by Idaho Code§ 67-450E. 
17. All documents and communications relating to any funding the State ofldaho has 
provided for trial-level indigent defense services since 2010. 
18. All documents and communications relating to any supervision or oversight the 
State ofldaho has provided for trial-level indigent defense services since 2010. 
19. All documents and communications relating to any training the State ofldaho has 
provided for trial-level indigent defense providers since 2010. 
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20. All documents identifying or relating to, preferably by county, the number of 
attorneys representing indigent defendants in Idaho, whether on a contractual basis, by 
appointment of the court, or as a full-time employee of an institutional public defender office, 
reported separately for each year since 2010. 
21. All documents identifying or relating to the number of adult criminal defendants 
within Idaho who qualify for public defense services, reported separately for each county, for 
each year since 2010. 
22. All documents identifying or relating to the number of juvenile defendants within 
Idaho who qualify for public defense services, reported separately for each county, for each year 
since 2010. 
23. All documents relating to the average per-year and/or per-month caseload for 
public defenders in Idaho, reported separately for each county, for each year since 2010. 
24. All documents relating to any informal or formal complaints or other information 
provided or conveyed by state officials relating to Idaho's indigent defense system and funding 
for that system, since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act in 2014. 
25. All communications between the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, or any 
member thereof, and individual county commissioners since the passage of the Idaho Public 
Defense Act in 2014. 
26. 
27. All communications between Governor Otter and individual county 
commissioners since the filing of the above-captioned lawsuit on June 17, 2015, relating to 
indigent defense services in Idaho. 
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28. All rules proposed by the Idaho Public Defense Commission for the provision of 
indigent defense services in Idaho, as well as all drafts of any such rules, and any correspondence 
and/or records documenting the rulemaking process. 
29. All uniform performance standards proposed by the Idaho Public Defense 
Commission for the provision of indigent defense services in Idaho, as well as all drafts of any 
such proposals, and any associated correspondence and/or records relating to these proposed 
standards. 
30. All recommendations proposed by the Idaho Public Defense Commission for the 
provision of indigent defense services in Idaho, as well as all drafts of any such 
recommendations, and any associated correspondence and/or records relating to these proposed 
recommendations. 
31. All documents and communication relating to any trainings or supervision for 
public defenders proposed by the Idaho Public Defense Commission. 
32. All minutes, recordings, or transcripts of meetings held by the Idaho Public 
Defense Commission. 
33. Any and all documents relating to studies, reports, surveys or analysis received, 
prepared, requested, or requisitioned by the Idaho Public Defense Commission relating to the 
provision of indigent services in the State ofldaho. 
34. All documents identified in your Responses to the Interrogatories or Requests for 
Admission. 
35. All documents relied upon in responding to the Interrogatories or Requests for 
Admission. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1510240 
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS 
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Tracy 
Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and 
through their undersigned attorneys, hereby request that Defendants, the State of Idaho, 
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and Idaho State Public Defense Commissioners Molly Huskey, 
Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Chuck Winder, and 
Christy Perry ("Defendants") answer, in writing, and under oath, the following requests for 
admission and serve such answers upon counsel for Plaintiffs. 
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
In addition to the definitions and instructions set forth in Rules 26 and 36 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the following definitions and instructions apply to each of the 
discovery requests set forth herein and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests. 
Definitions 
I. The present tense includes the past and future tenses. 
2. The terms "relate to," "related to," "relating to," and "regarding," as used herein, 
mean mentioning, citing, quoting, involving, representing, constituting, discussing, reflecting, 
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, or in any 
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly. 
3. The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any natural person, corporation, 
and any other form of business entity, including, but not limited to, partnerships, joint ventures, 
and associations, and shall include directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents, 
attorneys, or anyone else acting on the person's behalf. 
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4. The terms "and" and "or," as used herein, are to be construed conjunctively or 
disjunctively, as necessary, to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive. 
5. The terms "any" and "all," as used herein, shall mean "any and all," and shall be 
construed so as to bring within the scope of the request any information that otherwise might be 
construed to be outside its scope. 
6. The terms "you," "your," and "Defendants," as used herein, shall mean the State 
ofldaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Commissioner Molly Huskey, Commissioner Darrell G. 
Bolz, Commissioner Sara B. Thomas, Commissioner William H. Wellman, Commissioner 
Kimber Ricks, Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner Christy Perry, and each and every 
former, present, and future commissioner and officer of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission. 
7. The terms "public defender" or "public defenders" shall mean any attorney or 
attorneys providing legal services to an "indigent person," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§ 
19-851(4), who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a 
conviction of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§ 19-851(5), as well as any 
attorney or attorneys providing legal services to a "juvenile," as that term is defined at Idaho 
Code§ 20-502(11), who is under formal charge of having committed, or who has been 
adjudicated for commission of, an act, omission or status that brings her or him under the 
purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.). 
8. The terms "county commissioner" or "county commissioners" shall mean any 
member or members of a board of county commissioners as described in Idaho Code Ann. § 31-
701-31-718. 
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9. The term "initial appearance" shall mean the first time a person under formal 
charge of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code § 19-851 (5), or of an act, 
omission, or status that brings her or him under the purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act 
(Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.), appears before a judge regarding the charge. 
10. The term "state officials" shall mean any state or county official within the State 
ofldaho. 
Instructions 
1. If you file a timely objection to any portion of a request, definition, or instruction, 
provide a response to the remaining portion as well. 
2. The terms defined above, along with the individual requests for admission, should 
be construed broadly, to the fullest extent of their meaning, in a good faith effort to comply with 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. These discovery requests are continuing and require supplemental responses as 
specified in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26( e) if you ( or any person acting on your behalf) 
obtain additional information called for by the requests between the time of the original response 
and the time of trial. Each supplemental response must be served on Plaintiffs no later than 
thirty (30) days after the discovery of the further information, and in no event should any 
supplemental response be served later than the day before the first day of trial. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Please admit the following: 
1. The Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) was created by Executive Order in 
2005, and operates under the supervision of the Governor. 
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2. The purpose of the CJC is to provide policy-level direction to State officials and 
to promote the efficient and effective use of resources, based on best practices or evidence-based 
practices, for matters related to the State's criminal justice system. 
3. The CJC is comprised of at least one representative from the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches ofldaho's state government, and consists of26 total members. 
4. Among other required members, the CJC must include a representative from the 
Governor's office; the state Attorney General or his designee; two members from the Idaho 
Senate; two members from the Idaho House of Representatives; the Administrative Director of 
the Courts; three representatives from the judiciary; and one representative from the Office of the 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender. 
5. In 2009, the CJC formed a Public Defense Subcommittee (Subcommittee) tasked 
with developing specific recommendations for improvement ofldaho's public defense system. 
6. In 2011, Defendant Governor Otter issued Executive Order No. 2011-11, 
continuing and reaffirming the CJ C's mandate . 
. 7. On May 24, 2013, after approximately three years ofinvestigation, the 
Subcommittee issued a set of public defense reform recommendations to the CJC. 
8. Defendant Sarah B. Thomas became Chair of the CJC on or about May 30, 2013, 
and continues to serve in that capacity at present. 
9. In 2008, the CJC, along with the Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission, authorized 
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct a comprehensive 
evaluation ofldaho's trial-level indigent defense services. 
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10. The CJC identified seven counties to serve as a representative sample of indigent 
defense systems to be evaluated by the NLADA. These included Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, 
Canyon, Kootenai, Nez Perce, and Power Counties. 
11. In January 2010, the NLADA released the results of its evaluation of trial-level 
indigent defense systems in Idaho, entitled "The Guarantee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due 
Process in Idaho's Trial Courts." 
12. In its January 2010 report, the NLADA determined that none of the indigent 
defense systems in the sample counties were constitutionally adequate. 
13. The NLADA's January 2010 report was made available to and reviewed by 
representatives of the executive and legislative branches of Idaho state government, including 
Governor Otter. 
14. There are currently no statewide caseload standards for public defenders in Idaho. 
15. There are currently no statewide performance standards for public defenders in 
Idaho. 
16. There are currently no specific statewide training requirements for public 
defenders in Idaho. 
17. There is currently no statewide oversight of trial-level indigent defense services 
being provided to criminal defendants throughout the various counties. 
18. There is currently no requirement that public defenders report their individual 
caseloads to state officials or any court. 
19. Aside from the trustee benefit payments allocated to the Idaho Public Defense 
Commission (PDC) in 2014 to offer limited training for public defense attorneys around the 
state, the State ofldaho currently provides no funding for trial-level indigent defense services. 
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20. Pursuant to I.C. sec. 19-862, each board of county commissioners alone is 
responsible for appropriating enough money to deliver adequate public defense services to 
indigent defendants being prosecuted in their jurisdiction. 
21. County commissioners are not required to have any formal or informal training in 
the law. 
22. A survey conducted by the CJC in 2014 found that indigent defendants are 
represented by counsel at their initial appearance in only 5 of the 44 counties. 
23. A significant number of public defenders in Idaho are not receiving adequate 
training hours in areas directly relevant to the representation of their indigent clients. 
24. According to a recent report by the Idaho Legislative Services Office regarding 
caseloads, public defenders in some counties are handling more than twice the number of cases 
they should be. 
25. On any given day, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals being 
prosecuted by the State ofldaho, who qualify for in~igent defense services. 
26. The majority of individuals charged with either a misdemeanor or felony in Idaho 
are alleged to have violated state law, rather than a county or municipal ordinance. 
27. The State ofldaho does provide funding to county prosecutors' offices throughout 
the state. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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bated: July~ 2015 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDA.HO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
P.O. Bo~ 1897 . 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208) 344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Jason D. Williamson 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
. jwilliamson@aclu.org 
12,5 Broad Street 
New York.New. York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2'254 (fax) 
Pro hoc vice application pending 
Ancirew C. Lillie 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
andrew.lillie@hogarilovells.com 
One T&bor Center, Suite 1500 . 
l200 Seventeenth Street. 
Denver, Cb 8Q202 
.. " ... · · · .. · · · · · · .. · · · .. · ....... 303-899-7.300 ... · · · .... ·········· -
303-899-7333 (fax) 
Pro ha.c vice application pending 
Kathryn M. Ali 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
kathryn.ali@hoganloveils~com. 
555 Thirteenth Stre~t NW . 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 
(202) 637-591 Q (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
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Bret H. Ladine 
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP 
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 374-2300 
(415) 374-2499 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Jenny Q. Shen 
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP 
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
650-463-4199 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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APPENDIX D 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF 
IAN H. THOMSON WITH SUBPOENA 
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IN THE DISTRICl' COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT . 
OF 'I'HE STATE OF'IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IRA.CY TUCKE~ et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
STATE OF IDAHO., ·et al.~ 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1510240 
PLAlNTJFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF IAN H. THOMSON 
. Pursuant to Rules 30; 45(a), and 45(b) of the Idaho Rules o~ Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs 
ti;:acy 'f-qcker, J~QP.. Sharp, Naomi Morley, .ancl Jeremy Payne (coliectiveiy, "Plaintiffs"), by and 
through their undersigned attorneys, will take the deposition oflan lI. Thomson, Executive 
Director, Iciwio State Public· Defen~e Commission~ to commence at 9:QO a.m. Qn August 27, 
2015. The deposition will mke place at ~)10 West Main Street (So·nna Building), Boise, Idaho 
8~702, and will continue from day to day until completed. The .deposition will be recorded by 
· ,st~npgrapbic anq au9io-visua1 means an.d will be condg.cted unqer oath by an office a'uthorized to 
take s·1ich testimony. The deposition will be taken for the Puwoses of discovety, for use at trial . 
in this ·matter, and fo.r imy other purpose p.ermitted 1;1nde.i; the Idaho Rui~s of CivU Proceclme. 
. . 
. The parties are· also hereby notified that a-sub_poena will be served on fan H. Th6msort for 
the production of documents. A copy of the subpoena is attached. 
Dated: August 19, 2015 
1 
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............ •··------
AMERICAN CIV{L LJQERTIES TJmON 
OJ? lDAIJO FOVNDATIO~ 
reppink@acluidaho.org· 
. P..O. Box 1897 
·:soise, idaho 83701 
(208) ~44-9750, ext, 1202 
(208) 344-7201 {fax) 
Idaho State Bar' no. 7503 
Jason D. Wiil_iam_s9n . 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBE:Q.'JIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
jwillianison@aclu.org 
125 Broad Street 
New .Y Q*, New York .10004 
-c212) 284_.:n40_ .. 
(212) 549-~654 (fax) 
Pto hac vice application pending 
Andrew C. Lillie 
.. .. . . .. 
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP 
ahdrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com 
O~e Ta~or Center, Suite 1500 
'1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO '8Qio2 
,303:g99_7300"· .. 
303-899~7333 (fax) . · _ 
Pro h11c vice application pen.ding 
. . . 
Kathryn M. Ali . 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LU,> 
katluyn.ali@hogartlovells.com 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, b.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 .. · : 
(202) ·637-5910 (fax) 
P.to hac vice application pending 
Bret H. Ladine . 
HOGANLO'.VELLSUSLLP 
bi:-et.ladiite@hogaruovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Frandsco, CA 94111 
(415) 374-~300 
(415) 3'74-2499 (fax) 
Pro hac. vice applica_tfQl'J ·pe-,zcfin!f 
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Jenny Q .. SbeQ. 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
j'enny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
6~0-'463-4199 (fax) 
Pro hac vice applict:ltion pending 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Ti;I_E FOUR'Ill .rQ))ICM.L. DlSTJ.UC'r 
OF Tl;I_E STAT)l) ~f IJ:>AHO, IN A!W FOR THE COUNI:Y OF AD~ 
TRACY TUCKER;.et al.,' 
Plaintiffs; 
vs. 
_STATE bF JD,WO, et a}., 
Defendants. 
C~se No. CV OC 151_0240. 
SUBPOENA 
The· State of Idaho · to: fan H. Thomson, Executive Director, Jdaho State Pu blip Defense 
Commission, ~16 West B~gc~ s·treet, S~it~ 201, Bois~, id~o 83702: 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
[ X ] to ·appear at the place, date and iime spec;ified befow to testify at the taking of a deposition 
in the_ abov.e case. 
[ X ] t<;> produce or permit inspection and copying of the documents described in Appendix A, 
including electrOi;lically stot~Q .iI).foqnatioil, at th~ place, date and time Specified below; 
·. 910_ West Main Street (Sonp~ Buildipg), :Qoise, Idaho 83702, August i7, 2015 at 9:00 a.Di. 
You are fut.1her nqtified that ii you fail: to appe·ar at the place and time spedfied above, or to . 
J?roduce· Qr p~fll)it copying·or inspecti<;>A as specjfi.ecJ above that YOll may b~ _held fn ~QnJempt of 
court and that the aggrieved party may recover from _you the sum· of $100 wid all damages which 
the party may sustain by yoµr f,!ilure to co.mplywjtp this irµbp~e;na. 
Dated this 19th day ofAu~t 201 s·. 
By order of the court. 
.. 
. 4 
... . ~ . . 
. . ... ; . •; .... : . ······:·-: ..... l • • . . • 
Rich~rd . 
AM.ERIC;\N CIVJL LIBERTQ!:S :UNION: 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
teppink@acluidaho.or:g 
P.O. Box 1897, Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 3.44-975.6, ~?ct. 1202. 
ldaho .State Bar no. 7503 · 
; .. · .. · ·.·· ••••• (: •• ~~- J. •• • • ' • ·- •• • • •• • • •••• 
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APPENDIXA 
. . 
in addition to the definitiops and instru9tions s~t forth in Rµle 45(i)(2) ofthe Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the. following· definitions and instructions apply to each of the discovery 
req1J.ests set forth herein· and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests. lah H. 
· Thompson is req11ested to produce to ]?lainti:ffs QOClJll1ents as set forth below by f\ugust 27, 
2015,_at 910 West Main Street (Sonha Building), Boise, Idaho_ 83702, 
Definitions 
, 1. The present tense includes the pa·st ~d fyture tenses·. 
i. thci tel111 i'document," as use1 h~rein, _mean~ the original and all non-identical 
copies of.any handwritten~ printed~ typed~ recorde,d, or g~phlc or photog:i.-apbic mate:dal of any 
. . 
kjnd and nature,' including all drafts th~reof and all inechanical or electronic sound recordings or 
transcripts thereof, however prqduced or r~produced, and incfoqing, but not Jimiteci to, 
accoun~g materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment books, books of account, 
calen,_qa,rs, 9.atal9gs, clw9ks;' computer data,· 99mputer disks, computer gene~ated or-stored 
information, c·omputer programming materials, contracts, con:espondence, date boo~s, diaries, 
cii_skettes, drawings~ electronic-mail ("e-mail") messages, faxes, guidelines, instructions, inter-
. . 
office communic~tioris, invoices,. iedgers, l~tters, "licenses, logs, m~uals, ~emoran:da, metadata, 
microfilm, niip~tes~ notes, opiriions, payments, pians, receipts, records, regulations, reports, 
- · ·. sound recordings~ statep-lent$; studies, surveys? telegrams~ tel~~e~, tini.esheets, voµchers, word 
pro~_essing materials (however" stored or maintaine.d) and working papers, and all other m~ans by 
which information is stored for tetrievitl jp fixed form. 
3. The.te~ i•communicatiort,'' as used herein, tne~s cl?d includes any transmission 
or exchange of information between..two .or more persons, whether orally or tn writing, anc;i 
~ ~ C • -
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inclµding but not limited to a,riy-conv~rsatio~ of discussfon by means of letter, note·, 
'memorandum, telephon~. telegraph, telex, telecopier, fax transmission, cable, e-mail, or any 
othei: mecfo.un. 
4. The terms "relate to " "related to " "relating· to '-' and "regarding- " as used herein, 
' ' ' ,, ' 
. . 
mean mentioning, citing, quoting, inv~lying, representing, constituting, discussing, refle.cting, 
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, ot in any, 
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly. 
·: 5. Th~ term ''per:son/' a~ us~d hei:ei1;1, sball rue~ any natural persog1 Cbrp<;>ratio~, 
. and. any other' form of business entity, including, but not iimited to, partiierships, joint ventures, 
~· ~ ~ - ~ , ~ . . -
attorneys, or anyone else acting ori the person's behalf. 
. . . 
6. The terms "a1_1ci'1 an_d "or," as us~d herei1_1? are to be construed conjU.nctively or 
' ' 
disjluictively' as necessary' to make the .tequ~st inclusive rather than exclusive~ 
. 7. The t~rII1$ "_any" an~ "all/' as ~edh~rein, ·sh~ll mean_ ''any .and all,'' and' ~hall be 
consti;ued so as to ptj.ng_ wi!~Jl tb,e scopi of the requesfl:llly infom~atio~ that ojh~rwise might be 
.. 
construed to be outside its scope. 
8. · The tetm "describe_," as used herein, means to state all facts of which you a.re 
aware concerning the subject, including, but~ot limited to, identifyin~. any dates, any person . 
involved ":1 or ~ith.knowledge of the. si.ibject, and. any places or locations relevant to the subject. 
9. The term "ide1~tify/' a$ used h;rein, ~eans: 
a 1? copnectio_n with persons, to giv~; to the extent khoy,m, th~ per:mn'_s fµll 
. ~ame, present or l~st known addr~ss, and, whefi referrin~ to a natu~al person,, · 
-tbe _present o~ last knQWJ;l place of emp1oyrne~t; 
6 
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b. In con,necti.9p wjt}J a document~. to ~ve, to t}ie ~xteQt known, the (i) type of 
doc]lIDent; (ii), general s'Ubject.matter; (iii) date of the document; and 
(iv) author(s), addressee(s), and recipient(s); 
c. In connecti9p wit11 an qral statement or communication; to the extent known, 
to (i) ·state when and where it was mad,e; (ii) identify each of the. makers and 
recipients th_ereof: in addition. to all other~ present; (iii) mdicate the medium of 
communication; and .Qv) state the substance of the ,statement or 
c9qununi_cati9n. 
· l 0. The temis "you" an_d "your" as used herein shall mean Tan H. Thomson, 
. . 
: 'Executive Direptor; iaahoState Public Defense Co~issi,on. 
- . 
11. The term .''Defendants/' as used herein~ ~l1all mean the State of Idaho, Governor 
•' . . ' -
C.L "Butcli' Otter~ Conunjssioner Moll)'. Huskey, Commissioner Darr~ll G. ~olz, 
. . 
Commi~sioner Sa,ra B. Thomas~ Comniissionet William }J. Wellman, 
- ~ ' ~ ~ ' . - ~ ' - ' 
Conunissioner Kimber Ricks~ Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner 
Christy P~rfy, an~- each and every former~ present, ~d future cdinmissioner a~d 
officer of the Idaho State Public Pefense Commission . 
. 12. The terms ~'public defender" or "pul?lic defe1J,ders:' s~all mean any ·atto~ey '~; 
.attorneys providing legaf services to an "indigent person," ijS tha,t term is defiQed _ 
at Idaho Cod~ §. ·t 9-851 ( 4), who is 'under fo:nual cha!ge of having co~nmifte~, 9r is 
},eing ·detajneq unde~ !i conyict.ion o.f ~ ".s~riou~ crimet ~ tha~ t!;lrm ,is -ci~finec:J at 
Idaho _Code § 19-8_51(5), as Well as· any attorney or attorneys provi~ing_ legal 
servlces to a 'juvenile/' a~ that term is definec{ at.Idahp Co4~ § 2·0-502(1 l), who 
. . . . . ~ ' . 
is under f~~al charge of having committed, 6r who ~as b~en adjudicated for 
·; 1 
: . )·" .. : ;• "" .. · ... ;. 
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. . 
• 
commission of; an-act. omission or status. that.brings her or him. undet the, purview 
of the Juvenile-Corrections Act (Id$o Code§§ 20.:501 et seq_.). 
13. The- ien:ns "County .. Commi~sioner" Qr "County· Commissioner~" shall mean ·any -
membet or members of a Board of County Commissioners, as described in Idaho-
Coc!~ A..nn. * 31--701-3l-71g_ 
14. The tenn "state officials" ·shall me@ll any state or cQunty official within the Stat~ 
of Idaho . 
i ~i • --.· ii:~ ~ - ~i , • ·; 
<, 
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Instructions 
l. In responding to these rec:(uests_fot p.rodtiction you should furnish all non-
privil~ged document_s (unless such privilege has been waived) that are within your possession, 
cust9<;ly, or control,. or are within the possession, ~ustody, or control of youragents, employ~es, 
~~-.:~ ~-
representatives, or investigators, and identify all documenti;; known to be responsive to. these 
reqlloest or the possession, custody, or controi of others by stating (a) who y.QU believ~ to QOntroi 
. ' ~ . . . . 
such documents, (b) where you believe such documents cart be found, ( c) the nature of the 
;clocurp:~nts (i.e., letter, e-mail, report, memorandum, etc.), and (d) when' you believe such 
.. . 
docUlhents to hav~ been created. . 
2. . If, in responding to these requests for·pro4uction, y~m encounter &ny ainbigttities 
_when 'construing a req~est or 4~fmition, th!;: .response sha~l set forth. th~ matter deemed 
' . 
ambiguous and ~e c<?n_struction used in your response. 
... 3 .. Th~ documents requested must be produqed in thei! entirety, without redaction or 
. ~" ~ 
alteration,. except where necessary to protect privileged material. When a document contains 
both priyileged and n,<;>n~pri~ilegeci material, the ·uon:-privileged material' must'be di~closed' to the 
.tulles\ extent possible without thereby disclosingthe privileged inateri~. If any document or 
portion of any document co_vered by tliis reque~t i~ withheld froni prod,,iction-yoq must identify 
' ' . . •' 
~cJ.cb iuch ~ocum~nt or p~rti_on of the document, and provide, with respect to each $~ch . 
document or po~ion thereof, (a) the !easo~(s) for withholding, .Ch) the date of the document; (c) 
the \d~ri#ty of each pe~on w~o dr!ifted or assisted in the preparation ~f the do·cument, ( d) the 
identify of each person ~ho received or h~d access to the document or copi_es thereof, Qr ·to . 
whorn;-ariy portion of·t11:e contents .h!¥3 -bee~ qomrnu,nicat~d, ( e) the type or'doc~ent and a brief 
des~riptio~ ofthe'nafure and subject matter of the docum~nt and (t)a stateme~t-~f-the facts that 
. . .. ' '. . . ' . ~ " . ' .. 
·1 
9. 
.. . .. :·. .. ~- . ; ...... , . • : ,. ' , .. ~ I • • ~ • ,- ; ,• • "• 
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constitute the basis for the claiui ofpriviiege .. 
' 4, · If production of any reqµested document is objec;ted tp Qn the grounds that 
p(odu6tiofi is unduly .burdenscfm~, 4escrib'e. the. burden or 1:;xp6nse of the propo~~d di$_covery .. 
. 5. Documents should be produced as·they are kept in the ordinary course of 
business. Where possibie, organize· and iabel each document ()( set of docmnepts? indigiting by 
f 
·numb~r the request to which the docturiefit(s) relates . 
. 6.. If any document responding to ail or any part of tbe request for d.ocum~nts 1~_not 
currently available, include a statement to that effect and furnish whatev~r documei1ts are 
available. Include in your ~t~t~ment when such documents were· mo;t ~e~e~tiy i~ your. 
·. possessio.n: or subject fo yo1,1r c;ontrpl and ~hlit disposition wa,s m~de of them., · Identify the nam~, 
job titl~, and the last kgown address of_each person currently in ·possessi~n .or control of such 
doc\1~~13:ts: If any such d~c1Jnients y,rere destroye?? icl~ntify _th~ name, Job .title, and th~ jas( · 
known business address ~f each pets~h who dire?ted that the docur~1eJits be destroyed, and state 
the re~ons the documents: were dest;oyed. · 
• ! 
I • 
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Documents to be Prod1iced 
. 1. . All documen~s related to corpmim,ications amol)g the Idaho Stat~ Puqlic Defense 
Co.mmiss.ion or its staff regarding the provision of indigent defense services in. the State of Idaho. 
· 2. All documents.related to-~ommunica~ions between·~y members or staff'ofthe 
Idaho State Public.Defen:.se Con:imission and others, including but not limited to the Governor of 
Idaho or his office, Idaho legislators, oi Idaho counties or their agents, regardin$ the ·provision of 
indigent defense services in the_ St~te ofldaho. 
· 3, All documents related to any rules., standards, onecommendations proposed, 
- • ~ • • ~ • • • • ' < 
passed, or considered l;>y the Idahq State Puolic;:. Qefense Commission relf!.ted to the ptovisicm o;f 
. . ~ .. ~.. ~ - . . . , ' -
.. . indigent defense servic.¢.s in the State of Idaho since 2010. 
.. • n • ~ • • • 
4. All documents related ·to ~y trainings or' supervision for public defenders 
·proposed by .the Idaho State. Public D~ftin:se Co~ssion. 
~ , .. . 
.. · 5. All miri1,1tes, recordings, o:r traii~.cripts of meetings. held by the· Idaho Staie Public 
Defense Commission. 
· · 6. All documents relating to studies~ reports, surv~ys ·or analy.sis·re~eived, pf~pared, · 
i:equested, ot r~q~isitj.Qne<;l l:>y _th~ Idaho St~te ~~l?U.9 Perep$.e COilJ.IJl.l$Si~l). fel~tiqg to the 
provision of indigent services in the State of Idaho. 
: : 7. All docull1:ent~ related to any 1egislatiori a,s~esseµ by the Idaho State fµblio 
Defense Cciinmissiori rel~ted to the provision of inµigent defense ·services in the State of Idaho 
since 2010: 
· ~. : All documents relatec,l to auy informal or formaJ. <;om plaints received by the Idf,lho 
State P_ublic- Defense Commission regarding pu~lic in~igent defense services in the .State of 
Idaho. since 2010. 
Ii 
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.. 
· 9. · All documents related to cc;HJlilJ.~nicatjqns invqlving you or others at the Idaho 
. . 
· .State Pu,blic Defense Co1n.tr1ission regardi~g this litigation. 
10. All c;locum~n.ts _related. to ~our toµr of visits to l~:laho' s .PlJ.blic; def~nqei;_f of;fic:es 
upon taking your position, including any reports, sllinmaties., othot~s. 
11. All documents related to.pommunicafio~ involving the ldah_o State Public 
Defense Commission and the provision of indigent qefense services in the State of Oregon. 
r 
I 
i 
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APPENDIX E 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF 
LISA FULLMER WITH SUBPOENA 
000236
! 
l 
l 
IN TUE ])ISJ'lUCT COURT ()Jt T_UE· )[OURtll JUDI_C_I~;r_, ))ISTR{CT 
OJ? THE STA T,E OF IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
· TRACY TUCKER, et q[._, 
Plaintiffsj _ 
STATE OF lDAI-lO, et.aZ: 1 
Defendimts. 
Cf!~e No. CV oc 1510240 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF LISA FULLMER 
-Pursuant to Rl,lles_ 30, 45(a),.ruid 45(b) of1he Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs 
Tracy Tucker, JasonShar_p; Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs;'),. by and 
through their uri_der:signed attom_eys~ will take the deposition of Lisa Fullmer, former Canyon 
County public defender, to comn1ei1ce at 8:00 a.m.. ort Au.gust 28, 2015. 'The deposition will take 
piace at 910 West Main Str~et (Sonna Building), Bois~ Idaho 83702,_ and wili continue from 
- 1 
day to day until completed. The deposition will be recorded by stenographic and aU:dio-visual 
means wid will be conducted under oath by art offi~e authorized to take such testimony. T.he 
deposhion: will be taken for the purposes of discovery, for use at trial in this matter1_ and for any _ 
other purpose Mi:hJ.itted tui.dei;- the Idaho Rules o:fCivJI :procedure. -
· The p~~s are, a!_so ijeEeby-no!~~ed ti.Ia~~ Sl_lbpoe~a-~ll be served on_Lisa Full~er for the. 
production of qocuIJ1ent$, A ~opy o;f 1he ~µbpo~na, j~ aJt~cbed. 
Dated:· August 20,. 2015 
I • 
1 
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AMERICAN CIVIL .LIBERTIES UNION: 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATJON 
reppink@a~lu1d?110.org 
P.O._B9}5: 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
· (208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
. (208) 344-7201 (fax) 
· Idah9 ·State Bar no. 7503 
Jason D. Williamson 
AMERiCAN CIVIL LIBER'riES UNION . 
. FOUNDATION 
jwiiliamson@aclu.org 
1.25' Bro~d Street · · 
New York,New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Pro hac vi~e application pencftng 
Andrew C. Liliie 
· HOGAN LOVELLS tJS LLP 
ancirew.lillie@hoganioyells.·c~m 
One. Tabor· Cepter, SiJite l ;,OQ 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO _80202 
303-8'99-7300 . 
~?03-899-7°333 (fax) 
Pr<} _h~c vi~e appfic_atio.n p~ndi~g 
Kathryn M. Aii . 
HOGANLOVELLSUS LLP 
·~athryrr.ali@hoganlovells.coill 
· 555 Thir.teenth Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 · .. 
'(207) 637-5910 (fax) 
Pr9 hac vice applicati.on pending 
Bret ii. L;,._di~e · 
HOGAN.LOVEL.i.s US LLP 
bret.iadine@hoganfovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
Sap :Francisco, CA 94.11 l 
(415) ).74-2300 
.(41.5) 374-2499 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application j)eridin[t 
000238
. ·.• .. 
. jenny Q. Shen 
}IOG~ LOVELLS US LLP 
jenny.shen@hoganlovelis.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Stit~ 100. 
Meruo Park, CA 94025-
6~0~4.63-400Q 
650-463-4199 (fax) . · 
· Pro hap. vie~ application pe,n{iing 
AttorYJeys for Plaintiffs 
. 3 " 
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i 
...... : .. 
. IN THE DJSTRJCT COURT OF l'HE F_OU_R'fU :JQ])ICIAL DISt.RJCT 
QF THE STATE OF IOAao, 1~ AND FOE. 'l'H]j: COPNTV OF AJ>A 
_ TRACY TUCKER, et al.~ . 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al.; 
Defendants. 
Ca~e,No.· CV ()C 1510240 
SUBPOENA 
:rhe St~te of Iciaho_tQ:, Lisa.Fullm~r, c/o Thompson Law FirQl,· 78 SW 5th Ave #2? Me~dian, 
ID 83642: . 
YOU ARE COMMANDED:·. 
[ XJ t<;> appear at the pi.ace, date a!].d' time specified below to testify at the. taking or a. deposition 
in the above c~e. 
[ ~] to produce or pernut inspection and copying of the documents_d_escriqed in' f\ppendix A, 
including electronically stored information, at the place, date and tiine specified belQw. 
> • ~ • 
- 910 West Mai.n Str~et(S6nna Buildjng), Bois~, ld~ho 83702., August 28; l01~ at 8;00 a.~. 
I • ' • • • • • 
You ~e frirth~t notifie4 th~t jf you fail to· appear at the place ~cJ time specified· ~bove; or to 
ptoduc~ or petmit copying ot inspection as specified above that you may b~ heid fo conte.inpt pf 
' court·a~q that th~· aggrieved party way recover from.you the sunj 9f $LOO ~1d all dam.ages which 
th~ party may SllStain by your failure to comply with this subpoena. . 
D~t~d this 2.0tp. day_of August 2015 . 
. By.order of.the court 
.. " . : . 
' . ,• 
...... 
. . . . ~. .· 
,4 
.. :·Ricnar ppmk .. , . •, ' 
·A.M~RlJ~AN ClVlL Lll3ERTIES.UNI0N 
OF .IDAHO. fOUNDA.l'lON 
,reppink@acluidaho.org. 
P.O. Box:'i897; Bois~,I~aho· 83701 
{208) 344-9750', ext. 1202 
Idiµ,.o Sta~e Bar no. 7503. 
.· ...... ·· .. · ..: . . ·.·· . 
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APPENDIX A' 
; In addition to the dennjtions and. instn,tctions set forth.in Rule 45(i)(2) o{the {d;mo Rul~ 
of Civil Procedure, the following. definitions and instructj.ons apply to each of the discovery 
requests set 101th her~!n. and are· dee°?eci to be i_ncorpo~ated iri each of ~e requests. Lisa Fullme~ 
. ~. ~ ' 
is r~q1,1ested to produGe to Pl~tiffs dQCUJP{lnts as set forth bel9w by Augu~t 2~, 2015., at 910 
West Main S1reet(Sonna Building), Boise, Idaho. 83702 ... · 
Definitions· 
· 1. .'_[he pr~sent tense includes the past and f11fute tenses. 
-'2. .The tepn ''document,." as us¢d herein, means th~ ~rigmal and all non-identicai 
. '.. .. . . 
. . . 
copies ~f any handwritten, printed, typed, recotded, br graphic br photographic .materiaJ of any 
kind ru-id. nature, fu.cl~ding all .drafts thereo:f'and all mechanical or electronic sound recordings or 
tr~scripts thereof, however prodµced or "reprodtJced, ancl including, but pot ljmited to, 
accounting materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment b?oks, books of account, 
cc!lendais_? caJalogs, checks, compu~er ciat~ compµter dlsks, comp:uter _generateq or .sto~ 
. ~ ' . . ~ .. 
information, computer programming _materials, contracts, corresp_ondence, date books, di~es, 
dis~ettes,. dni.wjngs.., elecfronic-mafl ("e-m~Ii'') _messages, faxes, guidelines, instm~ti01js, lnter-
office communications, invoices., ledgers, letters~ licenses, logs,. j:nanua]s, memoranda, metadata, 
~ ' ; . . -· . . 
microll:lm, minutes, notes, opinions, payJ]len~, plans,. receipts, records, regulations, reports, 
sound ie~ordings, statements, stµdie.s, surveys, telegrams, telexes, timesheets, vouch~rs, wo!d _ 
processing inat{ltials (4owever st9red 01: ,m~ip.tained) anq W9tkipg pap~:rs, and all other means by 
. - . ~ . ~ . 
~hich iilformati~n is stored for retrieval in fixed form. 
3, JheteTilJ."communication,·,;_as used'herei!l, means and inoludes any tiansrnjssion 
or exch~ge ofinformatiofi between two or niore persons, whether ·orally or in_ writing, and 
5 
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includt11g _ l:mt not limi1ed to any convei'S~ti<;>J?- or disc~siO:n by_ rrieans of lett~r, note,_ 
- • .. ... • J • 
memorandum; te;lephone, teiegra]?h, telex, tele~opier, fax transm_issiOJ:l, cable, ~,.mail, or any 
.other ni'edium. 
' 4. The terms "_relate toz" "related. to," ''relating tq( and "regardi-Pg/' as used herein, 
- - -.:.. --~- - -~~-::.· ,._ - -'• - - ' -- _... . .. 
rn_ean 1pentj.oning, citing, quoting, ipvolving, _i:¢present:ing, coIJStituting, discussing, reflecting, 
idefntifying, descri]?iirg, "refe~in$ to, containing, e1!urner~ting, evidencing, supporting, or in_ any 
. way ~.onceming, in whole OF in pap:, :dir_ectly oripdirectly. 
:.. - < .. • 
. 5. The te'm'l "person/: as used herein, ~hall mean ruiy natural person, corpofatiort, 
. ·• ... , ...... . 
and any Qther form of business entity,. in~luqing, but pot limhed to, partrierships, jomt ye~tures, 
and as;ocic1.tions, ruid shaJl irtclude directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents, 
' attbmeys; Qr anyone else acting on the person's behalf. 
. . 
'6. · The terms ''q11d" anq "or/ as 11secl herein, are fope construed conjunctively qi; 
disjun~tively, ~ _hecess~y, to make' the req~e_st inc~usiv~:ta~er th~Ji exclusiye. . . 
: ".Jc 
. . The terms "My" and "all," ,as used h~rein, shall mean "any and all,." and shall be 
• - - : ,.. -- - ·- - ••• - 1. - -- - • • • • 
coilstni~~ so as to b_ring wit1:,iJi the- ~cope of the request any infom1ation tliat otherwise might ~e 
construed. to be outside its scdpe. 
8. The tenns ''you" and ''your" as used hereiri shall mean :fonner Canyon County 
. . . 
public def~nqei: Lisa Fullmer. 
. . < 
· '9. · . · The terms "p11blic defender"· or "public· defenders" shall mean any attorney or 
. . . .,, ' , . ,, . - .. . ~ -
~ttomeys providJn~ le~0:I ·service$ t? an "h1cljgentper$on," a$ that term is. d~fined atldaho_ Co~e § 
19-85 f( 4 ), wp.o is. under iof111al chru:;ge of pa~ing ~ommitted, or is being detained under a 
convicti~n of a "serio~$ crime," a~i'°tha,t tennis defined ~t Ic;laho dad~ § 19-851 (5), as well as any 
attorney or a~~rrteys .providing leg~ services 'to a ''.i uvenile/ as :fuat tetri.1 is d'e:rined at ldalio 
... 6 
. . 
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. '< 
-~ --·· . 
C9de § 10-50.2(11 ),. _wh.o is _umler fqrm~ chaq~e. of havi_ng copup:itted., or who .h.a~ l;>een 
adjudi~ated for commission of, a~ ac~, omission or status. that brings her or him under the 
purview of the Juvenile Coriections Act (Idaho Code §§ 20-50 I et ~eq. ). 
7 
, r 
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instructions 
.• 
: 1, · In responding to these ~eque~t; fot ptpduction you sho~lc;l fu~sh all .poil~ · 
privileged documents (unless such privilege has been waived) that are. within your possession, 
custody~ or con,trol; Of ar~ ~~in ~et~·ss~s$ion,. (;UStod~; QI control of your_ ~g,nt_~~ ~l):lpioyees, 
repte~e.rtfa:tives, or investigators~ and.identify all doc~ents known to he responsive td these 
·request or th~ pos~ession, custot;ly, or contn>l of others by statjp.g ( a) who yo1,1 belfeye tQ i;;Qntrol 
-- . - . - . . .. - " 
.. 
SUCh d?cmments, (b )' where· you believe SU~b docwn~ntS ca:n be folirid, ( C) the mit~e. Of the 
. . ., . 
docwne:O.ts (i.e., letter, e-mcil, report, 'memorandum, etc .. ), an4 {d) ~hen you i;;;lieve .such 
• .. ·, • • ~ J " • 
docum(;lnts ·to _have been created. 
. . 
If~ jn responding :to these requests· for production, you encounter- any ambiguities 
:w~en construing a· r~u~~~ or ~efiniti~n, the .respoiise ~~ll~l set for:th the matt~r deemed · 
arnbi~~ous and t}?.e constructi~~ used in your :response. 
3, The d9cuments requested must b~ produced inJheit entirety, witho~t :reilaction 01: 
. . . . - . ., . . - ~ " . -
aiterat(on~ except where ~epes;ary to protect privjleged. material._ When a docw:ri.ent contains 
. . . ~ ., 
both p~fvileged and non-privileged material, the "nori.;priviieged "material must be ciisc~9~e4' to th~· 
full~st ~xtent p~ssible without thereoy di~clq~ihg the p;rivileged ~aterial: If any dpcitinent br 
portion of any document covered ~y this req~e~t is withhe~d from production y9u must ,identify 
each sitch qoc~ent or pQrtio1rof th~ docurpent, an.cl provide, with respect to e;ch s~ch . 
• • • " • ~I • • •• • , • , , • ! ' • • 
. . . 
document o~portion thereof, (a) the reasori(s) for withholding, (h) the date 6fthe docWilent, (c) 
. . . 
the J.dei).tity of ~ch perscm wh,o grafted or ~sisted inJhe prepara~ion nf the ·cloc~ment, ( d) the· · 
. -.. -- -- .. . .. :.. - - . . _... . : - . .. . . .. 
idehtify of each person who received or: had access to the document or copi~s thereof,. or to 
. ' ~ 
who~ any portion of the· contents h~s. be(;]J. conumuucated, ·ce) the type_of document and a brief. 
des~iptio~ of the nature and subject matter.of the'._docqm(;lnt, and_ (f) a s~tem~nt of the facts ~hat. . 
. . 8 
.,, . . .. . . -~·. ... . ·--. : ·.:.- ._ .. ...:·· 
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: --··· 
con~titute tbe b~_is f9r the claim 9£ piiyilege. 
~ ~ . . 
· 4. ffpfoduction of any requested ~ocument is objected fo on. the grounds tha:t 
production is unduly burdensome; describe the burden or expense of the propos~d discovery. 
5. Docunients should b~ ·produced as they ~e kept in the ordinary course of 
business. Where possible, o·;ganize and l~bel each document or set of documents,. indi~ting by 
µumbet tp.e request.to whic~ t.J:ie do9ur,r;ient(s) rel.ates. 
· 6. If any document responding to all o~ any part of the request for documents is not 
.pUI'[eptly avaiiable, inplucle a ~tatemei;1t j:o thaf~ffect and fu_rnjsh whatever documents are 
.. ·. \ . - . - . . ·. . . . " . . . . 
I <• • < 
available. Include_ in your statement when. ~uch docuri1ehts were most recently in your 
:. . .. . . . ' .. . " 
posses~ion orsubject to your control and what disposition w~ inacie of theq:1; · Iqentify the name, 
• • • .. , • • f 
job title, a,nd the las_t k;nown address of each person currently in_possession or'contro! of s1:1ch 
documents. if any such documents ·were destroyed,. identify the n~me.· job title; and the las.t. 
~- . . . . ~ . 
' . . . . 
k_n.9wn l?usines_s addl'ess of .each pei:sort ?v'h6 qitected ~hat the do~ur.nents be de~troyed; and ~tate 
< ' " ~ L • .. • • • • • • • '( <• • • • 
the reasons the :documents- were destroyed. 
' ' ' 
.. ' 
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Docum·ents to be Produced 
.. i, AU cioc~rpents rel~t~d to yoµr job respop~ibiliti~s a~.ii. ¢MyQn Cot,1nty public 
defender prior to the op~ning of the Canyon County Public Defendet Office on October 1,, 2014. 
2. All docwnents Te fated to yotir job responsibilities as a Canyon County public 
. ~ . ;.: ~ ... " - . .. ... . . .... ... .... - . . ~ -. -.... ~-: - . 
. defender after the opening ofthe Canyqh County Public Defender: Office on October 1,.2014, 
3. All documents related to you~workload as a Canyon County public defender . 
. 4. ;\II doctJ.n:ie11ts relat~d to any ~aining you r~ceiyeq en: ieques~ed in, yorir role as. a, 
Canyo~ County public _defender:. , 
s. All docum.~nts relat~d io ·communications l;Jetween you ~d Canyon. <;ounty Chier 
Public Defend~t Tera Harden, or .other m~agement o:fffo~als wlt~n the Canyon County Publk. 
~ . - . . 
Defender 9ffice, regar~in.g your abi~ity ~r capacity t~ represint the indigent defendants to whom 
. you were assigned ~ a· C~nyo!1 County p~b.lic defonder~ . 
6.. . · All documents related to co1TlI11unications between you and any Canyon County 
' -··· ~ ~ ~ ~ - . ~ 
judges or oth~t court perso.Ill}el, regai:din& your ability or capacity to represent the in4i~ent 
, , . 
defend~ts to whom you. were assigned as. a Canyon·County public defender. 
. . . . .. '" - . ,;-
7. All documentsr~lateµ to cpmnmnic~tions:between yo11 apd an'y Ca,nyon County 
prose~utors, regarding your apility_or.capacify to represe.nt the indigent defendants f~ whom you 
. . . 
. were assigned as a Canyon County pub.lie defender, 
8. · . All'dcicume_nts related tq =any formal qi; infonrtal supetv_ision you received ·as a 
. <;anyon County public defen~et. 
' ~ J. -
9. All documents related to :my form&! or informal evalmitions you reGeived as a 
. .. ' .. .. - .. ' . .. .. 
Canyon C~:rnnty public defender .. 
10 
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It ••••••• ~-.. ;~ 
.. 
. 10 .. 
l,. .. All documents· related to your use of investigators in your role as a Canyon . . ' -·· . . . .. · ., . . .. . .. . 
: 1 L All documents related to your use of expert analysis or testimony 111 your role as & 
Canyon County ·pu~~ic defonder. 
. . . . . . ~: . ..-.. . . . 
12. All docurnenfo related to any informal or formal complaints you have received or. 
of which you are aware, regarding your r.~presen!ation of indigent defendin.ts in your role as a 
Ca11yo_n Coun~y- pubiic ~eferider. 
,. 
' 
.. . ····· . . . ...... ·:,.•· .. -~: .. :.. -_ :· . 
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Jason D. Williamson Andrew C. Lillie 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
iwilliamson@aclu.org 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
303~899-7300 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
125 Broad Street By TENilE GRANT . 
New York, New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208) 344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
303-899-7333 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Kathryn M. Ali 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 
(202) 637-5910 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Bret H. Ladine 
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP 
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
( 415) 374-2300 
(415) 374-2499 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
Jenny Q. Shen 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
ienny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
650-463-4199 (fax) 
Pro hac vice application pending 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
, OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1510240 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER STA YING 
DISCOVERY PENDING DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
STAYING DISCOVERY PENDING DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, a proposed class of all indigent persons who are now, or will be in the future, 
under formal charge before a state court in Idaho of having committed any offense that could 
result in imprisonment, and who are unable to pay for an attorney, hereby oppose Defendants' 
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss raises questions of fact regarding, among other things, whether 
and the extent to which certain state officials, including the Governor and members of the Idaho 
State Public Defense Commission, have been involved in the delivery or reform of indigent 
defense services in Idaho. Plaintiffs seek discovery on these exact issues. Defendants' motion 
for protective order should be denied for two additional reasons. First, the issues raised by this 
case are of gre_at public interest. Second, proceeding with limited discovery - especially of third 
party witnesses - would impose no undue burden on Defendants. Defendants have therefore 
failed to meet the heavy burden required to justify a stay of discovery. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants' motion and allow discovery to continue on 
schedule. 
BACKGROUND 
On June 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the State ofldaho, the Governor of 
Idaho, and the members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief from Defendants' ongoing failure to ensure that indigent defendants in Idaho 
state courts receive the legal representation guaranteed to them under the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions. The Complaint alleges that the failures within Idaho's indigent defense delivery 
system (which include, but are not limited to, a lack of sufficient funding, oversight, and 
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training) are pervasive and consistent across counties throughout the state. Plaintiffs further 
allege that Defendants are constitutionally required to ensure that adequate indigent defense 
services are provided to Idaho's poorest citizens; that the Governor bears ultimate responsibility 
for the provision of indigent defense services to Idaho residents; and that the members of Idaho's 
Public Defense Commission are responsible for promulgating rules related to training and data-
reporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state and for recommending core 
requirements to the legislature to ensure that Idaho's indigent defense delivery system meets 
constitutional muster, in addition to recommendations related to enforcement mechanisms and 
various funding issues. Compl. ,r,r 85-87. 
On July 8, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b ), in which they "acknowledge the seriousness of the issues that Plaintiffs 
describe in their Complaint," but argue that the named Defendants (the State ofldaho, the 
Governor of Idaho, and the members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission) have no 
power to grant the requested relief. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 6. The motion argues that 
neither the State of Idaho, its Governor, nor its Public Defense Commission, as a matter of state 
and federal statutory law, have any connection with the delivery of public defense in this state 
and have no authority to do anything about it. See id. ·at 9-10. 
On August 21, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion For Protective Order Staying Discovery 
Pending Decision On Motion To Dismiss. In this motion, Defendants seek to stay all discovery 
on the grounds that the motion to dismiss raises purely legal arguments about whether this Court 
can grant any relief against these Defendants, and that "permitting discovery before the Court 
rules on the motion to dismiss would impose unnecessary and undue burdens on Defendants." 
Mem. Supp. Mot. at 4. For the reasons described herein, both arguments fail. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendants' request to stay discovery should be denied because discovery would help 
this Court decide the central legal question raised by Defendants' motion to dismiss, namely: 
who exercises what authority (and when, how, and to what extent) over the provision of indigent 
defense services in Idaho. Defendants will face no undue prejudice if they are made to respond 
to Plaintiffs' discovery requests, and they have failed to supply any compelling reason why 
discovery should be stayed. Indeed, Plaintiffs thus far have acted reasonably in seeking 
discovery, even voluntarily narrowing their discovery requests to those that are most relevant to 
deciding the motion to dismiss, i.e. those requests that seek discovery regarding the extent to 
which certain state officials, including the Governor and members of the Idaho State Public 
Defense Commission, have been involved in the delivery or reform of public defense services in 
Idaho. See 2d Eppink Affidavit. The balance tips further in favor of allowing discovery to 
proceed in light of the fact that, as Defendants themselves have acknowledged, this case raises 
issues of great public importance. 
A. Lega1Standard 
The Idaho Supreme Court has emphasized that stays of discovery are disfavored, and that 
discovery should not be stayed on account of a pending motion unless the motion would dispose 
of the entire action. Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 847 (Idaho 2011) (citation 
omitted). This is consistent with the approach taken by numerous other courts, which, as a 
matter of general course, refuse to stay discovery absent good cause to do so. See, e.g., Young v. 
United States, 907 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the federal rule and noting that stays of 
discovery should not be granted absent a showing of "good cause"); IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. 
v. 8X8, Inc., No. C 13-01707 SBA, 2013 WL 6000590, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013) 
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( declining to stay discovery pending resolution of motion to dismiss where defendant failed to 
carry burden to demonstrate good cause); Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Pub. Library, No. CV 11-64-
M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 2117563, at *3 (D. Mont. May 25, 2011) (denying motion to stay 
discovery pending motion for partial summary judgment). 
A pending motion to dismiss may justify a stay of discovery only where there are no 
factual issues raised by the pending motion, discovery is not required to address the issues raised 
by the motion, and the court is convinced that the plaintiff is unable to state a claim for relief. 
Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); White v. Am. Tobacco Co., 125 F.R.D. 
508 (D. Nev. 1989) (citing Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981)). Put another 
way, stays of discovery are "disfavored unless there are no factual issues in need of further 
immediate exploration, and the issues before the Court are purely questions of law that are 
potentially dispositive ... such as where a challenge is directed to the Court's jurisdiction." 
FLSmidth Spokane, Inc. v. Emerson, No. 1:13-CV-00490-EJL, 2014 WL 979187, at *1-2 (D. 
Idaho Mar. 12, 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Cf TradeBay, LLC v. 
Ebay, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 597, 600 (D. Nev. 2011) (typical situations in which staying discovery 
pending a ruling on a dispositive motion are appropriate where the dispositive motion raises 
issues of jurisdiction, venue, or immunity). 
A party seeking a discovery stay bears a "heavy burden" and must make a "strong 
showing" in favor of a discovery stay. Raymond v. Sloan, No. CIV. 1:13-423, 2014 WL 
4215378, at *7 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2014) (citing Skellerup Indus. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 163 
F.R.D. 598, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1995)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A party 
moving for a protective order to stay discovery must show a particular and specific need for the 
protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or conclusory statements. Timothy v. Oneida 
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Cnty., No. 4:14-CV-00362-BLW, 2015 WL 4170140, at *2 (D. Idaho July 9, 2015) (citations 
omitted). Under this standard, a court "may stay discovery only if it is convinced that the 
plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief." US. ex rel. Jacobs v. CDS, P.A., No. 4:14-cv-301, 2015 
WL 5257132, at *2 (D. Idaho Sept. 3, 2015) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Notably, a stay is not permissible to merely save the time and expense that is part of 
discovery in all types of litigation. Raymond, 2014 WL 4215378, at *7. Further, discovery stays 
are disfa~ored by courts because they undermine judicial efficiency. See, e.g., Raymond, 2014 
WL 4215378, at *7. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which substantially match the 
applicable federal rules, encourage the speedy resolution of litigation and liberal discovery. See, 
e.g., Skellerup, 163 F.R.D. at 600-01; Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990). These rules do not provide any special procedures for discovery stays when a motion 
to dismiss is filed. See Timothy, 2015 WL 4170140, at *2 (discussing the federal rules). 
B. Defendants Have Failed To Meet Their Heavy Burden To Demonstrate That A Stay 
Of Discovery Is Warranted 
As noted above, stays of discovery are disfavored and are appropriate only in rare 
instances when a motion to dismiss raises no factual questions to which discovery would be 
relevant. That is far from the case here. To the contrary, Defendants' motion to dismiss raises 
substantial factual questions that cannot be resolved without at least some limited discovery. 
Moreover, Defendants' generalized, conclusory assertions regarding the burdens of responding 
to Plaintiffs' discovery requests - which, as noted above, Plaintiffs have made good faith efforts 
to narrow - fail to make the necessary "strong showing" to justify a stay of discovery, especially 
in light of the strong public interest in efficiently resolving this case. Further, even if Defendants 
were to prevail on their motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs would simply file suit against other state or 
local defendants, thereby requiring the State to respond to the very same discovery requests in 
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any event, whether pursuant to IRCP 45 or 34. Defendants' motion should be denied. 
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss raises issues that could be more effectively 
; resolved after discovery on threshold factual issues. 
'Defendants' motion to dismiss raises not only questions of law, but questions of fact as to 
who has exercised authority over the delivery of indigent defense services in Idaho, and to what 
-
extent. Discovery therefore will be relevant to show, among other things, what the Defendants 
have failed to do in discharging their existing responsibilities over indigent defense, as well as 
what they have done and could do to improve the system. 
Plaintiffs' discovery requests demonstrate how discovery would be relevant to the issues 
raised in the motion to dismiss. For example, Plaintiffs have propounded interrogatories 
requesting that Defendants identify the state officials with the authority to ensure that indigent 
defendants are receiving the representation guaranteed under the federal and state constitution,· 
all efforts undertaken by Defendants to address the oversight of indigent defense in the State, and 
any funding proposals by the Governor's office to contribute funding to the provision oftrial-
level indigent defense services. Plaintiffs have also requested all documents regarding any 
alternate legislation or reforms considered by the State of Idaho relating to the provision of 
indigent defense services since 201 O; documents related to any actual or proposed funding of 
indigent defense services by the State of Idaho since 2010 (including documents relating to how 
indigent defense services are funded by each of the 44 counties); documents relating to oversight 
provided to trial-level counsel; and recommendations and rules proposed by the Idaho State 
Public Defense Commission. All of these questions, among others included in Plaintiffs' 
discovery requests and to be included in future discovery, are questions of fact that are relevant 
to Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
In addition, Defendants argue that neither the Governor nor the Commissioners fall 
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within the ambit of Ex Parte Young, in which the U.S. Supreme Court established an exception 
to the general rule that, under the Eleventh Amendment, states cannot be sued by non-state 
actors, and allowed such actors to sue states for prospective relief, where the suit personally 
named a state official. Specifically, the Court found that "[i]n making an officer of the state a 
party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, it is 
plain that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is 
merely making him a party as a representative of the state, and thereby attempting to make the 
state a party." Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). While the Court's language makes 
I 
j 
clear that not every state official may be sued under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, those that have 
. . 
' . "some connection" f o the enforcement of the challeng~d act certainly can be. Although 
\\... Defendants appe.lio argue that there is no state official who is responsible for ensuring the 
'• /. 
dclive:ryofindigent defense services to poor Idahoans, such an excuse is insufficient. See HRPT 
Properties Trust v. Lingle, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (D. Haw. 2010) ("lfthere is no state 
official charged with enforcing Act 189, then it stands to reason that Governor Lingle herself is 
the person with the power to instruct state officials in the executive branch to enforce or to 
refrain from enforcing Act 189."). As such, there are questions of fact that bear on whether the 
state official named as defendants have a "some connection" to the delivery of public defense in 
Idaho. 
2. Defendants have failed to offer any compelling reason why discovery should be 
stayed. 
Defendants' conclusory arguments that their motion to dismiss will succeed are 
insufficient to meet the required "strong showing" to warrant a stay of discovery. Plaintiffs have 
sued the State, its top executive official, and members of a public defense commission that was 
created specifically to protect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants in Idaho. 
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As an initial matter, Defendants' motion to dismiss is not likely to succeed. First, 
contrary to their assertions, Defendants do have authority to effect change on the State's 
indigent defense services, which is supported by the language codified in the state's public 
defense statutes, and will be, we believe, supported by discovery. Second, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has made clear that the counties of the State of Idaho are merely arms of the State. See, 
e.g., State ex el. Rich v. Larson, 84 Idaho 529, 374 P.2d 484 (1962); Peterson v. Bannock 
County, 61 Idaho 419, 102 P.2d 647 (1940); Ada County v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, 92 P.2d 134 
(1939). The U.S. Supreme Court has been equally clear that the provision of indigent defense 
services is a responsibility of the State. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) 
( acknowledging "the burden that the States will have to bear in providing counsel" as a result of 
. 
the Gideon v. Wainwright line of cases; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that "the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent 
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the 
right to a~sistance of appointed counsel in his defense.") (emphasis added); ML.B. v. S.L.J., 519 
U.S. 102 (1996) (noting that, under Gideon, a State must provide trial counsel for an indigent 
defendant charged with a felony). As such, Defendants cannot avoid this legal obligation by 
merely asserting that the State has delegated its authority to the counties. 
Likewise, Defendants' arguments regarding the time and expense of discovery apply to 
all litigation, and are belied by the fundamental goal of the Rules of Civil Procedure to promote 
speedy resolution of litigation. The flawed premise underlying Defendants' argument is that 
because they have moved to dismiss, the Court should stay discovery. That is, however, 
insufficient. A defendant's confidence that it will prevail on a dispositive motion does not, by 
itself, justify staying discovery. See Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 
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1990). In fact, a federal district court in Idaho recently addressed this issue directly, noting that 
the defendants' belief that they would prevail on their motion to dismiss was insufficient. 
Timothy, 2015 WL 4170140, at *2 ("This idle speculation does not [warrant staying discovery] . 
I 
· .. Such general arguments could be said to apply to any reasonably large civil litigation ... Had 
the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss ... would stay discovery, the Rules 
would contain a provision for that effect. In fact, such a notion is directly at odds with the need 
for expeditious resolution of litigation.") (alterations and internal citation omitted).* The fact 
that a "non-frivolous motion [to dismiss] is pending is simply not enough to warrant a blanket 
stay of all discovery." U.S. ex rel. Jacobs, 2015 WL 5257132, at *1 (internal citation omitted). 
3. The balance of equities and the public interest weigh in favor of permitting 
discovery to proceed. 
This Court should decline to stay discovery for at least two more reasons. First, the Court 
should consider the strong public interest in an open, efficient resolution of this matter. That 
interest weighs in favor of permitting discovery to go forward here, where a large, 
geographically diverse class of Idaho residents seeks injunctive relief for civil rights violations 
that are a result of decisions made by Idaho public officials and entities. The case has attracted 
substantial media attention across Idaho and the United States, and the public has a deep and 
' ' 
strong interest in the prompt resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. See Morrow v. City o/Tenaha 
Deputy City Marshal Barry Washington, No. 2-08-CV-288-TJW, 2010 WL 3057255, at *5 (E.D. 
' 
Tex. July 30, 2010) ("The Court notes that this case has garnered considerable public attention as 
* . I 
There are no special rules that require a stay of discovery in civil rights lawsuits such as 
this one when a motion to dismiss has been filed. Compare to Petrie v. Elec. Game Card, Inc., 
761 F.3d 959, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying the Stay of Discovery provision in a federal 
securities act, which provision shows Congress's clear intent to postpone discovery infederal 
securities class actions until the sufficiency of a complaint has been sustained). 
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a result of the serious allegations made against local public officials. Because of this and the fact 
that this case is a class action involving constitutional rights and alleging abuses by public 
officials, the prompt res<?lution of this case would best serve the public interest."). Defendants 
should not be allowed to delay all discovery on these important issues by merely asserting that 
Plaintiffs, in seeking relief from the State, its top public official, and a public commission on 
indigent defense, have sued the wrong public officials. 
Second, the fact that Defendants would face minimal or no burden if they are made to 
comply with Plaintiffs' discovery requests weighs strongly in favor of permitting discovery to 
proceed. See, e.g., Kanowitz v. Broadridge Fin. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 13-649 DRH AKT, 2014 
WL 1338370, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). Because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from 
the State and State officials, there is little danger of an innocent party being forced to settle a 
frivolous class action to avoid incidental discovery costs. Cf Gardner v. Major Auto. Cos., 11 
Civ. 1664, 2012 WL 1230135, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.12, 2012) (part of the reason behind 
discovery stays is to avoid saddling defendants with the burden of discovery in meritless or 
frivolous cases and to discourage the filing of such cases). At bottom, Defendants have not 
established that allowing discovery will cause them any prejudice or harm. That conclusion is 
underscored by the fact that Plaintiffs have acted reasonably in their quest for discovery, and 
have even narrowed their discovery requests to those most relevant to the motion to dismiss. See 
2d Eppink Affidavit. Although all discovery necessarily involves some inconvenience and 
expense, this is not a sufficient reason for a stay or protective order. Moreover, this Court retains 
ample power to control discovery so as to minimize incidental costs going forward as it sees fit. 
See, e.g., IRCP 26(b )(2). 
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CONCLUSION 
Idaho case law, which is consistent with the approach taken by federal courts, makes 
clear that blanket stays of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss are disfavored 
unless the pending motion raises purely legal questions. Defendants' motion to dismiss raises 
important factual questions regarding the extent to which Defendants have more than "some 
connection" to Idaho's public defense system, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. 
For these reasons and the others set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the 
Court deny Defendant's Motion For Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision On 
Motion To Dismiss and allow discovery to continue in this matter without limitation. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September, 2015. 
Richard Epp1 
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the following: 
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mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov 
Shasta K.ilminster-Hadley . 
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov 
Scott Zanzig 
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By email 
Cally A. Younger 
cally.younger@gov.idaho.gov 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
Idaho State Capitol Building 
700 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By email 
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Flsmidth Spokane, Inc. v. Emerson, ___ t Reported in F.Supp.2d (2014) 
2014 WL 979187 
, 2014 WL 979187 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
· United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
FLSMIDTH SPOKANE, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
Andrew EMERSON, et al, Defendants. 
No. 1:13-cv-00490-EJL-
CWD. I Signed March 12, 2014. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER AMENDING DOCKET NO. 30 
CANDY W. DALE, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 This Order amends and supersedes the Court's Docket 
Entry Order entered on March 10, 2014 (Dkt.30). 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion 
for Protective Order, (Dkt.23), which requests a stay of 
all discovery pending a decision on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss (Dkt.6). 1 The current deadline for completion of 
all discovery in this case is September 1, 2014, and a bench 
trial before District Judge Edward Lodge is set for May 19, 
2015. (Dkt.21.) Pursuantto Judge Lodge's referral of all non-
dispositive matters in this case, (Dkt.10), the Court has held 
two telephonic status conferences with the parties in an effort 
to address their impasse over the requested protective order. 
1 Consistent with District of Idaho Local Civil Rule 37. I, 
the parties met and conferred on Defendants' proposed 
protective order but were unable to reach agreement. 
The first of these conferences occurred on February 25, 2014. 
(Dkt.28.) At that time, the Court directed the parties to meet 
and confer on Defendants' objections to discovery, including 
Defendants' specific objections to the individual requests in 
Plaintiffs first set of written discovery. The intent of this 
directive was for the parties to identify discovery that could 
go forward either before or immediately after a decision 
is rendered on the motion to dismiss. On March 7, 2014, 
Plaintiff filed a notice, stating that the parties conferred and 
"resolved all objections by D .. efendants to Plaintiffs First Set 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
[p]ropounded to Defendants."(Dkt. 29 at 1-2.) Interpreting 
this statement as a resolution of all of Defendants' objections 
to d~scovery, on March 10, 2014, the Court entered a docket 
entry order finding Defendants' motion for protective order 
moot. (Dkt.30.) 
Following entry of the March 10 Order, counsel for 
Defendant contacted Chambers 2 and stated that, despite 
Plaintiffs notice stating otherwise, Defendants were 
continuing to ask for a protective order from any and all 
discovery being conducted until the motion to dismiss is 
decided. Therefore, on March 12, 2014, the Court held a 
second telephonic status conference to address Defendants' 
concerns about the March 10 docket entry order (Dkt.30). 
Based on the comments of counsel during the status 
conference, it is now clear that Defendants do not have 
specific, unresolved objections to the written discovery 
served by Plaintiff. However, Defendants object to going 
forward with certain depositions Plaintiff attempted to 
schedule after the parties' March 7 meet and confer. And, as 
stated in the motion for protective order, Defendants maintain 
their overarching objection to any discovery in this case while 
the motion to dismiss is pending. Accordingly, the Court finds 
Defendants' motion for protective order, (Dkt.23), is not moot 
and, for reasons stated below, will grant the motion in part 
and deny it in part. 
2 Counsel spoke to the undersigned's law clerk, Mark 
Cecchini-Beaver. 
1. Legal Standard 
Rule 26(c) permits the Court, "for good cause, [to] issue 
an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. "The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized this language 
confers "broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a 
protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection 
is required."Seatt/e Times Co. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36, 
104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). Although a court 
may, for good cause shown, stay discovery pending resolution 
of a motion to dismiss, e.g., Stock v. Comm 'r of the I.R.S., 
No. CV-00-467-E-BLW, 2000 WL 33138102 (D.Idaho 
Dec. 20, 2000), that result is not automatic. E.g., Twin City 
Fire Ins. Cb. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 124 F.R.D. 
652 (D.Nev.1989). Indeed, a complete stay of discovery 
is disfavored unless "there are no factual issues in need 
of further immediate exploration, and the issues before 
the Court are purely questions of law that are potentially 
dispositive ... such as where a challenge is directed to the 
Court's jurisdiction."Hachette Dist., Inc. v. Hudson County 
News Co., 136 F.RD. 356, 358 (E.D.N.Y.1991). The good 
Westlav11Nexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
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cause inquiry is necessarily dependent on the facts and 
posture of each case. Id. 
_ 2. Discussion 
*2 Defendants argue that there is good cause for a protective 
order staying all discovery because such an order will protect 
both parties from undue burden and unnecessary expense. 
Defendants note that the motion to dismiss attacks the 
sufficiency of the Complaint and, if granted or even granted 
in part, could obviate or narrow the discovery in this case. 
Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion, arguing it is merely an 
effort to prejudice Plaintiff and delay expeditious resolution 
of this case. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Defendants' 
characterization of the motion to dismiss. The motion attacks 
the sufficiency of the Complaint and does not raise any 
jurisdictional issue that could potentially result in dismissal 
as a matter oflaw. It is therefore unclear whether a decision 
granting the motion to dismiss would necessarily moot 
discovery. On the other hand, if the motion is denied, delayed 
discovery could affect other case management deadlines, 
eviscerating the Court's Scheduling Order (Dkt .21 ). 
The Stock case is instructive because it highlights particular 
circumstances that warrant a stay of all discovery. There, the 
discovery requests were voluminous, covering approximately 
200 pages. Stock, 2000 WL 33138102, *2. The requests also 
were "burdensome[,] broad," and did not comply with the 
limit on interrogatories set by the applicable local rule. Id 
Moreover, the court expressed concern that the case might 
be "sidetracked" by discovery disputes before two motions to 
dismiss could be resolved. Id. Accordingly, the Stock court 
stayed discovery. 
This case is not Stock.Here, Plaintiff has so far propounded 
interrogatories and requests for production numbering 
13 pages-inclusive of caption, instructions, definitions, 
End of Document 
verification, and service details. (Dkt.23-2.) In accordance 
with the Court's February 25 directive, the parties conferred, 
and "resolved all objections" to these requests. (Dkt.29.) Both 
parties now agree there are no specific objections to any 
discovery thus far propounded. Thus, there is no apparent 
risk that this case will be sidetracked by additional discovery 
disputes regarding the pending discovery requests before the 
motion to dismiss is resolved. 
Defendants nevertheless maintain their general objection to 
discovery solely because their motion to dismiss is pending. 
Although a stay may avoid undue discovery expenses at 
this early stage in the litigation, it may also delay the 
speedy resolution of this case. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. I. Given these 
circumstances, Defendants have not shown good cause for a 
complete stay of discovery. The Court is, however, concerned 
that Plaintiff's proposed depositions or additional written 
discovery may be premature at this juncture. Therefore, the 
Court finds good cause for a more limited stay of discovery. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Court being fully advised in 
the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' 
Motion for Protective Order (Dkt.23) is GRANTED IN 
PART AND DENIED IN PART. 
*3 Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs first set of written 
discovery requests within 30 days of the date of this order. 
Plaintiff is restrained from serving any additional discovery 
requests or noticing any depositions unless Defendants agree 
to such discovery or until the Court resolves the pending 
motion to dismiss, whichever is sooner. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 979187 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
ROANNE L. MANN, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 Plaintiffs Dorsey R. Gardner and John Francis O'Brien, 
trustees of the Dorsey R. Gardner 2002 Trust ( collectively, 
"plaintiffs"), move for an order compelling The Major 
Automotive Companies, Inc. ("Major") and a member 
of its Board of Directors, Bruce Bendell ("Bendell") 
( collectively, "defendants"), to produce documents and 
respond to interrogatories served by plaintiffs in their initial 
discovery requests. See PL Mot. to Compel Disc. (Nov. 1, 
2011) ("11/1/11 Pl. Mot. to Compel"), Electronic Case Filing 
("ECF") Docket Entry ("DE")# 19. Defendants cross-move 
to stay discovery pending resolution of their motion, served 
by them on November 14, 2011, seeking judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure or dismissal of the complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the same. See Def. Mot. to Stay Disc. (Nov. 
14, 2011), DE # 27; Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Stay 
(Nov. 14, 2011), DE# 27-1 ("11/14/11 Def. Mot. to Stay"); 
see also Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Judgment on the 
Pleadings (Noy. 14, 2011) ("11/14/11 Def. Mem."), DE# 34-
8. 1 Because the discovery motions essentially represent two 
sides of the same argument, and require the same threshold 
analysis, the Court analyzes them together. 
The case was reassigned to this magistrate judge after the 
parties filed their discovery cross-motions. 
For the reasons to follow, the Court grants defendants' motion 
to stay discovery during the pendency of their dispositive 
motion, and denies plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants to 
respond to plaintiffs' initial discovery requests. 
BACKGROUND 
The instant case arises out of an allegedly improper 
management buyout transaction of Major, a publicly traded 
company, effectuated by defendants. See Compl. (Apr. 5, 
2011) ,i 1, DE # 1. The Complaint charges Major and 
Bendell, who is described as Major's "principal officer and 
majority shareholder," with "violations of Section 14(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 'Exchange Act') 
and Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC') Rule 14a-
9 promulgated thereunder and [with] breaches of fiduciary 
duty."/d. In brief, plaintiffs allege that defendants (1) offered 
a misleading justification for the buyout transaction, which 
was designed to benefit Bendell at the expense of its minority 
public shareholders; (2) failed to create a special committee of 
disinterested or independent members to evaluate the fairness 
of the transaction for the benefit of minority shareholders; 
(3) failed to consider alternatives to the transaction; (4) 
withheld and failed to consider financial information from 
the eighteen months preceding the transaction (resulting in 
an artificially depressed valuation of the company); and 
(5) omitted from their proxy material information regarding 
Major's performance and true value, so as to mislead minority 
shareholders. See id. ,i,i 5-6, 16-35. 
According to plaintiffs, defendant Bendell (along with other, 
unnamed Board members) thereby breached his fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith and fair dealing, and 
negligently misrepresented the fair price of Major's stock, 
all in violation of Nevada state law. See Compl. ,i,i 36-
42, 52-58. In addition, plaintiffs complain that the material 
omissions in defendants' proxy materials violated federal 
securities laws, specifically, Section 14(c) of the Exchange 
Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. See id. ,i,i 43-
51; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9(a). In their 
Answer, defendants deny the allegations and assert a number 
of affirmative defenses. See Answer (May 25, 2011), DE# 5. 
*2 The parties have already taken a number of steps in 
the discovery process in this case. The parties exchanged 
initial disclosures on July 14, 2011. See Defendants' Rule 
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26(a) Initial Disclosure Statement (July 14, 2011), DE # 
8; Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosure Statement (July 
14, 2011), DE # 9. Plaintiffs then served defendants with 
their document requests on August 2, 2011 and first set 
of interrogatories on August 3, 2011. See Deel. of Robert 
F. Brodegaard (Nov. 14, 2011) ("Brodegaard Deel.") ,i 3, 
Exh. A to 11/14/11 Def. Mem., DE # 27-2. Over the next 
several days, plaintiffs issued subpoenas to a series of non-
parties, 2 pursuant to Rule 45(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Brodegaard Deel. 'II 4-5. On August 
30, 2011, the parties agreed that defendants would respond 
to plaintiffs' initial discovery requests by September 16th, 
see Email from L. Varn to R. Brodegaard (Aug. 30, 2012), 
Exh. C to Deel. of Mark B. Rosen in Supp. of Mot. to 
Compel (Nov. 1, 2011), DE # 20-3, and they filed a 
stipulation as to electronic discovery on September 19, 2011. 
See Stipulation Regarding Electronically Stored Information 
(Sept. 19, 2011), DE # 13. Defendants did not respond to 
plaintiffs' discovery requests, but instead, in a letter docketed 
on September 21, 2011, requested a premotion conference 
regarding def~ndants' proposed motion for ·~udgment on the 
pleadings, dismissing ~e case in its entirety and, pending the 
Court's resolution of the motion, a stay of discovery."Def. 
Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conference (Sept. 21, 2011), DE# 14; see 
also 11/14/11 Def. Mot. to Stay at 2 (citing Brodegaard Deel. 
,i,i 9-1 O); 11/1/11 PL Mot. to Compel at 1. 
2 Including Empire Valuation Consultants, LLC, the entity 
that drafted defendants' fairness report; Major's in-house 
counsel, Gordon Silver; HSBC Banlc U.S.A., N.A.; and 
Wells Fargo Banlc, N.A. 
On November 14, 2011, following a premotion conference 
held on October 25, 2011, defendants serve(\ their motion for 
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) or, in the 
alternative, for dismissal for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6).See Notice of Def. Mot. for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or to Dismiss Comp 1. in its Entirety (Dec. 23, 2011) 
("12/23/11 Notice"), DE # 34; 11/14/11 Def. Mem., D.E. # 
34-8; Pl. Opp'n to Def. Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings 
(Dec. 9, 2011), DE# 34-9; Def. Reply Mem. in Supp. of 
Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings or to Dismiss Compl. 
in its Entirety (Dec. 23, 2011), DE # 34-10. The parties' 
fully submitted papers were filed on December 23, 2011. See 
12/23/11 Notice. Defendants' dispositive motion is currently 
pending before the Honorable Frederic Block, the District 
Judge assigned to this case. 
DISCUSSION 
The parties' discovery-related cross-motions raise two distinct 
issues. First, the Court must determine '\\'.hether the automatic 
stay provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B), mandates 
a stay of discovery pending the resolution of defendants' 
dispositive motion. Specifically, the parties dispute whether 
the PSLRA applies to post-answer motions for judgment on 
the pleadings and, if so, whether the stay should apply to any 
or all of plaintiffs' claims. Second, if the Court concludes that 
the automatic stay provisions of the PSLRA do not apply, then 
it must determine whether a stay is appropriate under Rule 
26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
*3 Having concluded that the PSLRA automatic stay applies 
to each of plaintiffs' claims, the Court need not and does not 
reach the Rule 26( c) issue. 
I. Application of Stay to Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings 
Plaintiffs first argue that a stay is inappropriate because the 
automatic stay provision of the PSLRA applies only to pre-
answer motions to dismiss and not to post-answer motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. See 11/1/11 PL Mot. to Compel 
at 1, 3. Defendants counter that the automatic stay provision 
is applicable here because a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, "[i]n essence, ... is a motion to dismiss."See Def. 
Opp'n to 11/1/11 PL Mot. to Compel (Dec. 9, 2011), at 4, DE 
# 29. This Court agrees with defendants. 
The PSLRA was designed to deter frivolous securities 
litigation through stringent pleading requirements and an 
automatic stay of discovery pending the resolution of "any 
motion to dismiss." 15 U .S.C. § 78u-4(b )(3)(B). The PSLRA 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
In any private action arising under 
this chapter [the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.], ·an discovery 
and other proceedings shall be stayed 
during the pendency of any motion to 
dismiss, unless the court finds upon the 
motion of any party that particularized 
discovery is necessary to preserve 
evidence or to prevent undue prejudice 
to that party. 
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Id. 
Contary to the premise of plaintiffs' argument, the plain 
language of the PSLRA does not limit the scope of the 
automatic stay requirement to any particular species of 
motion to dismiss, and courts have broadly construed the 
scope of the stay provision. First, the automatic stay provision 
has been held to apply to both initial and successive motions 
to dismiss. See Sedona v.Ladenburg Thalmann, No. 03 Civ. 
3120 LTSTHK, 2005 WL 2647945, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.14, 
2005); In re Salmon Analyst Litig., 373 F.Supp.2d 252, 256 
(S.D.N.Y.2005). In fact, as noted by (now) Circuit Judge 
Gerard A. Lynch, "it is appropriate to extend the stay"''until a 
complaint has been authoritatively sustained by the court .... " 
Id.; see Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 350 F.Supp.2d 
375, 378 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (Lynch, J.) (noting that, in PSLRA 
cases, there is a "strong presumption that no discovery should 
take place until a court has affirmatively decided that a 
complaint does state a claim under the securities laws, by 
denying a motion to dismiss") ( emphasis in original). Staying 
discovery pending judicial evaluation of the sufficiency of the 
complaint is consistent with "the entire purpose of the stay 
provision[, which] is to avoid saddling defendants with the 
burden of discovery in meritless cases, and to discourage the 
filing of cases that lack adequate support for their allegations 
in the mere hope that the traditionally broad discovery 
proceedings will produce facts that could be used to state a 
valid claim." Podany, 350 F.Supp.2d at 378. Consequently, 
those motions that require a court to determine the facial 
sufficiency of the pleadings fall within the ambit of the 
PSLRA's automatic stay provision, regardless of whether the 
complaint has been answered. 
*4 Here, defendants have filed a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)or to dismiss the 
Complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim. See generally 11/14/11 Def. Mem., DE# 34-
8. Rule 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed 
-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings."Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Second 
Circuit has held that courts faced with Rule 12(c) motions for 
judgment on the pleadings must "employ [] the same standard 
applicable to. dismissals pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) 
(6)."Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir.2010) 
(citing Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir.2009) 
(per curiam)). Indeed, Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure treats Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) identically in 
addressing the ramifications of considering "matters outside 
the pleadings" and the conversion of motions to dismiss 
into motions for summary judgment. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). 
Significantly, whether filed under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 
12(c), a motion to dismiss asks the court to decide whether 
the complaint should be "authoritatively sustained" 3 based 
solely on the available pleadings, drawing inferences in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See generally 
Hayden, 594 F.3d at 160. Accordingly, this Court agrees with 
defendants that a Rule 12(c) motion is a "motion to dismiss" 
within the meaning of the PSLRA ·automatic stay provision, 
and that therefore the stay is triggered by defendants' Rule 
12(c) motion. 
3 In re Salomon, 373 F.Supp.2d at 256. 
II. Application of the Automatic Stay to Plaintiffs' 
Claims 
Having determined that the PSLRA automatic stay applies to 
defendants' dispositive motion, the next question is whether 
the stay should extend to all of plaintiffs' claims. As outlined 
above, plaintiffs advance three claims in their complaint: (I) 
a federal securities claim pursuant to Section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder; (2) 
a Nevada state law claim for breach of fiduciary duties; and 
(3) a Nevada state law claim for negligent misrepresentation. 
See Compl. ,~ 36-51. Plaintiffs argue that ~e present case is 
"not a securities fraud action" as defined by the PSLRA, but 
rather is an action involving non-fraud state law claims and 
a Rule I 4a-9 claim "based on negligent acts, not allegations 
of fraud."See PL Opp'n to Def. 11/14/11 Mot. to Stay (Dec. 
9, 2011), at 2, DE # 30. Defendants counter that plaintiffs' 
Rule 14a-9 claim and breach of fiduciary duties claim are 
couched in terms of fraud or intentional misconduct, thereby 
falling within the scope of the automatic stay provision. See 
Def. Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Stay Disc. (Dec. 23, 2011), at 
3, DE#35. 
As detailed below, because the plain language of the PSLRA 
does not distinguish between fraud-based and non-fraud-
based claims, the discovery stay in this case should cover all 
claims. 
First, the PSLRA stay provision expressly applies to federal 
securities actions (not claims) arising under the Exchange 
Act. See15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Additionally, most 
courts in this Circuit have held that the automatic stay 
provisions of the PSLRA extend to state securities claims 
and non-securities claims brought in actions involving federal 
securities claims. See In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent 
Litig., No. 05 Civ. 7583(WHP), 2006 WL 1738078, at *3 
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(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006) (holding that "[t]he PSLRA stay 
is not limited to discovery related to securities claims," but 
"applies to 'all discovery' in any 'action' under the PSLRA's 
purview, regardless of whether non-securities claims are 
alleged"); Riggs v. Termeer, No. 03 Civ. 4014 MP, 2003 
WL 21345183, at *l (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2003) (holding that 
the automatic stay provisions of the PSLRA apply to related 
state law claims and to non-class-action securities claims 
where "the central claims asserted allege securities fraud and 
seek relief under the securities laws"); In re Tromp Hotel 
S'holder Deriv. Litig., No 96CIV.7820 (DAB)(HBP), 1997 
WL 442135, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1997) (holding that 
the automatic stay provision extends to derivative actions and 
to state law claims filed in conjunction with federal securities 
claims). 
*5 To be sure, one case cited by plaintiffs has construed the 
statute to exclude breach of contract and tortious interference 
claims asserted pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See Tobias 
Holdings, Inc. v. Bank United Corp., 177 F.Supp.2d 162, 
167-68 (S.D.N.Y.2001). 4 Rejecting the reasoning of the 
Tromp Hotel case, 1997 WL 442135, at * 1-2, the court 
in Tobias found an ambiguity in the PSLRA because it is 
"not clear from the face of the statute whether Congress 
contemplated the situation where both federal question and 
diversity jurisdiction are invoked in a single action."Tobias, 
177 F.Supp.2d at 165. Significantly, the Tobias court 
expressly noted that the claims for breach of contract and 
tortious interference (which the court.referred to as "the non-
fraud common law claims") "d[id] not mirror the federal 
securities claims .... " Id. at 168;see id. at 169.The court 
concluded that the PSLRA stay provision did not apply 
to those "distinct state law claims brought under diversity 
jurisdiction." Id. at 169.Notably, the plaintiff did not seek and 
the court did not order discovery on those claims that mirrored 
the federal securities claims-in Tobias, plaintiff's common 
law fraud claim. See id. at 164, 167. 
4 In another decision issued out of the Southern District 
of New York, the court held that the PSLRA's automatic · 
stay was inapplicable to a derivative action that did 
not assert a federal securities violation; the court 
nevertheless exercised its discretion to stay discovery 
pending its decision on a motion to dismiss. In re 
Bancorp Deriv. Litig., 407 F.Supp.2d 585, 586-87 
(S.D.N.Y.2006). In contrast to Bancorp, the instant case 
does involve a federal securities claim. 
This Court concludes that both the text of the PSLRA and 
common sense support staying discovery with respect to 
each of plaintiffs' three claims. First, consistent with the 
language of the discovery stay provision, plaintiffs' federal 
securities claim clearly "arises under" the Exchange Act of 
1934. Contrary to plaintiffs' assumption, the statutory text 
does not draw a distinction between federal securities claims 
that are based on fraud and federal securities claims that are 
based on negligence. As such, the discovery stay applies, at 
the very least, to the federal securities claim. 
Moreover, the discovery stay also applies to plaintiffs' state 
law diversity claims. Where, as here, a private action arises 
under the federal securities laws, the PSLRA plainly calls for 
a stay of "all discovery and other proceedings," see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b )(3)(B) ( emphasis added), with no exception carved 
out for situations also involving non-fraud claims grounded in 
diversity jurisdiction. 5 Accordingly, this Court respectfully 
disagrees with the reasoning set forth in Tobias and, like 
the court in Tromp Hotel, finds _that the text of the PSLRA 
supports a stay of discovery as to each of plaintiffs' claims. 
5 The PSLRA permits the Court to lift the automatic 
stay in the event it finds that "particularized discovery 
is necessary to preserve evidence or prevent undue 
prejudice to [a] party."15 U.S .C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
Plaintiffs do not invoke that portion of the statutory 
provision, nor do they purport to make the requisite 
showing of need. 
In any event, common sense supports a stay of all discovery 
in this case, even under the rationale of Tobias. Unlike the 
situation in Tobias, plaintiffs' federal and common law claims 
each derive from the same factual allegations: namely, that 
defendants Bendell and Major affirmatively misrepresented 
the value of Major's stock as a means of inducing plaintiffs 
to enter into an unfair buyout. To allow discovery on any 
one of plaintiffs' claims would open the door to otherwise 
currently undiscoverable information related to plaintiffs' 
federal securities law claim, and would undermine the 
purpose of the PSLRA's automatic stay provision. See Angell 
Invs., L.L.C. v. Purizer Corp., No. 01 C 6359, 2001 WL 
1345996, at *1-2 (N.D.III. Oct.31, 2001) (staying discovery 
on negligent misrepresentation claim, which was "related 
closely enough to the federal securities law claims" to involve 
the same discovery; distinguishing Tobias as involving state 
law claims that are "separate and distinct" from the federal 
securities claims). Therefore, all discovery in this case will 
be stayed pending a judicial determination of defendants' 
pending dispositive motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
*6 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendants' 
motion to stay discovery pending the outcome of their 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having concluded that 
a discovery stay is warranted, the Court denies plaintiffs' 
motion to compel discovery. 
Any objections to the recommendations contained in 
this Report and Recommendation must be filed with 
the Honorable Frederic Block on or before April 30, 
End of Document 
2012.SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections in a timely 
manner may waive a right to appeal the District Court order. 
The Clerk is directed to enter this Report and 
Recommendation into the ECF system. 
SO ORDERED. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 1230135, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. P 96,806 
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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ORDER 
Docket 83 
2012. Dkt. 31. On March 21, 2013, the district court in the 
Eastern District of Texas issued an order transferring this case 
to the Northern District of California. Dkt. 40. On May 23, 
2013, the case was assigned to the undersigned. Dkt. 52. 
On August 20, 2013, Defendant filed a motion to disqualify 
Plaintiffs counsel and a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 71, 73. 
On August 21, 2013, the Court issued an order referring 
the motion to disqualify Plaintiffs counsel to the Chief 
Magistrate Judge or her designee for determination. Dkt. 
75. On that same day, the Court also issued a minute 
order stating that Defendant's motion to dismiss will be 
held in abeyance pending a ruling on Defendant's motion 
to disqualify Plaintiffs counsel. Dkt. 76. The motion to 
disqualify Plaintiffs counsel was subsequently assigned to 
Magistrate Judge Westmore and is currently set for hearing 
on November 21, 2013. See Dkt. 82. 
On October 7, 2013, Plaintiff propounded interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents on Defendant 
which, among other things, seek "highly sensitive" financial 
information as well as technical documents such as 
schematics, plans, manuals and memorandums relating to 
Defendant's technology. Def.'s Mtn. at 3. On October 21, 
2013, Defendant filed an administrative motion to clarify the 
Court's directives regarding discovery. Dkt. 83. Plaintiff filed 
a response on October 25, 2013. Dkt. 84. 
II. DISCUSSION 
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG, United States District The court has inherent authority to manage the cases before it. 
Judge Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-255 (1936) ("[T]he 
*1 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendant 
8x8, Inc.'s ("Defendant") administrative motion to clarify 
the Court's directives regarding discovery. Dkt. 83. Having 
read and considered the papers filed in connection with this 
matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby STAYS all 
proceedings in this case until Defendant's motion to disqualify 
Plaintiffs counsel is resolved. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On November 1, 2011, Plaintiff IPVX Patent Holdings, 
Inc. ("Plaintiff') commenced the instant patent infringement 
action against Defendant in the Eastern District of Texas. See 
Compl., Dkt. 1. On August 23, 2012, Defendant filed a motion 
to transfi;:r venue to either the District of Delaware or to the 
Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
Dkt. 25. An amended complaint was filed on September 25, 
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent 
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on 
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 
counsel, and for litigants."). A "court may, for good cause, 
issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," 
including forbidding discovery or specifying terms, including 
time and place, for discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(l). "The 
burden is upon the party seeking the order to 'show good 
cause' by demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result 
from the discovery." Rivera v. NJBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 
1063 (9th Cir.2004). A stays of proceedings in federal court, 
including a stay of discovery, is committed to the discretion 
of the trial court. Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149, 155 (9th 
Cir.1987); seeLittle v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th 
Cir.1988) (a district court had wide discretion in controlling 
discovery). 
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*2 In the instant motion, Defendant seeks clarification as to 
whether the Court intended to stay all proceedings, including 
discovery, pending a determination ofits motion to disqualify 
Plaintiff's counsel, which is premised on the improper use 
and disclosure of Defendant's confidential information by 
Plaintiffs co-counsel. Def.'s Mtn. at 1, 4. According to 
Defendant, it "understands" the Court's August 21, 2013 
minute order, which states that Defendant's motion to dismiss 
will be held in abeyance pending a ruling on Defendant's 
motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel, as staying this action 
''pending determination of the disqualification issues." Id 
Plaintiff disagrees, asserting that it does not ''understand" the 
Court's minute order as staying discovery in this case. Dkt. 84. 
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the 
August 21, 2013 minute order did not stay discovery 
in this case pending resolution of Defendant's motion to 
disqualify Plaintiffs counsel. However, the Court finds 
that Defendant has shown good cause to stay discovery 
until Defendant's motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel is 
resolved. Staying discovery will avoid the possibility that 
the parties will unnecessarily expend time and resources 
conducting discovery. If the motion to disqualify Plaintiffs 
counsel is granted, the parties will have wasted time and 
resources propounding and responding to discovery requests. 
Moreover, a limited stay of discovery is appropriate to 
prevent Plaintiffs counsel from obtaining technical and 
financial information about Defendant before a determination 
End of Document 
is made as to whether Plaintiff's counsel may continue to 
represent Plaintiff in this action. Finally, Plaintiff has not 
shown that a limited stay of discovery will impose any unfair 
prejudice on it. 
In light of the forgoing, the Court hereby STAYS discovery 
in the instant action until Defendant's motion to disqualify 
Plaintiffs counsel is resolved. To the extent Defendant 
requests an order staying discovery pending resolution of its 
motion to dismiss, the Court denies this request. Defendant 
has failed to demonstrate good cause to stay discovery until 
its motion to dismiss is resolved. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
THAT: 
1. Discovery is STAYED pending resolution of Defendant's 
motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel. 
2. This Order terminates Docket 83. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 6000590 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
A. KATHLEEN TOMLINSON, United States Magistrate 
Judge. 
l. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
*1 This is a class action lawsuit alleging claims of (1) unpaid 
wages in violation of Article 6 of the New York Labor Law, 
§§ 190 et seq., (2) breach of contract, and (3) other claims that 
"can be inferred from the facts" against Defendant Broadridge 
Financial Solutions, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Broadridge").See 
Complaint ("Compl.") [DE 1]. This action is brought by 
Plaintiffs Mi~hael Kanowitz, Steven Roy, Helene Cranmer, 
Charles Hydo and Daniel Sturchio (collectively, "Plaintiffs") 
on behalf of themselves and all similarly-situated employees. 
Id The Plaintiffs alleges that Broadridge failed to pay them 
non-discretionary wages despite their satisfaction ofobjective 
criteria set forth in Defendant's Fiscal Year 2009 Management 
by Objectives (MBO) Bonus Plan Document. Id ~ 1. 
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for a full stay of 
discovery pending the disposition of its anticipated motion to 
dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAF A"), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(4) (B).See Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery 
("Def.'s Mot.") [DE 14]. Defendant argues that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction in light of the "home state" and "local 
controversy" exceptions set forth in CAF A, ''which are 
triggered when two-thirds of the putative plaintiff class and 
the defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action 
was filed."ld at 1. As, such, Broadridge submits that there 
is "no basis for jurisdictional or any other discovery."ld. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has not 
provided sufficient evidence that CAF A applies and that 
limited discovery is warranted to determine whether two-
thirds of the putative plaintiff class and the defendant are 
indeed citizens ofNew York State. See Plaintiffs' Opposition 
to the Motion to Stay Discovery ("Pls.' Opp.") [DE 15]. 
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to stay 
discovery is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Complaint 
In Fiscal Year 2009, a period which began on July 
1, 2008 and ended on June 30, 2009, Broadridge 
implemented and published a bonus payment plan entitled 
the "FY '09 Management by Objectives (MBO) Bonus Plan 
Document."Compl. ~ 1. According to the Complaint, the 
MBO Bonus Plan Document contained both discretionary and 
objective bonus provisions. Id. The discretionary portion of 
the Bonus Plan "carried a 10% weight." Id. The objective 
section, by contrast, constituted 90% of the weight of the 
plan. Id At the beginning of Fiscal Year 2009, the named 
Plaintiffs and the Class Action Plaintiffs were provided with 
the Bonus Plan Document which outlined the criteria under 
the plan. Id. Although the named Plaintiffs and the Class 
Action Plaintiffs satisfied the objective criteria, Defendant 
either "slashed" or refused to pay Plaintiffs the amount that 
they had earned. Id. Plaintiffs argue that "[t]hese totals are 
due and owing to Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs as 
unpaid wages."Jd. In the alternative, Plaintiffs maintain that 
"Defendant's failure to pay this money to Plaintiffs and Class 
Plaintiffs is a breach of contract entitling Plaintiffs and Class 
Plaintiffs to damages."Jd 
*2 Relevant to the motion before the Court is Plaintiffs' 
allegation in the Complaint that the basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Compl. ~ 2. Plaintiffs 
claim that the "amount in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $5,000,000 and at least one member of the 
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state than 
DefendantBroadridge. "Id The Complaint alleges that all five 
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individually-named Plaintiffs are citizens of the State ofNew 
York and were employed by Broadridge during Fiscal Year 
2009. Id. ,r 4. Broadridge is alleged to be "a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of Delaware" and 
"according to the New York State Department of State," 
maintains a "principal executive office" at 2 Journal Square, 
Jersey City, New Jersey 07306." Id. ,r 5. 
Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23(a) and 23(b) 
(3).See Compl. ,r,r 7-8. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to certify 
the following class: 
Current and former employees of 
Defendant who worked for Defendant 
during the Defendant's 2009 fiscal 
year, i.e. from July 1, 2008 through 
June 30, 2009, and who were 
eligible to receive a bonus under 
the Defendant's MBO Bonus Plan 
applicable to the 2009 fiscal year. 
Id. ,r 9. The Plaintiffs contend that the proposed class will 
satisfy the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and 23(b )(3).Jd. ,r,r 
10-20.Plaintiffs further note that "[t ]here are over 100 known 
employees of the Defendant who fit the class definition 
outlined above; many hundreds more may exist."ld. ,r 10. 
On or about September 1, 2008, Broadridge published the 
Fiscal Year 2009 MBO Bonus Plan Document. Compl. ,r 27. 
The cover page of the document specifically stated that the 
plan was "retroactive to or 'effective' as of July 1, 2008."ld. 
All named Plaintiffs were employed at Broadridge during 
the entirety of Fiscal Year 2009 according to the Complaint. 
Id. ,r,r 21-26.The purpose of the MBO Bonus Plan was to 
"[p]rovide designated associates with individual goals that 
are aligned with [Broadridge's] business goals' and to reward 
associates when the organization achieves its goals."ld. ,r 
28 (internal quotations omitted). The MBO Bonus Plan was 
calculated on the basis of four components: (1) financial 
results, (2) client satisfaction, (3) projects/initiatives, and 
(4) leadership. Id. ,r 30.The MBO Bonus Plan Document 
explained how to calculate the different components. Id. ,r 
31.The Plaintiffs allege that the leadership component was 
the only discretionary section and that it carried a 10% 
weight. Id. "Thus, based on this language and simple logic," 
Pfaintiffs conclude, "all other components of the MBO Bonus 
Plan, comprising the other 90% of the calculation, were to 
be calculated on a non-discretionary basis."ld. Supervisors 
employed by Broadridge "explained to Plaintiffs and Class 
Action Plaintiffs exactly what they had to do to earn 90% of 
their objectively-calculated bonuses for that year."ld. ,r 33. 
*3 At the end of Fiscal Year 2009, supervisors submitted the 
calculations for approval. Compl. ,r 34. Plaintiffs claim that_ 
[u]pon such submission, even though the eligible employees 
had spent the previous year working towards and striving 
to meet such objectively-set criteria, the Defendant's upper-
level supervisors determined that none of the employees' 
bonuses could exceed a certain percentage even if those 
employees had earned a higher percentage in accordance 
with the objectively-based formula as set [forth] ... in the 
2009 MBO Bonus Plan Document." Id. ,r 35.Consequently, 
Plaintiffs contend, "Broadridge recalculated and slashed the 
bonuses of its Plan-eligible employees, including the five 
named Plaintiffs and the Class Action Plaintiffs, who had 
earned a higher bonus amount under Broadridge's announced 
and pre-determined objective formula."Id. ,r 36.Thereafter, 
"Broadridge paid to Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs such 
lower amounts and not the amounts that Plaintiffs and Class 
Action Plaintiffs had objectively earned over the course of the 
2009 fiscal year."Id. 
In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action 
for unlawfully withheld wages under New York Labor Law 
§§ 190, et seq. Compl. ,r,r 39-42. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege 
a cause of action for breach of contract under New York state 
common law. Id. ,r,r 45-50. 
B. Procedural History 
J. Defendant's Pre-Motion Conference Letter 
On April 10, 2013, Defendant filed a letter to Judge Hurley 
requesting a pre-motion conference for purposes of moving 
to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to FED. R. CN. P. 
12(b)(l), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. DE 10. 
Defendant argued that the Court is deprived of subject-
matter jurisdiction in light of the "home state" and "local 
controversy" exceptions to CAP A since more than two-thirds 
of the putative class and Broadridge are citizens of the same 
state-New York. Id. at 1-2.In their April 3, 2013 responding 
letter to Judge Hurley, Plaintiffs consent to a pre-motion 
conference but argue that factual issues exist with respect to 
the citizenship of Broadridge and the putative Class Plaintiffs. 
· DE 12 at 2. As such, "Plaintiffs ... request discovery into the 
factual contentions of citizenship that the Defendant raises in 
its letter."ld. at 3. However, Plaintiffs take no position with 
respect to merits-based discovery. Id. 
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2. The Initial Conference 
On April 11, 2013, the parties appeared before this Court 
for an Initial Conference. DE 13. The Court acknowledged 
that "Defendant is seeking to stay all discovery pending 
the submission and determination of its intended motion 
to dismiss."ld. Plaintiffs' counsel asserted that they seek 
discovery to proceed, "at least with regard to permitting 
discovery on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction."ld. In 
light of the request to stay discovery and the anticipated 
motion before Judge Hurley, the Court stated that: 
Id. 
*4 After hearing from both sides 
today, I advised counsel that I believe 
it is appropriate for this Court to 
take a further look, in a more 
formal way, at the arguments and 
cases cited by defendant's counsel 
this morning, in addition to giving 
plaintiffs' counsel an opportunity 
to argue why limited discovery 
should not proceed, notwithstanding 
defendant's legal arguments. Although 
the Court realizes that there is some 
overlap between the merits of this 
action and a request for a complete 
stay, I have asked counsel to focus 
on the "stay" argument as much 
as possible. Defendant's counsel will 
file a letter motion, not to exceed 
three pages, on ECF by April 22, 
2013 seeking a full stay of discovery 
pending the anticipated motion to 
dismiss. Plaintiffs' counsel will file his 
opposition to the letter motion by April 
29, 2013. Counsel are free to attach 
any pertinent exhibits which help to 
focus the issue of the proposed stay of 
all discovery. 
3. Judge Hurley's Stay of Dispositive Motion Practice 
In the wake of the Initial Conference and the permission 
granted to brief the issue of whether discovery should be 
stayed, Judge Hurley issued an Electronic Order holding 
Defendant's request for a pre-motion conference to file a 
motion to dismiss in abeyance. See Apr. 12, 2013 Electronic 
Order. Specifically, Judge Hurley held that "Defendant's 
request for a pre-motion conference in anticipation of 
moving to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) is hereby 
held in abeyance pending Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen 
Tomlinson's determination on the forthcoming motion to stay 
discovery."ld. 
C. The Current Motion to Stay Discovery 
In accordance with this Court's directives, Defendant filed a 
letter motion to stay discovery, maintaining that exceptions 
within CAF A prohibit this action from proceeding in federal 
court. See generally Def. 's Mot. Defendant maintains that "a 
full stay of discovery is warranted since Plaintiffs' claims 
will likely be dismissed, the burdens of discovery would be 
extensive and unnecessary, and a stay will not result in any 
prejudice to the Plaintiffs."ld. at 1. 
The Defendant claims that both Broadridge, as a New York 
corporation, and more than two-thirds of the putative class 
members are citizens ofNew York State. Def.'s Mot. at 1. As 
a result, the Defendant argues, the action lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction under CAF A. Id. Further, Defendant contends 
that the breadth of discovery and the burden it presents 
justifies a full stay pending Judge Hurley's decision on the 
anticipated motion to dismiss. Id. at 3. Third, Plaintiffs will 
not be prejudiced by a full stay of discovery, particularly 
because of their ;,declared intention to re-file in state court" in 
the event this action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id 
In this vein, Defendant asserts that they have demonstrated 
the requisite "good cause" to stay discovery. Id. 
In response, Plaintiffs point out that there remains a dispute 
about whether the citizenship of Broadridge and that of 
the putative class is, in fact, consistent with Defendant's 
representations. See Pis.' Opp. at 1. Plaintiffs state "[a]s the 
Court further knows, based on publicly available information 
that the Defendant put on file with the State of New York, 
Plaintiffs commenced this action with the belief that the 
Defendant's principal place of business was located in New 
Jersey."ld at 1-2.As Plaintiffs put it, "[i]n one declaration, 
the Defendant asserts that its principal place of business is 
truly in New York, but then boldly admits that the information 
about its principal executive office location on file with 
New York is not a mistake."ld. at 2. 1 Plaintiffs gather that 
Defendant "intentionally provided such misinformation, to 
a state agency, for the purpose of its own 'administrative 
convenience.' "Id. (quoting Declaration of Mark D. DiGidio 
annexed to Def.'s Mot. as Exhibit "B" ["DiGidio Deel."] at 
5-6). 
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1 Here, Plaintiffs are referring to the listing of Defendant's 
''principal executive office" in Jersey City, New Jersey 
with the New York Department of State. 
*5 Secondly, Plaintiffs takes issue with the "redacted chart" 
supplied by the Defendant listing the members of the putative 
class. Pl.'s Opp. at 2. The chart, Plaintiffs claim, is defective 
because "the only information that the Defendant provides are 
the town and state in which it contends each class member 
lives or lived at some point."Jd. Plaintiffs take issue with the 
fact that Defendant "redacts the names and street addresses 
of each putative class member and does not provide a phone 
number or any other means for anyone to be able to verify the 
accura~y of the chart's details."Jd. (emphasis in original). 
Plaintiffs propose that "the Court order the Defendant to 
produce the complete chart of the putative class, without 
redaction, and with the addition of a column containing 
a contact number for each individual."Pls.' Opp. at 2. 
Thereafter, at their own expense, Plaintiffs will "randomly 
select a handful of putative class members and attempt 
to contact them to verify the information about them 
that the Defendant has provided."Jd. Plaintiffs maintain 
that, if the "defendant's information proves accurate," the 
Plaintiffs will concede that Defendant's anticipated motion 
to dismiss is unneces-sary. Id. Alternatively, if the data 
disclosed by this exercise is inconsistent with Defendant's 
representation as to the putative class, "Plaintiff will then 
request broader discovery from the Court."Id. This activity, 
Plaintiffs maintain, "poses absolutely no prejudice" to the 
Defendant o~ the rationale that the foregoing discovery 
materials will have to be supplied to Plaintiff in any event 
once merits-based discovery commences, either in the instant 
forum or in state court. Id. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26( c) provides that "for good 
cause shown," a district court may, in its discretion, stay 
discovery or issue a protective order limiting discovery to 
certain matters. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). A party seeking 
a protective order has the burden of showing that good 
cause exists for issuance of that order. See, e.g. Gambale 
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir.2004); 
Garnett-Bishop v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc., No. 
12 Civ. 2285, 2013 WL 101590, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 8, 
2013). Further, it is well-settled in this District that litigants 
are not entitled to an automatic stay of discovery pending 
the determination of a motion to dismiss. See Bachayeva v. 
Americare Certified Special Servs., No. 12 Civ. 1446, 2013 
WL 4495672, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (issuance 
of a stay of discovery pending the outcome of a motion 
to dismiss is "by no means automatic") (internal citation 
and quotations omitted); Thomas v. New York City Dep't of 
Educ., 09 Civ. 5167, 2010 WL 3709923, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept.14, 2010) ("the pendency ofa dispositive motion is not, 
without more, grounds for an automatic stay" of discovery) 
(internal citations omitted); Rivera v. Incorporated Village 
of Farmingdale, 06 Civ. 2613, 2007 WL 3047089, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct.17, 2007) (citations omitted) (''the law is clear 
in this court that there is no automatic stay of discovery 
pending the determination of a motion to dismiss") (internal 
citation omitted); Osan Ltd. v. Accenture LLP, No. 05 
Civ. 5048, 2006 WL 1662612, at *I (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 
2006) (denying motion to stay discovery during pendency of 
potentially dispositive motion); Telesca v. Long Island Hous. 
P'ship, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5509, 2006 WL 1120636, at *I 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006) (collecting cases from within this 
district noting that the "pendency of a dispositive motion is 
not, in itself, an automatic ground for a stay"). As one court 
has noted: 
*6 Staying discovery pending 
judicial evaluation of the sufficiency 
of the complaint is consistent with the 
entire purpose of the stay provision[, 
which] is to avoid saddling defendants 
with the burden of discovery in 
meritless cases, and to discourage 
the filing of cases that lack adequate 
support for their allegations in the 
mere hope that the traditionally broad 
discovery proceedings will produce 
facts that could be used to state a valid 
claim. 
Gardnerv. Major Auto. Companies, 11 Civ. 1664, 2012 WL 
1230135, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.12, 2012) (internal citation and 
quotations omitted). Factors which courts have considered 
when determining whether or not a stay is appropriate 
include: 
(1) whether the defendant has made 
a strong showing that the plaintiffs 
claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth 
of discovery and the burden of 
responding to it; and (3) the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the party opposing 
the stay. 
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Chesney v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236 
F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.28, 2006) (internal citation 
omitted); see also Thomas, 2010 WL 3709923, at *3;RxUSA 
Wholesale, Inc. v. Alcon Labs, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3447, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92816, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006). 
Where a discovery stay is sought pending a dispositive 
motion, another consideration which may be evaluated is the 
strength of the motion and likelihood of whether the case 
could be dismissed based upon the merits of the motion. See, 
e.g., Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs. v. RPost Int'/, 206 
F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Additionally, courts may 
take into account the nature and complexity of the action, 
whether some or all defendants have joined in the request for 
a stay, and the posture or stage of the litigation. See Chesney, 
236 F.R.D. at 115. 
A. Whether Broadridge Has Made a Strong Showing 
that Plaintiffs' Claims are Unmeritorious 
In assessing whether Plaintiffs' claims are unmeritorious, 
the Court turns its attention to the "home state" and "local 
controversy" exceptions within CAF A which Defendant 
argues provide the grounds for the dismissal of this 
action. "CAF A allows for the exercise of federal diversity 
jurisdiction over class actions involving 100 or more class 
members, in which the amount in controversy exceeds 
the sum or value of $5,000,000 ( exclusive of interest and 
costs), and there is minimal diversity, i.e., where, inter 
a/ia, at least one member of the putative class and one 
defendant are citizens of different states."Richins v. Hofstra 
University, 908 F.Supp.2d 358, 360 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (citing 
Anirudh v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 448, 450 
(S.D.N.Y.2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A))."CAFA thus 
expands federal diversity jurisdiction allowing removal of 
cases lacking complete diversity of citizenship among the 
parties."ld. ( citing BlackRock Financial Management Inc. v. 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assur. Corp., 673 F.3d 169, 
175 (2d Cir.2012))."By legislating the expansion of diversity 
jurisdiction, Congress intended to allow federal courts to keep 
'cases of nati~nal importance' in Federal court, and 'to restore 
the intent of the framers of the Constitution by providing 
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance under diversity jurisdiction."'ld. (citing Mattera 
v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1878, 
2006 WL 3316967 *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2006)). 
*7 A brief description of the CAF A "home state" exception 
may shed some light on the evidentiary requirements which 
Defendant must prove in order to sustain its motion to 
dismiss: 
CAF A includes several exceptions, including the home 
state exception which provides that: "[a] district court 
shall decline to exercise jurisdiction .. . over a class 
action in which ... two-thirds or more of the members of 
all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the 
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the 
action was originally filed " 
Gold v. New York Life Ins. Co., 730 F.3d 137, 141 (2d 
Cir.2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B)) (emphasis 
added). Additionally, "when jurisdiction is based on CAF A, 
the party seeking to avail itself of an exception to CAF A 
jurisdiction over a case originally filed in federal court bears 
the burden of proving the exception applies."Anirudh v. 
CitiMortgage, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 448,451 (S.D.N.Y.2009). 
Therefore, in the instant case and for the purposes of this 
motion, Defendant has the burden of showing that the "home 
state" exception has been met by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See Richins, 908 F.Supp.2d at 362. 2 
2 The Court notes that "[t]he Second Circuit has not 
resolved the level of proof required to establish 
an exception to CAF A jurisdiction."Hart v. Rick's 
N.Y. Cabaret Intern., Inc., 2014 WL 301357, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan.28, 2014)."Some Circuits have applied 
a preponderance of the evidence standard."(intemal 
citations omitted)."One district court in this Circuit 
has applied a reasonable likelihood standard."Id (citing 
Mattera, 239 F.R.D. at 80 ("While Defendants have 
not provided evidence, in the form of an affidavit or 
otherwise, establishing such citizenship, it is reasonably 
likely that more than two-thirds of the putative class 
members of the proposed class-all of whom work in 
New York-are citizens of New York."). In Hart and 
Richins, the courts applied a "preponderance of the 
evidence" burden of proof. See Hart, 2014 WL 301357, 
at *5;see also Richins, 908 F.Supp.2d at 362. 
Congress also carved out the "local controversy exception" 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). "Under the "local 
controversy" exception" [a] district court shall decline to 
exercise jurisdiction ... 
(A) (i) over a class action in which-
(!) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed 
plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in 
which the action was originally filed; 
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(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant-
( aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members 
of the plaintiff class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for 
the claims ass2erted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was 
originally filed; and 
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct 
or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in 
the State in which the action was originally filed; and 
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that 
class action, no other class action has been filed asserting 
the same or similar factual allegations against any of the 
defendants on behalfofthe same or other persons[.] 
Brookv. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 12954, 2007 
WL 2827808, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.27, 2007) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)); Henry v. Warner Music Group· 
Corp., No. 13 Civ. 5031, 2014 WL 1224575, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar.24, 2014). 
In the instant case, Defendant has "produced from its Human 
Resources database the home address information (town, 
state and zip code) for the 870 individuals within Plaintiffs' 
definition of the putative class; 700 current employees and 
170 former employees. "Def. 's Mot. at 2 ( citing Declaration of 
Douglas Myers, Senior Director, Human Resources ["Myers 
Deel."] annexed as Exhibit A to Pl.'s Mot. 113-5). In sum, 
Myers identified 865 (751 of 870 employees) members of 
Plaintiffs' putative class who are residents ofNew York State. 
Id (citing Myers Deel. ,i 7). This number more than satisfies 
the two-thirds residency requirement under the CAF A "home 
state" and "local controversy" exceptions.Id. 
*8 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs argument that 
the information supplied by Defendants does not sufficiently 
establish that more than two-thirds of the putative class 
members are residents of New York State. As an initial 
matter, the Defendant appropriately redacted the names and 
street addresses of these individuals given the early stage of 
litigation. Second, Plaintiffs' contention-that the listing of 
Defendant's "principal executive office" with the Department 
of State is indicative of the tendency of Defendant to 
misrepresent and misinform the Court-is unsupported. The 
Court finds credible Defendant's position that the New 
Jersey office was listed for purposes of administrative 
convenience and does not govern Broadridge's "principal 
place of business." This representation is supported by the 
declaration of Defendant's associate general counsel, which 
is discussed in further detail below. The Supreme Court has 
held that the "principal place of business" ofa corporation is 
defined by its "nerve center." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 
77, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 1186, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010)(defining 
"principal place ofbusiness" as its "nei:ve center"-"the place 
where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation's activities''). 
In Richins, the defendants argued that plaintiffs needed 
to show additional proof that more than two-thirds of the 
putative class members were residents of New York State 
which would thereby qualify the case for mandatory and 
discretionary remand to state court under CAF A. Richins, 908 
F.Supp.2d at 363. The defendants in Richins provided a chart 
illustrating the percentage of Hofstra University graduates 
with New York mailing addresses on file. Id. at 362.The 
court found that "[t]he data and calculations set forth by 
Plaintiffs support strongly the argument that greater than two-
thirds of the members of the Plaintiff Class are citizens of the 
State of New York."Id at *362-63.Although defendants did 
not dispute the accuracy of the data there, they did dispute 
whether the data reflected the citizenship of the putative class 
members since the data was restricted to mailing addresses on 
file.Id. The Court ultimately rejected defendants' contentions, 
holding that 
[t]aken to its logical conclusion, 
Hofstra's argument would require this 
court to conduct a full trial on 
the merits as to the citizenship of 
every class member before reaching 
a determination of whether or not a 
CAF A exception applies. That cannot 
be the intent of the statute. Indeed 
when determining in the context of a 
motion to remand whether a CAF A 
exception applies, the court is required 
to make a citizenship determination at 
the very early stages of the litigation. 
Id. Here, the Court finds the data supplied by Broadridge to be 
even more substantial than that provided by the plaintiffs in 
Richins.Defendants have provided the hometown, state, and 
zip codes of the putative class members both currently and 
formerly employed with Broadridge. See Myers Deel., Ex. 
"A" and "B." 
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*9 The court in Richins ordered expedited discovery on 
the issue of whether the action should be remanded to state 
court pursuant to CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § l332(d)(3).Richins, 
908 F.Supp.2d at 360. This is the single case relied upon 
by the Plaintiffs to argue that this Court, too, should order 
expedited discovery. Pls.' Opp. at 3. In Richins, Defendants 
removed the action from state court to federal court pursuant 
to CAFA. Richins, 908 F.Supp.2d at 360. In response, the 
plaintiffs sought a mandatory remand and the court found that 
additional discovery was necessary to confirm whether the 
two-thirds threshold had been met under 28 U.S.C. § 1332( d) 
(3).Id. The instant case is distinguishable from Richins.First, 
the Court has, in effect, already permitted limited discovery 
by allowing the parties to attach supporting evidence to the 
motion to stay discovery. See DE 13 ("Counsel are free to 
attach any pe~inent exhibits which help to focus the issue 
of the proposed stay of all discovery."). Second, as Plaintiffs 
point out, the Richins plaintiffs "did not request the names, 
street addresses and contact numbers of the putative class 
members."Pls.' Opp. at 3. Moreover, the court in Richins 
ultimately found the showing made by the defendants there 
to be far less substantial than the information presented by 
Broadridge here to meet the two-thirds residency threshold 
underCAFA. 
Moreover, Defendant has satisfactorily demonstrated that 
it is a citizen of the State of New York, notwithstanding 
that its "principal executive office" is listed with the New 
York Department of State as Jersey City, New Jersey. 
Defs.' Mot. at 2. Under federal law, "a corporation shall 
be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has 
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal 
place of business."28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1)."This provision 
'establishes a theory of dual citizenship for corporations and 
if either the corporation's place of incorporation or principal 
place of business destroys diversity, then the courts will not 
have diversity jurisdiction. "'Brauner v. British Airways PLC, 
No. 12 Civ. 343, 2012 WL 1229507, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 
2012) (quoting Sty-Lite Co. v. Eminent Sportswear Inc., 115 
F.Supp.2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y.2000)). 
Defining a corporation's "principal place of business" is 
based on an evaluation of several factors. "Recent Supreme 
Court precedent holds that a corporation's 'principal place of 
business' is 'the place where a corporation's offic;rs direct, 
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities, often 
called the 'nerve center.' "Brauner, 2012 WL 1229507, at 
*3 (quoting Hertz Corp., 130 S.Ct. at 1192); FirstStorm 
Partners 2 LLC v. Vassel, No. 10 Civ. 2356, 2012 WL 
1886942, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012)."[I]n practice it 
should normally be the place where the corporation maintains 
its headquarters .... "Brauner, 2012 WL 1229507, at *3 
(quoting Hertz, 130 S.Ct. at 1193)."A corporation has only 
one principal place ofbusiness."ld. (citing Hertz, 130 S.Ct. 
at 1193). 
*10 Here, Defendant has provided a Declaration from 
Associate General Counsel Mark DiGidio to support its 
representation that its "principal place of business" is 
Lake Success, New York-not Jersey City, New Jersey. 
See DiGidio Deel. In his declaration, DiGidio represents 
that Defendant's principal place of business is located 
at 1981 Marcus Avenue, Lake Success New York. Id. 
1 1. Broadridge, DiGidio explains, has "maintained its 
headquarters at the Lake Success, New York location since 
2007."ld. 1 3. Furthermore, DiGidio states that it is at 
the Lake Success, New York location where Broadridge's 
"principal corporate officers direct, control and coordin_ate 
Broadridge's operations and activities on a daily basis."ld. 
1 4. Among these officers are Broadridge's (1) Chief 
Executive Officer and Director, (2) President, (3) Corporate 
Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, (4) 
Corporate Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, (5) 
Corporate Vice President, (6) General Counsel and Secretary, 
(7) Corporate Vice President, Human Resources, and (8) 
Corporate Vice President, SPS International and Global 
Outsourcing Solutions. Id. The Court finds this information 
compelling with regard to the argument that Broadridge's 
principal place ofbusiness is in New York. Moreover, courts 
in the Second Circuit regularly find a corporate officer's 
sworn statement to be sufficient proof of a corporation's 
principal place of business. See Strix, LLC v. GE Capital 
Comm., 11 Civ. 4403, 2012 WL 2049825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 7, 2012); FirstStorm Partners 2 LLC, 2012 WL 
1886942, at *5. 
The Court is not ignoring the fact that Defendant has listed 
a "principal executive office" in Jersey City, New Jersey in 
its filings with the New York State Department of State. Pls.' 
Opp. at 2; Defs.' Opp. at 2-3. The mere listing of a non-
New York "principal executive office" with a state agency is, 
however, not determinative of Defendant's "principal place 
of business" under federal law. See Hertz, 130 S.Ct. at 1194. 
Moreover, as stated in DiGidio's sworn declaration, a Jersey 
City, New Jersey location was listed for "administrative 
convenience so as to ensure that any formal tax notifications 
from New York State would be sent directly to the tax 
department and timely addressed."DiGidio Deel. 16. Given 
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these facts, the Court finds that Defendant will likely show 
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to the "home state" and "local controversy" exceptions of 
CAF A. As a result, Broadridge has shown that the Complaint 
is "unmeritorious" in the sense that diversity jurisdiction 
cannot be sustained in these circumstances. The first factor 
therefore weighs in favor of a stay. 
B. The Breadth of Discovery and the Burden of 
Responding to It 
While the Court notes that Defendant has provided some 
evidence that the Complaint may be dismissed, this factor is 
not dispositive and the Court must also review other factors 
in exercising its discretion to stay discovery under Rule 
26(c).See Ceg/ia v. Zuckerberg, No. IO Civ. 569A(F), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85633, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.2012) ("In finding 
good cause, a court is required to balance several relevant 
factors including the pendency of dispositive motions, 
potential prejudice to an opposing party, the extensiveness 
of the requested discovery, and the burden of the requested 
discovery on the requested party, i.e., the party seeking the 
stay.") (internal citations omitted); Ellington Credit Fund, 
Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Services, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 2437, 2009 
WL 274483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.3, 2009). Specifically, the 
first prong of the analysis relating to whether the claim is 
''unmeritorious" must be balanced against other factors when 
assessing whether a stay of discovery should be imposed. 
The Court must also assess the breadth and burden of 
discovery presented by this action. Chesney, 236 F.R.D. at 
115; Barnes v. County of Monroe, No. IO Civ. 6164, 2013 
WL 5298574, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.19, 2013); Bachayeva 
v. Americare Certified Special Services, Inc. No. 12 Civ. 
1466, 2013 WL 4495672, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013). 
Here, Defendant has sought leave from Judge Hurley to 
file a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See DE 10. In light of Plaintiffs' intentions 
to re-file this action in state court, dismissal of the instant 
action will simply relegate discovery to the state court 
proceeding, not preclude it altogether. Although class action 
discovery would likely present a burden on the Defendant 
while its dispositive motion is pending, Plaintiffs will likely 
engage in similar class discovery in state court. See Fantastic 
Graphics Inc. v. Hutchinson, No. 09 Civ. 2514, 2010 WL 
475309, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2010) (denying defendant's 
motion to stay discovery because irrespective of the Court's 
ultimate decision on the issue of venue, the action was 
going to continue either "here or in New Jersey"). Like the 
circumstances in Fantastic Graphics, even if the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss is granted here, the case will likely be re-
filed in state court rather than be abandoned in its entirety. 
*11 Moreover, rather than seeking full-blown class 
discovery, Plaintiffs are simply seeking to verify the 
residency of the putative class members. See Pls.' Opp. 
at 2. To this end, the Court finds the Plaintiffs' proposal 
reasonable since they are not, at this stage, seeking to engage 
in merits discovery. Id. Plaintiffs seek to contact, at their own 
expense, a "handful of putative class members ... to verify the 
information" provided by Broadridge. Pls.' Opp. at 2. If the 
information supplied by Broadridge proves to be accurate, the 
Plaintiffs have proposed that they will forego further litigation 
in federal court and concede Defendant's representation that 
this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Pls.' Opp. at 2. As 
such, the Court does not find the limited scope of discovery 
requested by Plaintiffs to be burdensome. This factor tips the 
scale in Plaintiffs' favor. 
C. The Risk of Unfair Prejudice to the Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs argue that they will be prejudiced if the Court 
does not permit limited discovery to determine whether 
the representations made by the Defendant concerning the 
residency of the putative class members is, in fact, true and 
verifiable. Pls.' Opp. at 2. Plaintiffs claim that if they are 
· "to later l~am in State court discovery that the Defendant's 
chart was inaccurate, they will not be able to halt the case 
and re-file here."ld. Permitting limited additional discovery 
on the narrow issue of whether the putative class-members 
are citizens of New York is appropriate here and mitigates 
potential prejudice to the Plaintiffs' ability to maintain this 
action in federal court. Defendants contend that there is no 
prejudice to implementing a full stay of discovery here since 
Plaintiffs can re-file the action in state court. Def.'s Mot. at 3. 
Granting leave for limited, expedited discovery in the present 
matter will not cause Defendant to "suffer the heavy burden of 
class action discovery."ld. Moreover, the limited production 
will not prejudice the Defendant because this information 
is ultimately going to be provided in some court. Finally, 
Plaintiffs state that they will "request broader discovery 
from the Court" if the representations in the unredacted data 
supplied by Broadridge are inconsistent with the results of 
their investigation. Pls.' Opp. at 2. The Court will address that 
issue if and when it materializes. 
D. Additional Considerations 
Finally, "[c]ourts also may take into consideration the nature 
and complexity of the action, whether some or all of the 
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defendants have joined in the request for a stay, and the 
posture or stage of the litigation."Chesney, 236 F.R.D. at 115. 
The Court appreciates the potentially complex nature of this 
action in light of the number of putative plaintiffs. At the same 
time, the Court points out that the causes of action are not 
particularly complex. Some discovery, therefore, would be 
beneficial to resolving the threshold issue of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which may ultimately negate the necessity of 
Defendant's· dispositive motion if Plaintiffs agree, as they 
represent, to foreclose litigation upon a review of the putative 
plaintiffs unredacted records. Moreover, discovery has been 
in limbo for over a year. In the interest of moving this case 
forward, the Court finds that a balance of the factors supports 
the granting of limited, expedited discovery to bring closure 
to the jurisdictional issues presented by the Defendant. 
*12 In light of the foregoing analysis, the C~urt directs 
Broadridge to produce to Plaintiffs an updated and unredacted 
chart of the putative class members which includes their 
street addresses and phone numbers, no later than May 1, 
2014. Plaintiffs will then have thirty (30) days from receipt 
of the updated chart to complete their verification of the 
End of Document 
Plaintiffs' state citizenship. Plaintiffs' communications with 
putative class members must be limited to their citizenship. 
Following this thirty-day period, the Plaintiffs are directed 
to file a letter with the Court confirming whether they have 
determined that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 
under the "home state" and/or "local controversy" exceptions 
of CAF A. If Plaintiffs believe further discovery is warranted, 
they must articulate a reasonable basis to the Court to justify 
such discovery while the Defendant's motion to dismiss is 
pending. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to stay 
discovery is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, to the 
extent set forth in this Order. 
SO ORDERED. 
All Citations 
Slip Copy, 2014 WL 1338370 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
T. JOHN WARD, District Judge. 
*1 Pending before the Court are Defendant Lynda K. 
Russell's Second Opposed Motion for Protection Re: Staying 
Discovery D_irected Toward Her (Dkt. No. 167) and 
Defendant Danny Green's Second Motion for Protection to 
Stay Discovery Directed Toward Him (Dkt. No. 169). In 
their motions, defendants Russell and Green request that 
the Court stay discovery directed towards them in this case, 
including but not limited to the talcing of Russell's deposition 
currently noticed for August 3, 2010 and the talcing of Green's 
deposition currently noticed for August 4, 2010. The Court 
held a hearing on these motions on July 30, 2010. Having 
considered the parties' briefing, the arguments at the hearing, 
and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the 
motions should be DENIED. 
I. Background 
Plaintiffs bring this class action suit against five law 
enforcement officers and the mayor of Tenaha. Tenaha is 
located in Shelby County, Texas. The plaintiffs allege that the 
officers stopped the plaintiffs in traffic because of their race 
or ethnicity and unreasonably seized their money or property 
in violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs further 
allege that there is a widespread pattern and practice of doing 
so in the city of Tenaha. 
Plaintiffs sued, among others, Shelby County District 
Attorney Lynda K. Russell in her individual and official 
capacity and Shelby County District Attorney Investigator 
Danny Green in his individual capacity. On March 3, 
2010, Defendant Russell filed an opposed motion for 
protection requesting that the Court stay or abate all 
discovery directed towards Russell pending resolution of 
certain criminal investigations (Dkt. No. 123). On March 
31, 2010, Defendant Green filed a similar opposed motion 
for protection requesting that the Court stay or abate all 
discovery directed towards him pending the resolution of 
certain criminal investigations (Dkt. No. 134). After a hearing 
on the motions on April 15, 2010, the Court granted both 
motions and ordered a limited stay of discovery only as to 
defendants Russell and Green for a period of 90 days (Dkt. 
No. 149). That 90 day stay expired on July 14, 2010, and 
defendants Russell and Green now seek a further stay of 
discovery directed towards them. 
II. Analysis 
The Supreme Court has established that there exists no 
general constitutional, statutory, or common law prohibition 
against the prosecution of parallel criminal and civil actions, 
even where such actions proceed simultaneously.SEC v. 
First Fin. Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 666-67 
(5th Cir.1981) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 
11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970)). Thus, whether to 
stay a civil action pending resolution of a parallel criminal 
prosecution is not a matter of constitutional right, but, rather, 
one of court discretion, that should be exercised when the 
interests of justice so require. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 n. 27.A 
district court's discretionary authority to stay proceedings 
stems from its inherent authority to control the disposition 
of the cases on its own docket "with economy of time and 
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. "Landis v. North 
American Co., 299 U.S. 248,254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 
(1936); see also Alcala v. Texas Web County, 625 F .Supp.2d 
391, 396 (S.D.Tex.2009). However, "[i]t is the rule, rather 
than the exception that civil and criminal cases proceed 
together."Alcala, 625 F.Supp.2d at 397 (quoting United 
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States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 571 
F.Supp.2d 758, 761 (W.D.Tex.2008)). In civil cases, there is 
a strong presumption in favor of discovery, and it is the party 
who moves for a stay that bears the burden of overcoming 
this presumption. Id. at 397-98;see also Fresenius Medical, 
571 F. Supp.2d at 7 61; United States v. Gieger Transfer Serv., 
Inc., 174 F.R.D. 382, 385 (S.D.Miss.1997). 
*2 The Fifth Circuit has advised that in ruling on requests for 
stays of the civil side of parallel civil/criminal proceedings, 
"Judicial discretion and procedural flexibility should be 
utilized to harmonize the conflicting rules and to prevent 
the rules and policies applicable to one suit from doing 
violence to those pertaining to the other. In some situations 
it may be appropriate to stay the civil proceeding. In 
others it may be preferable for the civil suit to proceed-
unstayed."Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th 
Cir.1962) (internal citation omitted). However, the stay of a 
civil case should be entered only upon a showing of "special 
circumstances." Alcala, 625 F.Supp.2d at 398.District Courts 
in Texas have considered several factors in determining 
whether "special circumstances" warrant a stay, including: 
(1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap 
with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of 
the criminal case, including whether the defendants have 
been indicted; (3) the private interests of the plaintiffs 
in proceeding expeditiously, weighed against the prejudice 
to plaintiffs caused by the delay; ( 4) the private interests 
of and burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the 
courts; and (6) the public interest. See, e.g., Alcala, 625 
F.Supp.2d at 398-99; Akuna Matata Invs., Ltd. v. Texas 
Nom Ltd. P'ship, 2008 WL 2781198, at* 2 (W.D.Tex.2008); 
Librado v. MS. Carriers, Inc., 2002 WL 31495988, * 
1 (N.D.Tex.2002); see also Trustees of Plumbers and 
Pipefltters Nat'! Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 
F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Parallel Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 201-3 (Pollack, J.) 
( "Parallel Proceedings")); Volmar Distribs., Inc. v. The New 
York Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.1993). 
Defendant Russell argues that she has reason to believe there 
are ongoing criminal investigations against her based on 
the same facts and circumstances asserted in this lawsuit 
by the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 
and the Travis County District Attorney's Office. Likewise, 
Defendant Green argues that there is an ongoing criminal 
investigation against him based on the same facts and 
circumstances asserted in this lawsuit by the U.S. Department 
of Justice, Civil Rights Division. Both defendants argue that 
they intend to invoke their Fifth Amendment right against 
self incrimination in their depositions in this case and that, by 
doing so, they face a choice between defending themselves 
in this lawsuit and the risk of incriminating themselves in the 
potential criminal cases against them. Defendants Russell and 
Green assert that they have reason to believe that one or more 
persons have either been interviewed by federal investigators 
or have been called to testify before the federal grand jury 
since the initiation of the discovery stay in April. However, 
neither Russell nor Green asserts that they are currently under 
indictment nor has either defendant offered evidence that 
indictments against them are imminent or even certain. 
*3 Plaintiffs base their argument on the fact that no 
indictments have been issued against either Russell or 
Green and that the 90 day stay was more than sufficient 
to serve the defendants' interests. Specifically, plaintiffs 
argue that defendants Russell and Green have had more 
than enough time to determine their need to invoke the 
Fifth Amendment privilege during discovery in this case. 
Additionally, plaintiffs argue that there is a substantial risk of 
prejudice to them if an additional stay of unspecified duration 
is put into place because further delay in the case could lead 
to failed memories and lost evidence. 
The first question to be resolved is the extent to which the 
issues in the potential criminal cases against Russell and 
Green overlap with the issues in the present case. The risk of 
self-incrimination is more likely ifthere is significant overlap 
between the issues in the civil and criminal cases.Librada, 
2002 WL 31495988, at * 2;see also Volmar Distribs., 152 
F.R.D. at 39 (quoting Parallel Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 
at 203). Both Russell and Green assert that the criminal 
investigations directed towards them are based on the same 
circumstances giving rise to this action. However, because 
there have been no indictments against either Russell or 
Green, there is no way to determine whether the issues in the 
criminal investigations do, in fact, substantially overlap with 
the issues in the present case. Even assuming that there is 
complete overlap of the issues, there is little danger in this 
case that the civil litigation is an effort by the government 
to evade any limits on criminal discovery or pressure the 
defendants to waive their Fifth Amendment rights since this 
case was brought by private plaintiffs and not a governmental 
agency. See Alcala, 625 F.Supp.2d at 402 ("the potential for 
prejudice to a criminal defense is diminished where private 
parties, and not the government, are the plaintiffs in the civil 
action") (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Hakim, 1993 WL 481335, 
at* 1 (S.D.N.Y.1993)); see also Brock v. Tolkow, 109 F.R.D. 
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116, 119 (E.D.N.Y.1985) ("A stay of civil proceedings is 
most likely to be granted where the civil and criminal actions 
involve the same subject matter, and is even more appropriate 
when both actions are brought by the government.") (internal 
citation omitted). Accordingly, this factor is neutral and does 
not weigh for or against granting defendants' requested stay. 
The second factor to be considered is the· status of the 
criminal case. "A stay of a civil case is most appropriate 
where a party to the civil case has already been indicted for 
the same conduct for two reasons: first, the likelihood that 
a defendant may make incriminating statements is greatest 
after an indictment has issued, and second, the prejudice to 
the plaintiffs in the civil case is reduced since the criminal 
case will likely be quickly resolved due to Speedy Trial Act 
considerations."Librado, 2002 WL 31495988, at* 2 (quoting 
Trustee s, 886 F.Supp. at 1139). Neither Russell nor Green 
asserts that they are currently under indictment nor has either 
defendant offered evidence that indictments against them 
are imminent or even certain. For these reasons, this factor 
weighs against granting a stay of discovery as to Russell and • 
Green. 
*4 Under the third factor, the Court must weigh the private 
interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously against 
the prejudice that will be caused by the delay that will result 
from the stay. Plaintiffs rightfully assert that substantial delay 
can lead to the loss of evidence, loss of witnesses, and 
faded memories that may frustrate their ability to present an 
effective case and meet their burden of proof. This case has 
been pending for two years and has already been subject to a 
90 day stay of discovery as to defendants Russell and Green. 
Any further delay, much less the indefinite delay sought 
by defendants, poses a substantial risk of prejudice to the 
Plaintiff. This factor, therefore, weighs heavily in favor of 
denying the stay. 
The Court must also consider the private interests of and 
burden on defendants Russell and Green that would result if 
the stay is denied. It is well settled that "the Fifth Amendment 
does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil 
actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative 
evidence offered against them."Baxter v. Pa!migiano, 425 
U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). 
However, whether or not to permit such an adverse inference 
in a civil case is left to the discretion of the district 
court.Hinojos.av. Butler, 54 7 F .3d 285, 291-92 (5th Cir.2008) 
(quoting FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 977 (5th 
Cir.1995)). Accordingly, the Court may lessen the burden 
on defendants Russell and Green of proceeding with class 
certification discovery in this case while both defendants are 
under criminal investigation by limiting the adverse inference 
to be drawn from the exercise of their Fifth Amendment 
rights. Because discovery in this case is currently limited to 
those issues relevant to class certification, the Court will, 
at this time, limit any adverse inference arising from either 
defendant's decision to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment 
right to class certification issues. The decision of whether 
to extend any adverse inferences based on the currently 
scheduled depositions of defendants Russell and Green or any 
later depositions of or discovery from these defendants to the 
merits of the case is an open issue that will be determined by 
the Court upon the motion of either party. 
Next, the Court must consider its own interests in managing 
its docket and disposing of cases expeditiously. This Court 
has already stayed discovery as to defendants Russell and 
Green for 90 days based on their fear of imminent criminal 
indictments. However, no indictments have been issued, and 
there is no evidence as to whether or when indictments 
might issue as to either defendant or when the criminal 
investigations against them will be resolved. This case has 
been pending for two years and a further stay of discovery 
directed towards defendants Russell and Green would result 
in an indefinite delay of the class certification and trial 
schedule, frustrating resolution if this case for an undefined 
period of time. Such a stay of indefinite duration is contrary 
to the Court's interest in moving its docket and ensuring 
the expeditious resolution of cases before it. Alcala, 625 
F.Supp.2d at 407.In addition, stays of indefinite duration 
are frowned upon by the Fifth Circuit. See McKnight v. 
Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that 
a stay will be reversed when found to be immoderate or o,f 
an indefinite duration). Accordingly, this factor weighs in 
favor of denying defendants' motions to extend the stay of 
discovery directed towards them until the resolution of the 
criminal investigations. 
*5 Finally, the Court must consider the public interest in 
deciding whether to stay discovery directed to Russell and 
Green. As previously discussed, staying discovery towards 
these two defendants will result in an indefinite delay in 
these proceedings. The Court notes that this case has garnered 
considerable public attention as a result of the serious 
allegations made against local public officials. Because of 
this and the fact that this case is a class action involving 
constitutional rights and alleging abuses by public officials, 
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the prompt resolution of this case would best serve the public 
interest. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES 
Defendant Lynda K. Russell's Second Opposed Motion for 
Protection Re: Staying Discovery Directed Toward Her (Dkt. 
No. 167) and Defendant Danny Green's Second Motion for 
Protection to Stay Discovery Directed Toward Him (Dkt. 
No. 169). The Court FURTHER ORDERS that any adverse 
inference arising from either defendant's decision to invoke 
his or her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination 
End of Document 
will be limited at this time to class certification issues. The 
decision of whether to extend any adverse inferences based 
on the currently scheduled depositions of defendants Russell 
and Green or any later depositions of or discovery from these 
defendants to the merits of the case is an open issue that will 
be determined by the Court upon the motion of either party. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 3057255 
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United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
Jackie RAYMOND, individually as an 
heir, and as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Barry Johnson, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Scott SLOAN; Payette County, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho; Charles Huff, 
Sheriff; and John Does 1-20, Defendants, 
and the Idaho State Police, Intervenor. 
Civ. No. 1:13-423 WBS. Signed Aug. 25, 2014. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 
TO DISMISS; MOTION TO AMEND; MOTION 
TO INTERVENE; MOTION TO STAY 
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff Jackie Raymond brought this action against 
defendants Scott Sloan, Sheriff Charles Huff, and Payette 
County arising out of the death of her father in an automobile 
collision with Sloan. Defendants now move to dismiss 
plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted and to stay discovery pending the 
determination of their motion; plaintiff moves to amend her 
complaint; and the Idaho State Police ("ISP") moves to 
intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b ). 
I. Factual & Procedural History 
On October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson attempted to make a left 
tum from Highway 30 into the driveway of his residence near 
New Plymouth, Idaho. (Compl. ,i 12 (Docket No. 1).) As he 
did so, Sloan, a deputy sheriff of Payette County, allegedly 
passed him in the left-hand lane at a speed of 115 miles per 
hour.(Id. ,i 13.)Their cars collided. (Id. ,i 16.)Johnson was 
ejected :from the driver's seat of his vehicle and died as a result 
of his injuries. (Id.) 
Plaintiff is Johnson's daughter and heir. (Id ,i 4.) She asserts 
two basic theories of relief. First, she brings a state-law 
claim for negligence against Sloan and Payette County, which 
she alleges is both vicariously liable for Sloan's conduct 
and independently liable for its failure to train, supervise, 
and control its employees. (Id. ,i,i 6, 15, 17-19.)Second, she 
alleges that defendants conspired with officers of the ISP to 
cover up Sloan's misconduct and asserts that this conspiracy 
denied her of her constitutional right of access to the courts 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. (Id. ,i,i 20-21.) 
Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(Docket No. 27), and to stay discovery pending resolution of 
the motion to dismiss, (Docket No. 28); plaintiff seeks leave 
to amend her Complaint, (Docket No. 31); and ISP moves to 
intervene in the action for the purpose of opposing plaintiffs 
motion to file an amended Complaint, (Docket No. 41). 
II. Motion to Dismiss 
On a ~otion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations 
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff.Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 
U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,322 (1972). To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead "only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face."Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
This "plausibility standard," however, "asks for more than a 
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," and 
where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent 
with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility."Ashcro.fi v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
*2 Subsection 1985(3) prohibits two or more persons from 
conspiring to deprive any person or class of persons of the 
equal protection of the laws. "To bring a cause of action 
successfully under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate a 
deprivation of a right motivated by 'some racial, or otherwise 
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the 
conspirators' action.' " RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Sever v. Alaska 
Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir.1992)); accord 
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). This 
requires "either that the courts have designated the class in 
question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring 
more exacting scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through 
legislation that the class required special protection.'' Schultz 
v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.1985) (citing 
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DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th 
Cir.1979)). 
Here, plaintiff alleges only that defendants deprived her of 
her right of access to the courts in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl. ,i,i 20-21.) She has not 
alleged that she is a member of any protected class, let alone 
that defendants' conduct was motivated by a membership in 
such a class. See RK Ventures, 307 F .3d at 1056. Accordingly, 
the court must grant defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs 
§ 1985 claim. 
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
In relevant part, § 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State ... , subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States ... to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of 
substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any 
person who, under colorofstate law, deprives an individual of 
federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory rights. 
Jd.;Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 
"The Supreme Court held long ago that the right of access 
to the courts is a fundam~ntal right protected by the 
Constitution."De/ew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th 
Cir.1998) (citi.ng Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 
U.S. 142, 148 (1907)). That right is "deni[ed] ... where 
a party engages in pre-filing actions which effectively 
cover[ ] up evidence and render[ ] any state court remedies 
ineffective."/d. (citing Sweke/ v. City of River Rouge, 119 
F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1997)). 
However, because the right of access to the courts is "ancillary 
to the underlying claim" that a plaintiff seeks to litigate, a 
plaintiff must allege that the defendants' conduct actually 
prevented her from litigating that claim. Christopher v. 
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). A plaintiff "cannot 
merely guess that a state court remedy will be ineffective 
because of a defendant's actions."De/ew, 143 F.3d at 1222 
(quoting Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1264) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rather, she must show that she was "shut out of 
court" as a result of the defendants' conduct. Christopher, 536 
U.S. at 415. 
*3 Even if plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to establish 
that defendants had conspired to cover up Sloan's misconduct, 
(see Compl. ,i 20), she has not alleged that "defendants' 
alleged cover-up caused h[er] to lose or inadequately settle 
h[er] prior meritorious action."Ejigu v. City of Los Angeles, 
286 Fed. App'x 977, 978 (9th Cir.2008). In fact, aside from 
her bare allegation that defendants' conduct "significantly 
impaired" her ability to seek legal redress for her injuries, 
(Compl.iJ 21 ), plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing 
_ that she is currently unable to litigate her state-law negligence 
claim. 
At this stage in the litigation, it is premature to determine 
whether defendants' alleged cover-up will result in the defeat 
of her negligence claim. Instead of speculating upon the 
fate of that claim, the court will instead dismiss plaintiffs 
§ 1983 claim without prejudice. See Delew, 143 F.3d at 
1223 (holding that when a plaintiff alleges a cognizable but 
unripe access-to-courts claim, the proper course of action is 
to dismiss without prejudice). If plaintiffs efforts to litigate 
that claim in state court prove unsuccessful, she is free to file 
a new access-to-courts claim in either state or federal court. 1 
Because an access-to-courts claim does not accrue until 
the entry of judgment in the underlying claim, the statute 
of limitations will not run on that claim until after 
plaintiff has had the opportunity to pursue her negligence 
claim in Idaho state court. See Morales v. City of Los 
Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.2000) (holding 
that the plaintiffs' access-to-courts claim "accrued when 
the alleged police misconduct resulted in judgments 
being entered against them"). The court's dismissal of 
this claim will therefore not prejudice plaintiff from 
bringing an access-to-courts claim if and when it ripens. 
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are 
sufficiently related to those claims over which they have 
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). A district 
court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over 
which it has originaljurisdiction."28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see 
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also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th 
Cir.1997) ("[A] federal district court with power to hear state 
law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them 
under the conditions set out in§ 1367(c)."). 
Factors courts consider in deciding whether to dismiss 
supplemental state-law claims include judicial economy, 
convenience, fairness, and comity. City of Chicago v. Int'! 
Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997)."[I]n the 
usual case in which federal law claims are eliminated 
before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward 
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law 
claims."Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F .3d 1162, 1171 
(9th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by Acri, 114 F.3d 
at 1000. 
Because the court will dismiss plaintiffs §§ 1983 and 1985 
claims, only her state-law negligence claim remains. Plaintiff 
does not identify any extraordinary or unusual circumstances 
suggesting that the court should retain jurisdiction over her 
state-law claim in the absence of any federal claim. And 
because plaintiffs federal-law claims essentially assert that 
she was deprived of her ability to seek relief available under 
state law, comity principles suggest that the state courts of 
Idaho should be allowed to hear her negligence claim in 
the first instance. Cf Delew, 143 F.3d at 1223. The court 
therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs state-law negligence claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3). 
III. Motion to Intervene 
*4 Since ISP has moved to intervene for the limited purpose 
of joining in defendants' motion to dismiss and opposing 
plaintiffs motion to amend, the court must resolve that 
motion prior to determining whether amendment is proper. 
Rule 24(b) provides that, on a timely motion, the court may 
permit anyone to intervene who "has a claim or defense 
that shares with the main action a common question of law 
or fact."Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(l)(B); see Perry v. Proposition 
8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir.2009) 
(citation omitted).Rule 24(b) requires the court to consider 
whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the original parties' rights. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b) 
(3)."The court may also consider other factors in the exercise 
of its discretion, including 'the nature and extent of the 
intervenors' interest and 'whether the intervenors' interests are 
adequately represented by other parties.' " Perry, 587 F.3d 
at 955 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd of Educ., 552 
F.3d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977)). 
Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired with ISP and 
its officers to cover up and manipulate the investigation of 
Sloan's wrongdoing; as a result, any defense that ISP might 
allege shares common questions of fact with those defendants 
assert and thereby satisfies Rule 24(b ). Additionally, because 
ISP seeks to intervene for the limited purpose of supporting 
dismissal and opposing amendment, has already submitted 
briefs on these issues, and has already been heard at the 
hearing, there is little risk that its involvement in the case 
will further delay the proceedings or prejudice . plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the court will grant ISP's motion to intervene 
for the limited purpose of supporting dismissal and opposing 
amendment. 
IV. Motion to Amend 
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend and has filed a proposed 
amended complaint ("PAC"). (Docket No. 31-1.)That 
complaint asserts five causes of action: (1) a state-law 
negligence claim; (2) a § 1985 claim; (3) a § 1983 claim 
alleging that defendants' cover-up denied plaintiff the right 
to access the courts; (4) a § 1983 claim alleging t~at 
defendants' conduct denied plaintiff substantive due process 
by terminating her relationship with her father; and (5) a § 
1983 claim alleging that defendants denied plaintiff equal 
protection of the laws by interfering with the prosecution of 
Sloan.(ld.) In addition, plaintiff seeks to join ISP and four ISP 
officers as defendants. (Id.) 
A motion to amend is generally subject to Rule 15(a), which 
provides that "[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] 
when justice so requires."Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2)."However, 
once a scheduling order has been entered pursuant to Rule 
16(b ), the more restrictive provisions of that subsection 
requiring a showing of 'good cause' for failing to amend 
prior to the deadline in that order apply."Robinson v. Twin 
Falls Highway Dist., 233 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D.ldaho 2006) 
(Winmill, J.); accord Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 
975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). "Unlike Rule 15(a)'s 
liberal amendment policy, which focuses on the bad faith 
of the party seeking an amendment and the prejudice to the 
opposing party, the 'good cause' standard set forth in Rule 
16 primarily focuses on the diligence of the party requesting 
the amendment." Sadid v. Vailas, 943 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1138 
(D.ldaho.2013) (Winmill, J.) (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 
607). 
*5 Here, plaintiff has not made the required showing of 
diligence. On February 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a Notice of 
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Tort Claim against ISP and four ISP officers alleging that 
those officers were involved in a conspiracy to cover up 
Sloan's misconduct. (See Hall Aff. Ex. C (Docket No. 39-
1).) In that notice, plaintiff indicated that she learned of the 
identity of those ISP officers on October 31, 2013. (Id) The 
court then issued its scheduling order on February 28, 2014, 
indicating that the parties would have until April 14, 2014 to 
amend their pleadings. (Docket No. 20.)Yet plaintiff did not 
seek to leave to amend until July 1, 2014, nearly three months 
after that deadline had elapsed. (Docket No. 31 .)Because 
plaintiff evidently knew of the basis of any claims she might 
assert against ISP no later than February 18, 2014, her failure 
to do so before the deadline for amended pleadings shows 
that she was not diligent. See Robinson, 233 F.R.D. at 673 
("Knowing of the facts forming the basis for the proposed 
amendment prior to the deadline for amending precludes a 
finding of due diligence."). 
Plaintiffs proposed amendments would also result in 
prejudice to ISP, which is an additional reason to deny leave 
to amend. See id. at 674 ("While a finding of prejudice is not 
required under Rule 16(b), it is an added consideration .... "); 
Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (noting that the "existence or 
degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification 
might supply additional reasons to deny a motion" for leave 
to amend). In particular, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed ISP 
from this· action on February 14, 2014; as a result, ISP 
has not conducted any discovery and has not anticipated 
having to defend this action. (SeeDocket No. 18.)Ifthe court 
permitted plaintiff to join ISP and its officers at this point, 
ISP would have approximately two months to produce an 
expert report and approximately five months to conduct 
discovery. (SeeDocket No. 20.)Requiring ISP to complete 
discovery on an expedited timetable at this point in the case 
would prejudice its defense of this case-particularly if the 
evidence has become stale or unavailable in the six months 
since plaintiff previously dismissed it from this action-and 
militates against granting leave to amend. 
Although plaintiffs counsel conceded at oral argument that 
plaintiff could not show good cause to modify the scheduling 
order under Rule 16, he nonetheless argued that plaintiff 
should be permitted to amend her complaint to cure those 
claims that she asserted in her initial complaint. 2 As courts in 
the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly emphasized, it is generally 
appropriate to permit a plaintiff at least "one opportunity to 
amend, unless amendment would be futile."/n re Atlas Mining 
Co. Sec. Litig., 670 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1135 (D.Idaho 2009) 
(Lodge, J.) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA, 317 F.3d 
1097, 1108 (9th Cir.2003)); see also Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n 
of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1118 
(9th Cir.2013) ("As a general rule, dismissal without leave to 
amend is improperunless it is clear ... thatthe complaint could 
not be saved by any amendment."( citation, internal quotation 
marks, and alteration omitted)). However, this rule does not 
require the court to permit plaintiffs to assert new claims or 
join new parties. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians 
v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that 
denial ofleave to include new claims was appropriate because 
the "new claims set forth in the amended complaint would 
have greatly altered the nature of the litigation"); Stearns 
v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1153 
(N.D.Cal.2010) (granting leave to amend after dismissal but 
requiring plaintiffs to seek leave to add new claims). 
2 While Rule 16 does not expressly differentiate between 
amendments to pleading upon a party's motion and 
amendments to pleading after dismissal, several courts 
have permitted limited amendments to cure deficiencies 
in dismissed pleadings even when these amendments 
otherwise would not have satisfied Rule 16's "good 
cause" requirement. See, e.g., Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 
281 F.3d 613,626 (6th Cir.2002); MG. ex rel Goodwin 
v. County of Contra Costa, Civ. No. 11-4853 WHA, 
2013 WL 706801, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) 
(granting leave to amend complaint to replace two Doe 
defendants with identified sheriffs deputies, even though 
the "[p ]laintiffs counsel admit[ted] that good cause for 
the late amendment is absent"). 
*6 As plaintiff acknowledged at oral argument, her efforts 
to amend her § 1985 claim are futile: that statute requires a 
showing of some racial or other class-based animus, see RK 
Ventures, 307 F.3d at 1056, and plaintiffhas not alleged-and 
appears unable to allege-that any cover-up was motivated 
by her membership in a protected class. Plaintiffs· counsel 
conceded at oral argument that she had not alleged that any 
purported conspiracy was so motivated. The court therefore 
dismisses this claim with prejudice and without leave to 
amend. 
Likewise, plaintiffs efforts to amend her access-tocourts 
claim are futile. While her proposed amended complaint adds 
considerable detail to her allegations of a cover-up, those 
new facts do not resolve the central flaw with her claim: 
she has not alleged that defendants' actions have resulted in 
the defeat of her state-law negligence claim and cannot do 
so until that claim reaches judgment. See Delew, 143 F.3d 
at 1223. Granting plaintiff leave to amend that claim would 
not cure this defect and is therefore futile. See San Diego 
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Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 926 F.Supp. 1415, 1425 
(S.D.Cal.1995) (denying leave to amend claims challenging 
constitutionality of criminal statute when plaintiffs conceded 
that they were not currently facing prosecution under that 
statute). 
Plaintiff also seeks leave to assert a new equal protection 
claim in which she alleges that defendants denied her equal 
protection of the laws by interfering with Sloan's prosecution. 
(SeePAC 125.) But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, a 
claim of this nature is unavailing because "a private citizen 
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 
nonprosecution of another."Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614,619 (1973). And even ifitwere not futile, this claim 
appears nowhere in plaintiffs initial Complaint, and the court 
need not permit her to assert it now. See Rose, 893 F.2d at 
1079. 
Finally, plaintiff seeks leave to assert a substantive 
due process claim alleging that defendants' misconduct 
terminated her relationship with her father and thereby denied 
her of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. (SeePAC 
1 26; Compl. 1 20.) The parties dispute whether plaintiff 
should be allowed to amend her complaint to include this 
claim, in large part because they disagree about whether 
plaintiff attempted to assert a due process claim in her initial 
Complaint. Both sides agree that this dispute turns upon how 
the court construes paragraph 20 of the Complaint, which 
reads: 
On information and belief, the 
defendants, and each of them 
or some of them, during ISP's 
investigation of the misconduct of 
defendant Sloan as alleged above, 
conspired and attempted to, and did, 
cover up such misconduct and/or 
unduly influence the investigation, 
evidence, and witnesses accordingly, 
in order to shield defendants 
Sloan, Huff, and Payette County 
from liability and responsibility 
for their aforesaid misconduct, 
thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their 
constitutional right to due process 
and access to the courts, pursuant 
to official policies, practices, and 
customs ofISP and the Payette County 
Sheriffs department, in violation of 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution and 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. 
*7 (Compl. 120 (emphasis added).) 
This paragraph is not a model of clarity, and it leaves open 
the question of whether plaintiffs allegations that she was 
denied due process are a :freestanding claim or merely part 
of her access-to-courts claim. At oral argument, plaintiffs 
counsel vigorously argued that plaintiff intended to assert 
a separate due process claim alleging that Sloan's reckless 
or intentional conduct deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally 
protected interest. In light of her allegation that Sloan collided 
with her father's car while driving 115 miles an hour, the court 
cannot conclude that this claim would be futile. See generally 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-55 (1998) 
(describing standards applicable to substantive due process 
claims). 
In short, while plaintiff has not shown good cause to amend 
her complaint under Rule 16, the court may nonetheless 
permit plaintiff to cure deficiencies in her initial Complaint 
notwithstanding her lack of diligence. See Inge, 281 F.3d at 
626; MG., 2013 WL 706801, at *2. Accordingly, the court 
will permit plaintiff to amend her complaint to re-assert one or 
both of two claims: (1) a state-law negligence claim; and (2) 
a claim that defendants' conduct deprived her of substantive 
due process. The court will not permit plaintiff to plead any 
other claim or to join any additional defendant, including ISP 
or any of its officers. 
V. Motion to Stay 
Defendants have moved to stay discovery pending the 
resolution of their motion to dismiss. Their motions to dismiss 
have now been resolved by this Order. Admittedly there may 
be more motions in response to plaintiffs amended complaint, 
but the court sees no value in staying discovery any further. 
A district court "has broad discovery to stay discovery 
in a case while a dispositive motion is pending."Orchid 
Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Louis Univ., 198 F.R.D. 670, 672 
(S.D.Cal.2001) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.1977)). However, discovery stays 
are typically disfavored because they "may interfere with 
judicial efficiency and cause unnecessary litigation in the 
future."Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. Herakles, LLC, Civ. No. 
2:07-393 MCE KJM, 2007 WL 2288299, at *2 (E.D.Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2007). As a result, a party seeking a discovery stay 
bears a "heavy burden" and must make a "strong showing" in 
favor of a discovery stay. Skellerup Indus. Ltd v. City of Los 
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.Supp.2d (2014) 
Angeles, 163 F.R.D. 598, 600 (C.D.Cal.1995) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants represent that "[t]his [m]otion is made to save 
time and expense should the [c]ourt determine that there 
are no viable allegations sufficient to create federal court 
jurisdiction."(Docket No. 28.)As a general rule, however, 
the pendency of a motion to dismiss alone is not enough to 
merit a discovery stay. See, e.g., Skellerup, 163 F.R.D. at 
600-01; Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 
(N.D.Cal.1990). Nor do defendants explain how a discovery 
stay will save time and expense; on the contrary, it appears 
that a discovery stay will simply prolong these proceedings 
by forcing the parties to wait until the resolution of an 
additional motion to dismiss to begin discovery. Defendants 
have therefore not made a "strong showing" that a discovery 
stay is warranted, Skellen,p, 163 F.3d at 600, and the court 
will deny its motion for a disc~very stay. 
*8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion 
to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiffs 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S .C. § 1983 
End of Document 
and her state-law claim for negligence are DISMISSED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
(1) the Idaho State Police's motion to intervene be, and the 
same hereby is, GRANTED; 
(2) plaintiffs motion for leave to amend be, and the same 
hereby is, is GRANTED IN PART on the terms set forth in 
this Order; and 
(3) defendants' motion for a discovery stay be, and the same 
hereby is, DENIED. 
Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to 
file an amended Complaint, if she can do so consistent with 
this Order. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 4215378 
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United States District Court, D. Montana, 
Missoula Division. 
Michael E. SPREADBURY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BITIERROOT PUBLIC LIBRARY, City 
of Hamilton, Lee E.nterprises, Inc., 
and Boone Karlberg, P.C., Defendants. 
No. CV 11-64-M-DWM-JCL. May 25, 2011. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Michael E. Spreadbury, Hamilton, MT, pro se. 
Natasha Prinzing Jones, Thomas J. Leonard, William 
L. Crowley, Boone Karlberg, Jeffrey Brandon Smith, 
Garlington Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, MT, for Defendants. 
ORDER 
JEREMIAH C. LYNCH, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 PlaintiffMichael E. Spreadbury has filed various motions 
in this action. The Court will address several of those motions 
in this Order. 
L Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 
Spreadbury filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 
Spreadbury submitted a statement of his financial condition 
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears 
Spreadbury lacks sufficient funds to prosecute this action IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that his Motion to Proceed In Forma 
Pauperis is GRANTED. 
IL Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
Spreadbury moves for appointment of counsel to represent 
him in this action. In support of his motion Spreadbury states 
he is disabled, that he has been unable to secure gainful 
employment, and he has not been able to find legal counsel to 
represent him i~ this action. He contends his legal claims have 
merit, and that he is entitled to legal assistance as a matter of 
right. I 
Spreadbury cites to Fed.R.Civ.P. 44(a) in support of his 
motion for appointment of counsel. Rule 44( a), however, 
establishes what constitutes evidence of a domestic or 
foreign official record, and it does not provide any right 
to the appointment of counsel. 
A plaintiff does not have a right to the appointment of 
counsel in a civil action. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 
970 (9th Cir.2009). Although the Court has discretionary 
authority to appoint counsel to represent an indigent litigant 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(l) (see Palmer, 560 F.3d at 
970), such appointment can occur only under "exceptional 
circumstances." Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 
Cir.1991).Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. 
A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an 
evaluation of both 'the likelihood of success on the merits 
and the ability of the [litigant] to articulate his claims 
pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 
involved.'Neither of these factors is dispositive and both 
must be viewed together before reaching a decision. 
Id (citing Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 
Cir.1986) (citations omitted)).See also Palmer, 560 F.3d at 
970. 
At this early stage of this lawsuit there is no basis in the 
record on which the Court could conclude that Spreadbury has 
presented exceptional circumstances warranting appointment 
of counsel. Although Spreadbury asserts he is disabled, he 
has not established that he will be unable to sufficiently 
articulate his claims. He also has not demonstrated the 
requisite likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Spreadbury's 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED. 
IIL Motion to Appoint Lead Defense Counsel 
Jeff Smith, an attorney with the firm of Garlington, Lohn & 
Robinson, is counsel for Defendant Lee Enterprises, Inc. in 
this matter. All other Defendants named in this action are 
represented by Natasha Prinzing Jones, Thomas Leonard, and 
William Crowley, all of whom are attorneys at the firm of 
Boone Karlberg, P.C. 
Spreadbury moves for an order consolidating Defendants' 
legal representation, and appointing Jeff Smith to serve 
as lead counsel for all Defendants named in this action. 
Spreadbury asserts the appointment is warranted due to the 
nature of his claims advanced in this action, and based on his 
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perception that it would be inequitable for Defendants to be 
represented by multiple attorneys. Spreadbury also relies on 
rules applicable to the appointment of counsel for parties in 
class action lawsuits. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 23(g). 
*2 Spreadbury's motion wholly lacks merit. This matter is 
not a class action lawsuit, and is not governed by Rule 23. 
There exists no legal authority, and no basis in the record for 
the Court to designate and appoint a single attorney to serve as 
counsel for all Defendants in this action. Parties to an action 
are at liberty to retain counsel of their choice. THEREFORE, 
IT IS ORDERED that Spreadbury's Motion to Appoint Lead 
Defense Counsel is DENIED. 
IV. Motion to Remand Pendent State Claims 
On April 19, 2011, Defendants Bitterroot Public Library and 
City of Hamilton removed this action to this Court from 
the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli 
County. Defendants' Notice of Removal was filed pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and they assert this Court has federal 
question jurisdiction over this action as provided by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 based on the federal claims Spreadbury advances in 
this case. 
In addition to his claims pled under federal law, Spreadbury 
advances numerous claims against Defendants that are 
cognizable under Montana law. With respect to those claims, 
federal law grants this Court "supplemental jurisdiction over 
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution."28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that all 
of Spreadbury's state law claims advanced in this case are 
sufficiently related to his federal claims so as to "form part 
of the same case or controversy" within the contemplation of 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Therefore, the Court has supplemental 
jurisdiction over all of Spreadbury's stat~ law claims. 
Spreadbury moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), for 
an order remanding his claims for intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress that are pied under Montana 
law. Spreadbury presumably intends to leave all of his other 
remaining state law claims for resolution by this Court. For 
the reasons discussed, Spreadbury's motion for remand is 
denied. 
The Court has discretionary authority to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under the 
conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), or to remand 
those claims as provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). A district 
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for 
the following reasons: 
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim 
or claims over which the district court has original 
jurisdiction, 
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it 
has original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other 
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(l)-(4). Further, consistent with Section 
1367(c)(2), the court also "may remand all matters in which 
State law predominates."28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 
*3 A court's retention of supplemental jurisdiction is 
discretionary, and the court may decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over state law claims "[d]epending on a host of 
factors including the circumstances of the particular case, the 
nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing 
state law, and the relationship between the state and federal 
claims."City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 
522 U.S. 156,173 (1997). 
Spreadbury has not identified any valid reason justifying 
a remand of his emotional distress claims. Instead, he 
incorrectly asserts the Court does not have jurisdiction over 
his emotional distress claims contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) 
as discussed above. He has otherwise failed to identify 
any circumstances under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) which would 
prompt the Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over 
his emotional distress claims, and he has failed to establish 
grounds for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Therefore, 
under the circumstances of this case, the Court does not deem 
it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Spreadbury's emotional distress claims, or to remand 
those claims. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Spreadbury's Motion to Remand Pendant State Claims is 
DENIED. 
V. Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Court Action 
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On May 13, 2011, Spreadbury filed a motion requesting 
partial summary judgment against Defendants with respect 
to some of the claims set forth in his S~cond Amended 
Complaint. Spreadbury's motion also challenges the qualified 
immunity which some of the Defendants assert, or may assert 
in defense of Spreadbury's claims. 
On May 19, 2011, Spreadbury moved to stay discovery in 
this matter pending the Court's resolution of his motion for 
partial summary judgment and the related issues of qualified 
immunity. He contends he is entitled to a stay of discovery 
under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
A defendant's eligibility for qualified immunity, if granted, 
affords the defendant "immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability [.]"Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 
(1985). Consequently, if a defendant is eligible for qualified 
immunity, then the defendant should not be subjected to the 
End of Document 
costs of trial, or burdens of discovery. "Until this threshold 
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be 
allowed[,]" so as to avoid the excessive disruption which 
unnecessary litigation could cause to a government official's 
duties. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.Thus, under Harlow a stay 
of discovery is for the benefit of a defendant who may be 
entitled to qualified immunity, not for the benefit of a plaintiff 
attempting to defeat qualified immunity. 
Based on the foregoing, Spreadbury has failed to establish 
any good cause for a stay of discovery pending resolution 
of his moti9n for partial summary judgment. THEREFORE, 
IT IS ORDERED Spreadbury's motion to stay discovery is 
DENIED. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 2117563 
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United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
Heather S. TIMOTHY, an individual, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ONEIDA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the 
state ofldaho; Dustin W. Smith, individually and 
in his capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Oneida 
County, Idaho; Shellee Daniels, Dale F. Tubbs and 
Max C. Firth, individually and in their capacities 
as Oneida County Commissioners, Defendants. 
No. 4:14-cv-00362-
BLW. I Signed July 9, 2015. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Carol Tippi Jarman, Richard A Hearn, 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, ID, for 
Plaintiff 
Bruce J. Castleton, Tyler D. Williams, Naylor and Hales, 
Boise, ID, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge. 
*1 Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Quash 
Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order (Dkt.27). Pursuant 
to the Court's discovery dispute procedure outlined in the 
Case Management Order, the parties contacted Court staff in 
attempt to mediate a pending discovery dispute. Unable to 
resolve the issues, Defendants move to stay discovery and 
quash several subpoenas. For the reasons set forth below, the 
Court will grant Defendant's motion in part and deny it in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Heather Timothy was fired from her position as 
legal secretary to Oneida Co1JD.ty Prosecutor Dustin Smith 
after she reported Smith for allegedly misappropriating public 
funds. In August 2014, Timothy filed this lawsuit. The 
original amended complaint named Oneida County, Smith, 
and County Commissioners Shellee Daniels, Dale Tubbs, 
and Max Firth as defendants and asserted claims for (I) 
injunctive and declaratory relief for First and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations, (2) retaliatory discharge in violation 
of the First Amendment, (3) denial of due process in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) wrongful termination in violation 
of state law, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
(6) termination of private employment in violation of public 
policy, (7) intention infliction of emotional distress, and (8) 
conspiracy claims against the Commissioner defendants tied 
to the First Amendment claim and the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process claim. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, which 
the Court partially granted. Specifically, the Court dismissed, 
with leave to amend, (I) the First Amendment claim as to 
the Commissioner defendants (Count II), (2) the property-
interest claim alleged within the due process claim (Count III) 
as to the Commissioner defendants, (3) the claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress as to the Commission 
defendants (Count V), (4) the claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, alleged against Smith only (Count 
VII), and (5) the conspiracy claims associated with First 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment property-
interest claims. The Court dismissed, without leave to amend, 
the liberty-interest claim encompassed within the due process 
claim (Count III), and the accompanying conspiracy claim. 
Timothy has filed a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt.25), 
re-alleging all those claims dismissed with leave to amend. 
In addition, Timothy has filed a motion to reconsider the 
Court's decision denying Timothy the opportunity to amend 
her liberty-interest and accompanying conspiracy claim. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint and have opposed the motion to reconsider. 
This discovery dispute arose when Timothy notified defense 
counsel, Bruce Castleton, that she intended to serve third 
party subpoenas directed to: (I) Lt. Kyle Fullmer, Idaho State 
Police; (2) private attorney Mark L. Heideman, who served 
as a special prosecutor in connection with an investigation 
into Defendant Smith; (3) Sheriff Jeffery Semrad, Oneida 
County Sheriffs Office; and (4) Bruce J. Castleton. Each 
subpoena directs the recipient to appear for a deposition 
and requests production of documentation related to various 
communications and the appointment of a special prosecutor 
in connection with the investigation of Dustin Smith. 
Castleton Deel. ,i 2, Bxs. A-D. 
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*2 Mr. Castleton contacted Mr. Heam and objected to 
the subpoenas on the grounds that "most if not all of 
what they seek is moot in light of the Court's recent order 
partially dismissing the claims against Defendants, including 
relevant here the liberty-interest and conspiracy claims 
against Defendants .... "Defe' Opening Br., p. 2, Dkt. 27-1. Mr. 
Castleton also objected to the subpoena served against him 
on the grounds that his deposition would raise attorney-client 
privilege issues. Mr. Heam, in response, indicated that his 
client, Timothy, would be proceeding with the subpoenas and 
would not agree to a stay of discovery. 
Unable to informally resolve these issues, Defendants now 
file a motion to quash the subpoenas and a motion for 
-protective order staying all discovery pending resolution of 
Timothy's motion to reconsider and Defendants' recently-
filed motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26( c) governs the granting of 
a protective order. A party seeking such an order must show 
"good cause." Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 
40 (N.D.Ca.1990). A party seeking to stay discovery carries 
an even heavier burden and must make a "strong showing" 
for why discovery should be denied.Id. (citing Blankenship 
v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975))."The 
moving party must show a particular and specific need for 
the protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or 
conclusory statements."Jd. (citing Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2035). 
In this case, Defendants have not made a "strong showing" 
justifying a stay of all discovery; rather, Defendant merely 
urge that discovery should be stayed pending Court's ruling 
on its motion to dismiss. Defendants have done no more 
than to argue in conclusory fashion that its motion to dismiss 
will succeed. This "[i]dle speculation does not satisfy Rule 
26(c)'s good cause requirement. Such general arguments 
could be said to apply to any reasonably large civil litigation. 
If this court were to adopt Defendants' reasoning, it would 
undercut the Federal Rules' liberal discovery provisions. Had 
the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) would stay discovery, the Rules would 
contain a provision for that effect. In fact, such a notion is 
directly at odds with the need for expeditious resolution of 
litigation. Gray, 133 F.R.D. at 40. 
Defendants, however, argue that the information '.(imothy 
seeks through the third-party subpoenas only relates to 
Timothy's dismissed liberty-interest claim. Timothy has 
subpoenaed Sheriff Semrad, to whom she reported Smith's 
alleged misappropriation of public funds. Timothy alleges 
that she was terminated, at least in part, "because she was 
perceived to have been communicating negative information 
about Prosecutor Smith to the Sheriff. Sec. Am. Comp/. ,r 38, 
Dkt. 25. Given his involvement in the events that allegedly led 
to Timothy's termination, he would appear to be a key witness, 
and not just have information relating to the dismissed liberty-
interest claim. 
*3 Likewise, Mark Heideman, as the special prosecutor 
assigned to investigate Smith, and Lt. Kyle Fuller of the 
Idaho State Police, who also investigated Smith's alleged 
misappropriation of funds, could have information that might 
bear on the various other claims Timothy has alleged apart 
from the liberty-interest claim. For example, they might 
have information that might bear on Timothy's allegations 
that the Commissioner defendants conspired with Smith in 
denying Timothy her constitutional rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments (two claims that currently remain 
in the case). In addition, after Lt. Fulmer's investigation 
of Smith had concluded, on January 30, 2014, Lt. Fulmer 
interviewed Timothy about criminal investigation into Smith. 
Sec. Am. Comp/. ,r 74, Dkt. 25. Four days later, on February 
4, Timothy received a Notice of Pending Personnel Action, 
which indicated she may have been involved in acts or 
omissions that could subject her to discipline. Id. ,r 75. Given 
the proximity between these two events, it is possible that 
Lt. Fulmer may have information relating to the Smith's 
decision to issue the Notice. These are just a couple examples 
of relevant information that the subpoenaed witnesses may 
possess. 
Finally, the Court also believes that Mr. Castleton could 
have information relevant to claims apart from the liberty-
interest claim, but the proposed deposition of Mr. Castleton, 
as counsel for the defense, raises distinct issues, which the 
Court will address below. 
2. Castleton Subpoena 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that discovery of facts 
possessed by an attorney is proper where the facts are 
relevant, non-privileged, and essential to preparation of one's 
case. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S.Ct. 385, 
91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held 
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that blanket assertions of privilege are extremely disfavored. 
U.S. v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1000 (9th Cir.2002). And when 
a party challenges discovery of information from counsel 
based on privilege, the challenging party has the burden 
of establishing the relationship and privileged nature of 
the communication. U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 507 (9th 
Cir.1997). 
But "[t]he strong presumption against a blanket assertion 
of privilege while normally appropriate and necessary, 
must be abandoned where a party seeks to depose trial 
counsel."Melaleuca, Inc. v. Bartholomew, No. 4:12-cv-
00216-BLW, 2012 WL 3544738, *2 (D.Idaho August 16, 
2012) (citing Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 
1327-28 (8th Cir.1986)). Instead, because Timothy seeks to 
depose trial counsel, she must establish that "the information 
sought (1) cannot be obtained through other means; (2) is 
relevant and not covered by privilege or the work-product 
doctrine; and (3) is necessary in preparing their case."Jd. 
(citing Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327-28). 
"It is rare for this standard to be satisfied," Stewart Title Guar. 
Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-cv-227-BLW, 2013 WL 
4763949, *1 (Sept. 4, 2013), and, at least at this juncture, this 
case is no different. Indeed, this issue can be dispensed with 
under the first factor. Timothy has made no effort to show 
End of Document 
that the information she seeks from Mr. Castleton cannot be 
obtained through other means. Discovery has not even begun 
in this case. It is not only possible, but likely, that the other 
individuals Timothy intends to depose hold the information 
Timothy seeks from Mr. Castleton. The Court therefore finds 
that Timothy has failed to establish that any information she 
seeks from Mr. Castleton cannot be obtained through some 
other discovery. 
*4 Accordingly, at this point, the Court will quash any 
subpoena issued for Mr. Castl this case. P erhaps, at some 
later time, Timothy will be able to meet standard. That time, 
however, is not now. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to 
Quash Motion for Protective Order (Dkt.27) is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part. discovery is denied, but Defendants' 
request to quash Mr. Castleton's subpoena is granted. 
All Citations 
Slip Copy, 2015 WL 4170140 
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United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
United States of America, United States of 
Americ~ ex. rel., Dr. Jeffrey Jacobs, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CDS, P.A. d/b/a Pocatello Women Health 
Clinic; Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability Company; LHP Pocatello, LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, Defendants. 
Case No. 4:14-cv-00301-
BLW I Signed 09/03/2015 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 Before the Court is Defendants' CDS, P.A. d/b/a 
Pocatello Women's Health Clinic's (the "Health Clinic") and 
Pocatello Hospital LLC, d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC 
(the "Medical Center") and LHP Pocatello, LLC's ("LHP") 
Joint Motion to Stay Discovery (Dkt.28). Pursuant to the 
Court's discovery dispute procedure outlined in the Case 
Management Order, the parties contacted Court staff in 
attempt to mediate a pending discovery dispute. Unable to 
resolve the issues, Defendants move to stay discovery. For 
the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Defendants' 
joint motion. 
BACKGROUND 
Relator Dr. Jeffrey Jacobs initiated this action on behalf 
of the United States government pursuant to the qui tam 
provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3724, et seq. 
Jacobs alleges that Defendants submitted false certifications 
to the federal government in connection with payments to 
Medicare and Medicaid. More specifically, Jacobs alleges 
that Defendants falsely and fraudulently submitted, or caused 
the submission of, claims for medical services provided to 
Medicare and Medicaid patients who were referred to the 
Medical Center by the Health Clinic in violation of the 
AntiKickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) ("A.KS"), 
and the Stark Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. 
All Defendants have moved to dismiss Jacob's Complaint 
without leave to amend on the grounds that Jacobs (1) fails to 
stat~ a viable claim ofreliefunder Rule 12(b )(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) fails to plead fraud under 
False Claims Act with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties' disagree 
about whether initial disclosures under Rule 26 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure must be exchanged and discovery 
commenced pending a decision on the motions to dismiss. 
ANALYSIS 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26( c) governs the granting of 
a protective order. A party seeking such an order must show 
"good cause." Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 
40 (N.D.Ca.1990). A party seeking to stay discovery carries 
an even heavier burden and must make a "strong showing" 
for why discovery should be denied. Id. (citing Blankenship 
v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975)). "The 
moving party must show a particular and specific need for 
the protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or 
conclusory statements." Id (citing Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2035). 
Here, Defendants argue that a stay of discovery pending a 
decision on their motions to dismiss is warranted because 
the issues raised by Defendants' motions to dismiss speak 
to the threshold question of the sufficiency of Jacobs' 
Complaint and do not require factual discovery to resolve. 
In essence, Defendants have done no more than to argue in 
conclusory fashion that its motion to dismiss will succeed. 
This idle speculation does not satisfy Rule 26(c)'s good cause 
requirement. "The explosion of Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the 
wake of Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.C.1937 (2009), has made speedy 
determinations of cases increasingly more difficult. ... The fact 
that a non-frivolous motion is pending is simply not enough to 
warrant a blanket stay of all discovery." U.S. ex rel. Howard 
v. ShoshonePaiute Tribes, No. 2:10-CV-01890-GMN, 2012 
WL 2327676, at *4 (D. Nev. June 19, 2012). In fact, such 
a notion is directly at odds with the need for expeditious 
resolution oflitigation. Gray, 133 F.R.D. at 40. 
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*2 Defendants argue, however, that Relator must meet the 
heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b ). This is true. But it is still not enough to justify 
a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss. Rather, 
courts have held that "a district court may stay discovery 
only if it is convinced that the plaintiff cannot state a claim 
for relief." Howard, 2012 WL 2327676, at * 1 (emphasis 
in original) ( citing Twin City Fire Insurance v. Employers 
of Wasau, 124 F.R.D 652, 653 (D.Nev.1989) and Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 175 F.R.D. 554, 
55 6 (D .Nev .1997)). Other courts within the Ninth Circuit will 
allow a stay of discovery if, after taking a "preliminary peek 
at the merits" of a pending motion to dismiss, "there appears 
to be an immediate and clear possibility that [the pending 
motion to dismiss] will be granted." GTE Wireless, Inc. v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
The Court has taken a preliminary look at the pending motions 
to dismiss, and this is not case where the complaint is 
"glaringly deficient" and "completely wanting." Cf Jepson, 
Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1327 (7th Cir.1994). 
End of Document 
Nor is it a case in which the defendant is not a person 
for purposes of the FCA as in Howard. Instead, this is a 
run-of-the-mill case involving a standard motion to dismiss 
under Twombly and Iqbal and Rule 9(b). Even if the Court 
grants the motions to dismiss in part, the likelihood is that 
the Court will also grant leave to amend, as granting leave 
is a commonplace response to technical shortcomings in a 
complaint. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 
984, 995 (9th Cir.2011). Accordingly, the Court will deny 
Defendants' motion. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay 
Discovery (Dkt.28) is DENIED. 
All Citations 
Slip Copy, 2015 WL 5257132 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves and ) 
all others similarly situated, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
\tS. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" 0~ in his 
official capacity as Govemor ofldaho; HON. MOLLY 
HUSKEY, et al., in their official capacities as 
members of the Idaho State Public Defense 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. )) 
----------------
Commission, 
ARGUMENT 
Case No. CV OC 1510240 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY 
PENDING DECISION ON 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss raises purely legal matters and, if granted. will 
dispose of this action entirely. The Idaho Su.preme Court has said that it is within a coure s 
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discretion to stay discovery pending ruling on a Motion to Dismiss that may dispose of all 
claims. "Because the control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court, there was no 
error in the trial court's suspension of discovery since the motion to dismiss raised purely legal 
issues which were capable of resolution without a complicated foray into the facts." Serv. 
Employees Int 'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683 
P .2d 404,409 (1984). Given that the Motion to Dismiss is purely legal in nature~ factual 
discovery is unnecessary, and it would be an undue burden on Defendants who may not even be 
parties to this action once the Motion to Dismiss has been decided to have to answer discovery 
now. 
1- Discovery is unnecessary at this juncture because Defendants' Motion ta 
Dismiss may dispose of the case entirely. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss asserts that Plaintiffs' Complaint does not state a claim. 
upon which relief may be granted as to any of the Defendants. This includes both st.ate and 
federal law claims. The Motion to Dismiss relies on purely legal arguments as to the 
justiciability of Plaintiffs' claims against the named defendants. First., the State ofldaho is not a 
. 
proper defendant in this action because it is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and so it cannot be sued for violating Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. See Will v. 
Michigan Department o/Stare Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989) ("[N]either a 
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § I 983 "). Nor is the 
State a proper defendant under state law because the Court cannot enjoin the State as an entity 
under I.R..C.P. 3(b). See Weyyakin Ranch Properly Owners' Association, Inc. v. City of 
Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896 P.2d 327 (1995) (the designation of a governmental entity and not the 
elected officials individually did not comply withI.R.C.P. 3(b) when injunctive relief was 
. 
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sought). These arguments are grounded in law, and no factual discovery would provide 
additional insight into nlle or statute. 
P. 4 
The other defendants named in the Complaint cannot be sued for the relief requested 
because an examination of the applicable statutes shows that they have no legal authority to 
affect the changes to the public defense system that Plaintiffs seek. Governor Otter and members 
of the Public Defense Commission have no direct con1.Tol, administration, or responsibility for 
providing public defender services. That authority and responsibility was delegated to the 
counties by the Idaho Legislature in Idaho Code § 19-859, which states that "(t]he board of 
county commissioners of each county shall provide for the representation of indigent persons and 
other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an attorney at public expense." There is 
no factual discovery which could shed any light on the meaning of this statute, which is clear and 
unambiguous on its face. The responsibility and authority to provide constitutionally adequate 
public defense services in Idaho rests with the counties, not with the State, the Governor, or the 
Public Defense Commission. The named defendants are not proper defendants in this action, and 
they cannot provide the ·requested relief. as a matter oflaw. 
Plaintiffs address this problem in their Response with the statement that «even if 
Defendants were to prevail on their motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs would simply file suit against 
other state or local defendants, thereby requiring the State to respond to the very same discovery 
requests in any event. .. .'' Response at 6-7. So, Plaintiffs posit, even if the wrong defendants 
have been sued here, they must nonetheless provide discovery, because Plaintiffs may at some 
point sue the correct defendants. This argument is unavailing here, in this proceeding, because, 
if Defendants prevail on their Motion to Dismiss. Defendants will be out of this case. If 
Plaintiffs file suit against other~ later-to-be~identified defendants, then it will be up to those 
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defendants to address potential discovery requests made in that proceeding. The notion that 
• 
Plaintiffs can name the wrong defendants in this proceeding and require them to respond to 
burdensome discovery requests because Plaintiffs might one day name the right defendants in 
another proceeding runs afoul of basic principles of civil procedure. To the extent that Plaintiffs 
plan in a future proceeding to propound discovery on Defendants as persons who are not parties 
to the lawsuit, that too would occur as part of that future proceeding, and would come under· 
. 
different Rules of Civil Procedure than. those that allow Requests for Admission, for Production 
of Documents and for Interrogatories to be propounded to parties. 
What's :more, the discovery propounded to these presumptive "other state and local 
defendants" would almost necessarily be of a different sort and scope. For instance, suit brought 
against a single county in Idaho would likely not result in discovery regarding all 44 counties in 
the State or all State officers. The proposition that Plaintiffs' current discovery is inevitable as 
propounded to these Defendants regardless of who is named in a future complaint is not just 
implausible, it is immat.erial; if Defend.ants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs can decide 
whether to initiate other proceedings against other defendants and propound whatever discovery 
requests they like. Possible discovery in a potential future proceeding is not a basis for denying a 
protective order in this proceeding. 
2. The discovery requested remains extensive and would constitute an undue 
bnrden on Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendants would face ''minimal or no burden" if they comply 
· with Plaintiffs' supposedly narrowed discovery requests is simply untrue. Plaintiffs have still 
requested documents and infonna.tion dating back to 2010. See, e.g., Document Request No. I 
(requesting all documents relating to the provision of indigent defense services in Idaho since 
2010). At least o:ne request applies to any State official. See Document Request No. 24 
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(requesting "all documents relating to any infoxmal or formal complamts or other information 
provided or conveyed by state officials relating to Idaho• s indigent defense system and funding 
for that system, since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act in 2014") (emphasis added). 
Also, as nearly all of Defendants on the Public Defense Commission have served in other 
governmental positions as well, some of which necessarily involved privileged communications, 
responding to these requests would require substantial document review. 
Plaintiffs point to having "nazrowed'' their discovery requests, but the discovery 
requested remains extensive and burdensome. Of nine interrogatories, Plaintiffs have suspended, 
for the time being, two. Of thirty four document requests1, Plaintiffs have suspended eleven. 
Complying with the 23 document requests that remain would impose a substantial burden on 
Defendants who may be out of the case once the Court rules on the Motion to Dismiss. None of 
the twenty-seven Requests for Admission have been suspended. 
There is no prejudice to Plaintiffs if discovery is stayed. If Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs will have lost nothing. If they choose t.o file a suit against other 
defendants, they will be able to conduct their discovery at that time, against the right defendants. 
If Defendants' Mo~on is not granted, or is granted only as to some Defendants, Plaintiffs will 
still have ample time to conduct discovery in this proceeding, again, against the correct 
defendants. 
Most importantly, the remaining discovery requests shed no light on the issues raised in 
the Motion to Dismiss: namely, whether the State can be named as a party under § 1983, and 
what legal authorities and responsibilities Defendants have regarding the provision of public 
defense services, as provided by the constitution and statute. 
1 Although the document requests number 35, document request 26 is empty. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY PENDING DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS· 5 
000302
' . 
. . , 
SEP. 18. 2015 2: 14PM 1RNEY GEN LIT NO. 174 P. 7 
. . , 
CONCLUSION 
Toe pending Motion to Dismiss is purely legal in nature and may dispose of this case in 
its entirety. Proceeding with extensive discovery before disposing of the Motion to Dismiss 
would impose a subst.antial, and potentially unnecessary, burden on Defendants. For these 
reasons, Defend.ants respectfully request that the Court stay all discovery until after it has 
disposed of the pending Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2015. 
STATEOFIDAHO 
OFFlC Q ATTORNEY GENBB.AL 
S. GILMO);'{E 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attomey for Defendants other than 
Governor Otter 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
By 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of September, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Richard Eppmk ~S. Mail 
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho D Hand Delivery 
Foundation D_.PtLCsimile: 208-344-7201 
P.O. Box 1897 Ga'"Email: reppink@acluidaho.org 
Boise, ID 83701 
Jason D. Williamson 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
125 Broad Street 
New York, NY 10004 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Ho~ Lovells US LLP 
D U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery bl jacsimile: 212-549-2654 
L,¥'Exnail: jvvilliamson@aclu.org 
D U.S.Mail 
0 Hand Delivery D __.Pacsimile: 303-&99-7333 One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Sevepteenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
0"" Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Wasbingto14 DC 20004 
Bret H. Ladine 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
3 Embarcadero Center 1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
Je:r,.ny Q. Shen 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
4085 CampbellAvenue, Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 . 
D U.S.Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
I:] 9csimile: 202-637-5600 
l!:t'Email: Kathcyn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
D U.S.Mail 0 Hand Delivery D ~imile: 415-314-2499 
121" Email: bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
0 U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D F simile: ~ ·:·enn .shen 
\ 
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AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
jwilliamson@aclu.org 
125 Broad Street 
New York, New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Admitted pro hac vice 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208) 344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Attorneys for Plaintifft 
Andrew C. Lillie 
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP 
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
303-899-7300 
303-899-7333 (fax) 
Admitted pro hac vice 
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Kathryn M. Ali, kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
Brooks M. Hanner, brooks.hanner@hoganlovells.com 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-5600 
(202) 637-5910 (fax) 
Admitted pro hac vice 
Bret H. Ladine 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 374-2300 
(415) 374-2499 (fax) 
Admitted pro hac vice 
Jenny Q. Shen 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
650-463-4000 
650-463-4199 (fax) 
Admitted pro hac vice 
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ORDER GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
The Court, having considered the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order Staying 
Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss, filed August 21, 2015, and having heard oral 
argument from the parties on October 16, 2015, hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 
PART that motion. The defendants are HEREBY ORDERED to answer plaintiffs' 
interrogatories numbers 1, 6, 7, and 8; to produce and permit the plaintiffs to inspect and copy 
the documents and materials requested in plaintiffs' requests for production number 32, 33, 34, 
and 35; and to answer all of the plaintiffs' requests for admission. The plaintiffs' other 
interrogat~ries and requests for production are HEREBY STAYED, and no depositions shall be 
commenced, until this Court's decision on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed July 8, 2015, 
or further order of this Court. If the motion to dismiss is denied, all discovery may proceed at 
that time. 
DATED this /11¥ day of Uv/:- t~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -uf'day of c>J.obtu' , 2015, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Steven L. Olsen 
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov 
Colleen D. Zahn 
colleen.zahn@ag.idaho.gov 
Scott Zanzig 
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov 
Michael Gilmore 
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By U.S. mail 
David F. Hensley 
9avid.hensley@gov.idaho.gov 
Cally A. Younger 
cally.younger@gov.idaho.gov 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
Idaho State Capitol Building 
700 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
By U.S. mail · 
David W. Cantrill 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & 
Sorensen, LLP 
P.O. Box359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
By U.S. mail 
ORDER GOVERNING DISCOVERY - 3 
Richard Eppink 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
ACLU ofldaho Foundation 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
By U.S. mail 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
One Tabor Center, Ste. 1500 
1200 17th Street 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
By U.S. mail 
Bret H. Ladine 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
3 Embarcadero Center #1500 
San Francisco, California 94111 
By U.S. mail 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Brooks M. Hanner 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
555 13th Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
By U.S. mail 
Jenny Q. Shen 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
4085 Campbell A venue, Ste. 100 
Menlo Park, California 94025 
By U.S. mail 
Jason D. Williamson 
ACLU Foundation 
125 Broad Street 
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Jason D. Williamson . 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION . 
jwilliamson@aclu.org 
125 Broad Street 
New York, New York 10004 
(212) 284-7340 
(212) 549-2654 (fax) 
Admitted pro hac vice 
Richard Eppink 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
reppink@acluidaho.org 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202 
(208) 344-7201 (fax) 
Idaho State Bar no. 7503 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Jenny Q. Shen 
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jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
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Menlo Park, CA 94025 
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650-463-4199 (fax) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., 
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STATE OF IDAHO, etal., 
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SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD EPPINK 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Richard Eppink, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in this case. 
2. Exhibit 1 to this affidavit is a true copy of a document titled "Remarks by Chief Justice 
Roger Burdick to Public Defender Interim Committee, August 15, 2013," which I 
downloaded from the Idaho Legislature's official website, using this link, 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2013/interim/defense0815 burdick.pdf, on 
November 23, 2015. 
3. Exhibit 2 is a true copy of a document titled "State of the State and Budget Address, 
Monday January 12, 2015," which I downloaded from the Governor of Idaho's official 
website, using this link, 
http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/speeches/sp 20l5/SOS%20FY%202016.pdf, on about 
November 10, 2015. 
4. Exhibit 3 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers DOOl 153 through DOOl 155) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
5. Exhibit 4 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000724 through D000725) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
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6. Exhibit 5 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers.D003065 through D003074) 
produced to me by Defendan~s' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Orqer Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
7. Exhibit 6 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000375 through D000378) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. . 
8. Exhibit 7 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000364 through D000368) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
9. Exhibit 8 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000240 through D000244) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
10. Exhibit 9 is a true copy of Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for 
Admission to Defendants. 
11. Exhibit 10 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000410 through D000413) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
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12: Exhibit 11 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000049 through D000055) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
13. Exhibit 12 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers DOOl 149 through DOOl 152) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery; in response to formal discovery requests propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
14. Exhibit 13 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers DOOl 172 through DOOl 180) 
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20, 
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery reques.ts propounded 
by Plaintiffs. 
15. Exhibit 14 is a true copy ofldaho Executive Order No. 2015-04, which I downloaded 
from the Governor of Idaho's official website, using this link, 
http:! /gov .idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo 15/E0%202015-04%20Sage-
Grouse%20pdf.pdf, on November 23, 2015. 
16. Exhibit 15 is a true copy ofldaho Executive Order No. 2015-03, which I downloaded 
from the Governor of Idaho's official website, using this link, ·· 
http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo15/E0%202015-
03%20Epilepsy%20pdf.pdf, on November 23, 2015. · 
17. Exhibit 16 is a true copy ofldaho Executive Order No. 2010-11, which I downloaded 
froni the Governor of Idaho's official website, using this link, 
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http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo10/eo 2010 I I.html, on about November 
19, 2015. 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME this 23rd day ofNovember, 2015. 
:\11'1:l"tl'tft l INGRID ANDauiisJ : Notary Public · 
.. State of Idaho 
) 
- ' .... , 
. , 
Not Publi~or Idaho 
Res ing at: /3)()/;r..__ 
My commission expires: '/· Z,J.. ·,2..1)/f 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of November, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Steven L. Olsen 
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov 
Michael S. Gilmore 
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov 
Shasta Kilminster-Hadley 
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov · 
Scott Zanzig 
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By email 
Cally A. Younger 
cally.younger@gov .idaho. gov 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
Idaho State Capitol Building 
700 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho· 83702 
By email 
David W. Can trill 
cantrill@cssklaw.com 
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
By email 
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ROGERS. BURDICK 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPRE:ME COURT 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720.0101 
{208) 334-3464 
rburclick@ldcourts.net 
REMARKS BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER BURDICK TO 
PUBLIC DEFENDER INTERIM COMMITTEE 
AUGUST 15, 2013 
I would like to thank the interim committee for inviting me to talk about the 
public defender system in the State of Idaho. My comments are based upon 
personal observations from having served as a public defender for four years in 
Gooding, Jerome, Lincoln and Camas Counties as well as a prosecutor in Ada and 
Jerome counties and now almost thirty-two years in the judiciary, twenty-two as a 
magistrate and · district court judge and now ten years on the Supreme Court. 
· At the outset I want you to know that I fully support the Criminal justice 
Commission's vision of key areas of study: 
• The structure and organization of how Idaho will deliver its system of public 
defense 
• How the system will be held accountable 
• The standards and funding for training, and 
• How best to provide on-going and stable funding to support Idaho's system 
of indigent defense . 
. Next, _I would like to describe what a public defender's job entails. Our judicial 
system is a three-legged stool which depends on advocates for two sides - a 
prosecutor and a crimi~al defense attorney going to an impartial third party - the 
judge - who applies law to a set of contested facts. Ali three-legged stools are only 
as stable and useful for their intended purpose as the three legs .. In Idaho's system 
of justice today, defense for the indigent is the weakest leg in the system. I am not 
in any way impugning the comp~tence of the individual defenders but rather the 
system. Frankly, our system for the defense of indigents, as required by Idaho's 
constitution and laws, is broken. 
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A.s we lo_ok a,t our system of justice it fo only right that the two 
advocates on either side of a factual dispute are roughly equal in terms of talent, 
resources, and time. The job of a public defender is not as envisioned by some to · 
"get the guilty off through a technicality~" The job of a public defender is an 
advocate to ·make sure that the goverrunent's case is grounded in fact and law. 
Throughout my years as a public defender, over 95% of my c~ses were concluded 
with entries of a plea of guilty. I estimate that figure i~ true today in all criminal 
cases. There seems to be little or no difference between the conduct of private and 
public criminal defense attom~ys in tenns of the fin.~l resolution of their cases. So 
prior to this plea of gmlty, what Will a public defender be doing? 
First, a public defender contrary to any other lawyer practicing·Iaw has no 
control over who their client will be. These attorneys are doing 4 tremendous 
service to the communicy in their public defense ~ork. 
A public defender is notified of an appointment after an arrest has ·been 
made. The first step is usually at a hearing called an initial appearance Where the 
defender finds out the allegation an,d first meets their client. Usu~ly the public 
defender has minutes to obtain background information about the clie:qt's ability to 
secure a bond or other info~_ation. 
Next, the pubiic defender contacts the ·prosecutor for purposes of discovery 
ancl/or discussions concern.mg the case itself. This phase of the case can taj(e 
minutes to months. F elo:Q.y cases ate serious allegations involv4ig drug-related or 
property c.rimes and will ·take· some time. A murder case;:, of course, .or other 
crimes of violence may take a significant period of time to investigate, review and 
strategize for trial. · 
The 4~fense attor,ney will interview their client, contaGt witnesses? and 
obtain all the information that law enforcement has gathered. Additional 
conferences are set with witnesses,. ·client and family as well as the prosecuting 
attorney. There is also a determination based on the information, what violat10ns, 
i.f any, can be proven beyoncl a reasonable doubt. This process of checkipg law 
and facts is what some refer to as plea negotj.ations. The end result i$ a plea of 
guilty or a 1;rial if the inattei is not di_smisseci. Once this phase i$ concluded the 
defense attorney's ne~t responsibility is sentencing. 
The sentencing phase is a significant p~ of a public defe11der's work. Most 
of the individuals w~o are on the public defender; s caseload are individuals who 
,have suffered lives signjficat;ttly different than ours. Ofl:entjtpes, there is grinding 
poverty; sexual, physicaJ or emotional abuse; alcohol and/pr some sort of 
substance abuse or addiction; mental illness, lack of education, and as a result they 
'have lived very chaotic lives. As a public defender I often times stood in wonder 
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at how some of niy clients were still alive or that they functioned at all in modern 
society. 
Most publjc defenders have an intimate knowledge of the res·ources in a 
co:mmunjty that are availably to try to rehabilitate :or place individuals prior to 
ultimate sanQtions of jail or prison time. Most crin:J.inal defense attorneys will 
indicate to you that tll.ese facilities and alternatiyes ate non-existent ~ many 
counties or lacking even in our largest cities and counties_. I think your work on the 
pub1ic defender system will have a significant impact on the justice reinvestnient 
initiative ~d save taxpayers money. An appropriately trained public defender can 
better see what pl~ceµients are best based upon.evidence based risk factors thereby 
saving_ taxpayers unneeded w~ste for services or incarceration. 
The most significant factor in any sentence is the defendant's prior criminal 
record. Without that ~ccurate prior criminal record it is very hard for an effective 
sentence to be determin:ed. 
Does the case end at sentencing? The short answer is ~'no" for felonies and 
''yes;' :for misdemeanors. In either case there is an issue of appeal and if it is in fact 
a misdemeanor the public defender of the county involved will be in charge of that 
appeal after consultation with their client. As concerns a felony there are not_ only 
signific~t issues of appeal, but also ·pleas of leniency pursuant to Criminal Rule 
35, as ·well as uniform post- conviction relief issues. 
For those of you not familiar, post-c~nvicfion relief is a s_tatutory vehiqle 
enact~d whereby a defendant can file a civil ~uit alJeging fout ~asic grounds to 
have theit ponviction reviewed by the criminal. court that imposed the· sentence. 
The most common ground for the gr~ting of a post-convictiQn reltef petition is the 
incompetency of defen$e counsel. So a publiQ. defender not only must work with 
their client in making certain decisions throughout the case, but they must also be 
cognizant that they ·can be sued for incompetency of counsel at the ·end of their 
representation. As an aside, as a public defender, I often felt that I was battling not 
only the P:rose9liting attomey and law enforcement, but also QlY client in tenils of 
,their analysis of tp.e .case an(l what they thought sho"Qld be the outcome, and also 
the attom~y who was going to sue me at the ~~d of the case in a post-conviction 
reli~f proceeding. 
This gives _ you an idea of the responsibilities of a public defender in a 
criminal case. Public defenders. also represent individuals in child protective act 
proceedings, juvenile corrective act proce_edings, m,eittal competency and 
commitment proceedings, extradition, ~d civil and criminal contempt 
proceedings. All of the basic responsibilities I mentioned for a criminal case apply 
to the~e prQpeedings. 
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I need to comment that child. protection, and juvenile justice cases -present 
especi~lly important examples of the need to inSUte attorneys who handle these 
.cases ~e well trained; not only in the law, but that they know how to adequately 
· represent these vulnerable children. Our judges tell us that in some counties, the 
newest attorneys are often assigned these cases, yet the complexity of the law and 
the vulnerability of the children represented require seasoned, well trained and 
capable attor_peys. These laws can on1y be imple¢ented as intended if qualified, 
trained lawyers are available. . 
, WHAT is IDAHO'S. HISTORY OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Even before Idaho had been admitted to the union, our territorial legislators 
enacted statµtes r~lating to the right of ~(mnsel. The 187 4 Criminal Practice Act, § 
3, states "w~en the defendant is brought before the magistrate upon ail arr~st, either 
with or wi¢.out warrant, on a charge of having committed a public offense, the 
magistrate shall immediately infonn him of tJie charge against him and of his right 
to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings and before ~y further 
proceedings are had." · 
If the defendant wished to have an attorney, the magistrate h1;1d to adjourn 
the examination and send a pe.ace officer to take a message to the attorney within 
the township or city as the defendant may name. · · 
Section 267 of the same act then describes what happens ~hen the defendant 
is brought before the djstrict court. "If the defendant appears for arraignment 
without ·counsel, he shall be informed by the court that it is his right to have 
coUllsel before being arraigned, and shall be asked if he desires the aid of counsel/' 
This conc~pt of counsel at court; proceedings was carried into the 
constitutional convention and mEtde a part of the Idaho Constitution. Article I, §13, 
states in part: · 
"Section 13. Guarantees in crimlnal actions and ·q.ue process of laws-
in all crimin~l prosecutions, the party accused shidl have the right to a 
speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf and to appear and defend in 
person and with counsel. ... " 
The right to counsel in a criminal case has cpntinued uninterrupted in one statute or 
another until today. 
The policy embodied in these statute.s pr~dated by half of century the United 
States Supreme Court's pronouncement of the same Federal rule in Johnson v. 
Zerbst. 1n Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court said a defendant in a federal 
prosecution has the right to counsel in a criminal case even if they c<?uldn'~ ~ffo.rd 
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the same. In Betts v. Bradley, the United States Supreme Court refused, however, 
to extend the federal rule to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Idaho 
was cited as one of eighteen states affording counsel to an indigent aGcused of a 
crime. The fact states had enacted their own provisions showed that federal 
protection was no~ needed. 
Idaho's statute was enacted seventy-six years before the United States 
Supreme Court overruled Betts v .. Bradley, and declared in Gideon v. Wainwright 
in 1963: 
''The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trial in some countries, but it is in 
ours." 
"Fr.om the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and 
1aws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive 
safeguar9s designed to. assure fair tri_als before impartial tribunals in 
which every d~fendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal 
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his 
accusers without a lawyer to assist him." 
Throughout the nation there are symposiums, speeches and articles celebrating the 
50 TH anniversary ofthe Gideon decision. 
However, forty years earli~r than Gideon v. Wainright, in 1923 the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated in State v. Pontroy: 
It is the public policy of this state, disclosed by constitutional 
guarantees as well as by numerous provisions of the statutes, to accord 
to every pe:,;son accused of a crime, not only a fair and impartial trial, 
but every reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and to 
· vindicate ·his innoce:q.ce upon a trial. In a ·case of indigent persons 
accused of crime, the cotµt must assign counsel to the defense at 
public expense." 
As can be seen by this very plain statement, the ·right to be represented by an 
attorney at state expense is one of Idaho's basic tenents of crimlnal law. Not only 
is it a basic tenent that defendants hav~ the right to be representeq by an attorney, 
they must also be given the right to a fair and impartial trial and be given every 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense to vindicate their innocence upon 
trial. These words of "fair and impartial trial" and "reasonable opportunity to 
prepare for his· defense" have been the laws of this state since before statehood and 
certainly since 1923. 
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Historically those protections have been explored by federal and state law 
and have been expanded to juvenile proceedings and post arrest interrogation, line 
ups, other identification proceedings, preliminary hearings, arraignments, plea 
negotiations, sentencing .proceedings, .rights of appeal, and probation violation 
proceedings. Additionally, since the 1960's courts throughout the nation hav~ 
further defined what a fair and impartial trial is and what is needed in modem 
advocacy to prepare and .present a fair and impartial trial. Additionally, every 
crimin~ defendant in Idaho by statute and constitutional history must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense, 
As we go forward ask yourselves .are we in fact protecting and enhancing 
these stati,ltory and constitutional responsibilities? We should be in fact trying to 
uphold these ideals that wete handed tq us about 140 years ago. 
THE IDAHO COURTS' RESPONSIBILITY 
Pursuant to Title 3 of the Idaho Code specifically Idaho Code § 3-101, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has exclusive power in the admission and · policing of 
attorneys in the State of Idaho. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court must 
approve all rules defining the power of the Idaho State Bar pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 3-408 touching on .r.ules or prof~ssion~ conduct for attorneys. A~ st1ch, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has a significant jpterest in how the public defimders of the 
State of Idaho are carrying out th~ir dutjes tQ def~nd Idaho citizen,.s. 
However, the ·court also understands the power of the legislatur¢ to set 
p\lbliq policy of how best the State of Idaho can meet its constitutional and 
statutory duties to provide for th~ . crin!inal defense of indigents. A.s such, the 
Idaho courts stand ready to help this committee in any way possible. 
For instance our existing and ce~y our new technology systems will 
trac~ and manage cases assigned to public defenders and will allow you Md the 
counties to hold the system accoun~ble as well as track expen~es and other costs. 
Speakµig of ·costs, I would urge the ! committee to co~ider other 
recommendations to provide a fair ~ethod of public defender reimbursement. 
Considerable work h~ been completed in the :area of a defep.daht's financ.ial 
obligations and their impact on the system, society and recidivism. We can 
acquaint the interim committee with this data and offer recommendations. 
We would be. pleased to present 't;hes~ recorinnendatiop.s and others to you at 
subsequent committee meetings_. For instance a'. panel of administrative district 
judges will .meet on October· 17 to .answer questions from the front lines and 
provide their experienced perspective on these iss~es. 
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Your third branch of government will be active in making sure the interim 
committee is given factual information as well as any help necessary so you can 
c;raft a public policy that carries out idaho's long tradition of constitutional and 
statutory representation of indigent perso11s. 
I believe strongly that Idaho must aggressively 4Dprove the ~stem that 
exists today. Any change which takes place should have as benchmarks the 
following broad principles. 
first, I think the legislature and Governor's enacting of House Bills 148 and 
149 to· clarify who is entitled to an attorney at public expense is an important first 
step. 
Secondly, since 1923 Idahoans have had the right for every "re~sonable 
opportunity" to prepare a defense. This starts with t4ne - time to interview, 
investigate and prepare legal arguments. All of Idaho public defense attorneys do 
not have that time. Appropriate Cc!Seload ,i-µmbers exist from state and national 
organizations. These should be closely examined by the interim committee and 
made enforceable. 
Every reasonable opportunity for ~ fair l:llld impartial trial should include 
competent attorneys who are trained and have an experience level commensurate 
with the case or crime. This necessitates a well-funded, systematic state-approved 
training program. Remember the large sums of state and county dollars used for 
training for other members of the criminal justice system. 
'Part of the' funding issu_e needs to include an analysis of lowest bidder or 
fixed fee contracts. The conflict of economic interest is inherent in this approach 
and must be eradicated. 
Idaho has already d~fih~d the parameters of our task to "make sure that 
every person accused of crime, not only is given a fair and impartial trial but every 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and vindicate his innocence upon 
trial." It has been the duty of this state before statehood and continues today. It is 
our d~ty to protect these fundamental ideals for the future. 
Thank you for your time here today. 
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C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
STATE OF THE STATE AND BUDGET ADDRESS 
MONDAY, JANUARY 12, 2015 
Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Honorable Justices and Judges, my fellow constitutional officers, 
distinguished legislators and members of my Cabinet, honored guests, friends, my family and our First Lady ... 
my fellow Idahoans. 
Allow me first to comment briefly on two men who were with us here throughout the first eight years of 
my tenure in this office - Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna and Secretary of State Ben Y sursa. 
puring my time in government I have seldom been privileged to work so closely with two individuals 
more devoted to the public interest or more motivated by the better angels of public service than Tom and Ben. 
Please join me now in an appreciation of their work, their legacy, and their friendship. 
To our newly elected legislators and constitutional officers, congratulations and welcome. I applaud 
your willingness to serve. I respect and appreciate your civic virtue. And I encourage your attention, patience 
and commitment to the processes and purposes of our State government. 
Like you, I am beginning a new term in office. It is an honor and a privilege to have once again garnered 
the support and confidence of the citizens ofldaho. 
Like you, I take that responsibility very seriously. And I know that public confidence must be earned 
anew every day. So let us begin our work together unfettered by cynicism or mistrust, and with a sure 
understanding of our limitations as well as our potential. 
With you, I look forward to advancing the interests of the people we serve. 
With you, I am committed to continuing our efforts to make Idaho what America was meant to be. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we are blessed to live in interesting times. There is unrest and uncertainty all 
around us. But that's nothing new to the human experience. 
There has never been a shortage of issues upon which weU-intentioned people could earnestly and 
actively disagree in any free and dynamic society. 
We also are blessed to live in a nation and a state where there is an orderly, responsible, citizen-driven 
process for sorting out and addressing those issues. Our process is not designed to satisfy everyone. Nothing 
ever can. But it is designed to do more than stimulate public discussion and debate. 
Ultimately, it must inspire resolution and progress - however imperfect or incomplete. 
That is the lodestar on which we must find our way forward in the days ahead. 
Unfortunately, that has not been a hallmark of our national government in recent years. 
From immigration to energy and from environmental protection to budgeting, there is neither rhyme nor 
reason to how the federal government does - or does not - do its job. 
Partisan rancor and political infighting are unacceptable excuses for inaction and dysfunction. Here in 
Idaho we have not only the opportunity but the responsibility to set a higher standard, and then live up to it. 
I ran for Governor in 2006 because my six years in Congress taught me that the states are where our 
Republic must meet today's challenges and prepare for those that lay ahead. 
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That is just as true today, and even more apparent. So I am more determined than ever for Idaho to 
embrace that opportunity. · 
It will mean setting an example of both fiscal responsibility and policy vision, especially on those issues 
that are fundamental to our future prosperity, consistent with the proper role of government and aligned with 
our Idaho values. That will require all of us working together rather than at cross-purposes. 
We must not allow ourselves to emulate the federal government's politics of division, procrastination 
and misdirection for which we all are paying the price. 
In some cases and op, some issues, we already have put off making some tough decisions for too long. 
· That cannot and must not continue. Today, I will outline some issues on which I believe we must act - not in 
careless haste but with all appropriate dispatch. 
Perhaps the most important message I want to leave with you today is simply this: Idaho Learns. 
We learned the value of being more frugal and accountable with taxpayer resources during the Great 
Recession. We learned the value of preparation and consensus building during our discussions concerning 
transportation funding. We learned the value of process and inclusion during our efforts to improve education. 
And we have learned that even the best intentions and plans must be carried out with equal attention to detail 
and public perceptions from our contract experience with the Idaho Education Network. 
Idaho Learns. 
And those lessons run deep. 
As a result of our experiences we move forward more confident in our abilities, more certain in our 
goals, and better prepared for the challenges before us. Future generations will benefit from our efforts to apply 
these lessons today. 
I am not here to offer panaceas or to insist that your deliberations proceed in a particular direction - we 
are after all separate but equal branches of State government. 
Instead,'! am here to offer my view of what our state priorities should be and where our resources can be 
most effectively used in the public interest. 
That list begins with education. . 
Last year in this chamber I laid out a five-year plan for sustainably and responsibly investing in our 
public schools. : 
I greatly appreciate your support for achieving those goals and I encourage your continuing help in 
seeing this process through as we welcome new Superintendent of Public Instruction Sherri Ybarra. 
In Idaho, public schools are the most fundamentally proper role of government. They are essential to the 
health of our families, our communities and our economy. 
In addition to the choices that parents are afforded with home schooling, charter schools and private 
schools, world-class public schools can set the bar for higher individual achievement. They are the key to our 
prosperity and Idaho's competitiveness in the global marketplace. 
As you know, our school improvement plan is based on the recommendations of my broad-based, 
bipartisan Education Task Force, which was led and facilitated by the State Board of Education. The goal of its 
recommendations is to build a public school system that is focused on student outcomes, responsive to local 
needs, respectful of the role of classroom teachers, and more accountable to parents, patrons and taxpayers. 
The Fiscal Year 2016 Executive Budget recommendation I am submitting to you today provides more 
funding for teacher training and professional development, and a significant infusion of money for teacher 
compensation under the new tiered licensure and career ladder proposed by the State Board of Education. 
To support continuous improvement, my recommendation provides additional funding to help local 
school districts conduct planning on how best to improve the education of our children every year. 
In addition, I'm calling for another $20 million in discretionary operating funds for local schools in 
fiscal 201 (i. 
My recommendation also includes funding to provide more career and college counseling for students. 
As we implement our K-through-Career goals I want students and parents to have the best information available 
in making important decisions about courses, programs and post-secondary opportunities that will give them a 
leg up toward success in the workforce. 
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My total General Fund budget request for the coming year represents a 5.2-percent increase. 
But my proposal for public schools calls for 7.4 percent more funding. That's almost $60 million more 
than we allocated for schools before the Great Recession began in fiscal year 2009. 
Beyond the numbers·, I'm also calling on the State Board of Education and our education partners to 
work together to develop a comprehensive plan for improving literacy and reading proficiency. Reading at 
grade level by the end of third grade is a major foundation for a student's education. It enables their success in 
every other subject area. We absolutely must prepare our students by doing more to achieve this critical 
benchmark. Anything less is simply unacceptable. · 
My hope while you consider this request is that we work together to continue assessing the impact of the 
current year's investments and seek to advance those policies and processes that work best for Idaho students. 
We know that one of our initiatives to improve the quality and equity of the public school experience for 
our students is the Idaho Education Network. 
It enables students in Salmon and Montpelier to get the same kind of advanced instruction as those in 
Sandpoint and Meridian. It enables Idaho to overcome our geographic and socioeconomic barriers. It allows us 
to realize the kind of opportunities for enlightenment and progress that not long ago were available only in our 
largest and most connected communities. 
The kind and quality of courses and the level of instruction provided by the IEN truly is staggering. I 
believe its value is beyond question. The IEN. is an asset that must be maintained. The challenges in continuing 
this world-class educational tool can and should be overcome. 
I am committed to fulfilling the vision and promise of the IEN, which will start with rebidding the 
contracts involved, but also includes a strong recommendation for full funding ofIEN operations in fiscal 2016 
to ensure the service is continued for Idaho students. · 
One of the benefits of the Idaho Education Network continues to be the ability to bring college-level 
courses into high school classrooms throughout Idaho. That in tum helps ensure that more of our students are 
adequately prepared for the academic rigors of college life. 
Our colleges and universities have been spending too much time, money and energy on remedial 
programs to bring Idaho high school graduates up to a post-secondary level of competence on such critical 
subjects as science, math and reading comprehension. 
Many of our employers also are having trouble finding workers with the skills they need in an 
increasingly complex economy to enable those businesses to remain competitive. 
And I'm not just talking about computer science, engineering and healthcare fields; we have businesses 
struggling to find enough well-trained and qualified welders, technicians and other trades positions. In fact, at 
current levels of economic growth we are going to be tens of thousands of employees short of industry demand 
for the skills and level of post-secondary training and education they need in the coming years. 
That's why oui efforts to better prepare students to be contributing members of society now extend 
beyond the old K-12 focus to a K-through-Career emphasis. 
Education must not be allowed to end with high school. 
We have a responsibility to use our tax dollars more strategically and effectively- and to build and 
strengthen partnerships with employers - if we are to meet our goal of at least 60 percent of Idaho citizens 
between the ages of 25 and 34 having a post-secondary degree or professional certification by 2020. 
Folks, that's just five years down the road. We have a lot of work to do to achieve this worthy goal. 
Already the Board of Education and our higher edu~ation institutions are working more closely than 
ever with the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, Professional-Technical Education, Health 
and Welfare and local organizations to develop commonsense plans for meeting our workforce development 
needs. 
That includes more pronounced, targeted and sustainable investments in such programs as the computer 
science initiative at Boise State University, an employee readiness initiative at the University of Idaho, career 
path internships at Idaho State University, and the Complete College Idaho program throughout our higher 
education system. 
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Those are amongst the top priorities at each of our schools, and I'm asking for your continuing support 
to help them succeed - to help US succeed in building a comprehensive system of education and workforce 
training opportunities so that Idaho Learns applies to all the citizens of our state. 
I'm also pleased to report some good news from the efforts of our Leadership in Nuclear Energy 
Commission or LINE Commission and the Center for Advanced Energy Studies-CABS. As you will recall, 
that group did an outstanding job highlighting the strengths and capabilities of our National Lab - and one of 
their key recommendations focused on "regionalizing CABS" by including other state partners. 
This past fall my good friend Governor Mead and the University of Wyoming agreed to join as equal partners in 
the CABS consortium of our state universities. 
This is but the first step in a continuing effort to fulfill the promise of the INL and CABS. 
Let me talk for just a moment now about something that you won't find in my budget recommendation. 
But I believe it has the potential to improve the lives and enhance the opportunities of many Idaho citizens. I 
believe that because we've already seen it happen right here in this valley. 
In 2007, my first year as Governor, the Treasure Valley was one of the last metropolitan areas in 
America without a community college. That year the Legislature enacted my request to provide a State 
incentive of startup funding for any local jurisdictions where voters opt to establish a community college 
district. Ada and Canyon counties soon stepped up to the challenge and voted to establish the College of 
Western Idaho. 
And what a tremendous success it's been. It's forever changed the way education is delivered here in 
Idaho's most populated area. It's hard to even imagine this val_ley now without CWI playing a significant role in 
our future. . 
Thanks to the incredible efforts of President Bert Glandon, the visionary leadership of the College of 
Western Idaho Board and collaboration with Boise State University and others, CWijoins as a full partner with 
the College of Southern Idaho and North Idaho College in fulfilling the promise of true "community" colleges. 
They are providing affordable, accessible and responsive resources for both students and employers to 
meet their education and career-training goals. · 
Through them, Idaho Learns is taking on a broader definition. 
Providing that opportunity for our citizens during the economic downturn was critically important to our 
recovery. . 
Now that we are rebounding, we find ourselves faced with growing demand and intensifying need for 
the services that community colleges are uniquely able to provide. 
So today I challenge again the underserved communities ofldaho where no broad-based community 
college programs now exist to canvass their citizens and businesses on the value that can be added to their 
economic development and public enrichment efforts by establishing a community college district of the size 
and focus that will meet their local needs. · 
Those needs and my challenge for local leaders to address them will be part of the discussion in each 
town I visit to conduct Capital for a Day. We did it with CWI and we can do it again. 
Preparing Idahoans for the workplace is the primary focus of the Idaho Department of Labor. It's not 
just about sending out unemployment checks. 
And the experts at Labor and our other State agencies now have a clearer picture than ever of where our 
people will be working in the years ahead - if they are educated and trained to do the kinds of careers being 
created. 
We now expect to outpace the national employment growth rate with 15,000 job opportunities a year 
being created for Idaho workers through 2022- many of them in the healthcare and construction fields. 
That's why Director Ken Edmunds and his team at Labor have developed a plan for retaining, recruiting 
and returning employees to Idaho to help meet the demand for skilled workers. 
The idea behind the "Choose Idaho" initiative is to bridge the coming labor shortage by keeping Idaho's 
best and brightest right here at home, encouraging former Idahoans to come home, and welcoming people with 
new skills to our communities. 
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To help build on that effort, my budget recommendation for fiscal 2016 includes a transfer of $5 million 
for Industry Sector Grants. . 
That will help build partnerships between industry and our education system to more effectively address 
a growing shortage of skilled and trained employees - a key element of our K-through-Career goals. 
At the same time, I'm pleased that the Department of Labor was able to announce last month that 
Idaho's economic recovery and job growth will allow the unemployment insurance tax rate paid by Idaho 
businesses to fall for the third consecutive year- this time by another 16.8 percent. That means tens of millions 
of dollars in savings that can help capitalize additional Idaho growth. 
I appreciate your support over the years for reducing the tax burden on Idaho citizens. From increasing 
the grocery tax credit to lowering income tax rates and providing personal property tax relief, we are keeping 
almost $157 million in the hands ofldaho taxpayers during 2015. And that will grow to more than $169 million 
during the year that begins July 1 as our economy keeps expanding. 
Director Jeff Sayer and his team at the Department of Commerce are working hand-in-glove with 
Education, Labor, Transportation, Agriculture, Health and Welfare and other State agencies to leverage market-
driven economic growth into improving how employers see Idaho. Their goal is nothing less than to make Idaho 
a global leader in growth and prosperity. 
And we have some great resources to help Accelerate Idaho, including the Tax Reimbursement 
Incentive or TRI that you approved last year. This performance-based tool is attracting great interest from 
businesses ready to create thousands of jobs and invest billions of dollars in Idaho's future. 
Thank you for recognizing that Idaho Learns extends to the lessons from other states where 
government is mortgaging its future to up the ante on attracting new businesses. 
By contrast, the TRI requires employers to prove up their commitment to Idaho with jobs and capital 
investments before a dime of their tax payments are reimbursed. And most importantly, the TRI is getting just 
as much attention from our homegrown Idaho businesses looking to expand as it is from employers outside 
Idaho looking for a better place to achieve their goals. 
One of the most crucial parts of making Idaho a better place to do business and create jobs is improving 
our infrastructure. My budget recommendation includes an additional $3 million infusion for the Idaho 
Opportunity Fund at the Department of Commerce. That money is used for strategic grants to help Idaho 
communities provide the water, power, wastewater treatment, roads and other infrastructure necessary for new 
or expanding businesses. 
A great example of the return on investment from our Opportunity Fund is Cives Steel. When one of the 
nation's largest steel fabricators was looking to expand west of the Mississippi River it found a home in Ucon, 
just north ofldaho Falls. 
It landed there for a number of reasons, but one factor in particular helped seal the deal: Ucon was able 
to secure a $400,000 Idaho Opportunity Fund grant to support infrastructure needed for the Cives operation. So 
far the employee-owned company has invested about $10 million in facilities and equipment in Idaho. That 
figures to grow to about $32 million as Cives creates more than 150 career opportunities in Bonneville County. 
You know as well as I do that every Idaho community that's been passed over by a new or growing 
employer understands the value of those grants. But they only help address a small fraction of our statewide 
infrastructure needs. 
The biggest of the big-ticket items in our infrastructure inventory is our long-term, multibillion-dollar 
investment in Idaho's roads and bridges. 
And ifldaho Learns means anything at all, it's time for us to address that elephant in the room. 
Our own circumstances and the realities of our national government require us to seize the opportunity 
to become more self-reliant, to be the architects of our own destiny rather than the afterthoughts of a federal 
funding system that could be skewed to our disadvantage. There's a real possibility that Congress will try to 
pass a transportation funding bill in the coming year - maybe as early as the spring. 
, A cold, hard assessment of the politics involved indicates that we run the risk of getting left in the lurch 
if that federal legislation changes the Highway Trust Fund formula so that we wind up paying in more than 
we're allotted for our needs in Idaho. 
5 
000325
A survey last winter showed that most Idahoans believe our aging highways and bridges will need 
attention within ten years. 
That's one benchmark to consider. 
But the maintenance backlog we already have makes it even more important to figure out now how to 
pay for the hun~eds of millions of dollars in improvements needed to protect Idaho lives and corridors of 
commerce. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we know that after education, investing in infrastructure is among the smartest, 
most cost-effective and frankly essential uses of taxpayer dollars to promote the public's general welfare and 
· sustain economic growth. 
And that truth is being embraced by voters. It's interesting to note that roughly half of the survey -
respondents said transportation funding should be among the Legislature's top three priorities - even though 
most are satisfied with the condition of our roads and bridges right now. 
They get it. Building and maintaining infrastructure is not an overnight proposition -whether it's 
highways, broadband connectivity, electric transmission lines or water treatment facilities. It takes planning and 
a commitment to sustainable long-term investment. 
We already have 785 state and local bridges in Idaho that are over 50 years old and considered 
structurally "deficient." 
That number will grow to almost 900 bridges by 2019 even after completing work on the 68 for which 
we already have funding. 
This isn't a matter ofHennie Penny telling us that the sky is falling. It's a real problem, but we know 
how to fix it if we have the resources. Major Idaho highway improvement projects since 2009 - mostly funded 
by GARVEE bonds and federal stimulus money-have reduced the accident rate on those routes by 35 percent 
and the death rate by 25 percent. 
Under Director Brian Ness and Board Chairman Jerry Whitehead, the Idaho Transportation Department 
is making significant strides in efficiency and more effectively using limited highway resources. ITD has 
eliminated more than 100 full-time positions since 2013 alone by reducing layers of management. It now is 
recognized among the best-run transportation agencies in America. 
I fully understand the misgivings of some about higher transportation costs. 
But there is something to be said for the old adage about being "penny wise and pound foolish." In fact, 
every dollar we invest now in our roads and bridges will save motorists and taxpayers $6 to $14 later. 
Chairmen Brackett and Palmer, legislative leaders, I am not going to stand here and tell you how to 
swallow this elephant. That would be contrary to all we have learned about each other and the people we serve 
in recent years. But we all know it must be done. I welcome financially responsible legislation that addresses 
steady, ongoing and sustainable transportation infrastructure in Idaho; however, I will NOT entertain proposals 
aimed at competing for General Fund tax dollars with education and our other required public programs or 
services. 
That raises the question of taxation. 
So allow me to reflect for just a moment on our Idaho tax system and its conformance with the basic 
tenets of equity, certainty and simplicity. By that I mean taxation must be fair in its policy and administration 
across taxpayer classifications; it must be predictable so that taxpayers can plan and prepare as they conduct 
their business and personal affairs; and it must be understandable so that taxpayers have a fighting chance of 
making sense of the tax code and its impact on them. 
As it stands today, Idaho unfortunately has become a confusing hodgepodge of taxing authorities. That 
undermines public confidence that those who collect the tax are accountable to citizens for how the revenue is 
used. With that and the benchmarks of equity, certainty and simplicity in mind, I'm asking for your help today 
in ensuring that over the coming four years we can make Idaho's tax system one of the best in the nation. 
I believe that work should start now by enacting the recommendations from the task force I assembled 
last year to consider improvements to how the Idaho State Tax Commission operates. Those recommendations 
are aimed at improving the efficiency, accountability and transparency of our revenue operations. That includes 
refining the role of the Commission itself with the addition of a director over day-to-day agency business. 
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By now most of you know that I would like to see us further reduce the marginal rates for Idaho's 
individual and corporate income tax below 7 percent from their current 7.4 percent, as well as the complete 
elimination of the personal property tax. To that end, my budget recommendation sets aside the first year of a 
five year approach to reduce our income tax brackets from 7.4 percent to 6.9 percent. 
This effort will provide relief to 44 percent of taxpayers this year and up to 51 percent of taxpayers by 
2018. 
I also believe the time has come for Idaho to prepare for a potential change in federal law to address the 
issue of tax equity. It's called the Marketplace Fairness Act. 
As many of you know, that legislation now before Congress would clarify the legal authority of states 
like Idaho to impose and enforce a sales tax on interstate purchases of goods online. 
Not only is this a fundamental matter of fairness for those brick-and-mortar businesses in our 
communities. It also is a matter of securing our own long-term prosperity. 
Simply put, every dollar of sales tax from online purchases that goes uncollected is the better part of a 
dollar that is NOT going to support the necessary and proper roles of our State government - especially meeting 
the education and infrastructure needs of our growing economy. 
Congress has yet to act. But the legislation has support from within our own Idaho delegation. 
On the topic of Congress, I believe the chances now have improved - if only marginally - to repeal or 
more likely make incremental changes to Obamacare that would have a real impact here in Idaho. 
I have studied the recommendations of my Medicaid Redesign Workgroup and agree with its findings -
up to a point. I especially appreciate the Workgroup's strong focus on personal accountability, requiring co-
payments, and managed care. 
But more broadly, Idaho Learns should also apply to these findings and their experience. The 
W orkgroup did its homework and deserves an opportunity to share what they have learned. I am asking you to 
hold hearings this session, listen to their findings, ask questions and educate yourselves on all the work they 
have done. 
We worked together collaboratively and with great success on creating Your Health Idaho. After some 
initial trials, Idaho now is successfully running its own insurance exchange cheaper, more efficiently, with less 
staff and with better service than the national system that overpromised and profoundly under-delivered. That's 
because Your Health Idaho is locally run and utilizes insurance agents and brokers working in the free market. 
In fact, the marketplace is the key to how Idaho is advancing our goal of making health care more 
affordable and accessible for all Idahoans. 
Many people in this state have quietly gone about the business of putting Idaho at the forefront of the 
changing healthcare landscape. 
By building public-private partnerships, Health and Welfare Director Dick Armstrong and the men and 
women who are working on the State Healthcare Innovation Plan are changing the way we pay for and deliver 
healthcare services - including Medicaid. 
Those who are working diligently in both the public and private sectors to improve healthcare outcomes 
in Idaho deserve our sincere thanks. 
My thanks also go to the Legislature and those advocates who are enabling us to more aggressively 
address the local challenges of behavioral health. Less than a month ago I was in Idaho Falls to cut the ribbon 
on Idaho's first Behavioral Health Crisis Center, where people with mental health or substance abuse problems 
can get short-term help without going to a hospital emergency room or a jail cell. 
It's an important part of the broader improvements needed in our community-based services. We know 
that best practices across the country show that such local facilities reduce law enforcement and hospital-related 
costs while providing more sustainable support and better access for vulnerable citizens. That's why I once 
again am requesting funds for an additional Behavioral Health Crisis Center in the coming year. 
Another decision for which I'm proud of the Legislature, our courts and our Executive agencies is their 
unprecedented collaboration in enacting and now implementing the Justice Reinvestment Initiative or JRI. 
This is an effort started two years ago by the good chairmen of our House and Senate Judiciary 
committees. 
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Last year's overwhelming legislative support for Senate Bill 1357 and hard work during the past year by 
our courts, Department of Correction and Commission of Pardons and Parole has resulted in an outstanding set 
of administrative rules for you to consider during this session. 
They spell out in detail how we can improve public safety, reduce recidivism and lower the costs 
associated with locking up offenders by prioritizing and refining our post-release supervision efforts with swift, 
· certain and graduated sanctions. 
I appreciate your continuing support as our Justice Reinvestment efforts move from careful planning to 
effective on-the-ground implementation. 
I hope you will consider it equally important to continue our work toward addressing the very real 
challenge we face in our public defense system. 
The courts have made it clear that our current method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants does not pass constitutional muster. 
This is a priority for our counties so it also must be a priority for us. If we value the ideals embodied in 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, then it is undeniably our responsibility 
to take the phrase "due process of law" as seriously as the Framers intended. 
Which brings me to another constitutional issue - the defense of traditional marriage. 
Last year we found ourselves in the position of defending an amendment to the Idaho Constitution 
approved by voters in 2006 and .,.... I believe - truly representing both the intentions and the values of our 
citizens. It defines marriage between a man and a woman as the only "domestic legal union" valid in Idaho. 
It is incumbent upon those ofus sworn to uphold and defend our Constitution and to do so based on its 
content now- n,ot on changing societal views since it was enacted or how any ofus would write it today. 
Therefore, I will continue to do all I can to uphold my oath and defend our Idaho Constitution. 
I am hopeful that our recent request for the U.S. Supreme Court to review the issue will be accepted and 
that we can look forward to an outcome that affirms our Constitution. 
It's unfortunate that so many of our differences with the national government wind up in court. But in 
the absence of any federal consensus on a multitude of issues, too often the courts become the last refuge both 
for public policy disputes and safeguarding our freedoms. 
. That may well be where such questions as protection of sage-grouse and siting of electricity 
transmission corridors end up. I hope not, and we are working hard with Idaho landowners, sportsmen, federal 
land managers and other stakeholders to fmd common ground through our administrative processes on those 
issues and others. 
During the past year we completed the historic Snake River Basin Adjudication process. The largest 
single-stream adjudication in U.S. history took 27 years and covered water rights on about 87 percent ofldaho's 
land area. We advanced our efforts to similarly adjudicate all northern Idaho water claims. And we made great 
progress on our efforts to preserve, recharge and more sustainably manage our water throughout the state. 
In addition and with gratitude for your help and support, I'm proud to announce that there now are five 
Rangeland Fire Protection Associations throughout Idaho. They are organized and prepared to launch initial 
attacks when wildfire threatens any of more than 3 .5 million acres of state, private and BLM rangeland in our 
state. 
Ladies an:d gentlemen, look high above you. Within this magnificent chamber so beautifully renovated 
just a few years ago, you see an Idaho sky through a vaulted dome of glass. This chamber, this building, this 
body has all the room that anyone could need to accommodate the biggest, loftiest and most meaningful ideas 
and actions. 
In fact I would measure that the entire church used in the summer of 1787 to create this great Republic 
would but fill this chamber. 
So as you begin your deliberations today, don't limit yourselves. 
Think big. Be bold. Act decisively. Reflect the Idaho values you were sent here to represent. 
And as you consider the magnitude of the work ahead and how it will benefit the citizens we serve, keep 
looking up toward higher aspirations. 
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Keep looking up and apply what Idaho Learns so that our fondest hopes and best intentions will lead to 
a better tomorrow for future generations. · 
Join me in putting Idaho and our people first and foremost in your minds. 
Good luck, Godspeed, and may God continue to bless America and the Great State of Idaho. 
Thank you. 
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Governor 
Recommendations of the Public Defense Subcommittee 
. I ·, 
Adopted !\fay 24, 2013 
The SixtlJ. ~endmer;it of the U.S. Constitution provides that the accused sqall enjoy the 
right to tl).e assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. As with ,6ther rights that are 
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, the vindication of the Sixth Amendment right fo counsel 
is a state r~spofrsib1Jity. Although a state may delegate its duty to apprise citizens of this right to 
counties, it' is ultimately the state's responsibility to ensure that the co~stitutiC?nal .obligation is 
met. 
In 2009, the Idaho Criminal Justice Gomm'.ission ("the Commission" or "ICJC") form,ed a 
Public Defen.se Subcommittee ("the Subcom.mi~ee") tasked with developing recommendations 
for improvement of Idaho's public defense system. In January of 2010, the-National ·Legal Aid & 
Defender Association ("NLADA") released a report which suggested that Idaho is not 
ade9uate~y satisfyi~g its Sixth Amendment obligations. For more than thre_!:l y~ars, the 
Subcommittee ·cot'nmitted _itself to identifying improvements to be made, and its effo~s yield!:)d 
four pieces ;of proposed legislation. · · • 
'fhe , first piece of Jegislatior;i provides µniform · eligibi\ity ,requiretpents for the 
appointgi.ent of ~ounsel at public ~xpense'. More specifically, the arpep~h1'ents----;first~ redefine 
the t~rm • . "~erious crime," to include any offense the penalty for 'Wruch ' includes the mete 
possi~i_lity '·of .~onfinement. The ~1,1bcommittee observeci th~f some Ip_aho coµrts~xpecting that 
a jail sentence will ultimate! y not be· imposed-do not ~_ppoint counsel, whet~s oth~r courts will 
appoint counsel if the applicable cri!Jllnal -statute,tirovides for the · inere possibility of a jail 
sentence. COJ:?-Stitu~onally, a person is ·e~ti~e9 to ,cowisel if he or she faces actuii,1 iOJ-prisonment, 
even for violation o'f .probati<;>n. In other words, a person may ~ot be sentenced to inc~ceration or 
have his or her suspended sentence imposed without having qeen previously availed of the right 
to counsel.. The proposed changes to § I ~-851 will avoid -ambiguity and will en~ure that all 
Idahoans are appointed counsel under the same circumstances .. and in conformance with 
constitutional demand"s. . 
Similarly, · the Subcommittee learned that there is variance in terms of who financially 
qualifies for appointment of-counsel. While the current statute enumerates several factors that 
courts may consider, there is no uniform standard o'f financial eligibility. The proposed 
amendments will require the courts to presume a person is financially eligible for appointment of 
counsel if certain objective factors are present. However, the courts will still have discretion to 
either deny appointment of counsel in spite of the financial presumptions or to appoint counsel in 
lieu of them. 
The Subcommittee also acknowledged that requiring a person to complete a financial 
affidavit in order to qualify for appointment of counsel puts the person in a constitutional 
predicament. Under penalty of perjury, a person could potentially be compelled to disclose 
information that would be incriminating, such as the existence of, say, illegal income or assets. 
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In such a situation, the person is forced to choose between the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To remedy this dilemma, 
the proposed amendments to § 19-854 will restrict the admissibility of information provided in 
financial affidavits. This will encourage full and accurate disclosure and behoove efforts to limit 
appointment of counsel to the truly indigent. 
Next, the Subcommittee discovered that there is inconsistency in terms of whether people 
are required to contribute to or repay the cost of their court-appointed attorney. What is more, the 
Subcommittee is concerned that current contribution and r~coupment practices may discourage 
people from requesting or accepting the appointment of counsel. Some counties require an 
application fee up-front and/or warn people that they may have to repay the cost of counsel with 
lit:tle-to-no notice of how much it will cost them. Because of this potential1 for discouragement, 
the Subcommittee recommends that § 19-854 be amended to prohibit · pre-dispositional 
contribution and to limit post-dispositional recoupment to the costs associated with conviction, if 
, 
any. 
Last, the amendments to Title 19 add "defending attorney" as a defined term to include 
the myriad public defense practitioners in Idaho who are private attorneys appointed by the court 
on a c~se-by-case basis or contracted by the county on a systematic basis. The Subconprittee 
realized that many public defense attorneys do not currently file annual reports pursuant to§ 19-
864 because the statute only expressly applies to county offices of the public defender. By 
expanding the reporting requirements to all attorneys providing public defense services, the 
amendments will facilitate the collection of comprehensive data-a foundational prerequisite to 
m<taningful assessment ofldaho's public defense system. 
The second and third pieces of legislation propose amendments to the Juvenile 
Corrections Act and the Child Protective Act, respectively. With regard to the Juvenile 
Corrections ActJ the proposed legislation amends § 20-514 to expound the circumstances in 
r 
which juveniles are appointed counsel and to conform their right to counsel to that of adults. The 
Subcommittee f6und that counsel is particularly important for juveniles, given that child~en 
generally may not understand or appreciate the legal process. For the same reason, the 
Subcommittee cbncluded that, although it is impractical to prohibit juveniles from waiving their 
right to counsel in all situations, certain proceedings should preclude waiver. As such, the 
amendments set forth particular requirements that must be met before a juvenile may waive the 
right to counsel and also enumerate the situations in which waiver is prohibited altogether. 
Similarly, out of a concern for practical implications once again, instead of providing for 
the right to counsel in the diversion context, the Subcommittee decided to limit the admissibility 
of statements made by juveniles in pre-adjudication proceedings. While there is constitutional 
ambiguity ~d significant variance nationwide as to whether a juvenile is entitled to the 
assistance of counsel in the pre-adjudication context, the amendments will balance the rights of 
juveniles with tb.'e government's interest in facilitating informal disposition of juvenile 
proceedings. 
With regard to the Child Protective Act, the Subcommittee recognized that children over 
12 should have their interests represented by an attorney that is acting as a zealous advocate. 
Currently, children are only unqualifiedly entitled io a guardian ad litem ("GAL") in child 
protection proceedings. However, the GAL's role is to protect the "best interests" of the child-
not necessarily to advocate on behalf of the child's own wishes. The amendments to§ 16-1614 
will allow children to have a voice in the critical decisions being made about their lives in child 
protection actions. 
The final piece of legislation is reflective of a Subcommittee finding that the most 
significant trend in nationwide approaches to public defense reform has been the movement 
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toward state oversight of the public defense function. As such, the Subcommittee concluded that 
authority should be statutorily delegated to an independent commission to promulgate and 
enforce certain standards for public defense attorneys, including statewide training and 
continuing legal education requirements, data reporting requirements, core provisions for 
contracts between counties and private providers of public defense services, qualification 
standards, and caseload and workload controls. 
The Subcommittee agreed on the substance and form of the proposed legislation creating 
the commission and providing for its duties. After discussion, the ICJC determined that the 
appropriate action was not to pursue passage of this proposed legislation, but rather to support 
the creation of an interi~ legislative committee to examine potential means of reforming Idaho's 
public defense system. During the 2013 legislative session, the Idaho legislature passed House 
Concurrent Resolution 026, establishing that interim legislative committee. Thereafter, the 
Subcommittee identified four critical areas that it recommends the ICJC ask the interim 
committee to consider: (1) the structure and organization of indigent defense delivery; (2) the 
oversight and accountability of indigent defense delivery; (3) the mechanisms, standards, and 
funding for training and education for "defending attorneys" as defined in Idaho Code § 19-
851 (1 ); and (4) long-range planning for stable and ongoing funding of indigent defense delivery. 
Lastly, the Subcommittee has recognized that one cost of maintaining the status quo is 
the potential for litigation. The state ofldaho has made, and the Subcommittee believes, it should 
continue to make improvements in the delivery of indigent defense services in Idaho. The 
Subcommittee believes that the best way to make reforms in Idaho is through the legislative 
p,rocess. The landscape of indigent defense reform across the country has, however, been shaped 
to some extent by lawsuits. The Subcommittee believes that the legislative interim committee 
should be aware of the potential for litigation from special interest groups, including those from 
outside the state, aimed at forcing change in Idaho. 
Recommendations Page 3 
D001155 
000332
IDAI 10 ST.ATE 
PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION 
The price of freedom is eternal vigilance. 
816 W. Bannock St., Suite 201 
Boise, ID 83702 P[IPUBLIC ~ DErENS[ 
/) COMMISSION Tel (208) 332-1735 • Fax (208) 364-6147 mail@pdc.idaho.gov 
Ian H. Thomson, Esq. 
Executive Director 
Judge Molly Huskey, Chair 
Dishict Court Judge 
Darrell G. Bolz, Vice-Chair 
Jm•enile Justice Com111issio11 
Rep. Jason A. Monks 
House of Representatives 
Comrnr. Kimber Ricks 
Ida/to Assoc. of Counties 
Sara B. Thomas, Esq. 
State Appellate Public Defender 
WilliarnH. Wellman, Esq. 
Defending Attorney 
Sen. Chuck Winder 
Senate 
Christopher Rich 
Ada County Clerk 
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Dear Mr. Rich, 
December 1, 2014 
The State Public Defense Commission was established in the last legislative 
session as a self-governing agency in the executive branch of state government. 
Among other things, the Public Defense Commission has been charged with 
promulgating rules regarding uniform data reporting requirements for the annual 
reports submitted by the public defenders in each county. That data will include the 
caseload, workload, and expenditures of those attorneys handling indigent 
appointments. Those cases will include adult criminal cases, juvenile delinquent 
matters, child protection cases, guardianship representation, mental health 
commitments and some civil contempt cases. 
Although we hope that eventually the statewide implementation of Odyssey 
will alleviate the burden on the counties of collecting and reporting this data, the 
Public Defense Commission has been charged with collecting and evaluating much 
of this data for the state legislature. I understand that county clerks are already 
constantly receiving information requests and surveys from various state agencies 
and state courts. It is not our desire to increase the burden on your office. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that you will be receiving requests from our office during 
the upcoming year. 
Although this letter is not a request for infonnation, I did want to let you 
know that you are likely to receive such requests in the upcoming year. I would 
hope that when we do send a request for information that you feel free to contact us 
with any questions you might have about the information we are seeking. Also, 
upon receiving a request, please let us know if you have already collected similar 
data and passed it on to another agency. I will be happy to track that information 
down and try to reduce your office's efforts. 
Let us know if there is anything we can do to make it easier for you to assist 
us in the task at hand. Likewise, if you have any ideas regarding data collection I 
would love to hear them. 
Sincerely, 
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Ian H. Thomson 
Executive Director 
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TEN 
PRINCIPLES 
OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 
February 2002 
Approved by American Bar Association House of Delegates, February 2002. The American Bar 
Association recommends that jurisdictions use these Principles to assess promptly the needs of 
public defense delivery systems and clearly communicate those needs to policy makers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System were sponsored by the 
ABA Standing Committee on Legal and Indigent Defendants and approved by the ABA 
House of Delegates in February 2002. The Principles were created as a practical guide for 
governmental officials, policymakers, and other parties who are charged with creating and 
funding new, or improving existing, public defense delivery systems. The Principles consti-
tute the fundamental criteria necessary to design a system that provides effective, efficient, 
high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal defendants who are unable 
to afford an attorney. The more extensive ABA policy statement dealing with indigent 
defense services is contained within the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing 
Defense Services (3d ed. 1992), which can be viewed on-line (black letter only) and purchased 
(black letter with commentary) by accessing the ABA Criminal Justice Section homepage at 
http://www.abanet.org/ crimjust/home.html. 
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Black Letter 
'"§ The public defense function, 
§ including the selection, funding, 
• §;,~ and payment of defense counsel, 
is independent. 
.·~ Where the caseload is sufficiently 
,.l high, the public defense delivery 
, ... :: ....... :: system consists of both a defender 
office and the active participation of 
the private bar. 
.. \e Clients are screened for eligibility, 
.,...:'"'~ and defense counsel is assigned and 
f;::..)P notified of appointment, as soon as 
feasible after clients' arrest, detention, 
or request for counsel. 
_/ Defense counsel is provided sufficient 
/ § time and a confidential space within 
.. 'JR. which to meet with the client. 
Defense counsel's workload is 
controlled to permit the rendering 
of quality representation. 
.#,:-·=Defense counsel's ability, training, 
gf ·-~and experience match the complexity 
~ ... #1 of the case . 
:~The same attorney continuously 
/ represents the client until completion 
/ of the case. 
,,€-~ There is parity between defense 
::.; counsel and the prosecution with 
~ .... ,.,.-¥ respect to resources and defense 
counsel is included as an equal 
partner in the justice system. 
Defense counsel is provided with and 
required to attend continuing legal 
education. 
·"':iffi i~'&.. Defense counsel is supervised 
~ j I and systematically reviewed for 
. ~. ~.!' quality and efficiency according 
to nationally and locally adopted 
standards. 
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With Commentary 
1 The public defense function, including 
the selection, funding. and payment of 
defense counsel, 1 is independent. The public 
defense function should be in~ependent from 
political influence and subject to judicial 
supervision only in the same manner and to 
the same extent as retained counsel.2 To safe-
guard independence and to promote efficiency 
and quality of services, a nonpartisan board 
should oversee defender, assigned counsel, or 
contract systems.3 Removing oversight from 
the judiciary ensures judicial independence 
from undue political pressures and is an · 
important means of furthering the independ-
~nce of public defense.4 The selection of the 
chief defender and staff should be made on 
the basis of merit, and recruitment of attor-
neys should involve special efforts aimed at 
achieving diversity in attorney staff.5 
2Where the caseload is sufficiently high, 6 
the public defense delivery system con-
sists of both a defender office7 and the active 
participation of the private bar. The private 
bar participation may include part-time 
defenders, a controlled assigned counsel plan, 
or contracts for services. 8 The appointment 
process should never be ad hoc,9 but should 
be according to a coordinated plan directed 
by a full-time administrator who is also an 
attorney familiar with the varied requirements 
of practice in the jurisdiction. IO Since the 
responsibility to provide defense services rests 
with the state, there should be state funding 
and a statewide structure responsible for 
ensuring uniform quality statewide.11 
3Clients are screened for eligibility,12 and defense counsel is assigned and notified 
of appointment, as soon as feasible after 
clients' arrest, detention, or request for 
counsel. Counsel should be furnished upon 
arrest, detention, or request, l3 and usually 
within 24 hours thereafter.14 
4 Defense counsel is provided sufficient 
time and a confidential space within 
which to meet with the client. Counsel 
should interview the client as soon as practica-
ble before the preliminary examination or the 
trial date.15 Counsel should have confidential 
access to the client for the full exchange of 
legal, procedural, and factual information 
between counsel and client.16 To ensure 
confidential communications, private meeting 
space should be available in jails, prisons, 
courthouses, and other places where 
defendants must confer with counsel.17 
5 Defense counsel's workload is controlled 
to permit the rendering of quality repre-
sentation. Counsel's workload, including 
appoint~d and other work, should never be 
so large as to interfere with the rendering of 
quality representation or lead to the breach of 
ethical obligations, and counsel is obligated to 
decline appointments above such levels.18 
National caseload standards should in no 
event be exceeded,19 but the concept of work-
load (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as 
case complexity, support services, and an 
attorney's nonrepresentational duties) is a 
more accurate measurement.20 
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6Defense counsel's ability, training, and 
experience match the complexity of the 
case. Counsd should never be assigned a case 
that counsel lacks the experience or training to 
handle competently, and counsd is obligated 
to refuse appointment if unable to provide 
ethical, high quality representation.21 
?The same attorney continuously 
represents the client until completion 
of the case. Often referred to as "vertical 
representation," the same attorney should 
continuously represent the client from initial 
assignment through the trial and sentenc- _ 
ing. 22 The attorney assigned for the direct 
appeal should represent the client throughout 
the direct appeal. 
8 There is parity between defense counsel 
and the prosecution with respect to 
resources and defense counsel is included as 
an equal partner in the justice system. There 
should be parity of workload, salaries and 
other resources (such as benefits, technology, 
facilities, legal research, support staff, parale-
gals, investigators, and access to forensic serv-
ices and experts) between prosecution and 
public defense. 23 Assigned counsd should 
be paid a reasonable fee in addition to actual 
overhead and expenses. 24 Contracts with 
private attorneys for public defense services 
should never be let primarily on the basis of 
cost; they should specify performance require-
ments and the anticipated workload, provide 
an overflow or fun<;ling mechanism for excess, 
unusual, or complex cases, 25 and separately 
fund expert, investigative, and other litigation 
support services. 26 No part of the justice 
system should be expanded or the workload 
increased without consideration of the impact 
that expansion will have on the balance and 
on the other components of the justice 
system. Public defense should participate as 
an equal partner in improving the justice 
system. 27 This principle assumes that the 
prosecutor is adequately funded and support-
ed in all respects, so that securing parity will 
mean that defense counsd is able to provide 
quality legal representation. 
9 Defense counsel is provided with and 
required to attend continuing legal 
education. Counsel and staff providing 
defense services should have systematic and 
comprehensive training appropriate to their 
areas of practice and at least equal to that 
received by prosecutors. 28 
lo Defense counsel is supervised and 
systematically reviewed for quality 
and efficiency according to nationally and 
locally adopted standaros. The defender 
office (both professional and support staff), 
assigned counsel,or contract defenders should 
be supervised and periodically evaluated for 
competence and efficiency.29 
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1 "Counsel" as used herein includes a defender office, 
a criminal defense attorney in a defender office, a con-
tract attorney, or an attorney in private practice 
accepting appointments. "Defense" as used herein 
relates to borh the juvenile and adult public defense 
systems. 
2 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, Task Force on Courts, Chapter 
13, The Defense (1973) [hereinafter "NAC''], 
Standards 13.8, 13.9; National Study Commission on 
Defense Services, G11idelines far Legal Defense Systems 
in the United States (1976) [hereinafter "NSC"], 
Guidelines 2.8, 2.18, 5.13; American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense 
Services (3rd ed. 1992) [hereinafter ''.ABA"], Standards 
5-1.3, 5-1.6, 5-4.1; Standardr far the Administration of 
Assigned Cottnsel Systems (NI.ADA 1989) [hereinafter 
·~ssigned Counsel"], Standard 2.2; NLADA 
Gttidelines far Negotiating and Awarding Contracts 
far Criminal Defense Services, ( 1984) [hereinafter 
"Contracting"], Guidelines II-1, 2; National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Model P11blic Defender Act (1970) [hereinafter 
"Model Ace"], § lO(d); Institute for Judicial 
Administration/American Bar Association, f11venile 
j11Stice Standardr Relating to Co11nsel far Private Parties 
(1979) [hereinafter '~BA Counsel for Private Parties"], 
Standard 2.l(D). 
3 NSC, s1pra note 2, Guidelines 2.10-2.13; ABA, 
Sttpra note 2, Standard 5-1.3(b); Assigned Counsel, 
Sttpra note 2, Standards 3.2.1, 2; Contracting, mpra 
note 2, Guidelines II-1, II-3, N-2; Institute for 
Judicial Administration/ American Bar Association, 
f11venilef11.stice Standardr Relating to Monitoring (1979) 
[hereinafter "ABA Monitoring"], Standard 3.2. 
2 Judicial independence is "the most essential charac-
ter of a free society" (American Bar Association 
'Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 
1997), 
5 ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-4.1 
6 "Sufficiently high" is described in detail in NAC 
Standard 13.5 andABA Standard 5-1.2. The phrase 
generally can be understood to mean chat there are 
enough assigned cases to support a full-rime public 
defender (taking into account distances, caseload 
diversity, etc.), and the remaining number of cases 
'are enough to support meaningful involvement of 
the private bar. 
7 NAC, Sttpra note 2, Standard 13.5; ABA, Sttpra note 
2, Standard 5-1.2; ABA Counsel for Private Parties, 
s11pra note 2, Standard 2.2. "Defender office" means a 
full-time public defender office and includes a private 
nonprofit organization operating in the same manner 
as a full-time public defender office under a contract 
with a jurisdiction. 
8 ABA, mpra note 2, Standard 5-1.2(a) and (b); NSC, 
s11pra note 2, Guideline 2.3; ABA, Sttpra nore 2, 
Standard 5-2.1. 
9 NSC, stpra note 2, Guideline 2.3; ABA, s1pra note 
2, Standard 5-2.1. 
10 ABA, Sttpra note 2, Standard 5-2.1 and commen-
tary; Assigned Counsel, stpra note 2, Standard 3.3.1 
and commentary n.5 (duties of Assigned Counsel 
Administrator such as supervision of attorney work 
cannot ethically be performed by a non-attorney, cit-
ing ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
and Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
11 NSC, stpra note 2, Guideline 2.4; Model Act, 
s11pra note 2, § 1 O; ABA, sttpra note 2, Standard 5-
l.2(c); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
(provision of indigent defense services is obligation of 
state). 
12 For screening approaches, see NSC, stpra note 2, 
Guideline 1.6 and ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-7.3. 
13 NAC, stpra note 2, Standard 13.3; ABA, supra 
note 2, Standard 5-6.1; Model Act, s1pra note 2, § 3; 
NSC, sttpra note 2, Guidelines 1.2-1.4; ABA Counsel 
for Private Patties, sttpra note 2, Standard 2.4(A). 
14 NSC, s1pra note 2, Guideline 1.3. 
15 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Defense Ftenction (3rd ed. 1993) [hereinafter 
"ABA Defense Function"], Standard 4-3.2; 
Performance Gttidelines far Criminal Defense 
Representation (NI.ADA 1995) [hereinafter 
"Performance Guidelines"], Guidelines 2.1-4.1; ABA 
Counsel for Private Parties, stpra note 2, Standard 4.2. 
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l 6 NSC, mpra note 2, Guideline 5.10; ABA Defense 
Function, mpra note 15, Standards 4-3.1, 4-3.2; 
Performance Guidelines, supra note 15, Guideline 
2.2. 
17 ABA Defense Function, supra note 15, Standard 
4-3. l. 
~
8 NSC, mpra note 2, Guideline 5.1, 5.3; ABA, 
supra note 2, Standards 5-5.3; ABA Defense 
Function, supra note 15, Standard 4-1.3(e); NAC, 
supra note 2, Standard 13.12; Contracting, supra 
note 2, Guidelines III-6, III-12; Assigned Counsel, 
stpra note 2, Standards 4.1, 4.1.2; ABA Counsel for 
Private Parties, supra note 2, Standard 2.2(B)(iv). 
l9 Numerical caseload limits are specified in NAC 
Standard 13.12 (maximum cases per year: 150 
felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile, 200 men-
tal health, or 25 appeals), and other national stan-
dards state chat caseloads should "reflect" (NSC 
Guideline 5.1) or "under no circumstances exceed" 
(Contracting Guideline III-6) these numerical limits. 
The workload demands of capital cases are unique: 
the duty to investigate, prepare, and rry both the 
guile/innocence and mitigation phases today requires 
an average of almost 1,900 hours, and over 1,200 
hours even where a case is resolved by guilty plea. 
Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations 
Conceming the Cost and Quality of Defense 
Representation (Judicial Conference of the U niced 
Scates, 1998). See also ABA Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases (1989) [hereinafter "Death Penalty"]. 
20 ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-5.3; NSC, S1tpra 
note 2, Guideline 5.1; Standards and Evaluation 
Design far Appellate Defender Offices (NLADA 1980) 
[hereinafter ''.Appellate"], Standard 1-F. 
21 Performance Guidelines, S1tpra note 15, 
Guidelines 1.2, l.3(a); Death Penalty, S1tpra note 19, 
Guideline 5.1. 
22 NSC, mpra note 2, Guidelines 5.11, 5.12; ABA, 
stpra note 2, Standard 5-6.2; NAC, S1tpra note 2, 
Standard 13.1; Assigned Counsel, stpra note 2, 
Standard 2.6; Contracting, mpra note 2, Guidelines 
III-12, III-23; ABA Counsel for Private Parties, mpra 
note 2, Standard 2.4(B)(i). 
23 NSC, supra 'note 2, Guideline 3.4; ABA, supra 
note 2, Standards 5-4.1, 5-4.3; Contracting, supra 
note 2, Guideline III-10; Assigned Counsel, S1tpra 
note 2, Standard 4.7. l; Appellate, S1tpra note 20 
(Performance); ABA Counsel for Private Parties, S1tpra 
note 2, Standard 2. l(B)(iv). See NSC, supra note 2, 
Guideline 4.1 (includes numerical staffing ratios, 
e.g.: there must be one supervisor for every 10 attor-
neys, or one pare-time supervisor for every 5 attor-
neys; there muse be one investigator for every three 
attorneys, and at lease one investigator in every 
defender office). Cf NAC, stpra note 2, Standards 
13.7, 13.11 (chief defender salary should be at parity 
with chief judge; staff attorneys at parity with private 
bar). 
24 ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-2.4; Assigned 
Counsel, stpra note 2, Standard 4.7.3. 
25 NSC, s,pra note 2, Guideline 2.6; ABA, mpra 
note 2, Standards 5-3.1, 5-3.2, 5-3.3; Contracting, 
supra note 2, Guidelines III-6, III-12, and passim. 
26 ABA, s1pra note 2, Standard 5-3.3(b)(x); 
Contracting, supra note 2, Guidelines III-8, III-9. 
27 ABA,Defense Function, S1tpra note 15, Standard 
4-l.2(d). 
28 NAC, s1pra note 2, Standards 13.15, 13.16; 
NSC, supra note 2, Guidelines 2.4(4), 5.6-5.8; ABA, 
supra note 2, Standards 5-1.5; Model Ace, S1tpra note 
2, § lO(e); Contracting, supra note 2, Guideline III-
17; Assigned Counsel, mpra note 2, Standards 4.2, 
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1; NLADA Defender Training and 
Devewpment Standards (1997); ABA Counsel for 
Private Parties, supra note 2, Standard 2.1 (A). 
29 NSC, stpra note 2, Guidelines 5.4, 5.5; 
Contracting, stpra note 2, Guidelines III-16; 
Assigned Counsel, mpra note 2, Standard 4.4; ABA 
Counsel for Private Parties, supra note 2, Standards 
2.1 (A), 2.2; ABA Monitoring, supra note 3, 
Standards 3.2, 3.3. Examples of performance stan-
dards applicable in conducting these reviews include 
NLADA Performance Guidelines, ABA Defense 
Function, and NLADA/ABA Death Penalty. 
5 
D003071 
000343
0003072 
000344
FoR MoRE INFORMATION OR To ORDER PUBLICATIONS, CONTACT STAFF AT: 
American Bar Association, Division for Legal Services 
321 N. Clark Street, 19th Floor 
Chicago, Illinois 60610 
(312) 988-5750 
http://www.abalegalservices.org/ sclaid 
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Defending Liberty 
Pursuing Justice 
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[A] 
SALARY & BENEFITS 
Executive Director-Total 
Executive Director-Salary 
Admin. Asst.-Total 
Admin. Asst.-Salary 
OPERATING COSTS 
Rent/Utilities 
Rent 
Parking 
Other (Conf. Rm. Space) 
Assesment/Taxes 
Agency Services 
Accounting {DFM) 
IT Services {CIO) 
Legal Services (AG) 
Communications 
Postal & Mail 
Phone/Fax 
Email 
Employee Development 
Memberships 
Publications/Subscriptions 
Training (CLE/Conferences) 
Administrative Costs 
Copies/Copier 
Office Supplies 
Travel 
Commissioners 
Public Defense Commission 
FY 2015 ANNUAL BUDGET REPORT 
[B] [C] [D] 
· FY 2015 Actual 
Legislative Actual Exp. %at 
Appropriations July-June Allocation 
$119,800 $76,645 64% 
$67,001 
$48,545 
$9,735 
$8,858 
$70,200 $39,822 57% 
$7,708 19% 
$6,302 
$1,260 
$115 
$31 
$2,323 6% 
$936 
$1,387 
$0 
$690 2% 
$244 
$407 
$39 
$4,061 10% 
$615 
$2,096 
$1,350 
$2,462 6% 
$1,475 
$987 
$9,407 24% 
$4,752 
[E] [F] 
Extrapolated 
Monthly {Full 12-mo.) 
Estimate Expenses 
$8,516 $116,770 
$100,211 
$6,000 $71,996 
$16,558 
$1,235 $15,128 
$1,971 $32,843 
$924 $10,439 
$766 $8,654 
$140 $1,574 
$15 $180 
$3 $31 
$271 $3,304 
$104 $1,248 
$167 $2,056 
$0 $0 
$93 $1,155 
$35 $418 
$58 $699 
$39 
$332 $4,593 
$615 
$332 $3,978 
$352 $3,129 
$211 $2,529 
$141 $600 
$852 $10,223 
$335 $4,017 
D000375 
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FY 2015 Actual Extrapolated 
Legislative Actual Exp. %of Monthly (Full 12-mo.) 
Appropriations July-June Allocation Estimate Expenses 
Airfare $1,070 
Other· $3,682 $335 - . $4,017 
Executive Director $4,655 $517 $6,206 
Airfare $1,707 $190 $2,276 
Other $2,948 $328 $3,931 ioffi;~-Equip~-;;~i .. - ~-~~·~H ... ~,. · · ........ ~--·~--.......... $13,111 • ... ii% .. ,, .... --···· -· " - ... · - .. -- .. ~ 
I, __ ,.-_..,. ___ -~~-----~------ "-L,,.,. ....... ! • ,__......_,,,.._. _ ,_, ,_,.~,- • -• ........ ____ - - ..._ - -->lwt-•< ~ _..._ - :-~,. • ,4 _..,"-"k_ -~••" I-, _.._ ~"~ ... ,:. , -••""'-"•- • .: -
Furniture $6,994 
Computer/Electronics $3,271 
Misc. (signs, decor) $1,454 
Software $1,452 
r -- . ~ - ~""" _...,...,...,_.. .... _,.... -~- -,.. ~ ·- -.........--~ ........ --- .. -no,.. -·- •• -- .. -- ··~~- .._ .. - ~- •• - -·-~- - •• , . .,., -~ • .._,, ~ .. -.~·-· ..,.,. ,, ~ .. •· . , ............ - .,.. -. "'" 
1TRUSTEE & BENEFIT PAYMENTS $110,000 $89,401 81% 
\ •• ~ ------ -, -- ... - - - ~-~·-· ~-,•----~-- -- -· - ,._.., ..... ~,•- - ••• ~, ~. ' ........... ...1,. --~ -~ ..... l -j .... ;,•&..-..... ..-_ .... ~ .... _ _. .. 
NAPD Membership $3,680 
Juvenile Training $7,806 
Facilities $731 
Airfare/Milage $2,698 
Meals $1,262 
Lodging $1,245 
Other 
Capital Conference 
Facilities 
Airfare/Milage 
Meals 
Lodging 
Other 
Defender Summit 
Facilities 
Airfare/Milage 
Meals 
Lodging 
Other 
c: : : : : : TOTAL $300,000 
$1,869 
$24,802 
$281 
$12,436 
$2,612 
$7,404 
$2,069 
$53,113 
$2,418 
$18,894 
$8,812 
$18,000 
$4,989 
$205,868 69% 
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FY2015 Trustee & Benefits Allocations 
NAPD Memebership $ 3,680.00 
Juvenile Public Defense Conference 
Number of Registered Attendees 23 Actual Attendees 22 Presenters 6 
(4) Reimb 
Cost per Cost Per 
Expense Breakdown Total Cost Attendee Presenter 
Honorariums $ 1,300.00 
Facility Costs $ 731.40 
Materials $ 322.03 
Catering $ 747.80 
Lunch $262.50 $8.75 
Refreshments/Snacks $485.30 $16.18 
Travel Attendees Presenters 
Lodging $788.50 $456.50 $ 1,245.00 $35 .84 $76.08 
Per Diem $186.00 $328.60 $ 514.60 $8.45 $54.77 
Car Rental/Parking $32 .00 $214.94 $ 246.94 $1.45 $35.82 
Airfare/Mi le age $928.72 $1,769.60 $ 2,698.32 $42.21 $294.93 
Total Cost of Juvenile Conference $ 7,806.09 $112.89 $461.61 
Public Defense Summit 
Number of Registered Attendees 142 Actual Attendees 133 Presenters 16 
{58) Reimb (6) Reimb 
Cost per Cost Per 
Expense Breakdown Total Cost Attendee Presenter 
Honorariums $ 400.00 
Facility Costs $ 2,417.50 
Materials $ 1,859.98 
Catering $ 7,286.50 
June 4th Breakfast $630.00 $6.30 
June 4th Lunch $1,147.50 $7.65 
June 4th Banquet $2,224.00 $19.86 
Refreshments/Snacks $535.00 $3.57 
June 5th Breakfast $630.00 $6.30 
June 5th Lunch $1,147.50 $7.65 
June 5th Dinner $497.50 $9.95 
Refreshments/Snacks $475.00 $3 .17 
Travel Attendees Presenters 
Lodging $17,406.09 $594.00 $ 18,000.09 $130.87 $37.13 
Per Diem $1,320.50 $205 .10 $ 1,525.60 $9.93 $12.82 
Car Rental/Parking $2,187.81 $541.55 $ 2,729.36 $16.45 $33.85 
Airfare/Mileage $15,985.01 $2,908.86 $ 18,893.87 $120.19 $181.80 
Total Cost of Public Defender Summit $ 53,112.90 $341.88 $265.59 
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Capital Defense Seminar 
Number of Registered Attendees 31 Actual Attendees 
---~-· ... - --- - ~------- -------· -...... , .... _._ ------ - _ ... _______ .,.. 
Expense Breakdown_---·-- ... ·- ________ - -.. Total Cost 
l Honorariums 
Facility Costs 
Materials 
Catering 
Refreshments/Snacks 
Travel 
Lodging 
Per Diem 
Car Rental/Parking 
Airfare/Mileage 
!$ ~ $ I 
t $ 
! $ 
j 
281.25 i 
267.91 ! 
289.85; 
} 
$289.85 i i 
Attendees Presenters ; , 
$6,269.76 $1,134.00 '. $ 7,403.76 ) 
$1,507.50 $814.34 t $ 2,321.84: 
$934.54 $866.54 t $ 1,801.08 ' 
! ' $7,951.63 $4,484.49 l $ 12,436.12 , 
"----·-· -···· ·-·---
Total Cost of Capital Seminar $ 24,801.81 
Trustee & Benefits Allocation 
Total Trustee & Benefits Spent 
Amount Remaining 
$ 110,000.00 
$ 89,400.80 
$ 20,599.20 
32 Presenters 8 
(23} Reimb 
Cost per Cost Per 1 
._, 
Attendee Presenter ! 
------ ---- _......, 
$9.66. 
$195.93 $141.75 
$47.11 $101.79 
$29.20 $108.32 
$248.49 $560.56 
$530.39 $912.42 
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MISSION 
The mission of the State Public Defense Commission is to seek and preserve freedom for all by 
vigorously safeguarding Constitutional rights. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, "The price of freedom is 
eternal vigilance." 
VISION 
The State Public Defense Commission hopes to serve Idaho by 
(1) Serving as a clearing house of information regarding indigent defense for all relevant 
stakeholders; 
(2) Maintaining standards to ensure that attorneys have adequate training and resources to fulfill 
their Sixth Amendment obligations; 
(3) Promulgating rules for attorney training and data collecting; and 
( 4) Informing the legislature of any Sixth Amendment issues in the State. 
GOALS 
FIRST GOAL The Public Defense Commission will strive to Maintain or Improve the 
Performance of Individual Defending Attorneys. 
Objective 1: The Commission will seek to promulgate rules regarding training and Continuing 
Legal Education (CLE) requirements for defending attorneys where representation 
is provided by statute or required by the state or federal constitution in Fiscal Year 
2017. 
S11lJ\TEGY 1: The Commission will include training and CLE requirements in its suggested core 
contract terms for distribution in the Fall of 2015. 
S1MTEGY 2: The Commission will propose administrative rules setting out the practice and 
experience required in order to qualify for a contract or to serve as a public defender. 
1 
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PERFORMANCE MEASURE: The Commission will undertake the negotiated rule-making process 
in June and July of 2016, allowing a proposed rule to be submitted to 
the Department of Administration by the end of August of 2016. 
With initial publication and comment period slated for October of 
2016, a pending rule can be voted on by the Commission at the 
beginning of November of 2016, in time for publication and 
presentation to the legislature. 
Objective 2: The Commission will strive to ensure that defending attorneys are qualified to 
represent indigent clients where representation is provided by statute or under the 
state or federal constitution. 
STRATEGY 1: The Commission will include minimum qualification and experience standards in 
certain cases in suggested core contract terms offered to the counties and defending 
attorneys. 
STRATEGY 2: The Commission will make recommendations to the legislature, by statute or rule, to 
establish minimum qualifications and experience standards in certain cases. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE: Proposed legislation should be written and ready for presentation to 
the Legislature by January of 2016. If presented as for adoption by 
rule, the Temporary Rules process will need to be followed and all 
drafted rules must be submitted to the Department of Administration 
by the end of August 2015 in order to be published in the October 
2015 Bulletin. 
Objective 3: The Public Defense Commission will provide access to meaning~!, useful, and 
relevant trainings to defending attorneys.· 
S;rRATEGY 1: In the immediate future, the Public Defense Commission will host and conduct CLE 
trainings paid out of Trustee-Benefit payment funds. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE: In each Fiscal Year, the Commission should present substantive 
trainings for d~fending attorneys. Those trainings should include 
emphasis on training attorneys to handle juvenile cases, child 
protection actions, criminal cases, and capital training. 
BENCHMARK: The Commission will allocate as much of the Trustee-Benefit payments as possible 
in each fiscal year; and the Commission will strive to reach more than 190 defending 
attorneys in Fiscal Year 2016. 
STRATEGY 2: The Public Defense Commission will explore the possibility of partnering with other 
Idaho and national organizations to provide the most effective trainings. 
BENCHMARK: In Fiscal Year 2016 the Commission will determine dates ofIPA conferences 
through the next eighteen months, and conduct coordinating meeting with members 
of the IACDL subcommittee and with Federal Defenders ofldaho 
STRATEGY 3: The Public Defense Commission will seek to offer scholarships, financial subsidies, 
or incentives for defending attorneys to avail themselves of training programs and 
opportunities not offered by the Commission. 
2 
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PERFORMANCE MEASURE: The Commission will propose qualifications for scholarships and 
trustee-benefit payments by temporary rule by late August of 2015, in 
time for publication in the October 2015 Bulletin and presentation to 
the legislature for approval in January of 2016. 
BENCHMARK: Final adopted rules will be in place for Fiscal Year 2017. 
I 
STRATEGY 4: The Commission will provide online and remote training resources through webinars 
and the NAPD-MyGideon library. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1: The Commission will conduct a Winter and Summer drive for 
defending attorneys to join NAPD in each Fiscal Year. 
BENCHMARK: The Commission will seek to increase NAPD membership above 186 attorneys in 
Fiscal Year 2016. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2: The Commission will create a web-page featuring Idaho CLE credit 
courses offered through NAPD archived webinars during FY 2016. 
STRATEGY 5: The Commission will seek additional funding sources through grants and 
partnerships. . 
SECOND GOAL The Public Defense Commission will seek or explore systemic 
recommendations for the provision of indigent defense. 
Objective 1: The Commission will thoroughly explore or review other systems, models or 
alternatives by the end of Fiscal Year 2016. 
STRAIBGY 1: The Commission will gather information regarding all models for the provision of 
public defense. 
STRAIBGY 2: The Commission will seek input from defending attorneys and boards of county 
commissioners in order to determine their ideas and suggestions regarding the 
provision of indigent defense. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE: The Commission will continue to meet with defending attorneys and 
county commissions in every county, either one-on-one or through 
public defender events and Idaho Association of Counties 
conferences. 
Objective 2: The Commission will obtain sufficient information and perspective about Idaho's 
current circumstances to develop recommendations. 
STRAIBGY 1: The Commission will coordinate with the Idaho Supreme Court to determine what 
information will be collected through the Odyssey Program. 
BENCHMARK: Odyssey will be fully implemented in every county by the Summer of 2017, and the 
Commission will be ready to begin collecting its data through organized custom 
reports. A year of data collection will then be collected through Fiscal Year 2018. 
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STRATEGY 2: The Commission will identify any additional data that needs to be collected by the 
defending attorneys for the purpose of annual reporting. 
PERFORMANCE MEASUIIB 1: Provide the counties and defending attorneys a suggested template 
report for use across the State by the end of the county's fiscal year in 
September of 2015. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2: Engage in the negotiated rule-making process in June of 2016 in 
order to construct rules regarding the statutory reporting 
requirements of defending attorneys. That will allow for submission 
in August of 2016, for publication in October and adoption in 
November of the same year. 
STRATEGY 3: The Commission will develop a mechanism to gather input from defending attorneys 
regarding their unique circumstances. 
STRATEGY 4: The Commission will collaborate with the Idaho Association of Counties to gather 
information for actual and projected expenditures for public defense. 
Objective 3: The Commission will make recommendations for workload standards. 
STRATEGY 1: The Commission will review and select a time-management software program that 
would be recommend~d for defending attorneys in order to collect the data 
necessary to develop workload recommendations. 
STRATEGY 2: Identify the cost of a pilot program and explore funding solutions for that program. 
STRATEGY 3: Identify the counties that would serve as a pilot participant to track attorney time. 
STRATEGY 4: Identify how the data is going to be collected 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE: The Commission will have collected meaningful workload data 
before the end of Fiscal Year 2019. 
Objective 4: The Commission will identify the model that most appropriate meets the needs of 
Idaho, and indigent defendants according to the applicable constitutional standards. 
STRATEGY 1: The Commission will ensure that Objectives 1, 2, and 3 have been satisfactorily 
completed. 
STRATEGY 2: The Commission will identify workload standards, taking into account all external 
factors, including but not limited to: the geography of the county, the proximity of 
attorneys to clients and the courts, and travel distances required. 
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EXTERNAL FACTORS 
This strategic plan represents an initial attempt to identify those specific areas where the legislature has 
granted authority to the Commission. Nearly the entirety of the strategic plan is contingent on the further direction 
and approval of the Idaho Legislature. The existence of the Joint Interim Committee for Public Defense Reform 
means that the authority and scope of the Commission's charge is subject to change depending on the needs and 
decisions of the policymakers. The Commission is ready and willing to adapt with the shifting landscape and will 
revisit the strategic plan as often as is necessary in order to ensure responsiveness to the needs of Idaho. 
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MEETING MINUTES 
ST A TE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION 
Date I time 4/7/2015 8:30 AM I Location Canyon County Administration Building, 1st Floor Public Conference Room, 
111 North 11th Avenue, Caldwell, ID 
Meeting Commission Meeting-Model Contract Terms 
Commission members present 
Molly Huskey, Chair, District Judge I Darrell Bolz, Vice Chair, Juvenile Justice Comm. I Kimber Ricks, Madison Co. 
Comm. I William Wellman, Defense Attorney 
Ian Thomson, Exec. Dir. I Nichole Devaney, Admin. Asst. 
Commission members absent 
Chuck Winder, Senator I Christy Perry, Representative I Sara Thomas, SAPD (arrived late at 12:00pm) 
Others present 
None 
Item 
1. Welcome and Call to Order: 
Called to order at 8:35am 
2. Approval of Meeting Minutes (3/3/15): 
Mr. Wellman moved to adopt the minutes as presented, Mr. Bolz seconded, and the 
motion unanimously passed with one small typographical correction. 
3. Determination of who will attend the PDC Presentation to I.AC. on June 11th: 
Judge Huskey stated that it was not necessary for all members to attend. Ms. Thomas, 
Comm. Ricks and ED Thomson will already be in Coeur d'Alene, and suggested that 
either she or Mr. Wellman complete the group. Comm. Ricks suggested that anything the 
Commission wanted to talk about to better explain its purpose would be helpful for the 
audience. Judge Huskey recommended taking 30 minutes or so to go over the contract 
terms and then allow 30 minutes or so for questions. Comm. Ricks agreed, stating that the 
commissioners rely heavily on county staff and supporters to draft new contracts. Judge 
Huskey recommended the contracts terms discussion be the topic for the full hour and a 
half allotment. ED Thomson offered to forward an email in advance to all the 
Commissioners asking for suggested questions/concerns. Judge Huskey recommended 
tailoring the email to specify questions about contracts. Comm. Ricks mentioned that it 
would be helpful if the PDC touched on the issue of how the determination of who 
qualifies for a public defender is made. Mr. Bolz noted that it might be helpful for model 
contract terms to include a definition of a "flat fee contract" or that this issue be addressed 
with the IAC. Comm. Ricks reminded the PDC that there is clear division between some 
counties. The PDC needs to remember the differences between those counties with full-
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Item 
time commissioners, and in-house public defender offices. He expressed a desire that the 
PDC make an attempt and trying to mend some of those fences. 
4. Suggestions for use of excess Operating Budget FY 2015: 
5. 
At this time the anticipated operating funds available total approximately $25,000. Mr. 
Wellman referenced the Executive Leadership training discussed in the previous meeting, 
and inquired whether that was something the Commission wanted to use the money 
toward. ED Thomson referenced an email he forwarded to all the institutional office heads 
stating that he had only received interest from one person. Judge Huskey suggested 
offering leadership training to some of the up and coming PD's who show interest in 
leadership. Comm. Ricks commented that selection of individuals should be approached 
with caution so as not to give any appearance of favoritism. Judge Huskey proposed that 
she and ED Thomson get together over the next month and select a handful of potential 
individuals and establish a potential cost. 
ED Thomson suggested that some of the funds could be used toward educating the 
Commission, such as bringing out David Carroll from the Sixth Amendment Center to 
make a presentation to the group. He recommended asking him to come for the June 
meeting. Judge Huskey and Mr. Wellman agreed that would be a good idea. ED 
Thomson will contact him to see what his availability is in June. Comm. Ricks asked if this 
type of training should be open to the attendance of some of the interim committee 
members. Judge Huskey liked that idea and recommended getting Mr. Carroll's 
availability and then the Commission could determine which other individuals would 
benefit from a presentation that day. 
Mr. Bolz stated that if some money is reverted back to the general fund this year, it 
would not likely affect the Commissions budget next year. The legislature understands 
the Commission is new and will need a year to establish itself and its expenses. 
Model Contract Terms: 
The Commission then undertook a close examination of the contract terms. 
Case Types: Mr. Wellman suggested that the PDC use an inclusive approach that 
would strive to identify any case where a person's liberty is restricted. Mr. Wellman 
suggested that this list be incorporated with some verbiage within these terms to help 
Commissioners. ED Thomson suggested including direct appeals for all cases, whether 
that be by ·contract or through the SAPD' s services. There was also additional discussion of 
including appeals of juvenile delinquency matters. · 
Reports and Inspections: The Commission will recommend that annual reporting occur 
at the end of the county's fiscal year, and that it be submitted by the last day of October. 
The specifics of what that annual report should include were discussed and refined. That 
information must include all of those attorneys that provide services under the contract, 
regardless of whether they are the named attorney under the contract. 
Caseload Reports: There were suggestions that the proposed wording be modified to 
reflect the annual reporting requirement and to include the case types already included. 
Expenditure Reports: Suggestions were made to reflect the annual reporting and to 
include the case types. ED Thomson suggested adding language to distinguish between 
extraordinary expenses being spent out of original budget appropriations vs. 
Responsible 
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Item Responsible 
supplemental funding coming from the court. Commissioners generally agreed that the 
PDC should develop a standard form or report to be used by reporting attorneys, and that 
there would be a significant benefit in having all counties use the same form. 
Other: 'Inere was some discussion around the bar complaint process. It was determined 
that the requirements would be triggered by bar discipline instead of a complaints. 
Performance Expectations to be Considered: Mr. Wellman opened it up to the 
· Commission for direction as to whether the ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense· 
Delivery System, their guidelines for the defense function, or the NLADA Performance 
Guidelines should be incorporated or used in the terms of the contract. He asked, how the 
Commission might refer to them in a model contract. What burden would they place upon 
the countie~? There was general agreement amongst the Commissioners that the ABA Ten· 
Principles, along with part of the preamble, should be a mandatory provision of the 
contract. The Ten Principles could be attached as an addendum. There was a discussion 
about state and county exposure to liability once standards and aims are adopted. Ms. 
Thomas reminded the members that any proffered terms will be presented to the 
Legislature for adoption; if the counties then choose not to adopt them then the state and 
or county may open themselves up to liability (the state for not making them mandatory, 
and the county for acting contrary to state recommendation). 
There was also a discussion of the NLADA Guidelines compared to the ABA Guidelines 
for the Defense Function Standards. The Commissioners generally agreed that the NLADA 
Guidelines were (1) more recent, (2) incorporated most of the ABA guidelines, and (3) 
were more relevant to indigent defense practice. At the suggestion of Ms. Thomas and 
Chair Huskey, Thomson will order a bound volume of the NLADA guidelines for each 
county and member of the interim committee. There was general agreement to remove all 
caseload/workload issues from the initial model terms. Instead, attorneys should be 
guided by the ABA Ethics Opinion 06-441, which would be attached as an addendum. 
In discussing caseload, the issue of capital cases came up. Chair Huskey wondered 
whether it would be instructive for the members of the Commission if she were to arrange 
a meeting with J. Burdick, and obtain the court's interpretation of 18-4004A, and whether a 
First Degree murder case is considered a death penalty case in the absence of a filing of the 
Notice of Intent to Seek Death, before the statutory 60-day period after arraigni;nent has 
been satisfied, or where that period has been extended by an agreement of all parties. 
Should the capital standards apply in the interim? Otherwise, the defense team is at a 
significant disadvantage and very behind if that decision is made months later. 
Other Proposed Meetings: Ms. Thomas pointed out that the PDC will be going through 
the Executive Legislative System. Any proposed model contract terms need to go through 
the Governor's office, and reviewed by David Hensley or Mark W arbus. Chair Huskey 
would like to sit down with Governor's Office in advance of submitting any rules. Ms. 
Thomas offered to arrange that meeting. Comm. Ricks also offered to help arrange the 
meeting with Mr. Warbus. The PDC's goal would be to use the June IAC meeting as the 
start of a comment period, with feed~ack incorporated into the terms by September. (The 
IAC fall meeting is to be held from September 28-30 at the Grove Hotel.) 
It was also suggested that Chair Huskey and Dan Chadwick have a meeting with 
Comm. Yzaguirre (Ada County), to find out what are their concerns. A meeting could be 
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Item 
set-up for early May. There was an inquiry whether the IAC, and Dan Blocksom, could be 
used to assist counties in constructing model contract terms until the PDC is able to do so. 
Ms. Thomas made a motion for the PDC to ask for another FTE-attomey position next 
year, who could work with the counties to create RFP bids, and to manage, write and 
construct contracts. Mr·. Bolz seconded the motion. Comm. Ricks inquired as to whether it 
was premature, and whether anything similar already existed. Ms. Thomas explained that 
such an attorney would be an expert on the issue, and would constitute an actual service 
where the state (through the PDC) could off-set a cost to the counties. Comm. Ricks asked 
whether the PDC was appointing itself to act in that capacity. Ms. Thomas indicated that 
participation would not be mandatory. Chair Huskey added that the attorney could also 
help arrange and develop PD trainings, and data reporting. Such a position would require 
additional legislation. The vote in favor of the motion was unanimous (five present). 
, 
Grounds to renegotiate contract: Ms. Thomas believes there needs to be a clearer 
standard, other than "significant changes", when a defending attorney is justified in 
renegotiating a contract. The Commission should look for a definition of what constitutes a 
"significant change," and should probably include a definition of materiality. Ms. Thomas 
also believes there needs to be an "out" provision, like in Blaine County, in the event any 
case exceeds 60 hours of attorney-time. In that event, the attorney would have to notify the 
county, and then estimate the time required. In that event, the attorney would then be paid 
by the hour. The administrative district judge would then make a determination of the 
appropriate number of hours and the reimbursement rate, under seal. 
Qualifications and Case Requirements: Many of the remaining terms had already been 
taken up in the previous contract terms meeting on January 28th. There were some 
adjustments suggested when addressing capital cases. There was also lengthy discussion 
surrounding the experience qualifications required for juvenile representation, and 
whether the same case severity distinctions should be made when distinguishing between 
certain felonies and delinquency cases. The Commission generally agreed that serious 
adult felonies would be divided if the possible exposure was 15 years or greater, or where 
certain mandatorY. minimums applied. Juvenile cases need to be distinguished between 
whether the cases.are waivable and non-waivable crimes (whether the cases are 
transferra~le into adult court). There was considerable discuss~on as to what qualifications 
should be necessary in those types of cases. There was general agreement that any 
resulting model contract term should parallel the statute that discusses transferring 
jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court. 
6. Next Meeting: May 5, 2015, 1 - 5pm 
Agenda Items for Next ~eeting: 
7. 
Review and finalize model contract terms; should discuss IAC presentation in June; 
follow-up on David Carroll meeting in June; postpone discussion on strategic plan and 
caseload/workload studies. 
Proposed to meet again at Canyon County Administration Building. 
Adjournment 
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Attachments: 
Proposed Model .Contract Terms (Rough Draft) 
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) 
) Case No. CV OC 1510240 
) Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO 
) PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" ) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO 
OTTER, in his official capacity as Governor ) DEFENDANTS 
ofldaho; HON. MOLLY HUSKEY, et al., in ) 
their official capacities as members of the ) 
Idaho State Public Defense Commission, ) ) 
Defendants. ) 
---------------
. Pursuant to the court's Order Regarding Discovery, dated October 19, 2015, Defendants 
answer Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Admission as follows. Defendants deny each request 
except as specifically admitted below. 
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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Please admit the following: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 1: The Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) was creat-
ed by Executive Order in 2005, and operates under the supervision of the Governor. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 1: Defendants admit that on June 16, 2005, Gov-
ernor Kempthorne issued Executive Order No 2005-06, which "establish[ed] the Idaho Criminal 
Justice Commission." See Idaho Administrative Bulletin Volume (I.A.B. Vol.) 05-8, pages 15-
16 (August 3, 2005); 2006 Idaho Session Laws (I.S.L.), pp. 1430-1432. Executive Order 2005-
06 was repealed and replaced by Executive Order 2005-17, which was in turn repealed and 
replaced by Executive Order 2006-29. By its terms, that Executive Order ceased to be effective 
no later than four years later and is no longer in effect. Governor Otter continued the Idaho 
Criminal Justice Commission through Executive Order 2011-11, dated July 19, 2011, and 
Executive Order 2015-10, dated September 23, 2015. Defendants deny that the Idaho 
Criminal Justice Commission "operates under the supervision of the Governor." The currently 
effective executive order, Executive Order 2015-10, does not provide for the Governor to 
supervise the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission, and it authorizes the Governor to appoint only 
a minority of the Commission's members. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 2: The pmpose of the CJC is to provide policy-level direction 
to State officials and to promote the efficient and effective use of resources, based on best 
practices or evidence-based practices, for matters related to the State's criminal justice system. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 2: Defendants deny this Request for Admission 
because it is inconsistent with Executive Order 2015-10, which recites the following purpose for 
the CJC: 
2. The purpose of the Commission shall be to provide policy-level direction 
and to promote efficient and effective use of resources, based on a data-
driven approach and evidenced-based practices, for matters related to the 
State's criminal justice system. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 3: The CJC is comprised of at least one representative from 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of Idaho's state government, and consists of 26 
total members. 
· ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 3: Defendants admit this Request except for the 
fact that Executive Order 2015-10 provides that the CJC "shall consist of 25 members," and 
recognizing that from time to time there can be vacancies in the membership of the CJC that, 
until filled, will leave the CJC with fewer than 25 total members. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 4: Among other required members, the CJC must include a 
representative from the Governor's office; the state Attorney General or his designee; two 
members from the Idaho Senate; two members from the Idaho House of Representatives; the 
Administrative Director of the Courts; three representatives from the judiciary; and one 
representative from the Office of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 4: Defendants admit this request. See Executive 
Order 2015-10. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 5: In 2009, the CJC formed a Public Defense Subcommittee 
(Subcommittee) tasked with developing specific recommendations for improvement of Idaho's 
public defense system . 
. ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 5: Defendants admit that the CJC formed a 
subcommittee in 2009 tasked with evaluating the public defender system and bringing 
recommendations to the CJC. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 6: In 2011, Defendant Governor Otter issued Executive Order 
No. 2011-11, continuing and reaffirming the CJC' s mandate. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 6: Defendants admit that Governor Otter issued 
Executive Order No. 2011-11, "CONTINUING THE IDAHO CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMIS-
SION." However, the continued CJC was differently constituted than the CJC established in 
2005 (which had 22 members, not 26). Defendants deny that Executive Order 2011-11 
"continu[ed] and reaffirm[ed] the CJC's mandate" because the Executive Order No. 2005-06's 
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Paragraph 2, clauses a thro4gh g, overlapped in part with Executive Order No. 2011-11 's 
Paragraph 2, clauses a through e, but also differed in part in their directives to the CJC. Compare 
I.A.B. Vol. 05-8, pages 15-16 (August 3, 2005), 2006 Idaho Session Laws (I.S.L.), pp. 1431-
1 
1432, with I.A.B. Vol. 11-9, p. 31 (September 7, 2011); 2012 I.S.L., p. 1008. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 7: On May 24, 2013, after approximately three years of in-
vestigation, the Subcommittee issued a set of public defense reform recommendations to the 
CJC. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 7: Defendants admit that on May 24, 2013, the 
CJC · Public Defense . Subcommittee adopted Recommendations of the Public Defense 
Subcommittee in a process summarized below: 
In 2009, the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission ("the 
Commission" or "ICJC") formed a Public Defense Subcommittee 
("the Subcommittee") tasked with developing recommendations 
for improvement of Idaho's public defense system. In January of 
2010, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association ("NLADA") 
released a report which suggested that Idaho is not adequately sat-
isfying its Sixth Amendment obligations. For more than three 
years, the Subcommittee committed itself to identifying improve-
ments to be made, and its efforts yielded four pieces of proposed 
legislation. 
See http://icjc.idaho.gov/pubs/ICJC%20Recommendations%20of1>/o20the%20Public%20 
Defense%20Subcommittee.pdf. 
, REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 8: Defendant Sarah B. Thomas became Chair of the CJC on 
or abo'ut May 30, 2013, and continues to serve in that capacity at present. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 8: Defendants admit this request. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 9: In 2008, the CJC, along with the Idaho Juvenile Justice 
Commission, authorized the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct 
a comprehensive evaluation ofldaho's trial-level indigent defense services. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 9: Defendants admit that the CJC was aware that 
the NLADA intended to evaluate Idaho's trial-level indigent defense services. Defendants admit 
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that the CJC agreed to cooperate with the evaluation, but deny that the CJC authorized the 
evaluation by funding or permitting it. The NLADA funded the evaluation through a grant and 
did not need the CJC's permission to do it. Defendants deny that the NLADA evaluation was 
"comprehensive" because the NLADA sent evaluators to only seven ofthe 44 counties. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 10: The CJC identified seven counties to serve as a repre-
sentative sample of indigent defense systems to be evaluated by the NLADA. These included 
. 
Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, Nez Perce, and Power Counties. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 10: Defendants admit that a subcommittee of the 
CJC identified seven counties to serve as a representative sample for the NLADA evaluation, but 
deny that the full CJC selected or approved the sample counties. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 11: In January 2010, the NLADA released the results of its 
evaluation of_trial-Ievel indigent defense systems in Idaho, entitled "The Guarantee of Counsel: 
Advocacy & Due Process in Idaho's Trial Courts." 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 11: Defendants admit that in January 2010 the 
NLADA released a document the cover of which was titled and subtitled "The Guarantee of 
Counsel: Advocacy & Due Process in Idaho's Trial Courts" and "Evaluation of Trial-Level 
Indig~nt Defense Systems in Idaho." 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 12: In its January 2010 report, the NLADA determined that 
none of the indigent defense systems in· the sample counties were constitutionally adequate. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 12: Defendants admit that the 2010 NLADA 
report stated: ''NLADA finds that none of the public defender systems in the sample counties are 
constitutionally adequate." Page iii. Defendants deny the rest of this Request for Admission to 
the extent it implies that the counties involved were a statistically valid random sample of coun-, 
ties in Idaho or that the NLADA report is a "determination" that must be judicially accepted. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 13: The NLADA's January 2010 report was made available 
to and reviewed by representatives of the executive and legislative branches of Idaho state gov-
ernment, including Governor Otter. 
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ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 13: Defendants admit that NLADA's January 
2010 report was made available to members of the executive and legislative branches of Idaho 
State Government, including the named Defendants, who had the opportunity to review it. 
Defendants admit that the named defendants who are persons reviewed the report. Defendants 
neither admit nor deny which Legislative or other Executive officers "reviewed" the 2010 report 
because Defendants are not responsible for and do not monitor which other State officers did so. 
· REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 14: There are currently no statewide caseload standards for 
public defenders in Idaho. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 14: Defendants admit this Request for Admis-
sion. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 15: There are currently no statewide performance standards 
for public defenders in Idaho. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 15: Defendants deny this Request. United States 
Supreme Court decisions, Idaho Supreme Comt decisions, Idaho Court of Appeals decisions, 
Idaho Supreme Comt rules and State Bar Rules contain some performance standards which apply 
to all public defenders in Idaho. Defendants admit that there are no statewide statutory 
,performance standards for public defenders in Idaho and no Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission rules with statewide performance standards for public defenders in Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 16: There are currently no specific statewide training require-
ments for public defenders in Idaho. · 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 16: Defendants admit this Request for Admission 
except as qualified in this paragraph. Defendants note that Idaho State Bar Rules 400 through 408 
require every attorney practicing in Idaho, including public defenders, to paiticipate in continuing 
legal education (CLE), although that requirement does not require public defenders to take CLE 
specific of criminal defense. Defendants further note that Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3 contains 
Stand.ards for Qualification of Appointed Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. 
Ill 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 17: There is currently no statewide oversight of trial-level 
indigent defense services being provided to criminal defendants throughout the various counties. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 17: Defendants admit this Request for Admission 
with ~he exception of Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3 's standards for Qualification of Appointed Coun-
i 
sel in Death Penalty Cases. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 18: There is currently no requirement that public defenders 
report their individual caseloads to state officials or any court. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 18: Defendants admit this Request for Admission 
with respect to repmting to State Executive or State Legislative Officers, but deny that there is no 
requirement to report to other officials or courts. Idaho Code § 19-864 requires all defending 
attorneys to "submit an annual report to the board of county commissioners and the appropriate 
administrative district judge showing the number of persons represented under [the Idaho Public 
Defense Act], the crimes involved and the expenditures . . . made in carrying out the 
responsibilities imposed by [the act]." Defendants object to this Request for Admission as unduly 
burdensome to the extent that it seeks information on whether any other Idaho judge has ever 
required a public defender to report his or her individual case load to the judge because that would 
require a survey of every one of the 45 current District Judges, all of the 88 Magistrate Judges, 
and over 60 Senior Judges, any of whom could be designated to hear criminal cases. Little 
purpose would be served by diverting these judicial officers from their normal duties to answer 
such a survey to determine whether one or more of them has ever asked a public defender to 
repo,t his or her case load to the Court. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 19: Aside from the trustee benefit payments allocated to the 
Idaho Public Defense Commission (PDC) in 2014 to offer limited training for public defense 
attorneys around the state, the State of Idaho currently provides no funding for trial-level 
indigent defense services . 
. ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 19: Defendants admit that the trustee benefit 
payments allocated to the Idaho Public J?efense Commission (PDC) in 2014 to offer training for 
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public defense attorneys around the state is :funding the State of Idaho currently provides for 
trial-level indigent defense services. Defendants deny that the funds are provided to offer 
"limited" training. There are no limits imposed on the PDC regarding the training it can provide 
with the funds. Defendants object to this Request for Admission as unduly burdensome to the 
extent that it seeks information on whether any defending attorney has applied for and received 
any State grant funding, which would be additional funding for trial-level indig~nt services. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 20: Pursuant to J.C. sec. 19-862, each board of county com-
missioners alone is responsible for appropriating enough money to deliver adequate public 
defense services to indigent defendants being prosecuted in their jurisdiction. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 20: Defendants deny this Request for Admission. 
Idaho Code § 19-862(2) explicitly allows counties that establish and maintain an office of public 
defender to "accept private contributions for support of the office" of public defender in addition 
to the appropriations for suppmt of the office for which they alone are responsible. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 21: County commissioners are not required to have any for-
mal or informal training in the law. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 21: Defendants admit Request for Admission 21. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 22: A survey conducted by the CJC in 2014 found that indi-
gent defendants are represented by counsel at their initial appearance in only 5 of the 44 counties. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 22: Defendants deny this request because it 
suggests that the CJC conducted a complete and accurate survey. Defendants believe the request 
may be referring to an informal e-mail poll a member of a CJC subcommittee conducted. Not 
every defending attorney was polled, and public defenders from only some counties responded, 
making any results of the informal poll incomplete and unreliable. Defendants are aware of no 
written report describing the informal poll and its results, which have not been presented to or 
reviewed by the CJC. 
II/ 
II/ 
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· REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 23: A significant number of public defenders in Idaho are not 
receiving adequate training hours in areas directly relevant to the representation of their indigent 
clients. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 23: Defendants object to this request on the 
ground that the tenn "adequate training" is ambiguous and Defendants do not know what the 
Plaintiffs consider "adequate." Defendants admit that the PDC's initial assessment of the amount 
and source of the mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) credit hours obtained by public 
defenders in their current reporting period indicated that a significant number of public defenders 
in Idaho were not receiving adequate CLE training hours in areas directly relevant to the 
representation of their indigent clients. Defendants note that the PD C's initial assessment did not 
include other training the public defenders may have received. Since the PDC's initial 
assessment, the PDC has helped increase available training by joining public defenders to the 
National Association for Public Defense, which provides significant online resources. The PDC 
also has used its trustee benefit payment allocation to host and sponsor indigent defense attorney 
training conferences at little or no cost to the attending attorneys. Defendants believe the PDC's 
effmts have improved and will continue to improve the training Idaho's public defenders are 
receiving. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 24: According to a recent report by the Idaho Legislative 
Services Office regarding caseloads, public defenders in some counties are handling more than 
twice the number of cases they should be. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 24: Defendants object to this Request for Admis-
sion because it is vague and does not identify the repmt In addition, the notion of the number of 
cases a public defender "should be" handling is a subjective judgment not based on any adopted 
caseload standards in Idaho. Defendants also deny this Request for Admission to the extent that it 
may be referring to written materials presented to the 2014 Legislative Public Defense Reform 
Interim Committee. The website for the that 2014 Interim Committee contains links to a number 
of materials submitted to the Interim Committee and lists three Committee Staffers, 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS - 9 
000369
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/defense.htm, but none of the Staff materials 
that are linked to that website stated that public defenders in some counties are handling more 
than twice the number of cases that the public defenders should. If Plaintiffs are referring to 
materials other than those produced by the Legislative Services Office for the 2014 Legislative 
Public Defense Reform Interim Committee or are themselves inferring such a conclusion, they 
need to provide more information about what materials they are referring to in order to allow 
Defendants to admit or deny this Request. 
1 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 25: On any given day, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of 
individuals being prosecuted by the State ofldaho, who qualify for indigent defense services. 
· ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 25: Defendants object to this Request for Admis-
sion because it is vague and because it would be unduly burdensome to answer. It is vague be-
cause the words "individuals being prosecuted" could refer to persons who are in court on "any 
given day" or to persons who have prosecutions pending on "any given day." The numbers 
would vary significantly depending upon which meaning these words have. It is further vague 
because "hundreds" might refer to any number from 200 on up. There is no way to know what 
the threshold for "hundreds" is. It is unduly burdensome because in order to answer this question 
for "any given day" one would have to know the actual number of defendants who qualify for 
indigent defendant services on every day of the year, presumably for several years, which would 
require reviewing the Court dockets for every county in the State and further determining which 
criminal defendants are eligible for indigent defendant services to determine whether there are 
"hundreds" of them on each of those days. 
· REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26: The majority of individuals charged with either a misde-
meanor or felony in Idaho are alleged to have violated state law, rather than a county or munici-
pal ordinance. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26: Defendants admit this Request for Admission 
for felonies because neither citi~s nor counties have authority to enact ordinances creating felo-
. 
nies. See Idaho Code § 31-2604 (noting that cities and counties may create misdemeanors by 
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ordinance). Defendants object to the part of this Request for Admission that concerns misdemea-
nors as unduly burdensome because it would require Defendants to compile a Statewide list of all 
misdemeanor prosecutions and separately determine which were brought under Idaho statute and 
which were brought under city or county ordinance in order to determine where a majority lie . 
. -
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26: The State of Idaho does provide funding to county prose-
cutors' offices throughout the state. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26: Defendants deny this Request for Admission. 
There is no direct legislative appropriation to County Prosecutors' Offices throughout th~ State 
as such. However, some State revenues a1·e dlrectly distributed to counties, which in t11rn may use 
those revenues for county offices, including the County Prosecutor's Office or the County Public 
Defender's Office (if there is one). Se~, e.g., Idaho Code § 63-3636(8), -(lO)(b)-(c), -(11), & ~ 
( 13) ( distribution of State sales tax to Couf!,ties ). 
DATED this 12th day of November, 2015. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By 4-H-~ SCOITANZIO -
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants State ofldaho, 
Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz, 
Kimber Ricks, Sen, Chuck Winder, and 
Rep. Christy Perry 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
By /k{)fr: ~ 4---
CALLYYOUNG t,.er e,,w.;I ~-. 
Attorney for Govem01 Otte1· 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & 
SORENSEN;LLP 
By pJwfd;;r/ 
DAVID W. CANTRILL 
Attorney for Defendants William H. 
Wellman and Sara B. Thomas 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of November, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy o~the foregoing by the following method to: 
Richard Eppink 
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho 
Foundation 
P.O. Box 1897 
Boise, ID 83701 
. Jason D. Williamson 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
125 Broad Street 
New ,York, NY 10004 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 
1200 Seventeenth Street 
Denver, CO 80202 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
Bret H. Ladine 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
3 Embarcadero Center 1500 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
Jenny Q. Shen 
Hogan Lovells US LLP 
4085 Campbell Avenue, Suite 100 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 208-344-7201 
!Z] Email: reppink@acluidaho.org 
0U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 212-549-2654 
!Z] Email: jwilliamson@aclu.org 
0U.S.Mai·I 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 303-899-7333 
!Z] Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com 
0U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 202-637-5600 
!Z] Email: kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com 
0U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 415-374-2499 
!Z] Email: bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com 
0U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile: 
!Z] Email: jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com 
evelyn.perry@hoglanlovells.com 
SCOTTZANZ 
Deputy~ n:a:: 
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MEETING MINUTES 
ST A TE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION 
Date I time 9/15/2015 1:00 PM I Location Len B. Jordan Building, Conference Room B-09, 
650 W. State Street, Boise, ID 83702 
Meeting September Commission Meeting 
Commission members present 
Molly Huskey, Chair, District Judge I Kimber Ricks, Madison Co. Comm. I Chuck Winder, Senator arrived at 
1:25pm I William Wellman, Defense Attorney I Christy Perry, Representative 
Nichole Devaney, Admin. Asst. 
Commission members absent 
Darrell Bolz, Vice Chair, Juvenile Justice Comm. I Sara Thomas, SAPD 
Others present 
Kathy Griesmyer, ACLU I Eric Fredericksen, SAPD 
Item 
1. Welcome and Call to Order: Judge Huskey ~alled the meeting to order at 1:00pm. 
2. Approval of Prior Meeting Minutes (8/19/15): Approval of the minutes was 
postpone.cl until the next meeting to allow those members who were present an 
opportunity to review the minutes. 
Responsible 
Huskey 
3. Executive Session: Judge Huskey made a motion to move into an Executive Session Huskey 
as authorized by subsection 74-206F for the purpose of discussing personnel matters 
and an update on the pending litigation. The executive session would be attended by 
the commissioners only, with the exception that the administrative assistant could 
remain for the personnel discussion. A roll call vote was taken with all present 
members ( 4) unanimously agreeing. The public session was adjourned at 
approximately 1:05pm. 
a. Personnel Matters-Review of Executive Director Applicants: Mr. Folgerson 
application package would need removed from consideration as it was 
incomplete at the time of submission. In Mr. W~lhnan's opinion the only 
vi~ble applicants were Mr. James and Mr. Patterson. He is familiar with both 
candidates and offered his opinion on both. Comm. Ricks asked the members 
what they could learn from the previous director that would prevent similar 
issues. Judge Huskey offered that she would like to ~valve Dan Chadwick in 
the interview and selection process. The Commission will need someone who 
works well with the counties and Mr. Chadwick would be the best person to 
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Item Responsible 
provide that insight. Additionally she stated that the new director would need 
to be able to take direction well initially. The commission members have many 
years of experience with the legislature, the new director should be open to 
direction in that regard. Mr. Wellman shared that this person would also need 
the ability to delicately approach issues given the pending law suit and hurdles 
that face the commission at this time. Judge Huskey shared that she would like 
to see the commission reopen the position posting. Rep. Perry commented that 
she felt the position requires a great deal of administration she was not sure 
that an attorney after having practiced many years would be happy in an 
administrative role such as this. Judge Huskey and Mr. Wellman explained 
that some attorneys are more interested in the administrative side, these are the 
individuals that are comfortable working on policy, research and the like .. The 
commission would need to find an individual such as this. Judge Huskey 
offered that in her opinion the current applicants have not shown interest in 
this type of work therefore they may not be the best fit. At this point the 
administrative assistant was excused and only the members remained for the 
litigation update. 
b. Update on Litigation from Judge Huskey: 
The public session promptly reconvened at 1:30pm at which time Rep. Perry motioned 
that the Executive Director position posting be reopened, Mr. Wellman seconded, and 
the motion passed unanimously. Reposting should be effective immediately, closing 
on October 5, 2015. The members would expect an update at the next meeting with 
the understanding that the posting had just closed. Judge Husky requested that Ms. 
Devaney contact the current applicants and make them aware that the position would 
be reposted however they need not apply again. Their application packages would be 
considered along with any new packages received through reposting. 
4. Discuss section VII.J.lb of the Suggested Contract Terms, finalize for submission to Thomas 
IAC: 
5. 
6. 
Ms. Thomas was not present therefore the discussion was postponed until the next 
meeting. · 
Discuss temporary rules for Public Defender Training and Scholarship 
Qualification: 
The discussion was postponed until the next meeting due to Ms. Thomas absence. 
Thomas 
Joint IACDL Sun Valley Conference Update: Ms. Devaney summarized_ that IACDL Devaney 
has agreed to partner with the Commission on the Sun Valley Conference to be held 
March 4 and 5, 2016. The commission will be responsible for paying IACDL $15,525 
regardless of the number of attendees up to 104. Any additional attendees over 104 
will be at a cost of $150.00 per registrant. The PDC would cover the cost of registration 
and two night's hotel for all attendees who register through the PDC. Participants 
traveling a distance of 200 - 300 miles would also receive a travel allocation of $150.00 
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Item 
those traveling a distance greater than 300 miles would receive $300. IACDL holds a 
dinner on Friday evening, this is typically included in the price of registration 
however, for PDC registrants it would be at an additional discounted cost. Rep. Perry 
asked if the conference is in line with training topics the commission has previously 
provided. Mr. Wellman assured her it was a very well done conference and would be 
valuable to all PD' s. 
7. Addition to Agenda: Judge Huskey asked if the Commission could discuss the 
Interim Committee Meeting scheduled for Friday, September 18th. She shared that she 
had been ~sked to provide an update on the Commission that should include requests 
for additional services/assistance the Committee could provide to help the 
Commission to be successful in its charge. After much discussion the following topics 
were suggested: 
Statutory modification to address training funding and the ability of the 
Commission to conduct training programs. 
Provide the Commission enforcement capabilities - contract terms, standards 
and qualification requirements will not be effective if counties are able to opt 
out. The addition of enforcement to the Commission's charge will require 
additional staff and resources. 
Provide information on a state funding mechanisms. The following three 
models would be suggested: a) state administered funding from one 
location/agency, b) a regional funding program administered at the district 
level or c) leaving funding at a county level subjecting it to a cap. 
Sen. Winder moved that Judge Huskey present on the three points suggested, Mr. 
Wellman seconded, the motion passed unanimously. 
Judge Huskey voiced her concerns about the length of time it may take to find an 
Executive Director. She felt the Committee will need to be aware of the constraints the 
Commission maybe under due to the lack of staff as they relate to the Commissions 
goals for the year. 
8. Set Future Meeting Schedule: The meeting schedule has been set through December. 
Jan. 5, 2016 was the only additional date added to the schedule. 
9. Agenda I~ems for Next Meeting 
a. Executive Session: Personnel Issues - Applicant update 
b. High Quality Representation in Child Welfare Case (Debra Alsaker-Burke): 
Judge Huskey requested that Ms. Devaney contact Debra Alsaker-Burke to 
invite her to present at the 10/5 meeting. 
10. Next Meeting Location: Nampa Public Library 
The members then decided that the next meetings should be held as follows: The 
November meeting in Boise at the LBJ Building & December's in Nampa at the Public 
Library. 
Responsible 
Devaney 
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Item 
11. Adjournment: Mr. Wellman motioned to adjourn, Judge Huskey seconded the 
motion passed unanimously. The meeting adjourned at 3:10pm. 
Attachments: 
Suggested Contract Terms 
Public Defender Training and Scholarship Qualification 
Memo of Understanding with IACDL 
Responsible 
Huskey 
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STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION 
MEETING MINUTES 
October 21, 2014 
Location: State Appellate Public Defender, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, ID 83703 Time: 10:00 am - 2:00 pm 
Members Present: 
Molly Huskey, Chair, District Court Judge 
Darrell Bolz, Vice Chair, Juvenile Justice Commission 
Jason Monks, Representative 
Kimber Ricks, Madison Co. Cmmsr. 
Sara Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender 
William Wellman, Defense Attorney 
Chuck Winder, Senator 
Ian Thomson, Executive Director 
Members Absent: 
Huskey arrived at 11 :OOam 
Winder arrived at 12:15am 
ffl Monks left at 11 :30am 
>< :C Others Present: 
- Marilyn Paul, Twin Falls PD m Kathy Griesmyer, ACLU-Boise 
- Jason Williamson, ACLU-NYC 
.... Tanya Greene, ACLU-NYC 
~ Rep. Luker . 
~ 
I. Welcome and call to order 
2. Call for additional items 
Bolz 
All members 
a NORC DOJ Survey Sara Thomas mentioned the letter she had received from NORC, addressing the Thomson 
national survey they are conducting for DOJ. She suggests that we send out 
b Meeting Minutes 
a letter or email to the various counties (PDs or clerks) to encourage wide 
participation. (Marilyn Paul noted that she has received the same materials). 
Thomson will prepare and send the letter. 
Vice-Chair Bolz mentioned that no meeting minutes had been aooroved (past Bolz 
1 
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Minutes 
3. Report on PDC developments 
a Lease,office,hiring 
b ED Meetings: IACDL, IAC, 
ACLU, PDs in Bonner, Boundary, 
Kootenai, Owyhee, Gem 
c Public Defense Roster: numbers 
and geography 
Meeting Outcomes/Decisions Reached 
four meetings.) He suggested that all members review the minutes m 
advance of the next meeting for the Commission's approval. 
ED Thomson has moved forward on a lease at the Garro Building (Bannock St. 
downtown). The Dept. of Lands has delayed and prolonged the process 
considerably with their own lease. A final lease and possession is hopefully 
forthcoming. The problem of parking was mentioned. Thomson indicated 
that parking would be included in the lease and that Capital Mall parking 
was not available to PDC employees. Vice-Chair Bolz said he would look 
into parking for members of the Commission in the new garage. 
ED Thomson indicated that interview for the administrative assistant position are 
scheduled for tomorrow. Interviews will be conducted with someone from 
HR or Rachel Murray from the SAPD in attendance. 
Thomson brought up the fact that he has met with board members of IACDL, 
representative of IAC and ACLU, and several county public defender office 
heads. 
Ricks explained that 36 of the counties are headed by part-time commissioners, 
and they are in need of considerable education. Step one is educating the 
commissioners on the inherent conflict of relying on the prosecutors for 
advice regarding PD contracts. There are a few counties that are hiring 
outside counsel to advise on this issue. Ricks suggests a meeting with 
commissioners and prosecutors (or the civil deputy). All commissions meet 
at least once per month. Bolz suggests that the PDC consider getting on the 
statewide Commissioner-meeting, which is in the I 51 . or 2nd week of 
February. Ricks also suggests a regional tour. There are six commission 
Who's 
Responsible 
Thomson 
districts, and each has a quarterly meeting. (ED will check with IAC for a Thomson 
schedule and consider attending those meetings.) Ricks indicated that they 
are frequently looking for things to put on the agenda. 
ED Thomson presented a summary of current public defender roster numbers. 
(Summary document was distributed to members.) Thomas inquired whether 
there rules that will require judges to follow certain standards .when making 
appointments? If not, the Commission is likely to end up requiring certain 
standards from institutional defenders and not requiring the same from the 
contract attorneys in other counties. 
Thomson passed around four geographical maps outlining the distances from 
out-of-town contract public defenders. It was suggested by Rep. Bolz that 
similar slides be prepared for the Interim Committee next week. 
There was a discussion about how time should be considered and whether it 
should be included in proposed contract terms. Wellman and Thomas 
2 
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d 
4. 
5. 
Minutes 
Travel: E.D. meetings with county 
defenders and commissioners 
Commission related 
mail/ correspondence 
Commission Media Inquiries 
lY,(e~ting Outcomes/Decisions Reach~d 
suggested that contracts might include a "door-to-door" travel time 
allowance. 
Chair Huskey mentioned the Judge's need to consider the reimbursement for 
attorneys' court time, and the impact it has on courthouse accommodation of 
the calendars for privately retained counsel and the public defender. She 
inquired whether public defenders get "high-centered" by spending so much 
time waiting for private counsel and always being heard last? 
Thomas proposed a quarterly report to the Commission on the expense budget. 
Those in attendance were in general agreement. Thomson proposed 
travelling as much as possible in November and December in order to meet 
with county defenders and commissioners. Thomas suggested an 
informational presentation: it needs to be emphasized that PD reporting is 
necessary in order to advocate for additional resources. She advocated a 
presentation that convinces the county_ commissions and public defenders 
that the PDC is a resource. She reiterated that J. Burdick has already 
admitted that the system is broken. Thomas also proposed that someone 
from the PDC speak to the IACDL in Sun Valley. Wellman brought up the 
IACDL listserve response to Jared Hoskins' survey, which indicated that the 
response was very poor . He expressed a desire to receive information and 
input directly from defending attorneys. ED Thomson agreed to get 
Wellman a copy of the PD roster for contact information. 
Monks brought up complaints and letters being sent directly to PDC members. It 
was proposed that all correspondence with complaints be sent to the ED. ED 
Thomson is to draft and create a form letter. It will be sent around to the 
Commission for revisions. 
Chair Huskey believes that a strategy with a cohesive message from the 
commission needs to be composed in response to inquiries or pieces like the 
Moscow-Pullman Daily News, and Idaho Public Television. 
Huskey and Thomas indicated that Spitfire Communications, out of DC, has had 
money in the past to help states develop media strategies regarding public 
defense funding and inadequacy of representation. They are a media 
relations firm familiar with the subject. Thomas also suggested talking to the 
NAPD. Huskey expressed the need for help not only in crafting that 
message, but in delivering it. They may help prepare a media kit. The PDC 
should also consider using social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc). The ED 
needs training on how to conduct an interview and help developing a 
message. Thomas suggested that Jeff Ray or Wray (at DOC), may be a 
resource, he was previously with Channel 2. Huskey believes that kind of 
training is a high priority. Wellman expressed that the Mission and Vision 
3 
· Who.'s 
Responsible 
Thomson 
Monks, Winder, 
other members 
Thomson 
Molly Huskey, 
other members 
Due Date 
Endofweek 
Nov. 4th 
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Minµtes 
6. Model Contracts 
Meeting O_utcomes/Decisions Reached 
Statement of the Commission gives significant guidance on the matter. Chair 
Huskey recommended looking at Gallatin, locally, for guidance. A motion 
was proposed that the PDC make an inquiry with Gallatin as to how much a 
press kit would cost, the motion was seconded and passed unanimously. 
Chair Huskey asks if commission members get a media inquiry, where should 
they go and do they want to each individually respond? Thomas 
recommended that all inquiries go through the ED. Ricks says that he would 
like the option to respond to local media, if it is in his own community. 
Wellman moved for a resolution that all media inquiries be forwarded to the ED, 
with the Commissioners' discretion to make a statement if it concerns a local 
political concern. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously. 
Thomas made a motion for the ED to reach out to Spitfire and to obtain a bid 
from Gallatin as to how much advice on a press kit would cost. The motion 
was seconded and passed unanimously. 
Chair Huskey called Dan Chadwick to inquire whether the counties wanted a 
template contract, or whether they wanted options to pick and choose from? 
Chadwick indicated that they would want various options. She suggested 
that the Commission first identify what is mandatory and then decide what 
the extra options (add-ons) would be 
Thomas suggested that any model contract should include workload issues. 
Other members believed that workload issues should be on the optional 
menu. 
Wellman suggested that the PDC require that commissioners not use their 
county attorney to advise on workloads. In his opinion, the issue of inherent 
conflict is a core concept. Wellman referred primarily to the Washington 
contract, which addressed standards, not specific caseloads. 
In the preliminary draft, caseload and workload issues should be a mandatory 
element-regardless of whether this takes the form of hard caps or mere 
standards. 
Who's 
Responsible 
Thomson 
Huskey, Wellman, 
Ricks, Thomson 
Members of the commission asked to see a copy of the Blaine County contract. Thomson 
Ricks suggested a training requirement for attorneys. Chair Huskey suggested 
the NLADA standard for experience required to handle criminal cases. Chair 
Huskey suggested that maybe the PDC should keep qualification standards 
separate from contract requirements. Ricks responded that Commissioners 
probably want guidance on that issue. If the Commission establishes 
requirements, it will likely cost more money from the State (is this an 
unfunded mandate?). Such a requirement is going to impact counties 
fiscally. 
Training requirements should also be kept separate and distinct from the 
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7. 
8. 
Minutes 
Defender Training 
a IACDL seminars 
b Determining eligibility for training 
Content of Report for Interim 
Committee on 10/28/14 (likely 45-
Meeting Outcomes/Decisions Reached 
required level of experience of the attorneys. 
Chair Huskey inquired as to whether worker's comp and malpractice would need 
· · to be a core requirement of the contract. Worker's comp is already required. 
Malpractice is handled differently by each attorney/county, but the insurance 
is quite cheap. 
Chair Huskey expressed that any contract should include in the definitional 
section, the va_rious types of cases to be covered by the services of the 
attorney. Thomas would like to see the model contract clearly define the 
types of cases that local public defenders would handle. 
Ricks asked what is specifically missing in the Madison County contract that he 
sent around? He believes it works and knows that it is used as a model in 
other surrounding counties. Wellman explained the process of attorney 
selection in rural counties-that it is generally not an open bid contract. 
Chair Huskey expressed a belief that any contract should place limits, or clearly 
defme limits, on outside work, the expectations of the attorney, and 
participating in the reporting requirements. (The PDC is ultimately 
interested in workload information.) 
Chair Huskey asked whether the model contract will be defining what the 
attorneys will be doing. Those expectations are defined by the ABA 
Guidelines for the criminal defense function. 
Bolz inquired about a requirement for vertical representation and whether the 
contract would weigh in on the type of representation required. Chair 
Huskey explained her position that verticality is very difficult for some 
larger courthouses. 
Thomas sent around a document with several questions. 
Thomson suggested that the PDC could spend some of its money in partnering 
with the IACDL Sun Valley conference this year, which is emphasizing 
criminal forensics. Winder expressed an interest in the PDC sponsoring its 
own trainings. Members of the Commission generally agreed. Thomas raised 
the question about whether there were any limitations in co-sponsoring 
trainings with for-profit entities. 
Thomas proposed a motion for the PDC to put on a training this year, which was 
seconded and adopted unanimously. 
Who's 
Responsible 
Thomas, Monks, 
Winder, Thomson 
Thomson 
Chair Huskey suggested that the ED make the presentation to the Interim Huskey, Thomson 
Committee next week. Sen. Winder indicated that it might be helpful for the 
5 
Due ])ate 
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Minutes Meeting Outcomes/D.ecisions Reached Who's Due Date 
Responsible 
minutes) Chair to be available for questions, but thinks Ed should present the report. 
(Chair Huskey indicated she could make it, but not before 11 :30.) Thomson Oct. 28th 
Ed will present the Interim Cmte. with its numbers concerning the PD Roster 
and the illustrations of geographic distance. 
Ed to plan on 20-25 minute presentation, to be followed-up with their questions. 
Ed to provide them with additional information: Model Contract will be 
ready in January, and any IDAP A rules necessary by January. 
Rep. Luker indicated that the Interim Cmte. would like a list of the legislative 
fixes that they could make by the November date. 
Thomas mentioned that Judges need power to appoint; Chair Huskey mentioned 
that she would like to see the return of the four-year service term for public 
defenders. -
9. Next meeting-Assignments and Next meeting scheduled for November 41", 2014, from l-5pm. The meeting will 
Agenda (Final interim Committee be held at the Canyon County Courthouse. Chair Huskey to make Huskey, Thomson Endofweek 
11/25/14) arrangements and ED to notify members. 
Any agenda items should go to the ED. 
10. Adjournment Thomas motioned to adjourn. Seconded, and adjourned. Huskey 
6 
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Idaho Criminal Justice Commission Three-Year Strategic Plan 
Approved June 29, 2012; May 24, 2013, December 13, 2013 
''Think Big, Start Small" 
Governor's Executive Order "Idaho's current criminal justice efforts and initiatives require clear strategic planning and continued coordination." 
The Idaho Criminal Justice Commission will continue to collaboratively develop a strategic plan to improve criminal justice policy, program and 
operational decision making. 
t~ccifnb~ti?~ ,c~ime a_~d pr~te.cting~~~th::n~:rroni' .. ~~i~in_al ~~{ jf. ~~~uE~·:vi~i~!z"a~l'oil;~~~~: \ :~: :~sta~_lish;~~!~~n~~:?as~,d·a~d .. ~estp.r~~!c~s_r~.l~t~ng.to.~:: ,::..::~1 
\ depr7dat1ons ,s_ of ~1tal.c.~n~e~p_'!~ ~~~e~2~~nt;::.": ''l':;:: ;·tecid1v~s~.m·t_~~ ~'._:: :i:,t~· _:.:S~·:. ('/ }_~c~~f'!~~b1IJ_fy,:p!eve~.t1~nt~ducat1on,~n~/ec1d1v1sm·reduct1on - ! 
'..~Lri~1~:,:,~: )~!8~;t~t0f ~:r~::..;~;~~~~if ~;:If ~;i~,~ J(t;!:,~J~~f ~";t~~~~~i~rJ~\<J:.· :::~'.> 
Strategies Persons Responsible Indicators of Success Status Completion Date 
1) Report on causes of new parole violations Brent Reinke & Olivia Craven Annual report September 2014 
2) Prevention Action - Reinstate Educational Climate Elisha Figueroa and Prevention Report In process June 2014 
Survey and collect gang involvement information in And Treatment Research 
the survey (PATR) 
3) Continue work with Children of Incarcerated Parents 
including video visitation program and pilot program 
, for incarcerated pregnant women . 
4) Sex Offender Management including developing 
statewide policy for juvenile and adult sex offender 
assessment, treatment, supervision and recidivism 
reduction, draft registration notification protocol 
5) Form a Reentry Council 
Ross Mason, Chair, Children of 
Incarcerated Parents 
Shane Evans, Chair, Sex 
Offender Management Board 
Brent Reinke & Sharon 
Harrigfeld 
Youth Prevention 
Survey 
Services to 7D"A, of the 
children, ages 0-18, of 
incarcerated parents 
Adopt Administrative 
Rules 
Adoption of 
registration notification 
promulgation 
Lower rates of 
recidivism 
Working with July 2014 
prevention 
coalitions 
Reports of July 1, 2017 
progress 
Legislation 2014 July 2014 
Legislation 2015 
July 2015 
Report to ICJC December 2014 
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IM.MJJii.liJ HJJ.ttM5f ,if.rMJ,foiYii 11 t'c¥ffiil\ . 1 
" ... providing policy makers and criminal justice decision Advance delivery of justice 1) Determine reasonable expectation of community needs 
makers with accurate information results in better through effective interventions and services based on resources 
decisions, improves public safety and results in the by proposing balanced 2) Promote standards and equity throughout Idaho where 
efficient use of public resources; ... " solutions, which are cost applicable 
effective and based on best i) Indigent defense 
practices ii) Effective policing practices 
iii) Accreditation standards 
iv) Adjudication 
v) Prosecution 
3) Reduce criminogenic risk factors in both adult and juvenile 
populations through the expanded use of effective 
evidenced-based risk assessments, policies and 
programming to inform decision making 
4) Ongoing assessment of problem solving courts and other 
community-based sentencing alternatives 
5) Examine emerging issues 
.. . . .. 
l, ~~ ·«·" .•• Strategies ...... , ..... - ·-·. ~"'·· .•"-J· Persons Responsible_ • ... } .. lndicatorsofSuccess ;: ... _Status_ ..•. ;; __ CompletlonDat_!!J 
: 1) Provide input to interim legislative committee for · Da·n Chadwick, Chair, Public .t Passage of legislation ', Under · July 2015 
public defense reform Defense Subcommittee consideration by 
interim 
' .. 
! 2) Report on usage and provide education of best 
practices in photo line-up to decrease likelihood of 
false identification 
: 3) Evaluate the pros· and cons of privatization 
throughout criminal justice system 
Dan Hall 
1• ICJC 
ICJC presentation on 
' 
· usage 
Incorporation of 
training at POST 
Council 
Presentations of 
privatization 
effe_ctjve!les_s . ··--
committee 
May2014 
, May 2015 
February 2015 
D001150 
000385
1Governor's'Executive'Order)2011!11--
" ... it is in the best interest of the citizens of the 
State of Idaho that government promotes 
efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system and, where possible, encourage dialogue 
among respective branches of government to 
achieve this effectiveness and efficiency; ... " 
Promote well-informed 
policy decisions 
J([1]5f:m@£4 
1) Identify strategies to promote efficiencies and 
effectiveness in the criminal justice system in conjunction 
with the Grant Review Council 
Award funds appropriated through federal grant 
programs within the purview of Planning, Grants and 
Research of the Idaho State Police 
2) Continue presentations and training on trends, best 
practices & priority issues in adult & juvenile corrections 
3) Create and implement data sharing mechanisms and 
agreements among stakeholder agencies for the purposes 
of cross systems analysis and reporting 
4) Maintain awareness of substance abuse trends and 
priority issues 
t ~ _: . ' : ... ~. : .. Strategies·:_~--~--·-----~--~--::·~ .. ~-Persons Responsible~- .,.JL Indicators of Success~::;~ ..... _., Status - ~- .:reo~pletion D~t~j 
1 1) Identify small number of longer-term · , ·: Sara Thomas, Chair, ICJC ' Theme meeting days : Provide ' Ongoing 
focus/depth areas ·; Gary Raney, Vice-Chair, ICJC · toward focus areas or opportunity for 
i) Juvenile justice continuum Sheriffs Association ·. information groups evaluation 
ii) Adult justice continuum 1'. held semiannually , following 
, , 
Continue to promote the efforts of the "Results 
First" Project 
Develop funding strategies consistent with 
statewide strategic planning efforts of the 
Commission including the following priorities: 
i) Collaborative 
ii) Evidence-based or best practice where 
possible enhances measurable outcomes: 
a) The solution of crimes 
b) Assistance to victims 
c) Direct services to the community 
iii) Sustainable 
• iy) __ Exit_ strategi~s , --- ... 
Sharon Harrigfeld 
'• 
·; Gary Raney and Grant Review 
·, Council 
' Commission hold the Council 
responsible 
ICJC report of results 
actionable in Idaho 
1) Grants awarded 
that address the 
priorities of ICJC 
Strategic Plan 
Semiannual or 
yearly Grant 
Review Council 
updates to ICJC 
·. presentations to 
determine next 
, step_s 
. 1) Grants 
awarded 
· May2014 
October 2014 
based on ICJC , 
strategies 
I 2) Report of 
awarded 
grants 
Semiannual 
",,# ......... 1 .... , •• ,, 
(continued on next page) 
D001151 
000386
Strategies 
4) Develop strategies among agencies and 
branches of government to share data 
Persons Responsible 
· Sharon Harrigfeld, lead, and 
, ICIC 
i 5) Develop ongoing access to behavioral health" ,' IDOC, IDJC, IDHW, Courts 
treatment from criminal justice clients. 
' . 
· 6) Identify criminal justice system budget needs I ICJC 
.. and_priorities . • .. .• . _ . 
Indicators of Success 
· 1) Completion of 
business process 
map 
2) Using the Global 
Reference Archi-
tecture & the 
National Informa-
tion Exchange 
Model, two or 
more agencies will 
collaborate on & 
implement an 
interface provid-
ing for the sharing 
of information 
: 1) Report on 
substance use 
disorder services 
funding, ongoing 
access to 
behavioral health 
treatment and 
trends, including 
Medicaid and 
Affordable Health 
Care Act 
2) Presentation of 
models for crisis 
centers & 
determine ICJC 
written support 
Submit list of priorities 
•r • , . ., 
t ColTlpletlon Date_ . 
· June 2014 
September 2014 1 
Report every 
. other month 
Jan. 24, 2014 
,I 
·, July-Sept. 2014 
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STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE 
COMMISSION 
Presentation to Joint Finance-Appropriations 
Committee for FY 2016 
Ian H. Thomson, Executive Director 
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C Org n· ti n 
Self-governing agency of the Executive 
Ian Thomson 
D001173 
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-
} . ' ~ . . 
~._: I / '• , , ' , 1 
The Problem 
• 44 different public defender systems in Idaho 
• No uniformity, no training or qualification standards 
• General consensus that'current system is inadequate 
The Approach 
• Set reporting requirements, gather information 
• Ensure public defenders have access to relevant training 
• Report to legislature and make recommendations for public 
defense reform 
0001174 
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PURPOSE OF P.D.C. 
• PROMULGATE RLILES for public defender training and data collection 
regarding indigent defense services 
• Maintain standards to ensure that defending attorneys have adequate 
TRAINING AND RESOLIRCES to fulfill their Sixth Amendment obligations 
• Serve as a CLEAR.INGHOllSE OF INFOR.MATION for relevant 
stakeholders 
• INFORM THE LEGISLATLIRE of Sixth Amendment issues and make 
legislative recommendations. 
0001175 
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START-UP COSTS 
• No Capital Outlay Budget in FY 2015 
• Estimated Total One-Time Outlays: 
$9,300 
• One-Time Expense Savings 
- Acquired some furniture at no cost to state 
- Significantly reduced IT and communications through 
C.1.0 by leasing space in the same building as other state 
tenants 
(Endowment Fund Investment Board and State 
Independent Living Council) 
D001176 
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Because the Public Defense Commission 
is only Four Months into its First Year of 
Operations, anticipated program expenses 
are still uncertain. 
In FY 2015 & FY 2016 Commission Will 
(1) Seek Other Revenues, ie. Grants 
(2) Identify Additiqnal Program Expenses 
0001177 
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---------~_} FY 2015 Approp. JI FY 2015 Expected :; FY 2015 Remainder 
Personnel ·. $119,800 $76,300 $37,500 
Exec Dir. (<9 mos) $67,000 $30,700 
. · Admin. Asst. (<8 mos) $9,300 · · .. . $6,800 
Expected Personnel Reversion: $43,500* 
' I lf 
~--------- i: FY 2015 Approp. FY 2015 Expected [L FY 2015 Remainder 
Operating Expense·s 
· (<9 mos.) · $70,200 
*Full-year personnel expenses are $6,000 less than amount appropriated. 
$40,800 ·. $29,400 
Possible Operating Budget reversion 
in first year due to "partial" year. 
D001178 
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FY 2015 Appropriation $110,000 
- - - - T - - ~ -- l' - -- - - lf -~-~ ~-- -r -- - - -- - -,r - --- -
Program i: Spent . Planned :1 Beneficiaries :. % of 262 PDs 
~--------~----~ ~----
Online Training & Resources $3,680 · $1,000 186 
2-Day Defender Conference $67,500 154 
. Capital Defender Training $19,700 25 
Juvenile Defender Training $9,600 21 
Total $3,680 $97,800 
Total Allocated Expenses for FY 2015: 
$101,480 
·71% 
59% 
9% 
8% 
' .. 
D001179 
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No Change from FY 2015 other than 3% CEC 
- - - • - - 1r -
Operating Budget Category :• FY 2015 Appropriation FY 2016 Reque~ 
Personnel Costs $119,800 $124,100* 
Operating Expenditures $70,200 $70,200 · 
Trustee/Benefit $110,000 $110~000 
Total $300,000 $304,300 
Full-Time Positions {FTP) 1.5 . 1.5 
See FY 2016 Legislative Budget Book 5-107 
*represents 3% CEC and increased cost of benefits 
D001180 
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Executive Department 
State of Idaho 
The Office of the Governor 
EXECU11VE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BOISE 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2015-04 
State Capitol 
Boise 
ADOPTING IDAHO'S SAGE-GROUSE MANAGEMENT PLAN 
WHEREAS, in December 2011, the U.S. Department of the Interior invited the eleven (11) western 
states impacted by a potential Endangered Species Act (ESA) listing of the greater sage-grouse to develop state-
specific conservation plans that would conserve the species and its habitat while maintaining predictable levels 
of land use; and 
WHEREAS, Governor Otter accepted the federal government's invitation, and by and through Executive 
Order 20I 2-02 established the Governor's Sage-grouse Task Force (Task Force) to collaboratively develop 
science-based recommendations for inclusion in Idaho's sage-grouse conservation plans; and 
WHEREAS, in September 20I 2, and based on recommendations from the Task Force, I submitted the 
Federal Alternative of Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter for Greater Sage-grouse Management in Idaho 
(Governor's Alternative) as an alternative for inclusion in the National Greater Sage-grouse Land Use 
Planning Strategy. This national planning strategy amends some 68 U.S. Bureau of Land Management (ELM) 
planning units and 20 U.S. Forest Service (USFS) National Forest Plans by including objectives, habitat 
conditions and management actions for sage-grouse; and 
WHEREAS, in Febntary 2013, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) published the Greater Sage-
Grouse Conservation Objectives Team Final Report (COT Report). The purpose of the COT Report, which was 
developed in conjunction with state wildlife agencies, was to establish the ESA goals by identifying Primary 
Areas of Conservation (PAC) and the threats to the species throughout its range, as well as to develop 
conservation measures, based on the best available science, to address those threats. The COT Report provides 
the flexibility to create solutions that meet the needs of greater sage-grouse and the local ecological and 
socioeconomic conditions; and 
WHEREAS, Governor Otter requested the FWS to evaluate the Governor's Alternative for consistency 
under the COT Report, and in April 2013, the FWS concluded that the foundational elements, and some 
individual components, within the Governor's Alternative were consistent with the COT Report. (App. 2); and 
WHEREAS, based on the strength of FWS's recommendation, the BLM and USFS selected the 
Governor's Alternative as a co-preferred alternative within Idaho's portion of the national planning strategy 
(see Alternative E in the Idaho and Southwestern Montana Greater Sage-Grouse Draft Land Use Plan 
Amendments and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,703 (Nov. 1, 2013)); and 
WHEREAS, the State has continued refining individual components of the Governor's Alternative, 
including but not limited to: (1) Idaho Code§ 38-104B developing rangeland fire protection associations; (2) 
the State Board of Land Commissioners on April 21, 2015, adopting the Land Board's Greater Sage-grouse 
Conservation Plan (Land Board Plan) for State endowment lands complementary to the Governor's Alternative 
(App. 3); (3) the State Oil and Gas Conservation Commission on April 23, 2015, adopting portions of the Land 
Board Plan applicable to oil and gas programs (App. 3, p. 38); (4) working collaboratively with the local 
federal agencies' representatives and Task Force members to better clarify the Governor's Alternative; and (5) 
increasing statefimdingfor enhanced lek monitoring, habitat restoration projects, and wildfire suppression; 
and, 
WHEREAS, it is vital to the interests of the State to continue these efforts as the listing of the species 
and/or overly restrictive federal land-use plan amendments would adversely impact Idaho's sovereign interest 
in managing its wildlife pursuant to Idaho Code§ 36-103 and§ 67-818, its customs, culture and way of life, 
and the State's ability to generate revenues from private property and endowment lands; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Governor of the State of Idaho, by the authority vested 
in me under the Constitution and laws of the State of Idaho do hereby order the following: 
EXHIBIT 1, 
000397
That all executive agencies, to the extent consistent with existing state law.for relevant permits and 
policies, adopt the Governor's Alternative and all supporting documentation, incorporated in its entirety into 
this Executive Order by this reference, hereinafter known as "Idaho's Sage-grouse Management Plan, " which 
includes: 
L Application of thefmmdational elements of Idaho's Sage-grouse Management Plan (Idaho's 
Plan) to a/l landownerships. These foundational elements are consistent with the COT Report and apply across 
all land ownerships. 
a. Habitat Zones - Idaho's Plan includes three distinct management zones: Core Habitat 
Zone (CHZ), Important Habitat Zone (!HZ), and General Habitat Zone (GHZ). The COT 
Report identified the most important habitat areas for maintaining sage-grouse 
representation, redundancy, and resiliency across the landscape. These are'!s (or PA Cs) 
closely align with CHZ and !HZ. The three management zones within the Sage-grouse 
Management Area (SGMA) represent a management continuum that includes, at one end, 
a relatively restrictive approach aimed at providing a high level of protection to the 
species within the CHZ, and on the other end, a relatively flexible approach for the GHZ 
allowing/or more multiple-use activities. The zones are reflected in the attached map. 
(App. 1, p. 24). 
i. Core Habitat Zone (CHZ) - The CHZ includes approximately sixty-five percent 
(65%) of the known active leks and is occupied by approximately seventy-three 
percent (73%) of sage-grouse males. CHZ supports the highest breeding densities 
of sage-grouse in Idaho, and maintenance of these populations ensures that Idaho 
has a viable and robust population of sage-grouse. Management in CHZ is the 
most restrictive to protect what local data shows as the "best of the best" habitat. 
ii. Important Habitat Zone (!HZ) - The !HZ includes approximately twenty-five 
percent (25%) of the known active leks and is occupied by approximately twenty-
two percent (22%) of sage-grouse males. 
iii. General Habitat Zone (GHZ) -This management zone includes five percent (5%) 
of sage-grouse males, and generally includes few active leks and fragmented or 
marginal habitat. 
b. Population Objectives - In conjunction with the habitat zones, these population goals: 
(1) measure the efficacy of the State plan; and (2) ensure that there is an appropriately 
tailored response to significant fluctuations in habitat and populations. 
i. Objective 1 - Implement regulatory mechanisms that maintain and enhance sage-
grouse habitats, populations, and connectivity within CHZ. Recognizing the 
impact of wildfire, the !HZ provides important management flexibility and a 
strategic conservation buffer. 
ii. Objective 2 - Stabilize sage-grouse habitats and populations by monitoring the 
effectiveness of the regulatory measures over time. A primary objective is to 
minimize habitat lost within CHZ, and to a lesser extent, !HZ. 
c. Conservation Areas - Idaho's Plan divided the SGMA into four Conservation Areas 
(CA) across the state: the Mountain Valleys, Desert, West Owyhee, and Southern. Each 
CA is divided into Core, Important, and General management zones. (App. 1, p. 8). 
d Adaptive Regulatory Triggers - Given the unpredictability of wildfire, these triggers 
provide a regulatory backstop to manage loss within a CA. An adaptive trigger is 
employed when dramatic shifts in the population or habitat occurs based on an average 
over a three year period compared to the 2011 baseline. 
i. The adaptive triggers are based on the severity of habitat or population loss (i.e. 
a "soft trigger" or a "hard trigger''). (App. 1, pp. 11, 69-71). 
ii. When monitoring information indicates that a soft trigger may be tripped, the 
Implementation Commission 1 -aided by technical expertise from Idaho 
Department of Fish and Game and other relevant State agencies -will assess the 
1 Should the BLM and USFS adopt the Governor's Alternative, or an alternative consistent with the Governor's Alternative, for 
Incorporation Into relevant Land and Resource Management Plans, the Governor shall execute a companion Executive Order 
establish Ing an Implementation Task Force as outlined In Appendix 1, pages 21, 67-71. 
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factor(s) leading to the decline and recommend potential management actions. 
(App. 1, p. 69). 
iii. If the hard trigger becomes operative, management changes no longer are 
discretionary and will be implemented by the Implementation Task Force. 
e. Rangeland Fire Protection Associations (RFPA) - RFP As act as a regulatory 
mechanism across all landowners hips ensuring quicker initial attack on wildfires in the 
CHZ and !HZ through the deployment of additional trained firefighters and resources 
located in ntral parts of the SGMA. 
i. Idaho Code§ 38-104B provides for the creation andfimding of RFPAs in Idaho. 
ii. RFPA members work collaboratively with federal land management agencies and 
Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) to protect more than 2.9 million acres of 
federal and state rangeland and 675,000 acres of private land. These numbers are 
expected to grow as additional RFPAs become operational in the near fi1ture. 
iii. The success and effectiveness of RFPAs in Idaho is considered a model by other 
western states. 
IL Applicability of Idaho's Plan to Lands Managed by the Federal Govemment (as more fully 
described in Alternative E of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement/ 
a. Fire -Idaho's Plan for wildfire on federal lands focuses efforts on prevention, 
suppression, and resto~ation. The objective within Idaho's Plan is to implement actions 
necessary to manage fire within the normal range of fire activity and maintain and 
restore healthy, native sage-steppe plant communities within CHZ and !HZ. 
b. Invasive species - In addition to the wildfire restoration efforts, Idaho's Plan calls for 
the aggressive management of exotic undesirable plant species within the CHZ and !HZ. 
c. I11Jrastructure - Jnfrastn,cture means discrete, large-scale anthropogenic features, 
including but not limited to, highways, high voltage transmission lines, commercial wind 
projects, energy development (e.g. oil and gas development, geothermal wells), airports, 
mines, cell phone towers, landfills, residential and commercial subdivisions. (App. 1, p. 
32). 
i. Permitted activities in specific habitat designations 
1. Jnfrastmcture in CHZ - Jnfrastntcture development in areas designated as CHZ 
is prohibited, except if conducted pursuant to a valid existing right, incremental 
upgrade and/or capacity increase of existing development, or if a project-level 
exemption is obtainable by meeting the criteria outlined in Appendix 1, including 
compensatory mitigation. (App. 1, pp. 35-36). 
2. Jnfrastmcture in !HZ - Jnfrastnicture development in areas designated as !HZ is 
permissible subject to meeting the criteria specified within Idaho's Plan and 
approved by the ELM State Director. (App. 1, p. 42) 
ii. Best Management Practices (BMPs) for proposed infrastnicture development 
within CHZ and !HZ. 
1. Jnfrastnicture development should reflect unique localized conditions including 
soils, vegetation, development type, predation, climate, and other local realities 
and should utilize best management practices as described in Idaho's Plan. (App. 
], pp. 43-45). 
2. A lek buffer of 1 km (0.6 miles) from occupied leks will be applied to essential 
public services, including but not limited to distribution lines, domestic water 
lines, and gas lines. This will enable development in a manner that maintains 
populations, habitats, and essential migration routes where possible. (App. 1, pp. 
43-45). 
3. No Surface Occupancy (NSO) within 1 km of an occupied lek will be applied to 
oil and gas development. (App. l, pp. 46-47) 
2 Governor Otter encourages the adoption of Alternative E in the final EIS as it is consistent with the laws, programs, and policies of 
the State of Idaho. However, the Governor recognizes that the BLM and USFS may adopt a different alternative (or revised 
alternative) in the record of decision (ROD) and such action may necessitate a revision to this Executive Order. 
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iii. Nothing in Idaho's Plan shall revoke, suspend, or modify any project or activity 
decision made prior to the effective date of the ROD. 
d Improper livestock grazing (secondary threat) -This section of Idaho's Plan requires 
that the Idaho Rangeland Health Standards (IRHS) be met and is consistent with the COT 
report. While no studies exist directly relating livestock grazing systems or stocking rates 
to sage-grouse abundance or productivity, Idaho's Plan addresses improper livestock 
grazing within CHZ and !HZ through adaptive management according to the following 
process: 
i. Sage-grouse habitat characteristics will be incorporated into relevant Resource 
Management Plans as desired conditions, recognizing that these desired 
conditions may not be achievable due to the existing ecological condition of an 
allotment, the ecological potential of the area, or causal events unrelated to 
livestock grazing. (App. 1, pp. 14-20). 
ii. Based on these habitat characteristics, habitat assessments will be conducted to 
help inform grazing management in conjunction with scheduled term grazing 
permit renewals or if an adaptive regulatory trigger has been tripped (App. 1, p. 
73-75). 
iii. In conju~ction with scheduled term grazing permit renewals, livestock grazing 
will be assessed through the IRHS (primarily Standards 2, 4, and 8), as informed 
by the COT Report with respect to sage-grouse. (see Idaho Standards for 
Rangeland Health and Guidelines for Livestock Grazing Management (1997)). 
1. Assuming no adaptive regulatory trigger has been tripped, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that current grazing systems within a particular CA are adequate to 
maintain viable sage-grouse populations. 
2. This does not preclude adaptive changes to grazing permits based on the other 
standards contained in the IRHS. 
iv. If an adaptive regulatory trigger has been tripped within a CA, and after a more 
thorough analysis of those allotments within a relevant CA determines that 
improper livestock grazing is a potential limiting factor, modifications to permits 
will be determined based on ecological site potential and will be selected from the 
suite of management options outlined in Idaho's Plan. (App. 1, pp. 48-50). 
IIL Applicability of Idaho's Plan on State and private lands 
a. In April 2015, the Staie Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission contingently approved the Land Board Plan. (App. 3). The 
Land Board Plan,' consistent with the constitutional mandate (IDAHO CONST. ART. IX,§ 8), 
includes enforceable regulatory stipulations for inclusion into certain leases, permits, 
and easements on State endowment lands. Adoption and implementation of the Land 
Board Plan is contingent upon the incorporation of Idaho's Plan into the federal land-
use plan amendments for sage-grouse. 
b. Certain permit holders on private lands can voluntarily agree to add BMPs into their 
permit, which would then become binding. However, private land comprises less than 
twenty percent (20%) of sage-grouse habitat in Idaho (and less than 6% of the CHZ). 
c. Existing land uses and landowner activities are vital to the State of Idaho. Idaho's Plan 
recognizes changes in sage-grouse populations and habitats on private lands could 
influence land management on public lands as adaptive triggers can become operative 
within a CA regardless of landownership. To offset any impacts, SGMAs have been 
designed to provide flexibility in order to allow for the continuation of land uses and 
valid existing rights. In addition, Idaho continues to encourage voluntary conservation 
efforts on private land for the conservation of sage-grouse. 
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LAWERENCE DENNEY 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
to be affixed the Great Seal of the State of Idaho at the Capitol in 
Boise on this 2l1h day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand 
and fifteen, and of the independence of the United States of 
America the two hundred thirty-ninth and of the Statehood of 
Idaho the one hundred twenty-fifth. 
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
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Executive Department 
Stale of Idaho 
The Office of the Governor 
EXECU17VE DEPARTMENT 
STATEOFIDAHO 
BOISE 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2015-03 
State Capitol 
Boise 
AUTHORIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE TO IMPLEMENT A FDA-
APPROVED EXPANDED ACCESS PROGRAM FOR TREATMENT-RESISTANT EPILEPSY IN 
. CHILDREN 
WHEREAS, Idaho's citizens with severe or life-threatening diseases or conditions may not be able to 
access critical medications that are still in clinical trials; and 
WHEREAS, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has established Expanded Access Programs to 
allow limited, supervised access to such medications; and · 
WHEREAS, the FDA has approved an Expanded Access Program for Epidiolex®, a dn1g being evaluated 
for treatment-resistant epilepsy; and 
WHEREAS, it is estimated that eight people per 1,000 have active epilepsy; and 
WHEREAS, there are children in Idaho with treatment-resistant epilepsy who may benefit from 
Epidiolex®; and 
WHEREAS, the Department of Health and Welfare operates to improve the health status of Idahoans, 
increase the safety and self-szifficiency of individuals and families, and enhance the delivery of health and 
human services; 
NOW. THEREFORE, I, C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Governor of the State of Idaho, by virtue of the authority 
vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the State of Idaho, do hereby order as follows: 
1. The Department of Health and Welfare shall investigate the need for, and implement if appropriate, as 
determined by the Department, a FDA-approved Expanded Access Program for Epidiolex®; 
2. Further, as part of the investigation, the Department shall estimate the scope of the need in Idaho for 
this program, and shall determine whether appropriate medical supervision is available that allows safe 
and effective implementation of such a program; 
3. If implemented, the Department shall investigate and monitor long-term solutions, such as licensure of 
the medication, that may reduce or eliminate the need/or the program in the future; and 
4. The Department shall trackfimding utilized for the program and may accept private contributions, 
federal funds.funds from other public agencies or any other source for the purpose of implementing this 
study. 
LAWERENCE DENNEY 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
to be aff1Xed the Great Seal of the State of Idaho at the Capitol in 
Boise on this J 61h day of April, in the year of our Lord two 
thousand and fifteen, and of the independence of the United States 
of America the two hundred thirty-ninth and of the Statehood of 
Idaho the one hundred twenty-fifth. 
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
EXHIBIT 15 
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C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BOISE 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2010-11 
REVIEWING THE PREPARATION 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF IDAHO'S PLAN UNDER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT 
WHEREAS, the State of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act o/2002, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 ("JJDPA';, is required to designate a 
state agency to supervise and administer Idaho's plan under the JJDPA and to establish a state 
juvenile justice advisory group; and 
WHEREAS, the first regular session of the 53rd Idaho Legislature established the Idaho 
Department of Juvenile Corrections ("Department'; and amended existing law to create a 
juvenile corrections system based on principles of accountability, community protection, and 
competency development; and 
WHEREAS, the pwposes and intent of Idaho's Juvenile Corrections Act of 1995 and the 
JJDPA was heller served by transferring the Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission ("Commission'; 
to the Department; and 
WHEREAS, the Department was designated as the sole agency for supervising the 
preparation and administration of Idaho's plan under the JJDPA, and the Office for Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention was abolished effective July 1, 1995; and 
WHEREAS, the Commission was transferredfrom the Office of the Governor to the 
Department effective July 1, 1995, and has functioned as the advisory group referenced in Title 
42, Section 5633(a)(3), United States Code; and 
NOW. THEREFORE, I, C.L. "Butch" Oller, Governor of the State of Idaho, by the 
authority vested in me by Article If~ Section 5, of the Idaho Constitution, and Section 67-802, 
Idaho Code, do hereby order that: 
1. The composition of membership of the Commission shall be in conformity with the 
JJDPA. The chairman, vice-chairman, and members of the Commission shall be 
appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of the Governor. Members shall serve a term of 
three years, except for the youth members who shall serve a term of one year. The 
chairman and vice-chairman shall serve in such capacities for three years. 
2. The Commission shall perform the following functions: 
a. Advise the Department onjuvenilejustice and delinquency prevention issues; 
b. Participate in the development and review of Idaho's plan under the JJDPA; 
c. Be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on all grant applications under 
the JJDPA submitted by the Department; 
d Ensure compliance with the core protections of the JJDPA by jurisdictions with 
public authority in Idaho through education, technical assistance, monitoring and 
remedial actions for violations; 
e. Perform such other duties that the JJDP A requires to be performed by the advis01J1 
group referenced in Title 42, Section 5633(a)(3), United States Code; 
f Pe,form such other duties that the JJDPA requires to be pe,jormed by the 
supervisory board referenced in Title 42, Section 5671 (c)(/), United States Code, 
EXHIBIT 16 
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and Title 28, Section 31.102(b), Code of Federal Regulations, until such time as the 
director of the Department may establish a11other committee, commission, or board 
within the Department to perform those duties; and 
g. Perform such other duties as requested by the director of the Department, which 
may include submitting reports to the director of the Department and making 
decisions on grant applications under the JJDP A submitted to the Department. 
This Executive Order shall cease to be effective four years after its e11hy i11to force. 
BEN'SlJRSA 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused to be affixed the Great Seal of the State of Idaho at th e 
Capitol in Boise on this 4th day of October in the year of ou r 
Lord two th ousand and ten and of the Indepe ndence oft he 
United States of America the two hundred thirty-fifth and of the 
Statehood of Idaho the one hundred twenty-first. 
~~pr~~ 
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
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This lawsuit is not, as Defendants suggest, about miscreant counties refusing to obey 
Idaho's public defense statutes. Rather, Plaintiffs complain that public defense services across 
the state have failed under the weight of contemporary caseloads, an absence of coherent practice 
standards, and a far-reaching, longstanding lack of resources. The Chief Justice of Idaho's 
Supreme Court has already stated that the statewide system is "broken." 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 1. 
Defendant Governor Otter, too, has declared that the system "does not pass constitutional 
muster." Id. ex. 2 at 8. Plaintiffs, and poor Idahoans accused of crimes across the state, call 
upon this Court, in fulfillment of its fundamental role to interpret and vindicate core 
constitutional rights, to render judgment on the statewide system. 
In considering this motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b), the Court must draw all 
inferences from the record and pleadings in the Plaintiffs' favor. ISEEO v. Evans, 123 Idaho 
573, 57,8 (1993). The Court must liberally construe the complaint and presume that all facts 
alleged there are true. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 376 (1963). 
I. The Defendants Bear Ultimate Responsibility For Ensuring That Constitutional 
Rights of Idahoans Are Protected. 
In support of the motion to dismiss, Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs have not only sued 
the wrong parties, but that, under Idaho law, it is Idaho's 44 separate counties-not state 
officials-that collectively bear responsibility for a deficient statewide system. These arguments 
fail for three reasons. 1 First, decades of U.S. Supreme Court case law make it clear that states 
have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that adequate indigent defense services are 
available. Second, although Defendants may delegate some of their constitutional duties to 
1 Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs prayed for relief only from the State of Idaho itself. 
But, in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs defined "State" to refer to all of Defendants 
throughout the Complaint. (Similarly, this Response uses "the State" to refer to Defendants.) 
Accordingly, the prayer seeks relief from all Defendants. 
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counties, they cannot simply wash their hands of the state's duties and avoid responsibility if 
those duties go unfulfilled. This is especially true where, as in this case, the majority of the 
counties are unable to fulfill their duties because they do not have the resources, training, or 
supervision to do so. See Compl. ,r,r 9-20, 36. Third, unlike some rights protected by the state 
and federal constitutions, the right to counsel for indigent defendants places on the State an 
affirmative duty to guarantee that this right is respected.2 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Indicated Repeatedly That Indigent Defense Is the 
State's Responsibility. 
The U.S. Supreme Court determined long ago that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most sections of the Bill of Rights (including the Sixth 
Amendment), thereby making them applicable to the states. Specifically, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the right to counsel applies to the states. See, e.g., Powell v. State of 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932) (Fourteenth Amendment due process clause incorporates 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in capital cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the right to counsel in felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (incorporating the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has, in tum, acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to 
the State ofldaho. See Abercrombie v. State, 91 Idaho 586, 592 (1967). 
As such, it is no surprise that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly referenced the 
State's responsibility to ensure that its citizens' Sixth Amendment rights are protected. First, in 
2 Though Defendants are correct that the State of Idaho itself is not a "person" for the purposes 
of prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the State itself remains a proper 
defendant to the Plaintiffs' state law claims and requests for declaratory judgment. See ISEEO v. 
State of Idaho, 142 Idaho 450, 453 (2005) [hereinafter ISEEO V] (affirming judgment against 
State of Idaho in systemic reform litigation). The individual defendants, sued in their official 
capacities, are proper defendants as to all of the Plaintiffs' claims. 
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explicitly overruling its previous decision in Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court in 
Gideon noted that "the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that 'one charged with crime, 
who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the state,' conceded that 
'(e)xpressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument."' Gideon, 372 U.S. at 
343. Since then, the long line of cases following Gideon has consistently reiterated the point. 
For instance, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court clarified that under Gideon, it is the State's 
responsibility to guarantee that defendants receive_ constitutional representation in criminal 
actions brought by the State: "When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it 
is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty .... Thus, the Sixth 
Amendment does more than require the States to appoint counsel for indigent defendants." 446 
U.S. 335, 343-44 (1980) (internal citations omitted). Numerous other cases have also recognized 
the State's ultimate responsibility for ensuring a fair trial for indigent defendants prosecuted by 
the State. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) ("State expenditures are 
necessary to pay lawyers for indigent defendants at trial," citing Gideon and Argersinger); 
ML.B. v. S.L.J, 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) ("A State must provide trial counsel for an indigent 
defendant charged with a felony" (citation omitted)); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532-33 
(2004) (recognizing a number of affirmative obligations that flow from the well-established 
principl~ that a State must provide all individuals with a meaningful opportunity to be heard in 
its cou~s, including "the duty to' provide counsel to certain criminal defendants"); Walters v. 
Nat'! Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332 (1985) ("[W]e have held that this provision 
requires a State prosecuting an indigent to afford him legal representation for his defense"); 
Ludwig.v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 627 (1976) ("[I]f an accused is 
indigent, the State is required to furnish him counsel without cost before he may be deprived of 
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his liberty." (citation omitted)). There is no question that it is each state's responsibility to 
ensure that indigent defendants' Sixth Amendment rights are realized. 
B. The State Has an Affirmative Duty to Ensure Sixth Amendment Compliance. 
States do not just bear ultimate responsibility for indigent defense-they have an 
affirmative duty to guarantee that indigent defense is constitutionally adequate. The Supreme 
Court has emphasized this again and again. In Bounds, it held that "an indigent defendant's right 
under the Sixth Amendment places upon the State the affirmative duty to provide him with 
counsel for trials which may result in deprivation of his liberty." 430 U.S. at 834. Eight years 
later, in Maine v. Moulton, the Court made this even clearer, holding that the Sixth Amendment 
"imposes on the State an affirmative obligation" and further specifying that "this guarantee 
includes the State's affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents the protections 
accorded the accused by invoking this right." 474 U.S. 159, 171, 176 (1985). The Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, therefore, is unlike many of the rights preserved in the Bill of 
Rights, such as the First Amendment freedom of speech or the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy, which simply prohibit certain state actions. Rather, the Sixth Amendment is one of a 
few special constitutional guarantees that require states to take affirmative steps to supply 
necessary resources and supervision to see that the Constitution is carried out. Cf Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976) (holding that states must provide adequate medical care to 
prisoners in their custody, under the Eighth Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
315-316 (1982) (holding that the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause requires the State to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such 
services as are necessary to ensure their reasonable safety from themselves and others.); City of 
Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that the Due Process 
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Clause requires states to provide medical care to suspects in police custody who have been 
injured while being apprehended). 
Together, the Supreme Court later explained, these "affirmative duty" guarantees require 
that "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the 
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety 
and general well-being." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (citation 
omitted). The Court went on to explain the reason for this: 
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the 
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders 
him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic 
human needs--e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-
it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment 
and the Due Process Clause. 
Id. at 200 ( citations omitted). The same principle applies in the context of indigent defense, 
where the State has a similar duty to ensure that defendants prosecuted by the State receive a fair 
trial in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. As the Court explained in Moulton, when the 
. ' 
State hales a person into court and threatens her liberty, it is the State that has the corresponding 
"affirmative obligation" to provide competent counsel if she cannot afford an attorney. Moulton, 
474 U.S. at 171. 
The parallel state constitutional guarantee, in Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho 
Constitution, is at least coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right. See State v. Tucker, 97 
Idaho 4, 7 (1975); cf State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 230 (1996); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 
488 n.4 (1984); Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115 (1983); see also Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 
388, 395 (1966) (noting the extreme importance of the right to counsel in Idaho, calling it "the 
most pervasive right of an accused" (citation omitted)). Because that guarantee is part of the 
state constitution, it is, obviously, the State that is responsible for fulfilling it. And if no State of 
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Idaho official is tasked with fulfilling a constitutional responsibility, as the State seems to 
suggest,' it is the judiciary' s job to declare a constitutional violation. See LC. § 10-1201. 
C. Delegation Is Not Abdication. 
Noting that "Counties or other local units of government have provided whatever 
indigent defense services were provided at. the trial level," Defendants argue that the Idaho 
Constitution "contemplated that Counties would provide many governmental services required 
by law." Although such delegation is permitted, the counties are merely subdivisions of the state 
that are tasked with carrying out state responsibilities. As such, the counties' failure is the 
State's failure. See Striclfaden v. Green Creek Highway Dist., 42 Idaho 738, 738 (1926) 
("Counties are generally ... involuntary subdivisions or arms of the state through which the state 
operates for convenience."); see also Ada Cnty. v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, 404 (1939) ("Moreover 
the building and maintenance of the roads and highways by the state is one of the sovereign 
duties of government; and the act here involved, recognizing this duty on the part of the state, 
~_onstitutes counties and highway districts as agencies and arms of the state for carrying out its 
governmental purpose." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Hence, the counties' failure to 
fulfill State responsibilities-not out of intransigence or negligence, but due to lack of resources 
and supervision-ultimately lies at the feet of the State. Indeed, the Governor's own Criminal 
Justice Commission ("CJC") acknowledged this in its report on Idaho's public defense system: 
"As with other rights that are fundamental and essential to a fair trial, the vindication of the Sixth 
Am~ndment right to counsel is a state responsibility. Although a state may delegate its duty to 
apprise citizens of this right to counties, it is ultimately the state's responsibility to ensure that 
the constitutional obligation is met." 2d. Aff. Eppink ex. 3 at D' 1153. 
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Idaho courts have interpreted the relevant sections of the Idaho Constitution as conveying 
no authority to the counties independent from the state. See, e.g., Shillingford v. Benewah Cnty., 
' 
48 Idaho 447, 453 (1929) ("County commissioners must act as a board, and have only such 
power as is expressly or impliedly conferred on them by statute." (internal citations omitted)). 
Article XVIII, Section 5, of the Idaho Constitution states that "[t]he legislature shall establish, 
subject to the provisions of this article, a system of county governments which shall be uniform 
throughout the state; and by general laws shall provide for township or precinct organizations." 
Id. § 5. Section 11 provides that "[c]ounty, township, and precinct officers shall perform such 
duties as shall be prescribed by law." Id. § 11. Courts have clarified that under these provisions, 
counties have no authority or responsibility independent from the state. See, e.g., Shillingford, 
48 Idaho at 453; Prothero v. Ed. ofComm'rs of Twin Falls Cnty., 22 Idaho 598 (1912). 
A number of federal appeals courts, in the context of both constitutional and statutory 
obligations, also have found that states may not escape liability by merely delegating their 
obligations to the counties. For instance, in Stanley v. Darlington County School District, a case 
involving a State's obligation to desegregate its public schools, the Fourth Circuit clearly stated 
that a State's right to delegate power to a political subdivision does not absolve the State of its 
ultimate responsibility: 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment imposes direct responsibility on a state to 
ensure equal protection of the laws "to any person within its jurisdiction," a 
state's delegation to a political subdivision of the power necessary to remedy the 
constitutional violation does not absolve the state of its responsibility to ensure 
that the violation is remedied. Even if a state gives its local school districts the 
power and means to remedy segregation, it can still be sued by the students in 
those districts for its failure to take steps to dismantle a dual educational system 
that it created. 
84 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Others have recognized the same principle. 
See, e.g., Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Although the state is 
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permitted to delegate administrative responsibility for the issuance of food stamps, 'ultimate 
responsibility' for compliance with federal requirements nevertheless remains at the state level." 
(citation omitted)); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984) ("While the 
state may choose to delegate some administrative responsibilities ... the ultimate responsibility 
for operation of the plan remain[s] with the state." (citations omitted)); Kruelle v. New Castle 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 697 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that state department of education is 
, liable for failure of local school district to comply with federal law.) 
Under the cases cited above, the responsibility under the Sixth Amendment lies with the 
State, which cannot abdicate its constitutional duty by simply delegating administrative 
responsibility for public defense to the counties. 
II. As the Only State Officials Who Give Effect to Idaho's Statewide Indigent 
Defense System, the Governor and PDC Members Are Proper Defendants In 
Litigation Challenging the Adequacy of That System. 
In its seminal 1908 decision in Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that state 
officials sued in their official capacities for prospective or declaratory relief are proper 
defendants so long as the officials have "some connection" to the laws involved. 209 U.S. 123, 
157 (1908). The Governor and the members of the Public Defense Commission ("PDC") rest 
their argument that no relief can be granted here on cases, like Association des Eleveurs de 
Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013), involving state laws 
authorizing enforcement proceedings or other state action directly against individuals. However, 
Defendants' "affirmative obligation" to maintain an adequate statewide public defense system, 
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171, is "simply not the type of statute that gives rise to enforcement 
proceed~ngs." Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Accordingly, when a state law "is not of the type to give rise to enforcement proceedings, a state 
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official nonetheless may be named as a defendant under Ex parte Young if he has [a] 
responsibility to 'give effect' to the law." Idaho Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Wasden, 32 
F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1148 (D. Idaho 2014) (citation omitted). 
The decision in Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Eu shows how the Ex parte 
Young analysis works when plaintiffs challenge systemic issues, as they do here, rather than the 
failure to enforce a criminal or regulatory statute. In Eu, the plaintiffs challenged the California 
legislature's limit on the number of judges for Los Angeles County. 979 F.2d at 700. The 
County itself, despite having the option under state law to allow appointment of additional 
. . 
judges above the limit, was not a defendant in the appeal. Id. at 700 n.1. The defendant 
governor and secretary of state, like their counterpart defendants in this case, argued that it was 
the legislature-not executive branch officials-that had the power to determine the appropriate 
number of judges to be assigned to each county and claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit based on their lack of connection to the establishment of the limit on judges. Id. at 701, 
704. The Ninth Circuit rejected those arguments. Id. at 704. Noting that the case was not of the 
kind involving "enforcement proceedings," it held that the Governor's power to appoint judges 
and the .secretary of state's duty to certify judicial elections was a sufficient connection to the 
challenged system-despite that neither official had the power to directly increase the number of 
judges. Id. Moreover, the court added that "[ w ]ere this court to issue the requested declaration, 
we must assume that it is substantially likely that the California legislature, although its members 
are not all parties to this action, would abide by our authoritative determination." Id. at 701 
( citation omitted). 
Here, Governor Otter and the PDC members have a far more direct connection to Idaho's 
statewide indigent defense system than did the California governor and secretary of state in Eu. 
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See also Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738, 752 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding, in suit challenging 
membership requirements of judicial nominating committee, that because governor "play[ ed] a 
role" in the committee's operations by selecting from judicial nominees the committee identifies, 
governor's connection was sufficient to overcome the Eleventh Amendment). The Governor not 
only appoints the majority of the PDC, LC. § 19-849(1)(c), he has been and remains deeply and 
directly involved in its work, has been in regular communication with the PDC on systemic 
public defense issues, and has legal appointment authority over the State Appellate Public 
Defender and boards of county ·commissioners as well. For its part, the PDC has direct, statutory 
duties to establish rules governing public defenders throughout the State, LC. § 19-850(1)(a), and 
is mandated to make recommendations for system-wide reform, LC. § 19-850(1)(b). 
Yet, despite these specific duties, Defendants have failed to fulfill them. As a result, 
Idaho's' public defense delivery system continues to suffer from the same deficiencies it faced 
before passage of the 2014 amendments to the State's public defense statutes. These 
Defendants are the very state officials who "give effect" to Idaho's statewide public defense 
delivery system, and, as such, they are not immune from suit over that system. See Wasden, 32 
F. Supp. 3d at 1148. 
A. The PDC Members Have a Direct Connection to Idaho's Public Defense 
Delivery System Under Ex parte Young. 
A statewide commissioner of an agency is a properly named defendant in a lawsuit 
regarding that agency's duties. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the Oklahoma Commissioner of Health was a properly named defendant in a 
lawsuit challenging an amendment to a state statute preventing recognition of adoptions by 
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same-sex couples).3 For instance, in Lakeside Roofing Co. v. Nixon, No. 4:10CV01761, 2011 
WL 1465593 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2011), the court denied a motion to dismiss in a case naming 
the· Governor of Missouri and three Commissioners of the Missouri Labor and Industrial 
Relations Commission. The court found that the law "provides a sufficient connection between 
the Commissioners and the enforcement of the Law to make the Commissioners potentially 
proper parties for injunctive relief." Id. at *4 (citation omitted). There, the Commissioners were 
required to provide a list of nonrestrictive states to the Department of Labor, which would in turn 
determine which laborers are prohibited from working state jobs during a period of excessive 
unemployment. Id. The court reasoned that "[a]lthough the Commissioners are not the final 
decisio~akers, the Commissioners assist in giving effect to the allegedly unconstitutional law 
because they make the requisite determination for what constitutes a restrictive state. Thus, the 
. 
Commissioners are an indispensable part of the process of enforcing the Law and their presence 
in this lawsuit may be required for complete relief." Id. 
The Idaho Public Defense Commission, as its very name suggests, is Idaho's only state 
agency tasked with overseeing and promulgating rules for trial-level indigent defense services in 
Idaho. Its members are properly named defendants under the Ex parte Young exception. It was 
establis~ed as a self-governing agen~y in the executive branch of state government. See 2d Aff. 
Eppink ex. 4 at D'724. 
The PDC is specifically, statutorily mandated to improve Idaho's statewide public 
~efense system. Among other things, the PDC is required to promulgate rules establishing 
training requirements for public defenders. LC. § 19-850(1)(a)(i). Training requirements are 
essential to guaranteeing that a state's public defense delivery system is constitutionally 
3 In that case, the Governor, who was a defendant in the lower court proceedings in which the 
statute was held unconstitutional, did not appeal the judgment. Finstuen, 496 F .3d at 1142. 
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adequate. The American Bar Asso_ciation's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System 
emphasizes the critical role of training in preparing defense attorneys to be effective advocates 
for their clients. See 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 5 at D3069 ("Defense counsel's ability, training, and 
experience match the complexity of the case"; "Defense counsel is provided with and required to 
attend continuing legal education"; "Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed 
for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally adopted standards."). Furthermore, 
the PDC developed and sponsored three statewide training programs for public defenders in 
2015. See Aff. Thomson ,r 9. Indeed, accompanying the pass~ge of the 2014 amendments to 
Idaho's public defense statutes, the Legislature appropriated a $110,000 budget for the PDC to 
develop and conduct trainings for public defenders around the state. 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 9 at 7-8 
· (answer no. 19); id. ex. 6 at D'376-378. The PDC is, accordingly, intimately involved in 
overseeing indigent defense reform in Idaho, not just at a policy level, but on a local level as 
well, delivering training to individual public defenders on the ground. While these training 
sessions are not alone sufficient to repair the system, the PDC efforts and authority related to the 
training program demonstrate its close connection at all levels of Idaho's public defense system. 
Likewise, the PDC has affirmative duties to ensure adequate data reporting by public 
defenders throughout Idaho. LC. § 19-850(a)(ii). The PDC defendants have themselves 
acknowledged that making systemic, statewide improvements and monitoring the constitutional 
adequacy ofldaho's statewide system requires data collection and reporting. See 2d Aff. Eppink 
ex. 7 at D'366-367. In fact, the remedial injunction in a recent indigent defense class action in 
the State of Washington specifically ordered increased data reporting and collection. Wilbur v. 
City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
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Another section of the Public Defense Act requires the PDC to "make recommendations 
to the Idaho legislature for legislation on public defense system issues including, but not limited 
to" core requirements for county-level contracts with private attorneys, "enforcement 
mechanisms," and "[f]unding issues including, but not limited to" training, data collection, and 
conflict cases. LC. § 19-850(1)(b). Under the statute, the PDC was required to make a set of 
initial recommendations by January 20, 2015, in addition to "each year thereafter as deemed 
necessary by the commission .... " Id. 
The PDC, furthermore, is part of an "Executive Legislative System," involving 
Governor's office review and approval of the PDC's proposed rules and recommendations. 2d 
Aff. Eppink ex. 8 at D'242. Unfortunately, the PDC has failed to meet its initial statutorily-
prescribed deadline for making those recommendations, further stalling legislative action to fix 
the statewide system. See 1st Aff. Eppink ex. A at 12. The Commissioners are developing 
model contract language and a statewide data reporting system. See 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 7. 
Additionally, the PDC has been in regular communication with the Governor's office, county 
officials (including Dan Chadwick, Executive Director at Idaho Association of Counties), and 
the interim legislative committee on public defense. See, e.g., 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 8 at D'242, ex. 
10 at D' 410, and ex. 11 at D' 54 ("Rep. Luker indicated that the Interim Cmte. would like a list of 
the legislative fixes that they could make by the November date."). 
Despite its clear statutory mandate, the PDC has failed to promulgate rules and provide 
recommendations that would have set specific standards for the state's public defense system, 
and thus has contributed to the ongoing failure of the system. 
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B. Governor Otter Also Has a Direct Connection to Idaho's Public Defense 
Delivery System under Ex Parle Young. 
A governor is a properly-named defendant in systemic reform lawsuits regarding the 
State's provision of indigent defense services, based on both general and specific connections. 
For example, in Kitchen v. Herbert, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah's governor was subject to 
suit under Ex parte Young because he was "statutorily charged with 'supervis[ing] the official 
conduct of all executive and ministerial officers' and 'see[ing] that all offices are filled and the 
duties thereof performed."' 755 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting the Utah Code) 
(footnote omitted). Idaho's governor bears identical responsibilities under I.C. § 67-802(1) and 
(2). Cf Estep v. Commissioners of Boundary Cnty., 122 Idaho 345, 346 (1992) (regarding the 
executive branch functions of Idaho county commissioners and other officials). Therefore, 
because Governor Otter is "responsible for the general supervision of the administration by the 
local ... officials," he is not immune from suit. 755 F.3d at 1204 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
Because of similar responsibilities, Georgia's governor was a proper defendant in a suit 
challenging deficiencies in the state's provision of indigent defense services there. Luckey v. 
Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, No. 
2:14-CV-00876-DN-DBP, 2015 WL 6395587, at *4 (D. Utah Oct. 22, 2015) (holding that 
allegations that the Governor was the supervisor of all official conduct of all executive and 
ministerial officers, which included the chief election official in charge of enforcement of the 
challenged provision of SB54, were enough to show that the Governor had "' some connection' 
to the enforcement of the challenged provision of SB54, and a 'particular duty' to enforce the 
law"); Hall v. State of Louisiana, 983 F. Supp. 2d 820, 832 (M.D. La. 2013) (holding that the 
governor and attorney general were properly named defendants because the complaint alleged 
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that they had "some connection with the enforcement of the 1993 Judicial Election Plan, or that 
they are specifically charged with the duty to enforce the Plan and are currently exercising and/or 
threatening to exercise that duty.). 
· Like the governor in Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Eu, Idaho's governor's 
connection as an appointing and supervising power over Idaho's public defense system means he 
is a proper defendant here. Recall that in Eu, California's governor was a proper defendant in a 
suit over limits on the number of county judges-not because the governor had power to increase 
or decrease the number of assignments, but merely because he had appointment powers to fill 
judicial vacancies. 979 F.2d at 704. Here, Governor Otter has the same appointment powers-
not only to fill vacancies on the statewide Public Defense Commission, I.C. § 19-849(1)(c), but 
also to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, I.C. § 19-869(2), and to fill vacancies on 
Boards of County Commissioners, who administer public defenders for the State in each county, 
I.C. § 59-906A. See also I.C.-§ 31-5203(4). 
Governor Otter has far more than general responsibilities over Idaho's indigent defense 
t 
system than did the governor in Eu. Indeed, he has other substantial and direct connections to 
Idaho's statewide system. First, the Governor has a long history of involvement in Idaho's 
public defense system, and reform of that system in particular, beginning with the Governor's 
creation of CJC in 2005 by way of executive order, in addition to the creation of the Public 
Defense subcommittee in 2009. The Governor's executive order was intended to provide policy 
makers and criminal justice decision makers with more accurate information that would improve 
public safety and general equity across the state, including in the area of indigent defense. See, 
e.g., 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 12 atD'1150. In January of 2010, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association released a report that suggested Idaho was not adequately satisfying its Sixth 
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Amendment obligations. Over the next three years, the CJC committed itself to identifying 
improvements to be made to Idaho's public defense system. And in 2013, the CJC submitted 
written recommendations to the Legislature regarding specific reforms to the state's public 
defense system. In turn, these efforts yielded four pieces of proposed legislation focused on 
public defense reform. See id. ex. 3. 
Second, the PDC was established in 2014 as a "Self-governing agency of the Executive," 
and the Governor sits atop the PDC's organizational hierarchy, as the top-level official 
responsible for Idaho's statewide public defense system. Id. ex. 13 at D' 1173. The Governor is 
also the hub of the "Executive Legislative System" that the PDC follows, which requires the 
Governor's office to review, vet, and approve any rules, recommendations, or guidelines before 
they are established within the statewide system. Id. at ex. 8 at D'242. Naturally, therefore, the 
Governor's office has been in ongoing communication with the PDC since its creation in 201_4. 
Aff. Thomson ,r,r 14-15. Hence, the PDC, according to its own records, reports to the Governor, 
who bears the ultimate responsibility for the PDC's actions. 
Third, Idaho's Governor has broad executive order authority, which he can use towards 
reforming Idaho's statewide public defense system. Just this year, Governor Otter issued an 
expansive executive order establishing a comprehensive "Sage-Grouse Management Plan," 
requiring detailed supervision and achievement of objectives throughout the state. 2d Aff. 
Eppink ex. 14. Also this year, the Governor authorized a brand new statewide health care 
program, permitting-by executive order alone-an executive branch agency to fund and 
implement the program as necessary. Id. ex. 15. The Governor may also use executive orders to 
ensure that local jurisdictions are complying with federal law. In 2010, for example, Governor 
Otter commanded Idaho's Juvenile Justice Commission to "ensure compliance," by all 
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')urisdictions with public authority in Idaho," with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, including through "monitoring and remedial actions for violations." Id. ex. 16. 
Especially in light of Defendants' acknowledgement, in their opening brief, of "the seriousness 
of the issues the Plaintiffs describe," the Governor could likewise use his executive order 
authority to ensure compliance with the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution· in both 
criminal and juvenile proceedings in Idaho. 
The Governor's connection to the State's public defense delivery system, for all of these 
reasons, is far more substantial than a mere generalized duty to enforce all state laws, as 
Defendants suggest. The Governor's real argument, instead, seems to be that he should be 
immune from this lawsuit because there is no state official who was comprehensively 
responsible for Idaho's system. The federal court in HRPT Properties Trust v. Lingle explained 
why such an argument must be rejected. 715 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (D. Haw. 2010). There, 
the court allowed a prospective suit to go forward against a state governor, notwithstanding the 
defendant's claim that neither he nor any of his employees were responsible for enforcing the 
' law in, question. The court held that if there is no state official specifically charged with 
enforcing the challenged act, "then it stands to reason that [the governor] is the person with the 
power to instruct state officials in the executive branch to enforce or to refrain from enforcing" 
the act.' Id. This Court should similarly reject Defendants' attempts to argue that no Idaho state 
official could be sued to fix its public defense delivery system. 
III. Resolving Systemic Reform Litigation Is a Central Responsibility of the 
Judiciary. 
,· It has been a fundamental purpose of the courts of the United States since their creation 
to afford citizens a method to challenge State action and seek its reform. Resolving litigation 
that challenges systemic constitutional deficiencies on the state level, in particular, has been a 
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core responsibility of the American judiciary at least since Brown v. Board of Education, 349 
U.S. 2~4, 300-301 (1955). Through remedial schemes combining structural injunctions and 
declaratory judgments, courts have a special duty to oversee the elimination of systemic 
constitutional violations by states both "root and branch." See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 
430, 43.8 (1968). Although state and local authorities bear primary responsibility for managing 
their affairs, courts must act when those authorities fail to m~et their affirmative obligations. See 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-281 (1977). As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, 
plaintiffs challenging statewide constitutional failures need not base their case on individual local 
violations, but instead may rely on the existence of system-wide deficiencies. Brown v. Plata, 
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1925 n.3 (2011). 
' 
Idaho courts are no strangers to this kind of systemic reform litigation. In the face of the 
State's repeated failure to correct constitutional deficie_ncies in Idaho's educational system, the 
Idaho Supreme Court stepped in-five times-and expressly reaffirmed the courts' "duty to 
determine whether the current funding system passes constitutional muster" in upholding this 
District Court's judgment declaring the system unconstitutional. ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 453, 
459--460. The Idaho Supreme Court, in Hellar v. Cenarrusa, likewise upheld a district court's 
declaration invalidating the 1982 reapportionment of the Legislature as violating the Idaho 
Constitution. 106 Idaho 571, 575 (1984). In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to enter its 
own declaration striking down a later reapportionment, and entered an order prescribing a 
specific reapportionment plan. Id. at 585. Several years after Hellar, the Court made clear that 
"[p]assing on the constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactments with political 
overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of the judiciary, and has been so since Marbury v. 
Madison . . . . Constitutional rights, as well as this Court's duty to faithfully interpret our 
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constitution and the federal constitution, do not wane before united efforts of the legislature and 
the governor." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 640 (1989). Here, Plaintiffs ask this 
Court to do just that: pass upon the constitutionality of Idaho's public defense services, as 
reflected in the statutory enactment of the Public Defense Act and the actions (and omissions) of 
Defendants for ensuring that the constitutional guarantees of adequate indigent defense are 
carried out in this state. 
Systemic reform litigation specifically concerning public defense systems is also familiar 
territory for state courts. In Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, New York's highest court 
affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint raising issues nearly identical to those 
alleged in the complaint in this case. 15 N.Y.3d 8, 27 (2010). The court rejected the State's 
argument that "a claim for systemic relief of the sort plaintiffs seek will involve the courts in the 
performance of properly legislative functions," and denied the State's motion to dismiss despite 
that the New York Legislature had "left the performance of the State's obligations under Gideon 
to the counties, where it is discharged, for the most part, with county resources and according to 
local rules and practices." Id. at 15-16. Likewise, in Michigan, the Court of Appeals stated that 
"it is the state that ultimately has the affirmative constitutional obligation to implement a system 
that safeguards the right to counsel .... " Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 136 n.24 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2009), aff'd in result, 832 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). Accordingly, the 
Duncan court held that "[i]f a county system is constitutionally inadequate," and the court hears 
the evidence and finds "widespread and systemic instances of deprivation of counsel and 
deficient performance resulting from a flawed county system of providing indigent 
representation, but the county is in full compliance with existing state law and mandates, the 
cause of the constitutional deficiencies will necessarily flow from failures by the state." Id. 
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The very same logic applies here. In this instance, just as in other systemic reform 
litigation in Idaho state courts, the ultimate question at issue is not whether implementation in 
individual local jurisdictions is adequate, but whether the State has provided an adequate means 
for local jurisdictions to provide constitutionally sufficient services. See ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 
455. It has not. The law is clear that where a state seeks to "commit[] the details of its operation 
to local officers," it must first provide "suitable machinery" that will enable such officials to 
fulfill the legal obligation in question. Fenton v. Bd. of Commissioners of Ada Cnty., 20 Idaho 
392, 403 (1911). Plaintiffs in this case allege that the State has not provided the counties with 
suitable machinery to provide constitutionally adequate public defense. Accordingly, "the issue 
is systemic in nature," and the Distric~ Court may make generalized findings. JSEEO V, 142 
Idaho at 455. Here, just as the Idaho Supreme Court has had to point out before in this kind of 
litigation, "the State fails to grasp the relevance of the adage 'the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts."' Id. 
Finally, litigating these important issues on a county- or city-level basis would be 
inefficient, duplicative, expensive, and time-consuming. As such, Plaintiffs have specifically 
tailored the relief they are requesting to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on either the 
State or the Court. To the extent that enforcement will require, at the outset, efforts to craft a 
workable plan, the State has in place both the people and programs that would allow it to assign 
and complete that work quickly. Indeed, just as Defendants were able to provide the resources to 
litigate this matter on behalf of the entire State, it can utilize those resources to propose an 
interim plan here, and by doing so, reduce the overall burden on the State. While Plaintiffs 
believe this approach is preferable-and indeed advantageous for Defendants-the Court, if 
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necessary, has the authority to invoke its equitable powers to require the State to craft a litigation 
and dis~overy plan. 
At bottom, the State of Idaho should not be permitted to prevail on technical points about 
the scope and duties of certain State-level employees, in an effort to obscure its fundamental 
obligations to indigent Idaho defendants. 
IV. When a Statewide System of Constitutional Compliance Has Failed, It Is the 
Judiciary's Unique Responsibility to Declare It. 
Idaho's declaratory judgment statutes are "broad and comprehensive," Idaho Mut. Benefit 
Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 797-798 (1944), and must be "liberally construed and 
administered," I.C. § 10-1212. Their express purpose is to "afford relief from uncertainty and 
insecurity with respect to rights .... " Id. 
The declaratory judgment statutes begin, in fact, with a decisional rule that disposes of 
the State's argument: "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for." LC.§ 10-1201. As the State acknowledges in its 
brief, a Court may refuse to enter a declaratory judgment only when a declaration "would not 
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." I.C. § 10-1206. The 
uncertainty that gives rise to this proceeding is whether the State's system for ensuring the right 
to counsel throughout Idaho's 44 counties is constitutional as is, or whether the State must adjust 
that system.4 There would, however, be a genuine 1.c: § 10-1206 issue if this class action were 
4 The commissioners of the Public Defense Commission can adjust that system by promulgating 
rules governing training requirements for public defenders and issuing recommendations through 
the "Executive Legislative System." 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 8 at D'242. (Indeed, even were the 
plaintiffs to petition the Commission for rulemaking, the Governor's review and approval would 
still be needed under that "Executive Legislation System.") The Governor can also make even 
more sweeping adjustments by Executive Order. See, e.g., 2d Aff. Eppink exs. 14-16. And the 
State of Idaho, which is the plaintiff in every criminal case in state court, can do so by taking 
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forced into a· county-by-county approach. For, even if a court were to declare, as part of this 
action or a separate one, that individual counties were not complying with constitutional or 
statutory requirements, it would not terminate the root uncertainty that the plaintiffs raise in the 
existing complaint: whether the statewide system itself is constitutionally adequate. 
A statewide declaratory judgment would terminate that root uncertainty. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained in Wylie v. State, declaratory judgment actions are properly dismissed 
only where "the judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no other 
relief is sought in the action." 151 Idaho 26, 31 (2011) ( emphasis added) ( quoting ISEEO v. 
Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 282 (1996) [hereinafter ISEEO JI]). This Court's 
declaration that Idaho's system is currently operating below constitutional thresholds would have 
a direct effect on the plaintiff class because it would require the State to meet those thresholds 
before it could continue to prosecute indigent criminal defendants. Class members could obtain 
immediate further relief based on the judgment, through stays and other appropriate temporary 
relief in their criminal proceedings until the State dispatched the resources and rules needed for 
constitutional compliance. Alternatively, if this Court determines, after hearing all of the 
evidence, that Idaho's statewide system is operating at or above constitutional thresholds, the 
judgment would resolve the question whether Idaho has systemic problems, rather than merely 
local deficiencies. Cf I.C. § 10-1201 ("The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in 
form and effect .... "). Either way, the class complaint would be redressed, at least in part, by a 
declaratory judgment. 
In short, either the statewide public defense system in Idaho is constitutional or it is not. 
actions to ensure that criminal caseloads and workloads do not exceed constitutional limits, given 
the number and experience of public defenders available throughout the state. 
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Th~ time for making that decision will come once the evidence is developed and presented. The 
question now, though, is whether a declaratory judgment actio~ may p~oceed at all. To decide 
that question, this Court only considers whether the uncertainty about the statewide system's 
constitutionality presents "a real and substantial controversy" or merely a hypothetical one. 
Miles v: Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,642 (1989); see also Harris v. Cassia Cnty., 106 Idaho 
513, 516-517 (1984). With Defendant Governor Otter himself having stated on the record to the 
Idaho public that "our current method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants 
does not pass constitutional muster," the question is very real and quite substantial. 5 2d AFf. 
Epp ink ex. 2 at 8. In systemic reform class litigation, which raises "matter[ s] of great 
fundamental importance," it is imperative that the courts resolve constitutional uncertainties, and 
the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized a public interest justiciability exception to ensure these 
kinds of cases are heard. ISEEO 11, 128 Idaho at 284. In any event, deferring this real and 
substantial question to county-level litigation would achieve nothing because, even if the Court 
concluded that public defense in a particular county is inadequate, it will still not be certain 
whether it is the county's fault or just a localized symptom of a statewide, systemic deficiency. 
See Du~can, 774 N.W.2d at 136 n.24. Thus, because a declaration about the adequacy of the 
statewide system in Idaho will "remove an uncertainty" about the constitutiona~ity of indigent 
defense in Idaho, Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action must proceed to further discovery and 
5 The. State's entwined argument that declaratory relief is not available if injunctive relief is not 
also available is flatly rejected by statute: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions 
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief 
is or could be claimed." LC. § 10-1201 (emphasis added); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 
U.S. 452, 471 (1974) ("engrafting [on] the Declaratory Judgment Act a requirement that all of 
the traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction be satisfied before the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment is considered would defy Congress' intent to make 
declaratory relief available in cases where an injunction would be inappropriate"); LC. § 10-1215 
(requiring Idaho's declaratory judgment statutes be interpreted "to harmonize, as far as possible, 
with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees"). 
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adjudication. See LC.§ 10-1205. 
V. Plaintiffs' Suit Complies With Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 3(b) and 65(d). 
Plaintiffs' lawsuit complies fully with the mandates of I.R.C.P. 3(b) because the suit 
names Governor Otter and the individual members of the PDC as defendants. Rule 3(b) 
specifies that government officials "shall not be designated as parties in any capacity unless the 
action is brought against them individually or for relief under Rules 65 or 74." Plaintiffs named 
Governor Otter and the individual PDC members as defendants in this case. 
Defendants' reliance on Weyyakin Ranch Prop. Owners' Association Inc. v. City of 
Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896 P.2d 327 (1995) is misguided. While the language in Weyyakin 
correctly explains the interplay between I.R.C.P. 3(b) and 65(d), the plaintiffs in that case sued 
only the City of Ketchum, rather than the elected officials individually, thereby violating the 
Rule. · That is not the case here, where Plaintiffs have sued the relevant state officials 
individually. Defendants obviously disagree as to which individual state officials could be 
properly sued for the State's failure to provide a constitutionally adequate indigent defense 
system, and seem to suggest that members of the Idaho Legislature would have to be named in 
the lawsuit in order for Plaintiffs to get the relief requested in their Complaint. But that is the 
very issue being decided by this Court. The fact that Defendants believe it to be "obvious" that 
the Governor and Commissioners have been named improperly does not make it so. 
* * * * * 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs re~pectfully request that the Court deny 
Defendant's motion to dismiss and allow all discovery to proceed in this matter. 
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Respectfully submitted this 24th day of November, 2015. 
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TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves 
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) 
) Case No. CV OC 1510240 
) 
) REPLYMEMORANDUMIN 
) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., ) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
Defendants. ) 
------------------
Defendants (1) the State of Idaho, (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and (3) the seven 
members of the Public Defense Commission (PDC) file this Reply Memorandum in support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. This Reply is accompanied'by an Objection and 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavits and Exhibits. However, Defendants cannot know before 
their argument whether their Objection and Motion to Strike will be granted. Thus, this Reply 
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addresses the Affidavits and Exhibits as a fallback argument in case the Objection and Motion to 
Strike is denied in full or in part, but Defendants' primary argument is that the Affidavits and 
Exhibits should not be considered at all. 
I. OVERVIEW OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs may bring Federal claims against "persons", i.e., so-
called State actors, "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State ... , subject[], or cause[] to be subjected, any ... person ... to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States] .... " 
Plaintiffs agree that Idaho itself cannot be sued under § 1983. Response to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss (Response), p. 3, n.1 ("the State ofldaho itself is not a 'person' for purposes 
of prospective injunctive relief under ... § 1983"). Because Idaho cannot be sued under§ 1983, 
Plaintiffs' Federal claims are reduced to whether the Complaint alleged facts showing that the 
Governor or PDC members personally subjected or caused any Plaintiff to be subjected to depri-
vation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Governor and PDC members have taken 
no action or inaction regarding public defense services that would allow the Court to provide re-
lief against them under§ 1983, so the Federal law claims against the Governor and PDC mem-
bers must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have no case or controversy with these Defendants. 
The issue of whether Idaho may be sued for deprivation of the right to counsel found in 
Idaho Const., Article I, § 13, has never been addressed in a published opinion of the Idaho Su-
preme Court. However, for the sovereign immunity, prudential, and separation-of-powers rea-
sons given in the Argument below, the Court should dismiss the State law claims against Idaho. 
Further, because neither the Governor nor the PDC can provide the State law relief prayed for in 
the Complaint, the Court should likewise dismiss the State law claims against them. 
The issue before the Court is not whether the Complaint has alleged some Federal or 
State constitutional violation regarding provision of public defender services. For purposes of 
the Motion to Dismiss, the Court may assume that some Plaintiff alleged facts that if true would 
allow the Court to determine that he or she was denied his or her constitutional right to counsel. 
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"The facts of this case are not at issue because [defendant] accepts the facts [plaintifl] alleged in 
its complaint as true for the purposes of its 12(b )( 6) motion .... " ABC Agrs, LLC v. Critical Ac-
cess Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781,782,331 P.3d 523,524 (2014). The issue thus becomes: Are 
Plaintiffs seeking a remedy against the named Defendants that is consistent with Federal and/or 
State law. The Argument below shows that they are not. 
II. FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNOR AND PDC MEMBERS 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A CASE OR CONTROVERSY BECAUSE 
THEY CANNOT PROVIDE THE REDRESS SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT'S 
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 
Before addressing why neither the Governor nor PDC members can provide the redress 
prayed for in the Complaint and why the Federal law claims against them should be dismissed, 
Defendants first address the common practice ofmetonymy1 in which the words "the State" are 
often used interchangeably with or as shorthand for the words "State actors."2 To take an ex-
ample from the Response, "[I]n paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs defined 'State' to refer 
to all Defendants throughout the Complaint," Response, p. 2, n.1, i.e., the Complaint used the 
term "the State" to include two sets of State actors - the Governor and the PDC members. 
, Appellate courts often use the words "the State" to refer to State actors generally, not 
necessarily to a State of the Union itself. E.g., prison officials sued over whether they provided 
adequate law libraries or acceptable alternatives were called "the State" in Bounds v. Smith, 430 
U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977),3 cited Response, p. 4; there were numerous references to consti-
tutional limitations upon or constitutional requirements imposed upon "the State" in a suit 
against Federal officers, including the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Walters v. National 
Metonymy is "a figure of speech consisting of the use of the name of one thing for that of another 
of which it is an attribute or with which it is associated (as 'crown' in 'lands belonging to the crown')." 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 782 (11th ed. 2003). "For instance, 'Wall Street' is often 
used metonymously to describe the U.S. financial and corporate sector, while 'Hollywood' is used as a 
metonym for the U.S. film industry .... " https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metonymy. 
2 
"State actors" need not be officers or employees of the State itself; city and county officers and 
employees acting under color of State law are "State actors." Padgett v. Wright, 516 F. App'x 609, 611 
(9th Cir. 2013) (mayor acting in his official capacity was a state actor); Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cty. of 
Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 413-14, 258 P.3d 340, 348-49 (2011) (county sheriff was a state actor). 
3 The State officers who were sued are listed in Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1975). 
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Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3195 (1985), cited Response, p. 4; 
there were references to "the State" in a suit against a city, City of Revere v. Massachusetts 
General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983), cited Response, p. 5. Thus, courts often 
metonymically refer to "the State" without literally meaning a State of the Union. 
Defendants concede based upon the cases cited at Response, pp. 3-6, that some "State 
actor(s)" (as broadly defined) is or are responsible for providing indigent defense in Idaho trial 
courts. They do not concede that the Governor, the PDC members, or any other State Executive 
Officer is such a State actor. Importantly, despite the sweeping use of the words "the State" in 
Plaintiffs' cases, not one case cited at Response, pp. 3-6, holds that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires a State of the Union or one of its officers to be responsible for ensuring that there are 
constitutionally adequate public defender services throughout the State.4 
Cases cited later do not supply what is missing from pages 3-6. Response, p. 7, cites two 
Idaho cases and concludes that the "counties' failure to fulfill State responsibilities ... ultimately 
4 Plaintiffs quote the Recommendations of the Public Defense Subcommittee of the Criminal Justice 
Commission, adopted May 13, 2013, as follows: 
As with other rights that are fundamental and essential to a fair trial, the vindication of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a state responsibility. Although a state may delegate its 
duty to apprise citizens of this right to counties, it is ultimately the state's responsibility to 
ensure that the constitutional obligation is met. 
Response, p. 7, quoting from Second Epp ink Aff., Ex. 3. This quotation was part of a larger report that 
included recommendations for legislation for the 2014 Session. As with any report recommending legis-
lation, its focus and conclusions were legislative or political, not judicial; it may well be that its members 
believe that the State has a political responsibility for the public defense system. That is a far cry from 
whether Federal or State law places legal responsibility on the State or on specific State actors. In the 
end, neither the Commission nor its Subcommittee has authority to determine who has legal responsibility 
for public defense; that is a matter for the Courts. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
Further, the Subcommittee's comments that accompanied its proposed legislation preceded the 
2014 amendments to the Public Defender statutes. See 2014 Idaho Session Law, chapter 247, adding the 
Public Defense Act to the Idaho Code. The Subcommittee was not describing the system now in place; it 
was describing the system that preceded enactment of legislation along the lines that it proposed. 
Lastly, Plaintiffs describe the Criminal Justice Commission as the Governor's "own" Commission. 
It is accurate that the Governor created the Commission by Executive Order. Executive Order 2015-10, 
dated September 23, 2015, Idaho Administrative Bulletin, No. 15-12, pp. 23-26. However, only four of 
the Commission's ten ex officio members are direct gubernatorial appointees; only three of the nine direct 
gubernatorial appointees are unrestricted because the rest must represent specified entities; the Legislature 
and the Judiciary appoint the remaining seven members. The Commission represents all three branches 
of government and other interests as well. It is not the Governor's "own". 
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lies at the feet of the State." But no Idaho case cited on page 7 (or any other case that Defen-
dants know) holds that the State is legally responsible for a county not performing a duty placed 
on the county by law. Response, p. 8, cites Stanley v. Darlington County School District, 84 F.3d 
707, 713 ( 4th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that when local schools did not desegregate, the 
State.was not absolved of responsibility to cure the constitutional violation. However, this dicta 
came from a case in which "neither the original plaintiffs nor the United States ever sued the 
State," id. at 711, so there was no reason to opine on the State's responsibility. Further, Stanley's 
dicta was contemporaneous with the United States Supreme Court's reinvigoration of the Ele-
venth Amendment, which made it clear that private parties could not sue States in Federal Court. 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Needless to say, Stanley's dicta 
that the State would be responsible in a Federal Court suit for a school district's constitutional 
failings is an outlier that has not been taken up by other Federal Courts of Appeal. 
Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992), Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 
1444 (9th Cir. 1984), and Kreulle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1981), 
cited Response, pp. 8-9, do not help Plaintiffs. They involved States' voluntary participation in 
Federal social or educational spending programs. The United States can condition acceptance of 
Federal funds on the State's consent to suit over the administration of those programs. See dis-
cussion in Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
686-87, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999) (Congress may require waiver of State's sovereign immun-
ity or agreement to suit as a condition of acceptance of Federal funds). Federal statutes may al-
low or require a State officer who administers a Federal spending program to be subject to suit 
over State or local administration of the program; that does not mean that the Sixth Amendment 
requires the State to have an officer who may be sued over provision of public defense services. 
Thus, these cases do not stand for the proposition that "responsibility under the Sixth Amend-
ment lies with the State, which cannot abdicate its constitutional duty by ... delegating adminis-
trative responsibility for public defense to the counties," Response, p. 9, because Federal spend-
ing programs, not the Sixth Amendment, were at issue in Robertson, Woods, and Kruelle. 
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This Court does not have a Federal constitutional command to entertain "litigation that 
challenges systemic constitutional deficiencies at the state level," Response, p. 18, when there is 
no State officer who, in the words of§ 1983, "deprives" Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. 
While it is true that the United States Supreme Court did not require individual prisoners to bring 
individual claims for systemic failures in delivery of mental health services in the California pri-
son system, Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), cited Response, p. 19, the sys-
temic failure at issue there was in State prisons (i.e., there was no claim of a systemic failure in 
State prisons and in city and county jails), so of course there were State officers responsible for 
the entire State prison system who were amenable to suit. There is no such State officer here. 
Neither Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 930 N.E.2d 217 (2010), nor Duncan v. 
Michigan, 284 Mich.App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 9 (2009), cited Response, p. 20, create a right to 
mount a statewide challenge to the adequacy of public defense services under§ 1983. 
Hurrell-Harring (H-H) was a challenge to provision of public defense services in five 
' New York counties, not statewide. 15 N.Y.3d at 15, 25, 26-27. H-H cited the Sixth Amendment, 
but § 1983 and its standards for Federal suit were never mentioned, probably because the pri-
mary defendant-the State of New York- is not a person who can be sued under§ 1983. The 
rationale for suing the only other defendant - the Governor5 - under § 1983 likewise was not 
discussed. Whatever else one can say about H-H, it was not grounded in§ 1983. 
Neither was Duncan in the end grounded in§ 1983. Duncans puzzling, history is re-
counted in Duncan v State, 300 Mich.App. 176, 832 N.W.2d 761 (2012), a 2012 Michigan Court 
of Appeals opinion issued two years after the Michigan Supreme Court decisions. The 2009 
Court of Appeals decision, 284 Mich.App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 9, cited Response, p. 20, allowed the 
State and the Governor to be sued over provision of public defender services. The State was 
sued under the Michigan Governmental Tort Liability Act, 284 Mich.App. at 266-71, 77 4 
N.W.2d at 104-06, and the Governor was sued under§ 1983, 284 Mich.App. at 271-76, 774 
5 Hurrell-Harringv. New York, 66A.D.3d 84, 86, n.1, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349,350, n.l (2009), aff'das 
modified, ·15 N.Y.3d 8, 930 N.E.2d 217 (2010) (Governor added as a defendant without any discussion 
why he was an appropriate defendant under Federal law). 
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N.W.2d at 106-09, without any discussion of his authority to redress Plaintiffs' claims. 
The Court of Appeals was then affirmed, reversed, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Michigan in that order. See 486 Mich. 906, 906, 780 N.W.2d 843, 844 (2010) (affirming "result 
only of the Court of Appeals majority for different reasons"); 486 Mich. 1071, 1071, 784 N.W.2d 
51, 51 (2010) ("The defendants are entitled to summary disposition because, as the Court of Ap-
peals dissenting opinion recognized, the plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable"); and 488 Mich. 
957, 866 N.W.2d 407 (2010) ("we REINSTATE our order" cited first in this list),6 as explained in 
300 Mich.App. at 183-84, 832 N.W.2d at 765. Like H-H, § 1983 and its standards for suing the 
only named Defendants - the State and the Governor - are never discussed by the Michigan 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals "for different reasons". 
Other States have declined to follow H-H and Duncan. Flora v. Luzerne County, l 03 
A.3d 125, 134-37 (Pa.Commw. 2014), noted that H-Hwas a 4-3 decision and that Duncan was 
2-1 in the Court of Appeals and concluded that the dissents were better reasoned, in part because: 
First, there is no precedent from the United States Supr_eme Court acknowledging 
that a constructive denial of counsel claim may be brought in a civil case that 
seeks prospective relief in the form of more funding and resources to an entire 
office, as opposed to relief to individual indigent criminal defendants. Strickland, 
Cronic, and Gideon were all cases where the defendants sought a new trial. As 
explained in the Duncan dissent, the "United States Supreme Court in Gideon and 
Strickland was concerned with results, not process. It did not presume to tell the 
states how to ensure that indigent criminal defendants receive effective assistance 
of counsel." Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 153 (Whitbeck, J., dissenting). It is unclear 
that such a claim will be held cognizable in any state. 
103 A.3d at 136. Thus, in the end there is no basis for allowing suit against some State officer 
just because Plaintiffs have alleged a statewide, systemic problem. Instead, Plaintiffs must show 
the grounds for suing the specific State officers named as Defendants. They have not. 
6 The last order was issued not long before some members of the majority left office and were re-
placed with the winners of an intervening election. As a dissenter to the last opinion explained: 
The majority has decided to grant the motion for reconsideration, and to reverse our previous 
order, without affording disagreeing Justices sufficient time to adequately respond to this de-
cision. Instead, the majority has now decided to expedite the release of its order . . . . . .. The 
Court's decision to suddenly expedite this case seems designed to prevent the new Court af-
ter January 1, 2011 from considering a motion for reconsideration. 
Duncan v. State, 488 Mich. 957, 958, 866 N.W.2d 407, 407-08 (2010) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) . 
. . 
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A. The Governor Is Not "Connected" to Delivery of Public Defense Services and Can-
not Be Enjoined to Provide the Relief Requested; Therefore, the Federal Claims 
Against Him Should Be Dismissed for Lack of a Case or Controversy 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees at least seven rights in criminal prosecutions.7 Plain-
tiffs contend that the Governor is responsible for the last one - assistance o.f counsel- but do 
not explain how this responsibility can be cabined off from the rest. The answer, of course, is not 
that the Governor is personally responsible for the State meeting all seven Sixth Amendment 
constitutional responsibilities, but that he is not personally responsible for any of them. The 
Governor does not, in the words of Response, pp. 9-10, "give effect" to the Sixth Amendment. 
There is no vicarious liability under§ 1983; to be sued, a Defendant must be actively 
connected with the alleged deprivation ofrights. As the Supreme Court said in West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 54-54, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2257-58 (1988), a case involving suit against a State 
prison's medical supervisor over whether prisoners received constitutionally required medical 
care: "[F]ew of those with supervisory and custodial function are likely to be involved directly 
in patient care .... § 1983 is not available under the doctrine of respondeat superior." 
What do Plaintiffs say about the Governor's involvement in public defense issues? The 
Governor is not mentioned in Complaint~~ 3-84, where Plaintiffs lay out their facts. No amount 
of legal argument can overcome this omission: Plaintiffs do not allege any facts personal to 
them showing the Governor's deprivation of their right to counsel. Instead, they try to construct 
a legal argument to substitute for their lack of facts. That legal argument is not enough. 
Defendants begin with Los Angeles County Bar Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Response, pp. 9-11. In this judicial tour de force, the Ninth Circuit entertained a Federal claim 
by the Los Angeles Bar Association that "challenge[ d] the constitutionality of a California statute 
' 
which prescribe[ d] the number of judges on the Superior Court for Los Angeles County" on the 
7 The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a [1] speedy and [2] 
public trial, by an [3] impartial jury ... , and to be [4] informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be [5] confronted with the witnesses against him; to have [6] compulsory ser-
vice for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have [7] the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
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ground that "a shortage of state court judges causes inordinate delays in civil litigation, depriving 
litigants of access to the courts." Id. at 699. The Court concluded that neither the Governor, who 
could not create judgeships himself, but would appoint judges to newly created judgeships, nor 
the Secretary of State, who could not create judgeships herself, but would certify newly created 
judgeships in future elections, should be dismissed even though neither could redress the number 
of judgeships themselves; instead, the Court found it likely that California Legislature, which 
was not a party, would abide by the Court's decision to increase judgeships if it came to that. Id. 
at 701. To say that this stretches the notion of redressability that underlies standing is an under-
statement. But, the Ninth Circuit insulated the extraordinary reach of its standing analysis by 
denying relief on the merits, thus precluding the Governor or Secretary of State from obtaining 
Supreme Court review because there was no judgment against them. 
Later Ninth Circuit decisions are not so expansive. National Audubon Society, Inc. v. 
Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (2002) (plaintiffs could not sue Governor and Secretary of State with 
no enforcement authority over anti-trapping initiative); Association des Eleveurs de Canards et 
d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 398 
(2014) (same result for Governor with regard to anti:foi~ gras law). In light of decisions like 
these, what legal arguments do Plaintiffs make to connect the Governor with provision of public 
defense services_ when they had no factual allegations of his personal involvement? 
They say the Governor "[1] appoints a majority of the PDC, ... [2] remains deeply and 
directly involved in its work, ... [3] has legal appointment authority over the State Appellate 
Defender and [ 4] boards of county commissioners." Response, p. 11. To quote Gertrude Stein, 
"There is no there there." Even if the PDC had the remedial powers that Plaintiffs seek (it does 
not), it is a self-governing agency, Idaho Code § 19-849(1 ), not an agency subject to gubernator-
ial supervision. Its four gubernatorial appointees serve fixed, three-year terms and do not serve 
at the pleasure of the Governor. § 19-849(3)(a). Three of its seven members are appointed by 
the Legislature or by the Chief Justice,§ 19-849(1)(a)-(b), so there would be serious separation-
of-powers issues if the PDC were not self-governing and were subject to gubernatorial control. 
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Even if the Governor were "deeply and directly involved" in the PDC's work" (there is no such 
allegation of fact in the Complaint), that would be beside the point: He has no statutory authority 
to tell a s~lf-governing agency what to do. 8 
As for the Governor appointing the State Appellate Public Defender, what comes from 
that? Nothing, because this is a case about trial defense, not about appellate defense.9 Lastly, the 
Governor can appoint a County Commissioner only when there is a vacancy in office and only 
from a list provided by the County Central Committee of the party of the County Commissioner 
whose office became vacant. Idaho Code§ 59-906(1). No statute gives the Governor authority 
to tell a County Commissioner what to do. Plaintiffs' four observations about the Governor's 
powers come to nothing; they do not connect him with trial public defense. 
Plaintiffs cite Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014), for the proposition that "a governor is a properly-named defendant in systemic re-
form lawsuits regarding the provision of indigent defense services." Kitchen was a challenge to 
Utah's "anti-gay marriage" laws; the Kitchen Court analyzed the Governor's claim of authority 
over county clerks and their issuance of marriage licenses to conclude that he had statutory 
authority to enforce marriage laws and thus was amenable to that suit. Id. at 1202. Needless to 
say, analysis of Utah's domestic relations law does not show that Idaho's Governor has similar 
authority over Idaho's county commissioners when it comes to public defense services. 
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), Response, p. 15, might hel:p Plaintiffs if 
not for subsequent developments. The Luckey plaintiffs sued the Governor of Georgia, two chief 
judges of Georgia judicial circuits, and "all Georgia judges responsible for providing assistance 
8 A Public Defense Commission organizational chart, bearing the name of its since-departed Execu-
tive Director Ian Thompson and showing Governor Otter above the seven PDC members, is cited at Re-
sponse, p. 17. The disgruntled Mr. Thompson's chart and affidavit do not show that "the Governor sits 
atop the PDC's organizational hierarchy" or that "the PDC, according to its own records, reports to the 
Governor, who bears the ultimate responsibility for the PDC's actions." Response, p. 17. Lines of legal 
responsibility for statutory agencies come from statute, not from affidavits and charts. 
9 The State Appellate Public Defender is also in the Department of Self-Governing agencies. Idaho 
Code § 19-869( 1 ). Surely, Plaintiffs are not arguing that the Governor is entitled to tell the State Appel-
late Public Defender how to do her job. But, that would the logical extension of their argument that the 
Governor can tell the PDC how to do its job. 
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of counsel to indigents criminally accused in the Georgia courts." Id. at 1013. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit determined that the defendants were proper because "the governor is responsible for law en-
forcement ... and is charged with executing the laws faithfully ... [ and] has the residual power to 
commence criminal prosecutions ... and has the final authority to direct the Attorney General to 
'institute and prosecute' on behalf of the state .... Judges are responsible for administering the 
system of representation for the indigent criminally accused." Id.at 1016. The Court did not ex-
plain how the Governor could wear two hats and be responsible for prosecution and for public 
defenders. In the end, however, this case never proceeded to judgment. Four years later the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to abstain from considering the Luckey 
complaint and to dismiss. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). Like Eu, this is 
another case where no Governor was ordered to do anything in the end. 
Plaintiffs cite the last two Governors' interests in improving the public defense system as 
proof that Governor Otter "has far more than general responsibilities over Idaho's indigent de-
fense system" and "has other substantial and direct connections to Idaho's statewide system." 
Response, p. 16. In other words, according to Plaintiffs, when Governors take on the thankless 
political task of trying to improve the public defense system, they become legally responsible to 
do so. There is no rule of law that Plaintiffs can cite for that proposition, nor should there be the 
perverse. incentive that Plaintiffs in effect propose: Governors who do not ignore a problem and 
address the problem in the political arena then become subject to suit in the judicial arena. 
The Governor's authority to appoint four members of the self-governing Public Defense 
Commission, to appoint the appellate public defender, and to fill vacancies in County Commis-
sions are repeated, Response, p. 16, but they are no more persuasive than they were on Response, 
p. 11, because they do not give the Governor authority over county public defense services. The 
Governor's creation of the Criminal Justice Commission by Executive Order, Response, pp. 16-
17, should be lauded for what is - a political commitment to improve the justice system, in-
cluding public defender services - and not be hung as an albatross around his neck for what it is 
not - a statutory or constitutional obligation to be in charge of public defense services. 
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.Plaintiffs cite the Governor's Executive Orders for Sage Grouse Management and Treat-
ment-Resistant Epilepsy to support the proposition that he "has broad executive authority, which 
he can use towards reforming Idaho's statewide public defense system." Response, pp. 17-18, 
That conclusion does not follow from these Executive Orders. Executive Order 2015-04, Idaho 
Administrative Bulletin, Vol. 15-8, p. 16 (August 5, 2015), 2nd Eppink Aff., Ex. 14, directs "all 
executive agencies, to the extent consistent with existing state law," to implement a sage grouse 
management plan; it is not directed to any county officer. Executive Order 2015-03, Idaho Ad-
ministrative Bulletin Vol. 15-5, p. 20 (May 6, 2015), 2nd Eppink Aff., Ex. 15, is directed to the 
Department of Health & Welfare and instructs it to investigate and implement, if appropriate, ex-
pand access to an FDA-approved drug for epilepsy. The Executive Orders, which direct agen-
cies to work within existing law, do not show that the Governor has broad executive authority to 
reform the counties' public defender systems in a manner not provided by existing law. 
Plaintiffs say: "The Governor's real argument ... seems to be that he should be immune 
from this lawsuit because there is no state official who was comprehensively responsible for Ida-
ho's system." Response, p. 18. Almost, but not quite. The Governor adds that there are State 
actors who are responsible for county public defender services; they are subject to suit, he is not. 
Thus, this case is not like HRPT Properties Trust v. Lingle, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D. 
Haw. 2010), Response, p. 18, where no local official had authority to enforce Act 189 concerning 
negotiation of terms in a commercial lease and the Governor "decides whether and to what 
extent to enforce Act 189. She has the power to direct or prohibit enforcement, or to advise 
agencies or individuals to issue regulations, standards, or directives relating to Act 189." 715 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1127. Here, Idaho Code§§ 19-859 through 19-864 place responsibility for the 
public defender system on county officials, and the Governor is not a "default" defendant (if 
there is such a thing) who can be sued when no one else can be sued. HRPT does not apply. As 
noted in the Opening Brief, the Governor cannot be sued under§ 1983 because he cannot 
provide the redress that Plaintiffs seek. 
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B. The PDC Does Not Have Statutory Authority to Provide the Relief Requested; 
Therefore, the Federal Claims Against Its Members Must Be Dismissed for Lack of 
a Case or Controversy 
In Idaho, a statutory agency's "powers and jurisdiction derive in entirety from the enab-
ling statutes." United States v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 665, 667, 570 P.2d 1353, 1355 
(1977). Thus, one must look to Idaho Code§ 19-849 and§ 19-850 to determine what the PDC's 
membe~s may be enjoined to do under§ 1983, i.e., how can PDC members be ordered to exer-
cise their authority under color of State law so as not to deprive or cause a Plaintiff to be de-
prived of Sixth Amendment rights. The PDC members can be enjoined only if they can "give 
effect," Response, pp. 9-10, to the Sixth Amendment in the Plaintiffs' cases. 
Plaintiffs cite Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposi-
tion that the head of a statewide agency can be named as a defendant in a lawsuit involving the 
agency's duties. Response, p. 11. Fair enough. The problem in this case, however, is that the 
remedies sought in this suit do not involve the PDC's statutory duties. Plaintiffs are correct that 
"the PDC has direct, statutory duties to establish rules governing public defenders throughout the 
State, LC.§ 19-850(1)(a), and is mandated to make recommendations for system-wide reform, 
LC.§ 19-850(1)(b)." Response, p. 11. But, this is the starting point of analysis, not the ending 
point. The PDC has rulemaking power in only two areas: "Training and continuing legal edu-
cation requirements for defending attorneys" and "Uniform data reporting requirements." § 19-
850(1 )( a)(i)-(ii). Its recommendatory authority is just that: recommendatory. 
None of the four named Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied effective assistance of 
counsel because their public defenders were not properly trained or were not making uniform 
reports. Complaint, 113-7, 63-84. Further, even if their claims were amended to include inade-
quate training and reporting, the core of their complaints - no representation at initial appear-
ances, high caseloads, insufficient continuing involvement in the case, no access to expert wit-
nesses, inadequate conflict counsel, etc. - would be affected only at the margins (if at all) by 
training and reporting rules. The presence or absence of PDC rulemaking in the training and 
reporting areas has not deprived or caused any Plaintiff to be deprived of Sixth Amendment 
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rights to counsel along the lines of their claims. There is no injunction that the Court can issue to 
the PDC members regarding training or reporting that will affect these larger issues. That is 
further shown by the absence of enforcement power in the PDC statutes; i.e., even if the PDC 
were to adopt rules, the PDC could not compel a county to abide by them. 
As for recommendatory authority, the PDC can recommend reforms in every area men-
tioned i~ the Complaint, but the PDC cannot require the Legislature to enact its recommenda-
tions. Thus, failure to recommend is not a deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights because the 
causal chain (if any) is broken by the requirement for the Legislature to act. E.g., Galen v. City 
of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007) (sheriff deputies that make bail recommendations 
cannot be sued for denial of Eighth Amendment right to non-excessive bail because a supersed-
ing decisionmaker- a judge - sets bail). Thus, neither the PDC's rulemaking nor its recom-
mendatory authority allows it to address the core Sixth Amendment issues that are the subject of 
the Complaint. Its members cannot be enjoined to do what they have no power to do. 
Response page 13 returns to the training and reporting themes, but does not explain how 
the PDC's training programs (which presumably help with delivery of public defense services) 
deprive a Plaintiff of Sixth Amendment rights. Nor does the Response explain how rulemaking 
authority over training and reporting give the PDC a legal responsibility for "overseeing indigent 
defense reform in Idaho, not just at a policy level, but on a local level as well." Response, p. 13. 
The PDC's training and reporting authority do not bootstrap it into authority over all aspects of 
public defense in Idaho. While it made sense in Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 
1122, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2013), Response, p. 13, to require data reporting by defendants that 
provide public defenders services, Wilbur s rationale does not require an agency with authority to 
require ~ata reporting to be responsible for public defender services. 
Plaintiffs say "the PDC has failed to promulgate rules and provide recommendations that 
would have set specific standards for the state's public defense system, and thus has contributed 
to the ongoing failure of the system." Response, p. 14. Plaintiffs may offer that opinion as a 
matter of political judgment, but this is a Court, not a debating society; the issue is not whether 
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the PDC has "contributed" to the problem in some vague manner, but whether an injunction 
regarding the PDC's statutory powers will remedy the problems that the Complaint describes. 
They will not. No remedial injunction regarding PDC rules or recommendations will give the 
Plaintiffs redress. The Federal claims against the PDC members should be dismissed. 
Ill. THE STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST IDAHO SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, PRUDENTIAL, AND/OR SEPARATION-OF-POWERS 
GROUNDS; THE STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNOR AND THE PDC 
MEMBERS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR THE SAME REASONS AS THE FEDERAL 
CLAIMS 
The section first addresses the State law claims against Idaho itself and explains why they 
should be rejected. It then adopts by reference its argument in the Federal claims against the 
Governor and the PDC members with some additional comments. 
A. The State Law Claims Against the State Should Be Dismissed 
J. The State Is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity from Suit 
"States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact." Virginia Office for Prof. 
& Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247,253, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011). Idaho retains its sov-
ereign immunity unless the Legislature waives it by statute. Sanchez v. State, Dept of Correc-
tion, 143 Idaho 239, 244-45, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113-14 (2006). Thus, the threshold issue in a suit 
against the State is: Has statute waived sovereign immunity? 
Plaintiffs cite ISSEO II and ISEEO V10 in support of their contention that the State may be 
sued for systemic constitutional violations. Response, p. 3, n.2 ("the State itself remains a proper 
defendant to the Plaintiffs' state law claims"); p. 19 ("Idaho courts are no strangers to this kind of 
systemic reform litigation"); p. 21 (''just as in other systemic reform litigation in Idaho state 
courts, the ultimate question ... is not whether implementation in individual local jurisdictions is 
adequate, but whether the State has provided an adequate means for local jurisdictions to provide 
10 ISEEO II is Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education, 
128 Idaho 276,912 P.2d 644 (1996). ISEEO Vis Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v 
State, 142 Idaho 450, 129 P.2d 1199 (2005). ISEEO I, which is also discussed in this Reply, is Idaho 
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 570, 850 P.2d 724 (1993). 
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constitutionally sufficient services"); p. 23 ("In systemic reform class litigation, ... the Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized a public interest justiciability exception to ensure these kinds of 
cases are heard"). 
Plaintiffs overstate the ISEEO cases. The ISEEO plaintiffs did not have a State constitu-
tional right to bring a claim that there was a systemic failure of "the duty of the legislature of 
Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common 
schools." Article IX,§ 1. When the ISEEO defendants questioned school districts' authority to 
sue the State, ISEEO /held that the Legislature had consented to suit by statute. 123 Idaho at 
585, 850 P.2d at 739. When the Legislature later enacted the Constitutionally Based Educational 
Claims Act, Idaho Code§§ 6-2201 et seq., which withdrew that consent and prohibited suit for 
statewide systemic violations of Article IX, § 1, while preserving rights of action for claims in-
volving a school district, Idaho Code§§ 6-2202, 6-2205, and 6-2213, the Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld that Act's constitutionality. Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P.3d 236 (2000). Thus, 
there is no Idaho constitutional right to sue the State over a claimed systemic failure in the public 
schools under Article IX, § 1; likewise, there should be no Idaho constitutional right to sue the 
State over a claimed systemic failure of public defense services in the counties. The State is 
entitled t~ sovereign immunity from suit. 
2. Prudential Considerations Argue Against Allowing tltis Lawsuit to Proceed 
Hurrell-Harring and Duncan, discussed at pp. 6-7, supra, do not counsel for this Court to 
plunge headlong into a "systemic," Statewide litigation. Both cases involved public defender 
services in a small number of counties. This case is much larger in scope, and the Court should 
proceed cautiously. One reason to be cautious is that Plaintiffs do not expound their assertions 
that (1) "litigating these important issues on a county- or city-level11 ••• would be inefficient, 
duplicative, expensive, and time-consuming" because (2) "Plaintiffs have specifically tailored 
the relief they are requesting to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on either the State or the 
11 Defendants are unsure what Plaintiffs refer to here. Cities provide public defender services in 
Washington, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013); they do not in 
Idaho. If this remark comes from a generic "canned brief," it does not make sense in Idaho. 
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Court" and (3) "the State has in place both the people and programs that would allow it to assign 
and complete that work quickly." Response, p. 21. On the contrary, (1) there would be no way 
to assure Statewide relief were in place unless every county's public defender services were ex-
amined; (2) the relief requested is a shotgun request to "fix everything" and has not been tailored 
to specifics; 12 and (3) the State does not know what people and programs are in place that would 
allow it to assign and complete the work quickly. 
On the last point, if Plaintiffs believe the PDC has the people and programs to assign and 
complete the work quickly, that is incorrect. The PDC is a part-time Commission that meets at 
least quarterly. Idaho Code § 19-850(1 )( c ). Its members include one Senator, one Representa-
tive, a former District Judge (now a member of the Court of Appeals) appointed by the Chief 
Justice, and representatives of the Appellate Public Defender, the counties, the criminal defense 
bar, and the Juvenile Justice Commission. § 19-849(1)(a)-(c). The load that Plaintiffs would put 
on the part-time PDC members would be enormous. 
There is another reason to be cautious. Plaintiffs make no secret of their goal to bring 
criminal prosecutions of all indigent defendants to a halt until the system is completely "fixed". 
12 
This Court's declaration that Idaho's system is currently operating 
below constitutional thresholds would have a direct effect on the 
plaintiff class because it would require tlze State to meet those 
Prayers B-F, Complaint, p. 53, ask for the following: 
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate repre-
sentation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial appearances; 
C) Declare that the constitutional rights ofldaho's indigent criminal defendants are being 
violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for the State to move 
this Court for approval of specific modifications to the structure and operation of the 
State's indigent-defense system; 
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants by providing 
constitutionally deficient representation; 
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval and monitor-
ing, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense that is consis-
tent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and Jaws of the State of Idaho; 
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval and moni-
toring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys representing 
indigent criminal defendants in the State ofldaho in order to ensure accountability and to 
monitor effectiveness; 
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thresholds before it could continue to prosecute indigent criminal 
defendants. Class members could obtain immediate further relief 
based on the judgment, through stays and other appropriate tem-
porary relief in their criminal proceedings until the State dis-
patched the resources and rules needed for constitutional compli-
ance. 
Response, p. 23 ( emphasis added). In other words, this Court would enter an injunction and a 
judgment in effect requiring every indigent defendant's criminal proceedings in every State court 
in Idaho to be halted "until the State dispatche[s] the resources and rules needed for constitu-
tional compliance." Does that sound like work that can be assigned and completed quickly? 
Nothing like that happened in Hurrell-Harring or Duncan. But that is Plaintiffs' goal here. 
Plaintiffs are asking this Court to embark upon a path affecting criminal prosecutions in 
every county and every judicial district in Idaho - a path that neither the United States Supreme 
Court nor Idaho Supreme Court has required. If ever there is a case in which such a claim should 
be denied or dismissed until the appellate courts have had an opportunity to weigh in on the is-
sue, this is it. Further, given that the Defendants cannot provide the reliefrequested because that 
relief can come only from the Legislature, the Court may exercise its discretion under Idaho 
Code§ 10-1206 and "refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree" that "would not 
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." 
3. Separation of Powers Prevents the Court from Granting the Requested 
Remedies 
Plaintiffs dismiss Defendants' position that the proper defendants are not before the Court 
by arguing that the State "should not be permitted to prevail on technical points about the scope 
and duties of certain State-level employees, in an effort to obscure its fundamental obligations to 
indigent Idaho defendants." Response, p. 22. 
What Plaintiffs call "technical points" are otherwise known as Federalism and Separation 
of Powers. With regard to Federalism, Congress has not authorized suits against States under 
§ 1983, Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), and 
suing State officers who cannot provide the relief requested is nothing more than the sham of a 
suit against the State. As for State Separation of Powers, this is not technical; it is a part of the 
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Idaho Constitution, Article II, § 1, just like Article I, § 13 is a part of the Idaho Constitution. 
Plainti~s have asked for relief from Executive Officers that can only be achieved by statutory 
changes. See Prayers for Relief C, E and F, n.12, p. 17, supra. Under Article II, § 1, no 
Executive officer can exercise the Legislative Power, nor may he or she be enjoined to do so. 
B. Plaintiffs' State Law Claims Against the Governor and the PDC Should Also Be 
Dismissed 
Plaintiffs' State law claims against the Governor and the PDC members should be dis-
missed for the reasons given for dismissing the Federal claims against the Governor, see pp. 8-
13, supra, and against the PDC members, pp. 13-15, supra. 
Some additional State law reasons follow. The Governor and the PDC are described as 
part of an "Executive Legislative System," Response, p. 14, in which the PDC wants to keep the 
Governor's Office in the loop regarding terms for contracts and possible rulemaking. See 2nd 
EppinkAff., Ex. 8. What is the consequence of these allegations about contracts and internal 
rulemaking practices (none of which are in the Complaint)? Is any Plaintiff deprived of a consti-
tutional right because the PDC cooperates with the Governor's Office on contracts and does not 
hide the ball on rules? The Complaint does not allege so, nor would there be any basis for such a 
conclusion oflaw if it had alleged so. Plaintiffs' State law claims against the members of the 
PDC are grounded in Article I,§ 13, see Complaint, Second and Fourth Claims for Relief, 
~~ 174-76 and 181-83, pp. 51-53. The PDC's relationship with the Governor's Office does not 
bear on Article I, § 13, and it is no reason to deny the Motion to Dismiss.13 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ordinarily, one concludes a Reply with a simple statement of the relief requested and 
ends it with that. The reliefrequested is dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
This is the unusual case where some further comment on the role of the Judiciary is in 
13 Plaintiffs have not sought any relief under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (APA), Idaho 
Code§§ 67-5201 et seq., so this Reply does not express any opinion regarding the PDC and the APA. 
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order. Plaintiffs contend that it is the Court's "fundamental role to interpret and vindicate core 
constitutional rights, to render judgment on the statewide system," Response, p. 2, and that the 
question before the Court "is whether a declaratory judgment action may proceed at all. To de-
cide that question, this Court only considers whether the uncertainty about the statewide system's 
constitutionality presents 'a real and substantial controversy' or merely a hypothetical one," Re-
sponse, p. 24 ( citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs are missing the point of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. A Court's fundamental 
role is to issue judgments in cases or controversies between parties. Before a Court can vindi-
cate rights, it must determine that the controversy is between the parties before it, not with some 
other parties. "A plaintiff's failure to name the proper defendant is fatal to the claim." Health-
Now New York, Inc. v. New York, 739 F. Supp. 2d 286, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) aff'd, 448 F. App'x 
79 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal punctuation omitted) (complaint dismissed because New 
York Attorney General did not have enforcement power for statute that was the subject matter of 
the suit). Likewise, this Complaint should be dismissed for lack of a proper defendant. 
No case holds, in Plaintiffs' words, that "if no State ofldaho official is tasked with ful-
filling a constitutional responsibility, ... it is the judiciary's job to declare a constitutional viola-
tion." Response, pp. 6-7. No case holds that it is a constitutional requirement to create an office 
or appoint an officer at the State level who can be sued to implement a constitutional right. 
In the end, Plaintiffs' argument is that two constitutional wrongs make a right. Their 
claim of constitutionally inadequate public defense services is the first constitutional "wrong" . 
The remedy of suing the Executive Officers to obtain Legislative remedies is the second consti-
tutional "wrong". Together, under Plaintiffs' theories, these two constitutional "wrongs" make a 
constitutional "right". They do not. The Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have 
sued the wrong Defendants - Defendants who cannot provide the relief they seek. 
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ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, eta!., on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated, · 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1510240 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND 
) MOTION TO STRIKE 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., ) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
Defendants. ) 
------------------
Defendants (1) the State ofldaho, (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and (3) the seven 
members of the Public Defense Commission (PDC) object to and move to strike Plaintiffs' Affi-
davits and Exhibits filed in support of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b )( 6) because "The Complaint Does Not 
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State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted" under either Federal or State law. Memo-
randum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 7, 11. Thus, "the court does not accept affidavits," 
and "the moving party has the option to test the law and reserve a right to test the facts, i. e., by 
making a 12(b)(6) motion, reserving a Rule 56 motion." Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92 
Idaho 526,530,446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968). "The only facts which a court may properly consider 
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are those appearing in the complaint . . . . . .. 
[A] trial court in considering a 12(b )( 6) motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence . . . . " 
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990), reaffirmed by Tay-
lor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,833,243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010) (internal punctuation and cita-
tions omitted). 
Defendants stand on their right to bring a pure motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted that is not converted into a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. The Court should grant this Objection and Motion to Strike and not consider any Affida-
vits or Exhibits filed in support of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
0RALARGUMENT-NOTICE OF HEARING 
The Court may rule on this Objection and Motion to Strike with or without oral argu-
ment. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)-(4). If the Court does not rule without oral argument, Defendants hereby 
notice argument on their Objection and Motion to Strike for the same time as argument on their 
Motion to Dismiss, namely, on Wednesday, December 16, 2015 at 3:00 PM, in the Ada County 
Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, Idaho, before District Judge Samuel A. Hoagland. 
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The defendants ("State") make clear in their reply brief that the motion to dismiss 
challenges whether there is a "case or controversy" here. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to 
Dismiss 2 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter "Reply"] ("Plaintiffs have no case or controversy with 
these Defendants"); id at 3 (arguing that the federal claims "SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR A 
LACK OF A CASE OR CONTROVERSY"), 8 (same), 13 (same), 20). A "case or controversy" 
challenge is a challenge to this Court's jurisdiction. Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 
512 (2011); Gemtel Corp. v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 
1542, 1544 n.l (9th Cir. 1994); cf Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 275 (1986) (holding 
that Idaho courts interpret their "own rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as 
possible with the federal cases"). The State, indeed, expressly acknowledges that its motion to 
dismiss contends a lack of a "justiciable controversy" based on a "limitation upon . 
jurisdiction," in its briefing. Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss 14, 15-16 (July 8, 2015). 
As explained in Gemtel Corp., when a motion to dismiss challenges the existence of a 
case or controversy it is a motion to dismiss "for lack of jurisdiction." 23 F.3d at 1544 n.1. Such 
motions do not truly seek dismissal for failure to state a claim, id., but instead fall under Rule 
12(b)(l)-challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. See Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 
Idaho 129, 133 (2005). A court can and should review a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l) 
if it challenges the court's jurisdiction, even if the moving party incorrectly labels it as a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that case 
or controversy challenge must be treated as brought under Rule 12(b )(1 ), "even if improperly 
identified by the moving party as brought under Rule 12(b)(6)"); cf Mot. to Dismiss 1 (July 8, 
2015) (making motion under "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)," generally). 
Where such motions raise factual disputes, the Court may construe them as Rule 12(b )(1) 
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motions and thus "go outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary 
judgment." Owsley, 141 Idaho at 133 n.1; St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201 (holding that the Court may 
"rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court" when considering a Rule 
12(b)(l) motion). As the State's reply brief makes clear, its motion has raised factual disputes. 
E.g., Reply at 4 n.4 (disputing the nature of the Criminal Justice Commission and the import of 
its subcommittee's recommendations), 6 & 16 (disputing whether the ACLU cases Hurrell-
Harring v. State of New York and Duncan v. State of Michigan were statewide challenges to 
public defense systems, despite that only state officials were sued), IO n.8 (disputing the 
significance of the Public Defense Commission's organizational chart), IO n.9 (disputing extent 
of gubernatorial influence over the State Appellate Public Defender), 12 (disputing the scope of 
prior executive orders), 17 (disputing whether "[t]he load" that systemic reform tasks would put 
on the Public Defense Commission is manageable), 18 ( disputing whether necessary reforms 
could be assigned and completed quickly). 
For that matter, even were the State's motion considered under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court 
still may properly review public documents, like the ones the plaintiffs have submitted here. 1 
Gemtel Corp., 23 F.3d at 1544 n.l ("The court properly considered various public documents ... 
. This did not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment."); see also SB 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2015) 
(noting that even in determining Rule 12(b)(6) motions, courts "have allowed consideration of .. 
. matters of public record"). 
Ultimately, this debate is just an academic one, for the plaintiffs could simply amend 
Many of the documents attached to plaintiffs' response were produced by defendants to 
plaintiffs in response to the discovery requests that the Court ordered defendants to produce at 
the October 16, 2015, hearing on the motion for a protective order. 
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their complaint to allege all of the facts they learned through the recent Court-ordered discovery 
and submitted with their response brief. See Baker v. Holder, 475 F. App'x 156, 157 (9th Cir. 
2012) ( a plaintiff should be allowed to amend complaint if record, particularly attachments to an 
opposition, makes clear that doing so would allow her to defeat a 12(b)(l) motion); SB Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1350 ("Only when the affidavits show that the pleader 
cannot truthfully amend to allege subject matter jurisdiction should the court dismiss without 
leave to replead."). 
In short, the Court may properly consider all of the materials in the record in deciding the 
State's motion. In the alternative, the Court should treat the plaintiffs' complaint as implicitly 
amended by the materials and testimony obtained after the Court's ruling on the motion for 
protective order, allowing the plaintiffs to formally amend the complaint if need be. 
ubmitted this 9th day of December, 2015. 
Richard Eppink 
ACLU OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
Jason D. Williamson 
ACLU FOUNDATION 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Bret H. Ladine 
Jenny Q. Shen 
Brooks M. Hanner 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 4 
000461
.. 
a.. ·' It, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of December, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Steven L. Olsen 
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov 
Michael S. Gilmore 
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov 
Shasta Kilminster-Hadley 
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov 
Scott Zanzig 
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By email 
Cally A. Younger 
cally. younger@gov .idaho. gov 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
Idaho State Capitol Building 
700 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By email 
David W. Cantrill 
cantrill@cssklaw.com 
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
By email 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 5 
000462
i • -i 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
MICHAELS. GILMORE, ISB #1625 
W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB #9361 
SHASTAKILMINSTER-HADLEY, ISB #7889 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Fax: (208) 854-8073 
steven.olsen@ag. idaho. gov 
mike. gilmore@ag. idaho. gov 
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov 
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendants State of Idaho, Hon. 
Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz, Kimber 
Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. 
Christy Perry 
NO L_ 
CALLY YOUNGER, ISB -n.m-_g-7.,...-_-_-_-_-:F_,,;-;;;L~nt-+c--:,3-3,,.,...-
0FFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
P.O. Box 83720 DEC 14 2015 
Boise, ID 83720-0034 CHRIST 
Telephone: (208) 334-2100 Bys~~~,~~g8~1CH, Clerk 
FAX: (208) 334-3454 DEPUTY RRIOS 
call y. younger@gov.idaho.gov 
Attorney for Defendant C.L. "Butch" Otter 
DANIEL J. SKINNER, ISB #7225 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & 
SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Fax: (208) 345-7212 
danskinner@cssklaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants William H. Wellman 
and Sara B. Thomas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves 
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) 
) Case No. CV OC 1510240 
) 
) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND 
) MOTION TO STRIKE 
) 
) 
Defendants file this Reply in Support of Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike. 
First, Plaintiffs argue that the Motion to Dismiss should be decided as a motion under 
Rule 12(b)(l) (lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter) and not under 12(b)(6) (failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted), which entitles them to file evidence to supplement the 
Complaint. Response to Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike (Response), p. 2. However, 
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Defendants are not challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Memorandum in 
' Support of Motion to Dismiss clearly states at page 6 that the Motion to Dismiss is for failure to 
state a claim upon relief can be granted, which is a 12(b )( 6) Motion: 
For the reasons explained in the following Argument, none of these 
Prayers for Relief can be granted against any of the named Defen-
dants, so the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted against any of the named 
Defendants. 
There are further references to failure to state a claim in topic headings, text, or footnotes at pp. 
7-11. 1 The Conclusion on p. 19 says: "All of Plaintiffs' Federal and State law claims should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these Defen-
dants." The Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss is similar. Reply, pp. 3, 19. 
One element of failure to state a claim against the Defendants sued in their official capa-
cities is that there was nothing that Defendants could do to provide the redress requested in the 
Prayers for Relief. Plaintiffs focus on Defendants' references in the Reply Brief to Plaintiffs 
having no case or controversy with Defendants who could not provide relief to contend that the 
Motion to Dismiss is (at least in part) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Response, p. 3. 
Admittedly, whether there is a case or controversy is often described as "jurisdictional" in 
Federal Court rather than as an element of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. As 
Justice Ginsburg explained: "This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes con-
fused or conflated concepts: federal-court 'subject-matter' jurisdiction over a controversy; and 
the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
503, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1238 (2006). There can be similar confusion here. Defendants are not 
contesting this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear cases under § 1983 or under Article I, 
§ 13; they are contesting whether Plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief can be granted 
Plaintiffs seize upon a quotation from a case in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, pp. 15-16, to say that the "State expressly acknowledges that its motion to dismiss contends a 
lack of a justiciable controversy based on a limitation upon jurisdiction in its briefing." Response, p. 2 
(internal punctuation omitted). The case cited spoke of jurisdiction, but the text of the argument spoke 
about redressability in the sense of redressability being an element that must exist in a claim. See page 16 
of that Memorandum. The State made no lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction argument. 
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against these Defendants, i.e., do Plaintiffs have a case or controversy with these Defendants in 
the sense of: Can these Defendants provide relief to Plaintiffs? 
A simple (albeit ridiculous) example shows that failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted and failure to allege a case or controversy with a defendant are not mutually ex-
clusive. Assume a plaintiff petitioned the District Court to be crowned the king of Idaho. That · 
would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 10, cl. 2 
("No State shall ... grant any Title of Nobility"). No matter what State officer the plaintiff sued, 
the plaintiff would have no case or controversy with that officer, who would have no authority to 
crown him king. But the District Court would have general subject matter jurisdiction to decide 
whether a State officer may grant a title of nobility. 
When the Reply Brief referred to the absence of a case or controversy with Defendants, it 
was referring to Defendants' lack of authority to provide Plaintiffs with relief, which is an part of 
determining whether Plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against these 
Defendants; it was not a challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction under § 1983 or un-
der Article I,§ 13. However, if the Court believes that the Motion to Dismiss presents 12(b)(l) 
issues of subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants have a simple solution: They withdraw any 
12(b )( 1) issues and present a 12(b )( 6) Motion. 
Second, Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' assertion that "As the State's reply brief 
makes clear, its motion has raised factual disputes." Response, p. 3. When Defendants filed the 
Reply, they were on the horns of a dilemma. Plaintiffs had filed Affidavits and Exhibits with 
facts that were not in their Complaint with their Response to the Motion to Dismiss. Defendants 
objected and moved to strike, but still had to address the Affidavits and Exhibits: 
Defendants cannot know before their argument whether their Ob-
jection and Motion to Strike will be granted. Thus, this Reply ad-
dresses the Affidavits and Exhibits as a fallback argument in case 
the Objection and Motion to Strike is denied in full or in part, but 
Defendants' primary argument is that the Affidavits and Exhibits 
should not be considered at all. 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-2. 
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The Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss did not concede there were factual issues. 
It recognized that Plaintiffs attempted to introduce extra-Complaint facts and dealt with that at-
tempt as best it could: Defendants (1) objected and moved to strike as their primary positon, but 
(2) discussed the facts as their fallback if their Objection/Motion were denied. 
Third, some things that Plaintiffs describe as "factual" issues are not factual issues at all. 
The Complaint seeks statewide relief regarding public defender services. Prayer for Relief 
("develop and implement a statewide system of public defense"). Defendants pointed out that 
two cases cited by Plaintiffs - Hurrell-Harring and Duncan2 - did not involve statewide relief, 
but relief specific to a small number of counties. Plaintiffs do not explain how a factual differ-
ence between the relief in Hurrell-Harring and Duncan and the relief sought here creates a fact-
ual dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants. There is no factual dispute between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants; both agree that Plaintiffs seek statewide relief. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs are attempting to turn issues of law- e.g., what is the Governor's 
constitutional or statutory authority or the Public Defense Commission's statutory authority3 -
into issues of fact that the Court must resolve. They say that they could simply amend their 
Complaint to add the necessary allegations that are in their Affidavits and Exhibits, so the Court 
should consider their Affidavits and Exhibits in deciding the Motion to Dismiss. Response, 
pp. 3-4. However, the Court is not bound by conclusions oflaw in a Complaint. Owsley v. Idaho 
Industrial Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455,462 (2005). Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss presents legal issues including whether the Defendants have the constitutional or statutory 
power to exercise the authority that the Prayers for Relief would have the Court order them to 
2 Cites to these cases in various appellate courts are found in Defendants' Reply in Support of Mo-
tion to Dismiss at pp. 6-7. 
3 Although the issue of law of whether the Governor has direct authority to tell the Public Defense 
Commission what to do is irrelevant to the issue of the Governor's and/or the Commission's authority or 
lack of authority to grant the relief requested, Plaintiffs sought to establish the Governor's "authority" 
over the Public Defense Commission through a chart prepared by Commission staff. 2nd Eppink Aff., 
Ex. 13. It is Defendants' position that lines of authority are created by the Constitution or by statute and 
that determination of lines of authority is purely an issue of law. Courts, not bureaucrat's charts, deter-
mine who has what legal authority. Otherwise, any subordinate officer could expand or contract his/her 
authority at will by the simple expedient of making a chart or signing an affidavit. 
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exercise. That is a "straight up" issue of law for the Comi to decide, and no tome of Affidavits 
and Exhibits will change an issue of Jaw into a contested issue of fact. 
Thus, for the reasons given in the Objection ~nd Motion to Strike and in this Reply, the 
Court should grant Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, decline to consider the Affida-
vits and Exhibits filed in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and decide the Motion to Dismiss 
solely upon the basis of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint without any factual 
supplementation. 
·.~ 
DATED this/'1 day of December, 2015. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants State of Idaho, 
Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz, 
Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and 
Rep. Christy Perry 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
ByCAa~ 
Attorney for Defendant Governor Otter 
CANTRILL SKINNER WEIS CASEY & 
SORENSEN, LLP 
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DANIEL J. SKINNER 
Attorney for Defendants William H. 
Wellman and Sara B. Thomas 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION & MOTION TO STRIKE-5 
000468
' . 
fJO. ____ i;ITc;:;-----
AM. ____ F1J.Le.~i t(.,,,<;-( 
JAN 2 0 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE HARDY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT oepurv 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, eta/., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-10240 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed July 8, 2015. 
A hearing was held on December 10, 2015, wherein the Court took the matter under advisement. 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. 
BACKGROUND 
The central clai~ in this case is that the named Plaintiffs, and other indigent criminal defendants 
similarly situated in the State of Idaho, are continuously being deprived of their state and federal 
constitutional rights to counsel and Due Process of law, by the named Defendants, who are the 
State of Idaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and the Idaho Public Defense Commission. 
Plaintiffs seek class action certification 1 and remedial measures by this Court. 
1 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification on June 17, 2015, which the parties agreed need not be decided 
until Defendants' present Motion to Dismiss was resolved. 
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Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne 
( collectively, "Plaintiffs") were arrested and prosecuted, respectively, in Bonner, Shoshone, Ada, 
and Payette Counties. Plaintiffs were represented by public defenders in their individual cases. 
They allege facts to support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of representation 
' 
at initial appearances, and attorneys' failure to communicate with them at times, or to file certain 
motions on their behalf, or to properly investigate their cases. 
Plaintiffs contend that their individual experiences are representative of "thousands of indigent 
defendants across the State, who have been denied their right to effective counsel."2 Plaintiffs 
further claim that the "current, patchwork public-defense arrangement in Idaho remains riddled 
with constitutional deficiencies and fails, at all stages of the prosecution and adjudication 
processes, to ensure adequate representation for indigent defendants in both criminal and 
juvenile proceedings in Idaho."3 
Plaintiffs claim that the defects in the public defender system can be summarized as follows: (1) 
lack of representation at initial appearances, (2) extended and unnecessary pretrial detention, (3) 
excessive caseloads, (4) lack of sufficient investigation and expert analysis, (5) lack of sufficient 
access to or communication with the public defenders assigned to their cases, (6) continued use 
of fixed-fee contracts by some Idaho counties, (7) lack of public defender independence, and (8) 
lack of sufficient training, oversight, supervision, and evaluation. 4 
2 Pls.' Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (hereafter, "Complaint"), ,i 8. 
3 Id. ,J9. 
4 Id. ,i,i 97-161. 
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In Idaho, the legislature has delegated its constitutional duty to provide public defense to the 
individual counties. The counties must administer and fund the public defender services. Idaho 
Code§ 19-859 states "[t]he board of county commissioners of each county shall provide for the 
representation of indigent persons and other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an 
attorney at public expense." Counties are responsible for maintaining an office of public 
defender, joining with another county ( or counties) to provide a joint office of public defender, 
contracting with an existing office of public defender, or contracting with a private defense 
attorney for public defender services. 5 Counties are required to "annually appropriate enough 
money to administer" its public defender program. 6 Some would call this an unfunded mandate. 
The natural result is forty-four different systems with different standards and resources, 
managing thousands of cases with varying quality of services. In 2010, the National Legal Aid 
and Defender Association (''NLADA") issued a report after studying trial level indigent services 
offered in seven Idaho counties, which identified a number of specific areas of concern. 7 The 
report stated that "[b ]y delegating to each county the responsibility to provide counsel at the trial 
level without any state funding or oversight, Idaho has sewn a patchwork quilt of underfunded, 
inconsistent systems that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and in the level of 
competency of the services rendered."8 
5 I.C. § 19-859. 
6 I.C. § 19-862. 
7 "These include the widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high attorney caseloads and workloads; 
lack of consistent, effective, and confidential communication with indigent clients; inadequate, and often 
nonexistent, investigation of cases; lack of structural safeguards to protect the independence of defenders; lack of 
adequate representation of children in juvenile and criminal court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack of 
performance-based standards; lack of ongoing training and professional development; and lack of any meaningful 
funding from the State." Complaint ,i 1. 
8 Complaint ,i 36 (citing National Legal Aid and Defender Association, The Guarantee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due 
Process in I~aho's Trial Courts: Evaluation of Trial-Level Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho at 2 (2010)). 
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After the NLADA report, the legislature created the Idaho Public Defense Commission 
("PDC").9 It is a self-governing executive agency with four members appointed by the 
Governor, two from the legislature and one from the Supreme Court. It is tasked with 
promulgating rules for training and education for defense attorneys and to create uniform data 
reporting requirements that include caseload, workload, and expenditures. 10 The PDC is also 
charged with making recommendations to the Idaho legislature by January 20th of each year 
(beginning January 20, 2015) regarding requirements for contracts between counties and private 
attorneys, qualifications and experience standards, enforcement mechanisms, and funding 
issues. 11 The PDC failed to make any recommendations as of January 20, 2015. 12 
Plaintiffs argue the PDC is too little, too late, and then it did not even do what it was supposed to 
do. Pointing to past public pronouncements by both the Governor and the Chief Justice, 
Plaintiffs claim: 
"Despite the State's acknowledgement that significant reform is necessary in this 
arena - by, among other things, the creation of various virtually powerless 
committees, including the establishment in 2010 of a public-defense 
subcommittee of the Criminal Justice Commission, the establishment in 2013 of a 
special committee of the legislature to recommend legislative reforms to the 
public-defense system, and the 2014 statutory amendments and formation of the 
PDC - the State has done little to meaningfully address the myriad problems 
plaguing Idaho's indigent-defense system."13 
Plaintiffs emphasize that the State does not provide any funding or supervision to any of the 
counties, the public defender commission failed to promulgate any rules as of January 20, 2015, 
9 I.C. § 19-849 
to I.C. §§ 19-849, 19-850. 
11 I.C. § 19-850. 
12 Complaint ,i 49. 
13 Complaint ,i 45. 
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and the State has failed to sufficiently address the many state and federal constitutional issues 
raised by the NLADA report. 14 
Unquestionably, the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring constitutionally-sound public 
defense. Each branch of government has its responsibility. Each branch also has its limits, due 
to the separation of powers. Plaintiffs allege the State has failed to provide a constitutionally-
sound system of public defense, despite being on notice for over a decade of the deficiencies in 
the public defender system, because it provides no training, supervision, oversight, statewide 
standards, or funding. 15 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On June 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief against the State of Idaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and seven members of the PDC 
( collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the 
Defendants' failure "to provide effective legal representation to indigent criminal defendants 
across the State of Idaho, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho statutes and 
regulations."16 
Plaintiffs allege the following claims for relief: (1) violation of the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (right to counsel), (2) violation of Article 1, 
14 Id. ,r,r 46-48, 52. 
15 Id. ,r,r 162-169. 
16 Complaint ,r 3. 
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Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution (right to counsel), (3) violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Due Process), and (4) 
violation of Article 1, Section 13 (Due Process), by the Defendants' failure to ensure that all 
indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical 
stages of their cases. 17 
The relief requested by Plaintiff in this case includes, in relevant part, the following: 
A) Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate 
representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial 
appearances; 
C) Declare that the constitutional rights of Idaho's indigent criminal defendants are 
being violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for the 
State to move this Court for approval of specific modifications to the structure 
and operation of the State's indigent-defense system; 
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants by 
providing constitutionally deficient representation; 
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval and 
monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense 
that is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the 
State ofldaho; 
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval 
and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for 
attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in order 
to ensure accountability and to monitor effectiveness; 
G) Enter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of 
indigent-defense services in the State ofldaho; .... 18 
On July 8, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a Memorandum in Support. 
On November 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss, along with an 
11 Id. fl 170-183. 
18 Complaint, p. 53. 
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Affidavit of Ian Thompson and Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink.19 On December 4, 2015, 
Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, along with an 
Objection and Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendants' Objection and 
Motion to Strike on December 9, 2015. 
Defendants assert that the Complaint should be dismissed because the named Defendants are not 
proper parties (i.e. the State of Idaho is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
Governor Otter and members of the Public Defense Commission cannot be sued under § 1983 or 
for alleged violations of constitutional rights as they have no legal authority to make the 
sweeping changes to Idaho's public defense system; and the Complaint fails to state a claim for 
relief because the Court lacks authority to enjoin the State and there is no justiciable controversy 
between the State and Plaintiffs). 
Plaintiffs assert that the named Defendants are the proper parties because (1) the State bears the 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the constitutional rights of Idahoans are protected (the 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that indigent defense is the State's 
responsibility, the State has an affirmative duty to ensure Sixth Amendment compliance, the 
State's delegation of duties to the counties does not abdicate the State's responsibility); (2) the 
Governor and the PDC members are proper defendants because they are the only State officials 
who give effect to Idaho's statewide indigent defense system; (3) resolving systematic reform 
litigation is a central responsibility of the judiciary; and ( 4) Plaintiffs' suit complies with Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 3(b) and 65(d). 
19 On November 24, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an "Errata" regarding certain errors in their Response, along with a 
Corrected Response. 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
"A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only 
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim 
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 
1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue "is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008). "A motion to 
dismiss must be resolved solely from the pleadings and all facts and inferences from the record 
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243 
P.3d 642, 648-49 (2010). 
To state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need 
detailed factual allegations," however, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct. 
1955, 1959 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of a cause of 
action's elements will not do." Id. There must be "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S. Ct. at 1960. Stated differently, "[the] complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "As a practical 
matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which 
the plaintiff includes allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there is some 
insurmountable bar to relie£" Harper, 122 Idaho at 536, 835 P.2d at 1347. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss - 8 
000476
ANALYSIS 
(1) Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike 
Along with their Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed an Affidavit of Ian 
Thomson and an Affidavit of Richard Eppink. Defendants contend that the Affidavits should be 
stricken or disregarded, because this is purely a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion and the Court has no right 
to consider outside material. 
Plaintiffs contend that the evidence may properly be considered without converting the Motion 
to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment, because Defendants' Motion is really a Rule 
12(b)(l) Motion challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court may consider outside evidence on a Rule 12(b )( 6) Motion so long as the Court 
converts the Motion into one for Summary Judgment. However, it is within the Court's 
discretion to exclude such evidence and treat the Motion as purely a Motion to Dismiss. See 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Company, 126 Idaho 960,895 P.2d 561 (1995). 
Here, the Motion to Dismiss asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted under federal law (42 U.S.C. 1983) and under state law (Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3(b) and 65(d), and the Idaho Constitution). This Motion is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) 
and can be decided without considering outside evidence. Therefore, in exercising the Court's 
discretion, Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED and the Affidavits filed by Plaintiffs will 
not be considered. 
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(2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
,: 
,£ 
!I 
Plaintiffs have alleged that indigent criminal defendants in Idaho are systematically being 
deprived of their constitutional rights to counsel and Due Process of law, due to the Defendants' 
failure to provide an adequate public defense system in the State ofldaho. 
Defendants assert that the entire action should be dismissed because the State of Idaho, the 
Governor and the PDC are entitled to governmental immunity, and the Court lacks authority and 
jurisdiction to order relief. 
Before addressing the competing arguments on the Motion to Dismiss, underlying constitutional 
principles must first be addressed. 
One of the founding principles of our system of justice is that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. The landmark 1963 case, Gideon v. Wainwright, made clear that an indigent 
criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel even though they lack the financial 
means to· hire one. The Court reasoned that the state has the obligation to provide indigent 
defendants with counsel: 
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us 
to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend 
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. 
Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's 
interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with 
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and 
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present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants 
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The 
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and 
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, 
our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on 
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This 
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his 
accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-97 (1963). The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. The Idaho Constitution also guarantees the right to counsel: "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to . . . appear and defend in person and with 
counsel." Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. 
The United States Supreme Court also held that the constitutional right to counsel includes the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 2063 (1984). "The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel 
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system 
to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or 
appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
685, 104 S. Ct. at 2063. As explained in United States v. Cronic: 
The special value of the right to the assistance of counsel explains why "[i]t has 
long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel." The text of the Sixth Amendment itself suggests as much. 
The Amendment requires not merely the provision of counsel to the accused, but 
"Assistance," which is to be "for his defence." Thus, "the core purpose of the 
counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial, when the accused was 
confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public 
prosecutor." If no actual "Assistance" "for" the accused's "defence" is provided, 
then the constitutional guarantee has been violated. To hold otherwise "could 
convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal 
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compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the 
assistance of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel 
cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment." 
The substance of the Constitution's guarantee of the effective assistance of 
counsel is illuminated by reference to its underlying purpose. "[T]ruth," Lord 
Eldon said, "is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the 
question." This dictum describes the unique strength of our system of criminal 
justice. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that 
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective 
that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." It is that ''very premise" 
that underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment. It "is meant to assure 
fairness in the adversary criminal process." Unless the accused receives the 
effective assistance of counsel, "a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself." 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654-56, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted, citations omitted). 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all 'critical 
stages' of the adversarial proceedings against him." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 
P.3d 833, 837 (2006); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1931 (1967). 
"The commencement of the criminal prosecution, whether by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the 'critical stage' of the prosecution to 
which the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable." State v. Shelton, 129 Idaho 877, 
880-81, 934 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Ct. App. 1997). "Thus, under criminal procedures followed in 
Idaho, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered by the filing of a criminal 
complaint or an indictment." State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 363, 33 P.3d 828, 837 (Ct. App. 
2001). A critical stage of the proceedings is any stage "where certain rights may be sacrificed or 
lost." Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2002 (1970). Critical stages include, 
for example, the preliminary hearing, Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S. Ct. at 2003, the pretrial 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss - 12 
000480
lineup, id., the arraignment, Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449, 454, 163 P.3d 238, 243 (Ct. App. 
2007); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2002), and the entry of a plea, 
State v. Creech, 109 Idaho 592,602, 710 P.2d 502,512 (1985). 
As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Maine v. Moulton: 
[T]he Court has also recognized that the assistance of counsel cannot be limited to 
participation in a trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to 
trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself. 
Recognizing that the right to the assistance of counsel is shaped by the need for 
the assistance of counsel, we have found that the right attaches at earlier, 
"critical" stages in the criminal justice process ''where the results might well settle 
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." And, 
"[ w ]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a 
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against 
him .... " This is because, after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, 
'"the government has committed itself to prosecute, and ... the adverse positions 
of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds 
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in 
the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."' 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985) (citations 
omitted). 
It is abundantly clear in the authorities cited above that the fundamental right to counsel, and the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, is critical not only at a defendant's trial, but also in the 
pretrial proceedings. 
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A. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY UNDER§ 1983 
Defendants argue that they are not the proper parties to be sued in this suit, because they are not 
"persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and they cannot provide redress for the claims 
made by Plaintiffs. Defendants argue that there is no authority requiring a state or one of its 
officers "to be responsible for ensuring that there are constitutionally adequate public defender 
services throughout the State."20 Defendants also contend they are not proper parties because 
Idaho statutes place responsibility for the public defender system on county officials, not on the 
Governor or the PDC. 
Plaintiffs have conceded in their Response brief 1 and at oral argument that the State of Idaho is 
not a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs conceded that 
the federal law claims against the State should be dismissed.22 Therefore, Counts 1 and 3 must 
be dismissed against the State of Idaho. Accordingly, the Court will address only whether the 
Governor and the PDC members are "persons" subject to suit under§ 1983. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a remedial statute which provides an avenue of redress to persons injured by 
the actions of government which violated federal constitutional rights. The statue provides in 
pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
20 Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 4. 
21 See Pls.' Response to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 3, FN 2 
22 See Hearing held on December 16, 2015. 
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action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable .... 23 
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the United States Supreme Court specifically 
addressed the issue of whether a State, or an official acting in his or her official capacity, is a 
person within the meaning of§ 1983. The Court held that "States or governmental entities that 
are considered 'arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes" are not 'persons' under§ 
1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). 
Will also held that state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" within the 
meaning of§ 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312. 
However, there is an exception that "[ w ]hen sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official 
in his official capacity is considered a "person" for § 1983 purposes. In what has become known 
as part of the Ex parte Young doctrine, a suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, 
but well-established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Doe, 131 F.3d at 839 
(emphasis in original, citation omitted). "The rule of Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy 
Clause by providing a pathway to relief from continuing violations of federal law by a state or its 
officers." Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass 'n, 979 F.2d at 704. 
Under Ex parte Young, the state officer sued must have some connection with the enforcement of 
the allegedly unconstitutional act. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157, 28 S. Ct. 441,453 (1908). 
"That connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general 
23 Claims under§ 1983 are limited by the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 
131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997), however, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts, Will v. 
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (1989). 
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supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not 
subject an official to suit." Ass 'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 
F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
Defendants claim the Governor and PDC only have a "generalized duty" to supervise or enforce 
a constitutionally sound public defense system, but no direct or specific authority or 
responsibility. Defendants emphasize that the legislature has delegated that duty to the counties, 
as well as the duty to collect taxes in support thereof Defendants assert that the Governor and 
the PDC members "do not directly control, regulate, administer, or otherwise bear responsibility 
for provision of public defender services, and they have no ability to provide the requested 
relie£"24 . 
Defendants point to Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec, a case where 
producers and sellers of foie gras brought an action against the State of California, the governor, 
and the attorney general, to enjoin the enforcement of a statute that ''bans the sale of products 
that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size." Ass 'n des 
Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec, 729 F.3d at 942. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the California Governor was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because his 
only connection to the statute was a general duty to enforce state law. Id. at 943. However, the 
attorney general was not entitled to immunity, because the statute specifically authorized 
enforcement by district and city attorneys and the attorney general has direct supervision and the 
same powers as district attorneys. Id. 
24 Defs.' Mero. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, p. 11. 
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Plaintiffs assert that the Governor and the PDC members have a sufficient connection to public 
defense in Idaho. Plaintiffs further contend that the Governor is responsible for indigent defense 
and has power to effectuate necessary changes to improve the public defense system. Plaintiffs 
assert the Governor appoints the majority of the PDC members, is deeply and directly involved 
in its work, and has been in regular communication with the PDC on systemic public defense 
issues. Plaintiffs argue that the Governor has legal appointment authority over the PDC, the 
State Appellate Public Defender, and boards of county commissioners as well.25 The PDC has 
statutory duties to establish rules governing public defenders throughout the State, LC. § 19-
850(1)(a), and is mandated to make recommendations for system-wide reform, LC. § 19-
850(1 )(b ). 26 
Plaintiffs cite Los Angeles County Bar Association, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the governor was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity where the bar 
association was challenging the constitutionality of a statute that prescribed the number of judges 
on the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass 'n, 979 F.2d at 704. 
There, the Court found that the governor had a specific connection to the challenged statute, 
because the governor had the duty to appoint judges to any new positions. Id. 
Defendants urge the Court to find that the Governor and the PDC have no responsibility for 
public defense in Idaho. The Court disagrees. Contrary to the alleged animal abuse issue 
presented in Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d 'Oies du Quebec, the central issue in this 
case concerns the continuous and systematic violation of fundamental constitutional human 
25 Pls.' Response to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 11. 
26 Id. 
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rights. Plaintiffs pose serious allegations of widespread systemic violations of constitutional 
rights to counsel, to effective assistance of counsel, and to fair judicial proceedings for indigent 
criminal defendants across the State ofldaho. 
The Defendants would have the Court believe that the plain language set forth in United States 
Supreme Court cases mandating that it is the State's responsibility to provide counsel to indigent 
criminal defendants does not in fact place any responsibility on the Defendants in this case. 
Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court finds that the Governor and the PDC members 
have a more than sufficiently close connection or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in 
Idaho. The Governor has a duty to ensure that the Constitution and laws are enforced in Idaho. 
The Governor also has direct supervisory authority over those responsible to establish standards 
for a constitutionally sound public defense system. The PDC was specifically saddled with the 
responsibility of creating rules regarding training and education of defense attorneys and making 
recommendations to the legislature for improving public defense in Idaho. The fact that the 
legislature has delegated public defender services to individual counties does not abdicate the 
Defendants' responsibility to indigent criminal defendants in the State ofldaho. (Neither does it 
abdicate further legislative responsibility, nor excuse legislative inaction.) 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Governor and the PDC members are subject to suit under 
42 u.s.c. § 1983. 
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B. JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY 
In this case, Plaintiffs seek various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief. "A prerequisite to 
a declaratory judgment action is an actual or justiciable controversy." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 
116 Idaho 635,639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). The elements ofajusticiable controversy include 
the following: 
A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial 
determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or 
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. 
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the 
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts. 
Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011) (citation omitted). 
"Justiciability is generally divided into subcategories-advisory opinions, feigned and collusive 
cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative questions." Miles, 
116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. 
In this case, the issues of standing, ripeness, and separation of powers are implicated. 27 Each 
issue will be discussed in turn. 
27 In Miles v. Idaho Power Company, the Court discussed separation of powers as an element of justiciability. 
Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (1989). Accordingly, separation of powers will be addressed as a sub-issue 
of the justiciability doctrine. 
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1) Standing 
Plaintiffs must first establish standing to bring a case. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the 
party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles, 116 
Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. The major aspect of the standing inquiry has been explained as 
follows: 
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the 
court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the 
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformulation, this 
requirement of a "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a 
"distinct and palpable injury," to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2630 
(1978) ( citations omitted). Thus, in order to have standing to bring suit, a plaintiff must have (1) 
suffered an injury in fact, (2) causally connected to the conduct complained of, and (3) it is likely 
as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). 
"[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. "In some cases 
even though a plaintiff has shown or alleged an 'injury in fact,' standing is denied because of 
other factors. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that 'when the asserted 
harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of 
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citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction."' Id. ( citation 
omitted). 
"At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's 
conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we 'presum[ e] that general allegations embrace 
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. 
at 213 7 ( citation omitted). 
a. Iniury in Fact 
This is an issue of first impression in Idaho, as neither the United States Supreme Court nor the 
Idaho Supreme Court has addressed a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
counsel claim for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief concerning claimed pre-
conviction systemic injuries resulting from the representation that indigent criminal defendants 
are receiving from their publically appointed attorneys. 
In this case, Plaintiffs' alleged injury is the violation of their right to effective assistance of 
counsel. . As alleged, the injury is specialized and peculiar to each of the named Plaintiffs. 
However, Plaintiffs also allege that all indigent criminal defendants are suffering alike from the 
current public defender system in Idaho. · 
Here, it is important to note the procedural posture of the Plaintiffs' underlying criminal lawsuits 
in this matter. As of the date the lawsuit was filed, none of the Plaintiffs were convicted or 
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sentenced in any of their pending criminal cases. On the record presented, it is troubling to the 
Court that the Plaintiffs have not yet been convicted of any crime in their underlying cases, nor 
pursued or exhausted any appeal rights, nor any post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Court 
fails to see how the Plaintiffs have suffered an injury at the time the Complaint was filed in this 
matter. At this point, Plaintiffs have alleged various forms of ineffective assistance of counsel; 
however, there is not yet any ascertainable injury - i.e. none of the Plaintiffs have either been 
convicted or sentenced. Accordingly, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have not properly alleged an 
actual injury. 
b. Causal Connection 
The second element of standing requires the Plaintiffs to properly allege that the injury suffered 
is causally connected to the conduct complained of. In other words, the injury must be "fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action 
of some third party not before the court." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. 
Plaintiffs allege that the State, the Governor, and the PDC are ultimately on the hook for public , 
defender services in Idaho. However, the legislature has currently delegated the responsibility 
for public defender services to individual counties, none of which are parties to this suit. The 
Complaint alleges, and it is commonly accepted in official pronouncements by the highest 
officials in all three branches of government that there are widespread systemic problems with 
the public defense system. Defendants concede this point. However, it is not clear ( or even 
properly alleged) that systemic constitutional violations are occurring in every county. Plaintiffs 
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allege there is a problem with public defense in the entire State of Idaho, but only provides 
examples from a sampling of counties that are not even party to this lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs challenge the inaction of the Defendants, but do not acknowledge the legislature and 
the county commissioners - the principal bodies with the power to affect the policy (political) 
and systemic changes Plaintiffs seek. The connection of the claimed injury to the Governor and 
the PDC are too remote to be fairly traceable. Neither has the power and authority to act alone to 
redress Plaintiffs' grievances. Certainly, both have moral, political, and public power to pressure 
the legislature or the counties to act, but neither have the ability to require it. Accordingly, there 
is no fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged inaction. 
c. Redressabilitv 
Finally, Plaintiffs must show that it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. In order to 
have standing, the Court must be able to redress the problems not merely in an advisory, 
hypothetical or speculative way, but concretely. 
Here, Plaintiffs seek relief in their individual cases as well as in all other indigent criminal cases 
in Idaho. However, there is no basis for the Court to award such relief where the Plaintiffs 
themselves have not even been convicted of a crime, nor appealed, nor sought post-conviction or 
other relief. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss - 23 
000491
Instead, Plaintiffs invite the Court to make a variety of largely speculative assumptions: (1) that 
the Plaintiffs (and the class members they would represent) will in fact be convicted of a crime, 
(2) that the actions or inactions of the Defendants will have caused those convictions (i.e. that the 
actions or inactions of Defendants will have been so prejudicial that the Plaintiffs will have been 
denied their constitutional right to a fair trial), (3) that the trial courts in each case will be unable 
or unwilling to correct such results (e.g., new trial, dismissal, etc.), (4) that the Plaintiffs will be 
granted the relief they seek in this case, and that any such remedy would or could truly redress 
the problem. 
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is frequently raised in petitions for post-conviction 
relief and addressed on a case-by-case basis. In every case, before or after exhausting appeal 
rights, every convicted criminal defendant has the right to seek judicial review of the public 
defense services provided. The topic has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court 
and by the Idaho Supreme Court on a number of occasions. 
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court laid down a two-part test to 
analyze claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Under this test, the petitioner must 
demonstrate (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the petitioner was 
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064-65 (1984). To establish deficient performance, the applicant must prove that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Id. 
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In a post-conviction setting, a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the adequacy of his 
or her representation, and those cases are decided on a case-by-case basis, with the Court finding 
the individual facts of the case based on evidence and testimony, then applying the law to the 
facts, which is the traditional exercise of judicial authority.28 Strickland requires proof of actual 
prejudice, and here, there is no showing that any prejudice has been suffered in the Plaintiffs' 
underlying criminal cases. Rather, the prejudice suffered by Plaintiffs is merely hypothetical at 
this point. Moreover, even if prejudice were actually shown, any relief by this Court would be 
advisory or hypothetical since the underlying criminal cases are not before this Court. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the post-conviction procedure is faulty or is systematically failing 
criminal defendants in Idaho. Instead, Plaintiffs ask this Court to basically intervene and 
supersede in every single case, and in every court and county and to then make a blanket 
determination that every indigent criminal defendant's rights are being violated. This is a giant 
step from the case-by-case analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Plaintiffs 
generally request sweeping relief for counties and cases where there might not be any deficiency 
in public defense services. 
Without a doubt, the Court believes that there are serious problems with public defense in Idaho 
that need to be addressed. However, this Court cannot and should not usurp the duties of the 
PDC. Essentially, the Plaintiffs request the Court to assume control of public defense in Idaho, 
on the basis that a few defendants might have their rights violated. Such relief is too speculative 
and fundamentally violates the notion that courts are to decide specific cases and controversies 
before them. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs lack standing. 
28 Extended even further, there is also the Writ of Habeas Corpus remedy available. 
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2) Ripeness 
Another subcategory of justiciability is ripeness, which "asks whether there is any need for court 
action at the present time." Miles, 116 Idaho at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. A case is not justiciable if 
it is not ripe. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). "The 
traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents 
definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a 
present need for adjudication." Noh, 137 Idaho at 801, 53 P.3d at 1220. A declaratory judgment 
action must raise issues that are definite and concrete, and must involve a real and substantial 
controversy as opposed to an advisory opinion based upon hypothetical facts. Harris v. Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513,516,681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). The purpose of the ripeness requirement 
is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in purely abstract disagreements. Abbot Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967). 
In this case, even with the facts in the Complaint construed as true, Plaintiffs have not made 
sufficient allegations to sustain a Motion to Dismiss on the first two elements of ripeness, 
namely, that there are definite, concrete issues and a real, substantial controversy exists. The 
Complaint invites the Court to make speculative assumptions regarding Plaintiffs' conclusions. 
For example, although an arraignment is a critical proceeding requiring counsel, there is no 
allegation ( and the Court would find it hard to believe) that every single indigent defendant is 
lacking counsel in every single county and at every single arraignment. As set forth above, 
. Plaintiffs have not even pursued any appeal or post-conviction relief in their individual cases. 
While it seems Plaintiffs make allegations of present violations of right to counsel, the ultimate 
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results in their cases have not yet been determined. Our appeals process determines whether a 
defendant received due process on a case-by-case basis. At this time, Plaintiffs' arguments are 
based on assumptions that they will be convicted and that their convictions will be due to their 
systemic public defense inadequacies. 
This case is ultimately not ripe for adjudication. As previously set forth, none of the Plaintiffs' 
criminal cases have concluded, no appeals have taken place, and no post-conviction relief has 
been sought. In each of their individual cases, Plaintiffs can assert and litigate the claim of lack 
of effective assistance of counsel and lack of a fair trial. If it is decided that their constitutional 
rights have been violated, then those courts can order a specific remedy, for example, a new trial 
or dismissal of the case. Thus, the nature and extent of any real or permanent injury cannot be 
determined at this time. Accordingly, the Court finds the case is not ripe for adjudication. 
3) Separation of Powers29 
As much as anything, this case involves the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The 
doctrine permeated the discussion above, and will be discussed further below. 
Defendants contend that only the legislature can make the changes requested by Plaintiffs, and 
the legislature would not be bound by any injunction entered by the district court in this case. 
29 Defendants originally contended in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss that although the case 
presented a serious separation of powers issue, the issue need not be addressed because under Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3(b) and 6S(d) the Court does not have authority to issue an injunction in this case. However, in their 
Reply Memorandum and at the hearing held on December 16, 2015, Defendants did not argue for dismissal on the 
basis of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but on the separation of powers doctrine. The Court does not find 
Defendants' argument for dismissal on the basis of the Rules 3(b) and 6S(d) persuasive. 
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Defendants further assert that neither the Governor nor the PDC members have statutory or 
constitutional authority to tell county officers how to operate the public defense system. 
Article 2, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides for the separation of powers among the three 
branches of Idaho's government. Article 3, § 1 provides that the power to pass bills is vested in 
the legislature. Article 3, § 15, provides that "[n]o law shall be passed except by bill[.]" "Read 
together, these three constitutional provisions stand for the proposition that, of Idaho's three 
branches of government, only the legislature has the power to make 'law."' Mead v. Arnell, 117 
Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990). 
The separation of powers doctrine asks "whether this Court, by entertaining review of a 
particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of 
government, when the matter was one properly entrusted to that other branch." Miles, 116 Idaho 
at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. 
In Idaho Schools for Equal Opportunity v. State, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993) (!SEED I), 
the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the defendants (including 
the State and the Governor) and it also rejected the State's argument that the court was invading 
the legislature's authority by declaring that the present level and method of funding for Idaho's 
public schools is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e decline to accept the respondents' argument that the other branches of 
government be allowed to interpret the constitution for us. That would be an 
abject abdication of our role in the American system of government. 
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Passing on the constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactment with 
political overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of the judiciary, and has been 
so· since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1813). 
Id. at 583., 850 P .2d at 734. There is no question that the judiciary has the power to "say what 
the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) ("It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Accordingly, a court is 
"not precluded from reviewing the constitutionality of a proposed course of action merely 
because both the executive and legislative branches happen to concur in supporting it." Miles, 
116 Idaho at 640, 778 P.2d at 762. "Constitutional rights, as well as this Court's duty to 
faithfully interpret our constitution and the federal constitution, do not wane before united efforts 
of the legislature and the governor." Id. 
Here, the Idaho legislature has delegated the duty to provide indigent criminal defense to the 
counties. See I.C. § 19-859. Plaintiffs ask the Court to override this system and reshape the 
system of indigent criminal defense in Idaho. The Court finds that it would invade the province 
of the legislature to do so. 
Plaintiffs do not argue that the statute delegating the duty to provide public defense is 
unconstitutional. They simply argue that the county commissioners in some or all of the 
counties, and the various systems of public defense, have failed to protect their constitutional 
rights to counsel and a fair trial. Instead of filing suit against those counties where they believe 
their constitutional rights have been violated, they brought this action against the State, the 
Governor, and the PDC. Plaintiffs also do not argue that the statute establishing the PDC is 
unconstitutional. They argue, instead, that the PDC is an ineffective and inadequate response by 
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the legislature to redress the problem of inadequate or ineffective assistance of public defense 
counsel. Instead of seeking to have an act declared unconstitutional, they ask this Court to 
declare the inaction to be unconstitutional. Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare the whole system 
( or lack of system) to be unconstitutional and to then establish standards or guidelines, based on 
previous holdings of other courts, that the Governor, the PDC, the legislature, and all counties 
(whom they have not sued at this time), must follow. Plaintiffs ask this Court to mandate that the 
Governor and the PDC ( and the legislature and counties) must enact as legislation, ordinances, or 
rules to meet those standards, and to provide adequate funding therefore. This Court does not 
have the power or jurisdiction to do so under the established principles of separation of powers 
imbedded in the federal and state constitutions. 
To be sure, the Governor, as the "supreme executive power of the state" has the duty to ensure 
that the constitution and laws are enforced. Idaho Const. art. IV,§ 5. The Governor also has the 
ability to make recommendations to the legislature concerning the public defense system in 
Idaho. In addition, the Governor can veto budgets that do not appropriate any funding toward 
improving the public defender system in Idaho. Thus, even without the "power of the purse" or 
the power to legislate, the Governor has a constitutional duty to ensure a constitutionally sound 
public defense system, to the maximum extent of his authority within the limitations of power of 
the office. Moreover, the PDC has direct statutory duties and responsibilities, some of which 
were not met more than a year ago. 
Under the long-held principles of Marbury v. Madison, this Court has jurisdiction to pass on the 
constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactments with political overtones. This is a 
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fundamental responsibility of the judiciary. However, it is not the role of courts, but that of the 
political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the 
laws and the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court finds the case violates the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
This case presents troubling allegations regarding problems with the public defender system in 
Idaho. The Court is sympathetic with Plaintiffs' plight. However, the case invites the Court to 
make speculative assumptions regarding the outcomes of individual cases (that are before other 
courts and in other counties), presume that all indigent criminal defendants in all counties are 
receiving the same ineffective assistance of counsel, and then issue blanket orders halting all 
criminal prosecutions until the issues are resolved. The Court declines to do so as such action 
would essentially mandate the Court legislating standards that must be met in every county and 
in every case. Courts can, and do, find, and redress violations of constitutional rights in 
individual cases. But, it is not the proper role of the Court to legislate specific standards, nor can 
the Court provide funding to enact those standards. Accordingly, the Court finds that this case is 
not a proper case or controversy for judicial action. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismis 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
)'RACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI 
MORLEY, and JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf 
of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs- Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, 
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HON. LINDA COPPLE-TROUT, in her 
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State Public Defense Commission; WILLIAM 
H. WELLMAN, in his official capacity as a 
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Commission; KIMBER RICKS, in his official 
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WINDER, in his official capacity as a member 
of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission; and REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in 
her official capacity as a member of the Idaho 
State Public Defense Commission, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in 
his official capacity as Governor of Idaho; HON. LINDA COPPLE-TROUT, in her official 
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; DARRELL G. BOLZ, in 
his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; SARA B. 
THOMAS, in her official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; 
WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public 
Defense Commission; KIMBER RICKS, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State 
Public Defense Commission; SEN. CHUCK WINDER, in his official capacity as a member of 
the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; and REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in her official 
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, AND THE PARTIES' 
ATTORNEYS, Steven L. Olsen, Michael S. Gilmore, Shasta Kilminster-Hadley, Scott Zanzig, 
Civil Litigation Division, Office of the Attorney General, 954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor, 
Boise, Idaho 83702; Cally A. Younger, Counsel to the Governor, Office of the Governor, Idaho 
State Capitol Building, 700 West Jefferson Street, Boise, Idaho 83702; and Daniel J. Skinner, 
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP, P.O. Box 359, Boise, Idaho 83701, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. The above-named appellants, TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI 
!Vf ORLEY, and JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the JUDGMENT, 
entered January 21, 2016, the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTIN9 
MOTION TO DISMISS, entered January 20, 2016, and the ORDER GOVERNING 
DISCOVERY, entered October 20, 2015, Honorable Judge Samuel A. Hoagland. 
2. , That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l) 
and (2), Idaho Appellate Rules ("1.A.R."). 
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3. ! A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the appellants intend to assert in 
the appeal is as follows: 
(a) Did the District Court err in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss? 
(b) Did the District Court err in granting the defendants' objection and motion to 
strike? 
( c) Did the District Court err in granting, in part, the defendants' motion for 
protective order staying discovery pending decision on motion to dismiss? 
Provided, this list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants from asserting other 
issues on appeal. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in [] hard copy [] electronic format [x] both: 
(i) Status Conference, 8/26/2015 
(ii) Hearing on defendants' motion for protective order, 10/16/2015 
(iii) Hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss, 12/16/2015 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
(a) Affidavit of Jeremy Payne, filed 6/17/2015 
(b) Affidavit of Naomi Morley, filed 6/17/2015 
(c) Affidavit of Jason Sharp, filed 6/17/2015 
(d) Affidavit of Tracy Tucker, filed 6/17/2015 
(e) First Affidavit of Richard Eppink, filed 6/17/2015 
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(f) Motion to Dismiss, filed 7/8/2015 
(g) Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed 7/8/2015 
(h) Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to 
Dismiss, filed 8/21/2015 
(i) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order, filed 8/21/2015 
U) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, filed 9/11/2015 
(k) Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, 
filed 9/11/2015 
(1) Order Governing Discovery, entered 10/20/2015 
(m) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 11/24/2015 
(n) Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink, filed 11/24/2015 
(o) Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
filed 12/4/2015 
(p) Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, filed 12/4/2015 
(q) Response to Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, filed 12/9/2015 
(r) Reply in Support of Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, 12/14/2015 
7. The appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. (None.) 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter on whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and Address: Christy Olesek, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702. 
(b) That the reporter on whom transcripts have been requested has been contacted to 
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request the estimated fee for transcript preparation and that the clerk of the district court will be 
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript promptly after the estimated fee 
is provided to me. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2016. 
Richard Eppink 
ACLU OF IDAHO FOUNDATION 
Jason D. Williamson 
ACLU FOUNDATION 
Andrew C. Lillie 
Kathryn M. Ali 
Brooks M. Hanner 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
000507
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of January, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to each of 
the following: 
Steven L. Olsen 
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov 
Michael S. Gilmore 
mike. gilmore@ag.idaho.gov 
Shasta Kilminster-Hadley 
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov 
Scott Zanzig 
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov 
Civil Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Cally A. Younger 
call y .younger@gov .idaho. gov 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
Idaho State Capitol Building 
700 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Daniel J. Skinner 
cantrill@cssklaw.com 
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Christy Olesek 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
(208) 334-2616 
MAR 2 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KELLE WEGENER 
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NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 113 PAGES LODGED 
No. 43922 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Ada. 
Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Court Judge 
16 This transcript contains: 
8-26-15: Status Conference 
17 10-16-15: ·Motion for Protective Order 
12-16-15: Motion to Dismiss 
18 
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Date: March 18, 2016 
20 
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24 
25 
Christine Anne Olesek, RPR 
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------------------------L--------------------Christine Anne Olesek, Official Court Reporter 
Official Court Reporter, 
Judge Samuel A. Hoagland 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. SRL-1044 
Registered Professional Reporter 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI 
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in 
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON. 
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ, 
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, 
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and 
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities 
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Supreme Court Case No. 43922 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 23rd day of March, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
RICHARD EPPINK 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
MAR 2 3 2016 
Date of Service: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TRACY J'UCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI 
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalfof 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in 
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON. 
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ, 
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, 
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and 
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities 
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense 
Commission, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Supreme Court Case No. 43922 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
25th day of January, 2016. 
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